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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the instability of a financial system by taking a specific 
country’s example with the Indonesian financial system as a case study. To achieve 
its objectives, this research study aims to answer the following questions: 
(1) Are there any factors that contribute to financial instability? 
(2) How is the state of the financial system? 
(3) Are the policies available effective at dealing with financial instability, in particular 
external instability?  
To answer these questions, this study discusses the Financial Instability Hypothesis, 
employs different time series techniques, explores the relationships between relevant 
variables and investigates specific events within the observation period. First, this 
thesis examines the arguments of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and applies 
them to the implementation of Indonesian financial reforms. By modifying IMF’s 
financial liberalisation index and using it as one of the control variables, this thesis 
finds that financial liberalisation has a positive association with the volatility of the 
exchange rate.  
Second, this thesis develops the measurement of financial instability and investigates 
the potential for it to become an instrument for the detection of the country’s fragility 
condition. In developing these instruments, this study takes two different approaches 
into consideration, namely the ‘static’ and the ‘dynamic’ approaches. The former 
argues that the cause of financial instability is an exogenous process or a random 
shock. The construction of the instrument has the main purposes of predicting the 
occurrence of a financial crisis and measuring the instability of a financial system. 
Whereas, the latter assumes that financial instability is an endogenous process. In 
constructing the instrument, it has the objective of detecting the condition of a 
financial system. This study applies the financial instability measurements in 
Indonesian’s case and compares their performances with respect to crisis prediction.  
Third, this study investigates policies to handle the capital flows. It explores the 
implementation of policies to handle and manage the capital flows. Based on the 
empirical analysis, this study finds that the capital management policies fulfill its 
objectives in managing capital flows. Besides, this thesis examines the 
implementation of the compensation thesis and finds that this mechanism applies to 
Indonesia. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.01 The research background and motivations 
Financial fragility, financial instability, and financial crisis are three different concepts 
with differing levels of severity for the economy, but they all have one thing in 
common, which is that no country wants to experience them. It has been argued that 
the first two may cause the third. This means that a country, and in particular, its 
government and policy makers, must focus their attention on the first two concepts 
without ignoring the other. Financial crisis has a negative impact on the country, for 
example, the collapse of economic output, rising unemployment, increasing 
government debt, and drops in equity prices (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). However, 
one important thing is still missing. Most economists struggle to both define the 
concept and explain the mechanism of instability, and there is still little agreement on 
how to define and explain the aforementioned concepts (Schinasi, 2006; Creel et al., 
2015).   
Economists have investigated the causes and mechanisms of financial crises in the 
search for understanding their occurrence. Financial crisis models have been 
developed to explain the mechanisms, factors that trigger the crises, and possible 
actions that can be taken to strengthen or restore the financial system to its original 
state. There are at least three types of models that provide an explanation for the 
occurrence of a financial crisis. The first-generation model assumes the existence of 
a fiscal deficit policy under the fixed exchange rate regime. This model (Krugman, 
1979; Flood and Garber, 1984) emphasises the need to prioritize the implementation 
of prudential macroeconomic policies and to maintain a country’s economic 
fundamentals, which are macroeconomic conditions that demonstrate the country’s 
performance. The second-generation model explains the occurrence of a crisis as a 
consequence of government decisions to defend the value of its currency, and the 
impact that this has on the economic fundamentals of speculative behaviour 
(Eichengreen et al., 1995; Obstfeld, 1994). The third-generation model (Krugman, 
1999; Burnside et al. 2007) emphasises the role of the private sector in triggering the 
crisis. Within the third-generation model, there are various explanations of crisis 
offered. For example, the crisis is triggered by herding behaviour and asymmetric 
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information that creates an adverse selection1 and moral hazard2 (Mishkin, 1992 and 
1999a). Krugman (1999) argued that balance sheets problems and the 
mismanagement of the private sectors’ obligations are what triggers the crisis. Also, 
some economists (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Calvo and Reinhart, 1999; among others) 
have underlined the contagion effect in triggering the financial crisis. 
Hyman Minsky advanced the concept of the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) 
and showed the ways by which a financial system becomes prone to experiencing 
an episode of financial crisis. Minsky (1986 and 1992) explained the mechanism of a 
modern financial system that has conceived a tendency towards fragility and 
instability, even under normal conditions, which is triggered by the needs for profit 
accumulation and expansion. The FIH has been used to explain the Southeast Asian 
crisis and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Within the FIH, there are two types of 
financial instability, namely internal and external instability. With reference to Vercelli 
(2001) and Tymoigne (2010), internal instability discusses the structural change of 
an economy to become unstable especially when the economic agents tend to use 
external funding to fulfil their previous debt obligations. External instability can be 
described as when the domestic financial system faces a large and volatile 
movement in the capital flows and exchange rate. This condition is possible as 
foreign investors have an increasing role in the domestic financial system 
(Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2015). 
Some economists (Bordo et al., 2002; Bordo, 2006; Tymoigne, 2010) argue that 
starting from the 1980s, crises occur more frequently; even though, the impact of the 
crises do not appear to have become more severe (Bordo et al., 2002). Efforts have 
been made by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) to measure the country’s level of 
fragility and subsequent likelihood of experiencing a crisis by developing early 
warning indicators (EWI). The authors expected that by constructing an instrument 
                                                
1 Herding behaviour is the tendency of financial market investors in following other investors’ decision 
without considering any significant new information (Banerjee, 1992). In a similar vein, Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (1999) explained that herding behaviour in a stock market occurs when investors 
rely on stock market indices as the only consideration in making a decision without considering 
other relevant indicators.  
2 Mishkin (1999b) defined asymmetric information as a condition when an entity that involves in a 
transaction has a better information than another one. According to Mishkin (1992 and 1999a) the 
problem of asymmetric information would create adverse selection and moral hazard. Mishkin 
explained that adverse selection is a problem when one party decides to make an agreement or 
business transaction with the ones who will unexpectedly produce an undesirable outcome. 
Whereas, moral hazard is a problem when a party that enters a transaction engages in an 
undesirable activity with the risk being borne by another party.  
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to predict the level and timing of a financial crisis (Tymoigne, 2010), it could enable 
the authorities to take the necessary actions to prevent the aforementioned crisis. 
Some studies (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Drehmann et al., 2011; Drehmann and 
Juselius, 2014; Lang, 2013) have developed and refined the EWI as a method of 
signalling an upcoming financial crisis. Initiated by Bordo et al. (2002), there are 
economists (Illing and Liu, 2006; Cardarelli et al., 2009; Hollo et al., 2012; Louzis and 
Vouldis, 2013) who have also constructed a financial instability index that is meant to 
predict a crisis occurrence and measure the financial market’s conditions. They 
developed this index based on several financial market indicators, and most of them 
use high-frequency data. There are various data that are used in developing this 
index such as the volatility of exchange rate, the volatility of stock index, the 
movement of daily bonds yield, and so on. Based on their arguments, high-frequency 
data is necessary for this analysis, especially to enhance the accuracy of the index 
in capturing the financial market’s conditions. Hence, it is expected that the index will 
provide sufficient information on the financial market’s conditions for the authorities3. 
The measurement should be able to capture the dynamic movements of the financial 
markets. To this end, most of the indices have been built on weekly or monthly data.  
In understanding the conditions of a financial system, the FIH underlines the 
importance of exploring the private sector’s balance sheets since they can explain 
the period of fragility, especially when the companies’ balance sheets and their ratio 
of financial indicators have worsened (Lavoie, 2014, p. 253). The balance sheet 
shows that the operation is balanced, which suggests that a change on the asset side 
corresponds to a change on the liability side. From its structure, the balance sheet 
contains both assets and liabilities, which includes the company’s net worth. The 
balance sheet may provide the necessary information about the evolution of the 
company’s performance when it is compared with the previous ones. Additionally, it 
is also beneficial when one tries to trace the balance sheets’ component and 
compares this component with those of other companies’. The result can present the 
interconnections that can be found amongst economic agents. One indicator that can 
be obtained from the balance sheets and that shows the state of instability is the 
debt-to-equity ratio. The movements of this ratio can provide a description on the 
                                                
3 The authorities in this study refer to the Central Bank as the monetary authority and the government 
as the fiscal authority. In some countries, there is another unit to oversight and regulate the 
financial sector, a financial services authority. 
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behaviour of the economic agents in the domestic financial system. When the ratio 
increases, the financial system tends to incline towards instability. 
In dealing with external instability, the Financial Instability Hypothesis starts the 
analysis by focusing on the country’s degree of openness. The existence of capital 
movements among countries may facilitate foreign investors’ decisions to maximize 
their profits through a carry-trade mechanism (Arestis and Glickman, 2002). This 
phenomenon occurs particularly when the domestic interest rate is higher than the 
foreign interest rate, which may attract foreign funds into the domestic financial 
system. The capital inflows, however, may create another problem such as when 
these flows take on the form of portfolio investments. Hence, there will be a need to 
construct a strategy to strengthen the financial system by mitigating against the 
perceived risks and lessening the impact of the financial crisis (Grabel, 2005, p.357-
360).  
This research has investigated financial instability in the case of a particular 
developing country, specifically Indonesia. Like many other developing countries, 
Indonesia faces challenges in dealing with financial instability. In 1997-1998, a 
financial crisis hit the country leading to a negative growth rate of 13% in 1998 
(Kurniati and Yanfitri, 2010), the deepest currency depreciation when compared to 
other crisis-hit countries when it reached 231%, and the falling of the stock index by 
80% (Martinez, 1998 cited in Arestis and Glickman, 2002). During the GFC, 
Indonesia also encountered a problem handling capital flows that threatened the 
domestic economy. Theoretically, there are some measures that could have been 
implemented in dealing with the financial instability as proposed by Grabel (2006, p. 
364), such as the use of an early warning signal and crisis prevention instruments, 
the management of capital flows, and foreign exchange management.  
1.02 The objective of study 
This research has the main objective of investigating financial instability in the 
Indonesian financial system. The financial sector consists of the formal financial 
institutions that provide financial services, which consist of the banking sector, 
insurance companies, investment funds and so on. A few time series analytical tools 
have been used, with the 1990s up until 2015 as the observation period. To obtain a 
clear answer to the research questions, this study has specifically divided the main 
objective into several aspects, which consist of:  
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i. The investigation of the factors that contribute to financial instability. This 
objective includes the examination of the implementation of Indonesian financial 
reforms and how the reforms have impacted on the financial system and the 
economy.  
ii. An assessment of Indonesia’s financial instability and the ways to measure it; 
and  
iii. An investigation of the policies for dealing with financial instability, and in this 
particular case, external instability.  
Most of the discussion applies to two different frameworks, namely the mainstream 
views and the FIH. By presenting two competing frameworks, it is expected that this 
study may find the better framework for addressing financial fragility and instability in 
Indonesia. 
The research questions that will be explored in this study are:  
(1) Are there any factors that contribute to Indonesia’s financial instability? How do 
financial reforms affect the stability of the financial system and economic 
performance?  
(2) What is the state of the Indonesian financial system? Is there any instrument that 
can effectively predict the occurrence of a financial crisis? Is the domestic financial 
system in Indonesia becoming more unstable?  
(3) Are the policies that have been implemented by the authorities effective in 
handling and managing financial instability, in particular, external instability?  
1.03 Thesis contribution to the literature 
First, this study contributes to the literature by critically assessing the current 
theoretical frameworks in explaining the financial crisis mechanism using FIH and 
empirically developing new ideas by employing the Indonesian financial system as a 
case study. Secondly, the empirical chapters in this study employ higher frequency 
and the most current data. The higher frequency data (daily and monthly data) has 
been used in some of the analyses to get detailed information. Thirdly, this study has 
extended particular methodologies that, to the best of my knowledge, are the first 
attempt to carry out certain observations especially in the case of Indonesia, for 
example, the monthly financial liberalisation index (FLI), the daily financial instability 
composite index, and the financial fragility seismogram.    
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1.04 The structure of thesis 
Chapter 2 describes the phases of Indonesian financial liberalisation and details 
important events in relation to its financial reforms, including the occurrence of a 
financial crisis. This chapter presents three phases that stand out as significant 
periods in Indonesia’s financial system development and covers the period from the 
1960s to the presents. The first period is the 1960s-1970s, in which the government 
tried to stabilise its domestic economic system and developed the current financial 
architecture. The second period covered the period from the 1980s to the 1990s 
when the government adopted financial liberalisation. In this period, the financial 
crisis hit the country. The third period ranges from the early 2000s to the present; it 
covers the beginning of the country’s recovery period from the crisis, but then starting 
from the late 2000s, the domestic financial system struggled with fragile global 
economic conditions. This chronicle of financial reforms from the 1960s to the 2000s, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, will enrich the analysis provided in Chapters 5 to 11.  
Chapter 3 discusses the way in which each crisis generation model is developed and 
highlights the weakness of the models in explaining the crisis occurrence. The 
analysis highlights the features of the financial crisis under the mainstream 
perspective including the definition of financial crisis, the factors that triggered the 
financial crisis such as the weaknesses in the financial system and the liquidity 
problem in the banking sector, and the policies that should be taken on to handle the 
crisis.   
Chapter 4 focuses on the framework developed by Hyman Minsky with his FIH. In 
this chapter, the discussion starts with Minsky’s original framework, which is built 
using the closed-economy framework. This framework emphasized the argument for 
the disadvantages of a robust economic condition that goes on to become the source 
of fragility. Furthermore, this hypothesis also explored the importance of the 
economic agents’ behaviour in seeking profits. Arestis and Glickman (2002) 
expanded on this analysis to include the open-economy framework by exploring the 
existence of capital mobility among countries.  
Chapter 5 tries to address the first research question and examines the concept of 
financial liberalisation and its impact on the economy. To provide a detailed analysis, 
this chapter endeavours to construct a monthly FLI. This chapter undertakes an 
empirical analysis that examines the association between the control variables, such 
as the FLI, several macro-economic indicators and the response variables. This study 
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found that the implementation of financial liberalisation has a contribution towards 
increasing the volatility of the exchange rate and has a detrimental effect on 
economic performance.  
Chapter 6 outlines the attempts to measure the level of instability by developing the 
so-called EWI as an instrument to predict crisis occurrences. The results will be 
looked at in the case of Indonesia. This study found some weaknesses in this 
method, for example, it cannot fully be utilized as an ex-ante financial instability 
measurement since the quality of the crisis episode prediction is low. Nevertheless, 
this method is useful for evaluating (ex-post) the patterns and behaviour of some of 
the economic variables which may trigger crisis occurrences.  
Chapter 7 expands on the analysis that had been undertaken in Chapter 6, by 
exploring the methodology for constructing the financial instability index as another 
instrument to predict crisis occurrences. Based on the current development of the 
financial instability index, this study developed the index involving the financial 
system components and focused on two methods. These methods are the principal 
component analysis (PCA) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF). These two 
methods currently receive attention from many developed countries, especially in the 
European Union (EU) and North America. The construction of these indices is 
another contribution to the literature in the case of Indonesia, since it is considering 
to be developing a formal measurement method for domestic use.  
Chapter 8 discusses financial fragility using a simple balance sheet framework by 
highlighting the interconnections of the six economic agents, namely the government, 
the Central Bank, commercial or private banks, the private sector, households and 
the foreign sector. This study found that increased outstanding debts, both at a 
country level and an individual level, potentially created a problem because it affects 
lenders’ or investors’ views and their assessment of the borrowers. The findings 
support Minsky’s FIH, in that during the tranquil period, firms tend to increase their 
external financing, but when this optimism changes to pessimism, the financial 
system will suffer from a crisis episode. This chapter develops the financial fragility 
measurement based on the FIH and applies it to the Indonesian case in order to 
examine the structural changes and to assess the state of its financial system. The 
construction of the financial fragility seismogram is another contribution to the 
literature, especially in the case of Indonesia. 
Chapter 9 explores the phenomenon of capital flight from the domestic financial 
market. This chapter employs two methods in computing capital flight, namely the 
8 
 
residual and adjusted-residual methods. There is one aspect in the adjusted-residual 
method to consider, which is the value of trade misinvoicing. Based on the results of 
trade misinvoicing, it suggests that there are motives on the end of either the 
exporters or importers to maximize their profits by becoming involving in the practise 
of misinvoicing. This study found that the capital flight over the period of the 1980s–
1990s was positive. When the crisis erupted in 1997, the capital flight figure became 
negative. This negative value implies that there are more illicit inflows than illicit 
outflows during a crisis period. 
Chapter 10 evaluates and explores the implementation of capital flows management 
in Indonesia. This chapter focuses on the policy options that are used by the 
authorities in dealing with capital flows. In the case of Indonesia, there are two such 
policies; the exchange rate management policy and the implementation of the 
minimum holding period. By examining the two dependent variables, consisting of 
the exchange rate volatility and the return on the stock market, this study found that 
the implementation of these policies, to some extent, was effective. There is a reason 
that may explain the weak impact of the implementation of the minimum holding 
period to curb the exchange rate volatility, which is caused by investors’ decision to 
shift their investments to another risk-free financial asset.  
In the Central Banks’ daily operations, there is a mechanism named sterilization. 
Commonly, this term is understood as the Central Bank’s policy to sell and buy 
securities to manage the money supply. In connection with the discussion on the 
Central Bank’s balance sheets in Chapter 8, Chapter 11 examines the sterilization 
mechanism further. Under the mainstream view, Central Bank can affect the stock of 
base money. This view rests on the assumption of supply-led money creation in that 
the monetary authority has the power of setting the monetary base. The empirical 
results do not agree with the assumption since there is no positive relationship 
between foreign assets and the bank’s reserve of money. This chapter has also 
provided another contribution to the literature, since no analysis has previously been 
undertaken on this issue involving the Indonesian Central Bank. 
Chapter 12 presents the overall conclusions of the policy implications and has 
summarised the contributions to the literature of this study. 
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Chapter 2  
Building a modern but fragile financial system 
2.01 Introduction 
The process of financial reforms in most of the developing countries began in the 
1980s (World Bank, 2005, p.207), and it was undertaken with reference to the 
financial liberalisation framework. McKinnon (1973) emphasised the importance of 
financial liberalisation for its potential ability to boost savings, which will become the 
fuel for investment and economic growth. There are two types of liberalisation that 
are applied in the financial system: internal and external liberalisation (Ghosh, 2005). 
According to Ghosh (2005), domestic or internal liberalisation covers the policies of 
removing the government control over the interest rate, reforming the financial 
system to minimise government ownership in the development banks, and reducing 
government intervention in credit programmes. On the other hand, external 
liberalisation covers the policies for imposing trade liberalisation and liberalising the 
capital flows management. To implement financial liberalisation, a country should 
transform itself from financial repression4 into a market-led economy through two 
major steps to ensure smooth economic reform and transformation. Johnston et al. 
(1997) and James and Stephenson (2002, pp.25-43) explained that the steps of 
financial reforms consist of stabilisation stage and structural adjustment programme. 
The first refers to a policy intended to stabilise the financial system and economic 
indicators. This can be done by controlling the level of inflation and managing the 
imbalances in foreign obligations by keeping government deficit low. The structural 
adjustment programme is a process involving deregulation policies to create a free 
market environment that consists of liberalisation policies in trade and flows of capital.  
The need to apply these steps in sequence is based on the view that the stabilisation 
process is fundamental for the implementation of a long-term structural adjustment 
programme (Edwards, 1984, Johnston et al., 1997). One argument that supports this 
view hinges on the importance of stabilisation in assuring the implementation of a 
structural adjustment that involves a series of policies. According to Mathieson 
                                                
4 Referring to Arestis and Caner (2004) and Ryan-Collins (2015), financial repression is policies to 
achieve a lower debt to GDP ratio and reduce the inflation rate by controlling the low level of 
interest rate, imposing high reserve requirements and implementing credit programmes to certain 
sectors. 
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(1980), a stabilisation policy helps a country to integrate monetary and fiscal policies 
so that these policies pursue consistent targets. Furthermore, Mathieson (1980) 
provided the following example to emphasise the need for stabilisation process. 
When a government adopts financial liberalisation, the implementation of policy to 
maintain an interest rate ceiling will be abolished, which may lead to the increasing 
of lending and deposit rate. In the short run, this decision may have a negative impact 
on non-bank corporations that borrow from commercial banks since their debt 
obligations will increase. In contrast, commercial banks may also face a problem to 
pay its depositors with the new deposit rate, especially when their long-term financial 
assets have returns that reflect the old interest rate. Thus, there is a high possibility 
of bankruptcy in the financial system that requires government’s response.  
Within the structural adjustment programme, there are important policies to put into 
practice to ensure liberalisation in financial sectors within a country by minimising the 
government’s involvement; while, maximising the private sector’s participation. To 
implement the structural adjustment programme, the government can implement 
trade liberalisation, which is crucial to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic 
products and to avoid the adverse effects of capital inflows in exchange rate 
appreciation (McKinnon, 1973, pp.160-161; James and Stephenson, 2002, pp.25-
43). The reforms that were taken in Indonesia did not fully follow the previously-
mentioned steps. However, in a deviation from the common practice, the 
implementation of capital account liberalisation in Indonesia take place in the late 
1960s (Cole and Slade, 1996; Johnston, 1998), long before the implementation of 
trade liberalisation and structural adjustment policies.   
By implementing financial liberalisation, a country is supposed to experience a better 
economic performance, including: increased economic growth, saving rate and 
financial deepening, as well as improved resource allocation. Nevertheless, the 
previously mentioned positive impacts may raise questions as some countries have 
different outcomes. One example of these adverse effects is the tendency of some 
countries that adopted financial liberalisation to experience financial crises 
(Williamson and Mahar, 1998, pp.37–52).  In addition, Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999) 
argued that financial liberalisation has a negative effect on some countries, which 
causes them to be open to financial crisis as liberalisation allows the transmission of 
the adverse conditions across countries via capital mobility. 
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The rest of this chapter will discuss the sequence of Indonesian financial reforms. 
Thereby, this chapter describes the progress by distinguishing three periods of reform 
and discussing the policies and events in chronological order. 
2.02 The phases of Indonesian financial liberalisation 
In general, as provided in Figure 2.1, there are three phases that stand out as 
significant periods in Indonesia’s financial system development that cover more than 
twenty years. The first phase covered the 1960s and 1970s, the period in which the 
government tried to stabilise and develop its domestic economic system and financial 
architecture. In this phase, there were policies in the implementation of external 
liberalisation with regards to the management of capital flows and exchange rate.  
Figure 2.1 The sequence of Indonesian financial reforms 
Source: Own construction based on Cole and Slade, 1996; Johnston, 1998; Bank 
Indonesia, 2014b; and Nasution, 2015.  
Note: (i) JSX stands for Jakarta Stock Exchange. In 2007, JSX changed its name to become 
Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) after merging with Surabaya Stock Exchange (SSX). (ii) 
IDR is the Indonesian Rupiah; it is the official currency of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
The second phase covered the 1980s and 1990s when full financial liberalisation was 
adopted. In this period, most of the policies with regards to domestic or internal 
liberalisation were implemented. The domestic liberalisation covered some policies, 
such as the elimination of credit ceiling and interest rate control in 1983, and the 
deregulation of the banking sector and financial market in 1988. During this period, 
there was a regulation to abolish government controls on bank lending, followed by 
another phase of liberalisation when the government passed regulations in the area 
of banking and finance. Additionally, one example of external liberalisation policies 
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during this period was the elimination of the foreign ownership restrictions in the 
domestic financial market. The implementation of these policies in connection with 
financial liberalisation has brought far–reaching consequences, not only in the area 
of regulation but also in institutional arrangements. However, in this period, Indonesia 
experienced a financial crisis in 1997/1998. After the implementation of financial 
liberalisation, the role of the fiscal and monetary authorities was also transformed into 
two different recognised structures. Firstly, in the period before 1999, the government 
controlled the monetary authority. In this period, there was a monetary board led by 
Minister of Finance and the Central Bank’s Governor was one of its members. This 
board would discuss the monetary policies that would be taken. Secondly, in the 
period of 1999 up until the present, the Central Bank as the monetary authority 
becomes independent.  
The third phase ranged from the 2000s to the present when the recovery from the 
financial crisis began, but the domestic financial system continues to struggle with 
fragile global economic conditions. This long, painstaking process has encountered 
many challenges, for example, the unforgettable experience of coping with the 
financial crisis in 1997/1998; the impact of which was felt for more than five years 
afterwards.  The IMF and the World Bank provided their assistance in the various 
stages of Indonesian reforms (the 1960s–1980s). 
2.03 The period of the 1960s and 1970s 
The transformation of Indonesia’s financial system commenced in 1966 when 
hyperinflation surged through the country at about 600% per annum (Cole and Slade, 
1996, p.16). This hyperinflation was an impact of the government’s decision to force 
the Central Bank to print money during 1965–1966 for financing government 
expenditures since the fiscal and monetary policies were under the control of the 
President. The Central Bank, as the monetary authority, functioned merely as the 
government’s cash machine to print money for funding government expenditures. 
This condition changed with the Central Bank law legislation in 1968 that assured the 
status of the Central Bank in dealing with monetary policy and banking regulations 
under the coordination of the so-called Monetary Board. This structure left the Central 
Bank with a new role that, far from being responsible for the main source of budget 
deficit financing, allowed the Central Bank to become more focused on conducting 
monetary policy. Within this framework, every substantial decision to be implemented 
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had to be discussed by the Monetary Board and reported to the President; this 
practice has been rendered obsolete by the Central Bank Law, passed in 1999. 
With the assistance of the IMF and a group of donor countries, by the end of 1966, 
the government of Indonesia began to adopt stabilisation policy. The main objective 
of this policy was to improve the domestic economic condition. The efforts were 
packaged into a programme of drastic fiscal retrenchment to reduce the budget 
deficit, minimise the Central Bank credit to the government and quasi-government 
companies, and devalue the domestic currency (Cole and Slade, 1996, p.16). In the 
following years, the government maintained this programme and focused on inflation 
control. Taking into account the stable and improved economic performance, the 
government sought external funds by dismissing the capital control and so opened 
the country to financial flows from abroad (Cole and Slade, 1996, p. 17; Matsumoto, 
2007, p.7).   
In the late 1960s, with a strong intention to avoid a recurrence of high inflation, the 
government emphasised the need for some programme priorities to support civil 
society in the agricultural sector, foodstuffs price stabilisation, and investment5. The 
substantial programmes that were introduced from 1968 were a credit programme 
for the stabilization of foodstuffs through subsidizing credit for the government 
agency, the so-called National Logistic Agency, to finance its activities in procuring 
the rise crop, a staple food intensification programme to finance farmers in obtaining 
the inputs for production, and investment credit to finance small-scale industries 
(Cole and Slade, 1996, p.41).  The distribution of the credit programme for the 
National Logistic Agency was run and administered by the Central Bank directly. This 
task was in line with one of the Central Bank’s responsibilities of participating in the 
development as stipulated by the law governing the Central Bank. For the other credit 
programmes, the state-owned banks took the main role in distributing the funds to 
the beneficiaries as (Cole and Slade, 1996, pp.83–89).  
                                                
5 The credit programmes aimed to help sector priorities in having a better access for financing and 
encourage domestic economic activities. Three types of credit were prepared in pursuing these 
purposes, such as (Cole and Slade, 1996, pp.83–88): (i) the foodstuffs stabilization programme. 
The foodstuffs prices were very volatile, they were low during harvest and high in the cultivating 
season; (ii) The rice intensification programme, labelled Bimas – a kind of green revolution to boost 
the rice production. The credit was allocated to the farmers to purchase their basic production 
inputs, such as seeds, fertilizer, equipment, machinery, etc. (iii) Investment credit, called Kredit 
investasi, was addressed to domestic small and medium enterprises to facilitate access to the 
banking sector with a soft loan for enhancing production capacity by improving equipment and 
machinery 
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A policy that was imposed by the government with regard to the implementation of 
external liberalisation was the removal of control of capital flows and the unification 
of exchange rate. This policy package was enacted on April 1970 by eliminating the 
government control of capital flows and dual exchange markets6. This policy was in 
line with the IMF suggestion to apply the unified exchange rate management.  
During the 1970s, Indonesia benefitted from relatively high international oil prices, 
and the oil revenues became a source of finance for the government budget. In this 
period, the revenue from oil and gas exports contributed more than 27% of the total 
government revenues (Ministry of Finance, 1991, p.28). With the plentiful funds from 
oil revenues, in the 1970s, the government introduced a balanced budget policy 
(Stern, 2003). This policy had several objectives. Firstly, it intended to minimise the 
amount of foreign borrowing; secondly, it was meant to show the fiscal authority’s 
intention to support the monetary policy in maintaining a low inflation rate. In this 
context, the balanced-budget is a principle that was used to help the government 
keep its expenditure under control by allocating the funds to the priority expenses or 
projects (Stern, 2003). However, it appeared that the government faced a dilemma: 
on the one hand, it intended to have a balanced-budget; on the other hand, it needed 
to accelerate the development of high-profile projects. As a result, the objective of a 
balanced budget has never been achieved since the government invited the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank and some bilateral supports to finance several high-
profile projects. The disbursement of foreign financing from these international 
financial institutions and the bilateral cooperation was equal to the budget deficit 
(Kartasasmita, 2001). 
In the period of 1970s, interest rates were maintained at relatively low levels, and this 
policy led to the negative real interest rates (Cole and Slide, 1996, p.45). In turn, this 
condition may have discouraged people from saving in the banking sector. Monetary 
policy was conducted in a so-called financial repression regime, with a combination 
of government directed interest rates on bank deposits, a ceiling on bank lending that 
was allocated as a percentage of total bank credit, and the implementation of a fixed 
exchange rate regime.  
                                                
6 Previously there were dual foreign exchange rate markets that were called as ‘Bonus Ekspor’ (BE) 
and Devisa Pelengkap (DP). The first one (BE) is the exchange rate that could be used to import 
goods that are included in the commodity import programme list. The second one (DP) is the rate 
for any transactions including import of goods that were on the BE list (Cole and Slade, 1996, pp. 
42-43).  
15 
 
The existence of the capital market in Indonesia started back in 1912 when a small 
stock exchange was established during the Dutch colonial period, but its 
development could not be sustained as World Wars I and II intervened. The idea to 
rebuild the capital market began at the end of the 1960s in line with the government 
policy to open the capital account initiated through a series of high-level discussions 
involving the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. However, the operations of 
the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) formally started in August 1977 with only one 
listed company. For at least three years there was no substantial progress in its scale 
of transactions; even though, the government, operating through the Ministry of 
Finance tried to offer incentives for every company that wanted to make a public 
offering. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the stock market remained undeveloped and found 
difficulties in expanding its market capitalization. The reasons behind this 
phenomenon can be listed as (i) there were no advantages to stock market quotation 
that benefitted the companies; (ii) the government was reluctant to let the state-
owned enterprises be privatised; (iii) few companies issued bonds since the 
government bonds market had not developed yet making it difficult for bond issuers  
to determine the interest rate benchmark; (iv) high liquidity in the financial market, 
during the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s, stimulated households and 
companies to choose financing sources from the banking sector rather than the stock 
exchange, and (v) non-residents were not allowed to participate directly in the equity 
market (Cole and Slide, 1996, pp. 157–159). 
2.04 The period of the 1980s and the 1990s 
The continuing increase in oil prices combined with a relatively stable nominal 
exchange rate created ample foreign exchange funds. Cole and Slade (1996, pp.16 
–19) argued that these conditions increased domestic spending, which then brought 
inflationary pressures. In response to this, the government took measures by, for 
example, devaluing the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) against USD from IDR415 to 
IDR625 in November 1978. With this 50% devaluation, the government intended to 
encourage the domestic producers of tradable goods to enter the global market 
(Nitisastro, 2011, pp.196-197). In fact, this policy resulted in another dose of high 
inflation rates at the beginning of 1979.   
An unexpected event occurred at the beginning of 1980 when global conditions 
changed drastically, and oil prices declined sharply (Cole and Slide, 1996, pp.21–
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22). In 1982, an unpredicted predicament arose when the government of Indonesia 
faced a decrease in oil prices. With oil sector has been the main source of funds to 
finance its budget, this event encouraged the government to rethink its policy for 
sustaining the fiscal and macroeconomic performance. In 1983, the government took 
a major step in transforming the Indonesian financial system.  It introduced policies 
that covered at least three areas: firstly, in the monetary area, it decided for the 
second time in five years to devalue the IDR against the USD. This devaluation had 
a similar intention to the previous devaluation that was taken place in 1978, chiefly to 
boost exports and discourage imports. Secondly, in the fiscal area, the policy went 
back to the retrenchment of budget and maintaining the balance budget policy 
through managing routine government expenditure and cutting back expenditure on 
big or high-profile investment projects. This policy was accompanied by tax reform in 
order to boost tax revenue in maintaining the budget sustainability and responding to 
the continuous decline in oil prices. Thirdly, there was a policy in the financial sector 
to abolish the private banks’ credit ceiling and the state-owned banks’ deposit rate 
ceiling. Together with these policies, the government also made some important 
decisions concerning the elimination of interest rate control and the reduction of 
directed credit on some predetermined government programmes. These policies 
were considered a substantial step in implementing financial liberalisation with strong 
support from the IMF. 
With the decline of government revenue from the exports of oil and gas, the 
government introduced the policy to support non-oil export industries (Iqbal and 
James, 2002, p. 5). In so doing, the government undertook the measures to improve 
the domestic non-oil exporters’ competitiveness and diversify the export products by 
facilitating new exporter companies exporting their products. The policy package that 
had been imposed by the government in October 1988 was the deregulation of the 
banking sector to provide domestic companies with access to credit. The purpose of 
this policy is to encourage the growth of the banking sector through the simplification 
of the procedure for opening new banks and their branches and changing in the 
control of bank borrowing and lending rates. Besides, this policy is to enable society 
to access financing sources and increase the rate of investments. By opening access 
to all parties, the level of investments will increase, which then have an impact on 
increasing economic growth. The government also allowed the private sector and the 
banking sector to borrow from abroad. Within this year, there was deregulation that 
permitted non-residents to purchase the shares of several joint ventures companies. 
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As a result of the October 1988 banking sector policy package, the number of banks 
grew rapidly from around 106 banks in 1989 to 240 banks at the beginning of 1995.  
By the end of the 1980s, the reform also took place in the capital market, which 
covered the privatisation of the JSX and improvement in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in supervising the stock exchange companies. In addition to this policy 
package, there was a policy to give a more opportunity for non-resident to purchase 
companies’ shares up to 49%, but excluding banking sector shares (Cole and Slide, 
1996, pp. 162 and 165). This policy was followed by another regulation that provided 
some incentives for the listed companies and all eligible companies to go public. The 
decision to stimulate the development of the stock market was considered urgent, 
and this became the government’s response to the need to find alternative sources 
of financing. Soon after the enactment of this policy, the numbers of quoted 
companies and stock market activities increased dramatically. In March 1989, 
following the implementation of this deregulation, the government launched a policy, 
which was meant to abolish the constraints on financial institutions - banks and non-
banks - obtaining foreign loans.  
With the elimination of the prohibition on foreign ownership, the flow of funds from 
the global financial market into Indonesia, channelled through both direct lending and 
the stock market increased significantly. The adoption of financial liberalisation 
boosted the domestic financial market, which had not happened before its 
implementation (Grabel, 1995). The increase in capital inflows at the beginning of the 
1990s became an important aspect for policy makers. On the one hand, it helped 
economic agents who looked for funds to finance their investments; on the other 
hand, it potentially created a problem, especially those that have a shorter maturity.  
In connection with the management of capital inflows, in 1991 the government also 
passed a Presidential Decree to establish an inter-department team to control foreign 
commercial borrowing. Under this Decree, the team had responsibilities to assess 
and endorse every proposal that was made by the state-owned enterprises or private 
companies affiliated with government projects. This team consisted of several 
ministers and the Central Bank governor under the leadership of the Coordinating 
Minister for Economic Affairs. The establishment of this team was triggered by two 
factors: (i) there were growing concerns about external borrowing, which had 
increased at the beginning of the 1990s; and (ii) the government’s intention to 
manage the foreign currency risk with regard to the repayment terms. This team set 
a ceiling on the amount of direct borrowing from foreign banks and banking sectors, 
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private companies and state-owned enterprises that had a project related to the 
government could engage in. While this team contributed to the control of state-
owned enterprises’ foreign borrowing, the Central Bank had a responsibility to control 
the banking sector’s external loans by requiring every bank to report the amount of 
the loan and its timing. Under this scheme, every bank would have a quota for making 
foreign borrowing.   
During the period 1992 to 1994, these regulations could handle the massive short-
term capital inflows, but, only for the general government debt, which covered the 
Central Bank, the public sector and quasi-government corporations, and not the total 
debt. It seems that the regulations were ineffective at dealing with the short-term 
foreign debts since the outstanding debt was still escalating. The problem centred on 
the behaviour of private companies in expanding their businesses using foreign 
external financing, which subsequently created their obligations to foreign banks 
were mounting in this period. Based on the data from the Bank for International 
Settlements, the Indonesian non-bank private sector’s obligations were 
USD12millions in 1990 and became USD28millions by 1995 and rising again to 
become USD36millions by 1996. The private sector was one area that was not 
covered by the two regulations mentioned above.    
2.05 The period of 1996 to 2000 
The major deregulation policies by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s facilitated domestic firms in finding an alternative source of financing. The 
external borrowing became one additional source of funds. Up until 1996, with the 
increasing expansion of firms, the external debt was increasing sharply (McLeod, 
1998, p. 33). Based on the annual data from World Development Indicator (WDI) 
from 1989 to 1996, the annual average of Indonesian external debt before 1989 was 
around USD 22,433million per year, but then it soared to become USD 93,382million 
per year.   
One of the reasons that attracted domestic firms into taking foreign loans was the 
relatively low cost of borrowing (Goeltom, 1995, pp. 10-11; Nasution, 1998). With the 
intention to maintain the inflation rate, the Monetary Board set higher interest rate. 
Following the implementation of the high-interest rate in the 1990s, private sector 
went to the global financial market to obtain the foreign borrowing that offered lower 
cost of funds.  As provided in Figure 2.2, the cost of a USD loan from foreign banks 
was lower than the average real domestic lending rate as offered by the domestic 
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banks. The spike in the effective cost of foreign borrowing in the third quarter of 1986 
occurred as a result of the devaluation policy of the Indonesian government on the 
IDR against USD from IDR 1,134 to IDR 1,664. Overall, the discrepancy between the 
domestic and foreign cost of borrowing contributed to the increase of the external 
debt. The increasing of the external borrowing exposed the corporations to currency 
risk, which could deteriorate their balance sheets, especially when the domestic 
exchange rate experienced a sharp and prolonged depreciation.  
Figure 2.2 Cost of foreign borrowing and domestic lending rate 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS–IMF 
Note: The figure on foreign loan’s effective cost of foreign borrowing is calculated 
from the LIBOR USD 6months rate minus the natural log of IDR to USD exchange 
rate. Following Goeltom (1995), this calculation employs the LIBOR rate, since this 
inter-bank rate is commonly used as a reference in most of the external loan’s cost 
of borrowing. Due to the lack of data on the forward exchange rate within this 
period, data on the change of IDR/USD is employed to represent the forward rate.  
The second reason that affected the increasing external borrowing was the 
implementation of pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands7, by setting the 
                                                
7  The classification of exchange rate in this study follows the IMF (2015, p.5) that differentiates the 
exchange rate regime into four categories:  
- the first is hard pegs comprising (1) exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender 
and (2) currency board arrangements;  
- the second is soft pegs that consist of (a) conventional pegged arrangements, (b) pegged 
exchange rates within horizontal bands, (c) crawling pegs, (d) stabilised arrangements, and 
(e) crawl-like arrangements;  
- the third is floating regimes in which the market determines the rate. This third category has 
two type of exchange rate arrangements: (a) floating and (b) free floating;  
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upper and lower bands. The pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands led to a 
relatively low rate of volatility in the exchange rate, which enabled the private sector 
to make deals with their foreign lenders. During 1986 to 1995, with relatively stable 
IDR to USD exchange rates and a lower interest rate, foreign borrowing was 
advantageous for borrowers. Since for quite a long period the value of the exchange 
rate was relatively predictable and stable, most of the private sectors left their 
external borrowings unhedged (Nasution, 1998; McLeod, 1998, p.37). According to 
Nasution (1998), this phenomenon brought the deterioration of the private sector’s 
balance sheets in the period of sharp depreciation of IDR against USD. The firms 
that faced a bad experience in the crisis period were those that had their revenues in 
local currency, but their debt obligations in foreign currency.  
Following the government policies to create the opportunities for foreign investors to 
invest in the domestic financial market, the stock market index records a significant 
increase between 1994 and the middle of 1997. McLeod (1998, p.33) showed the 
JCI achieved its highest level of 637 by the end of 1996, which was then followed by 
a positive movement in July 1997 when the index reached the level of 720. 
Furthermore, McLeod (McLeod, 1998, p.33) noted that foreign investors dominated 
stock market activity during this period. In this case, the foreign investors’ role has 
two different impacts: on the one hand, the stock market became more active, and 
there was a transfer of knowledge, which allowed the domestic investors to learn 
from the foreign investors. On the other hand, most foreign investors in a developing 
country’s stock market represent a potential problem, especially if their investment 
preferences shift against the domestic market and they chose to sell their ownership 
of the domestic financial assets.  
In 1997–1998, Indonesia experienced a financial crisis that devastated its economic, 
political and financial system. In the first week of July 1997, the Central Bank widened 
the intervention band to allow for greater flexibility in defending the value of IDR. 
Following the devaluation of Thai Baht in July 2nd, 1997, according to McLeod (1998, 
p. 37), the investors and the borrowers realised that the exchange rate risk was one 
important factor in dealing with external borrowing. This author underlined the role of 
the investors and borrowers in finding and buying foreign currency to protect 
themselves against the devaluation. With the decision to defend from a possible 
                                                
- the fourth is called as a residual category, which covers other managed exchange rate 
arrangements.  
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currency devaluation, however, the IDR exchange rate became under pressure, and 
the Central Bank shifted the exchange rate management from pegged exchange 
rates within horizontal bands to floating rate in the third quarter of 1997 (McLeod, 
1998, p.34; Sarwono, 2005).  
As a response to the economic turbulence in 1997, in the third quarter of 1997 the 
government reviewed its budget and postponed all expenditures (Muhammad, 2009, 
p.75; Abimanyu, 2009, p.124), except the ones that related to salaries. The 
postponement of government expenditure mainly focused on the high-profile projects 
that involved importing goods to lessen the pressure on the declining international 
reserves (Muhammad, 2009, p.75). However, this condition posed an additional 
problem for the companies that carried out government related projects. Even though 
the policy to review and postpone the government expenditures was revoked soon 
after it was realised that the problem was not in the government sector, a number of 
companies needed a longer period than was expected to recover from the impact of 
the budget postponement policy.  
In November 1997, with reference to the IMF assistance package, 16 commercial 
banks were closed by the government. Following this closure, the currency 
depreciated severely, and the stock market index declined sharply. To restore 
financial market confidence, the government, and the Central Bank took necessary 
actions by restructuring and taking over some commercial banks through its 
Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA). The task of IBRA included 
managing the non-performing loans so that the illiquidity problem could be solved 
(Nasution, 2015). At the same time, the government also developed the Indonesian 
Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) to facilitate the private sector coping with their 
external borrowing. As a result of the IDR depreciation, most corporations that had 
foreign currencies debt faced problems as their debt in terms of IDR rose significantly. 
While the companies’ income was mainly in IDR, the payment of their debt obligations 
was in foreign currency. With the help of INDRA, these corporations could negotiate 
to reschedule their debts with the lenders. 
Following the closure of 16 commercial banks in the fourth quarter of 1997, in 
December 1997 and January 1998 the value of IDR against USD experienced a huge 
depreciation and reached 500%. At the same time, the stock market index also 
plunged by 40%, from around 697 in January 1997 to 394 in January 1998. In this 
period, there was another policy that was imposed by the Central Bank with regards 
to the increasing of policy interest rate, which then gave impact on deposit and 
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lending rates. As the lending rate increased, the corporations and households that 
had borrowed suffer since their debt obligations were increased significantly. 
Table 2.1 Capital flows description (ratio of GDP) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS-IMF and Bank Indonesia 
 
Table 2.1 provides a description of capital that goes in and out of Indonesia in the 
form of a ratio of GDP. In the period of 1996–2000 this country faced a crisis and 
experienced outflows. Two types of flows that contribute to the outflows were portfolio 
investments and other investments. However, based on Table 2.1 there is no data of 
gross outflows on portfolio and other investments during 1980s-2000. It is suspected 
that during this period the portfolio investments and private sector investments may 
have had an even bigger proportion of the gross outflows but there is insufficient data 
on this (Titiheruw and Atje, 2008; Usman, 2009, p.48). The former Minister of Finance 
was concerned with this condition and tried to collect all the information starting from 
the 1980s, especially on the external debt figures (Usman, 2009, p.48). Without 
sufficient information, authorities face difficulties in responding or anticipating a crisis, 
as already was evidenced in 1997/1998. For this reason, this study deems it 
necessary to investigate this phenomenon. The discussion of the proposed 
framework will be explored further in Chapter 9.  
There are at least two milestones in the financial sector’s development in Indonesia 
between 1997 and 2000, which shows a substantial reform in this sector. These key 
developments were, firstly, the enactment of the Central Bank’s new law, which 
contained new structure and policy objectives for the monetary authority and the 
issuance of government securities in dealing with the banking crisis. By 1999, the 
Central Bank was awarded a mandate as an independent body, as stipulated in the 
new law. Its central position as the monetary authority was assured by this law as the 
law ensured the Bank supersede the function and existence of the Monetary Board. 
All 1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2010-2015
Gross inflows 0.032 0.004 0.019 -0.014 0.011 0.067 0.136
Direct invest. (liab.) 0.017 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.030 0.017
Portfolio invest. (liab.) 0.013 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.008 0.029 0.047
Other invest. (liab.) 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.014 -0.006 0.008 0.019
Gross outflows -0.025 -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.081 -0.066
Direct invest. (assets) -0.008 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.018 -0.016 -0.031
Portfolio Invest. (assets) -0.002 n.a n.a n.a -0.008 -0.007 -0.004
Other invest. (assets) -0.317 n.a n.a n.a -0.008 -0.020 -0.019
Mean
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Furthermore, there was now a guarantee that the monetary policy would be 
developed without government’s intervention. 
Secondly, following the crisis period, in 1999 the government policy for developing 
the bonds market commenced by establishing the securities commission with the first 
task of handling the banking crisis. This commission had its first task to issue 
government bond to recapitalise the banking sector as a result of the financial crisis 
and to finance the budget deficit. The issuance of the government bonds was part of 
the government strategy for handling the solvency and liquidity problems within the 
banking sector. The issuance that reached the amount of IDR670trillion had several 
objectives, firstly, a portion of the issuance was allocated to the banking sector 
restructuring programme under the coordination of IBRA, and secondly, it was also 
allocated to support the financing of the budget deficit. This amount was equal to half 
of Indonesian GDP in 1999, and nearly 30% was distributed to the state-owned banks 
(Nasution, 2015, pp.77-78 and 108).  
2.06 The period of 2000 to the present 
Starting from the year 2000, Indonesian economic and financial indicators depicted 
an improving economic performance. On average, according to the WDI, in the post-
crisis period that covers the year 2000 up to 2015, the Indonesian growth rate 
reached 5.3% per annum, which represented a leap from minus 13% in 1998. 
Nevertheless, this post-crisis’ achievement was still below the growth in the period of 
1990 up to 1996 that reached around 8% per annum. Even though in the post-crisis 
period the Indonesian growth rate was positive, compared to the other neighbouring 
countries such as China and India, the rate was relatively low. These two countries 
during 2000–2005 reached 8% per year on average. The particular factors that 
impeded the acceleration of Indonesian economic growth were political instability, 
poor investment climate (Adiningsih, 2007), and natural disasters. Firstly, there were 
events that adversely affected the national security within this period, for example, a 
series of terrorist attacks, namely the JSX bombing, the first and second Bali 
bombings, and the Australian Embassy bombing. Secondly, toward the end of 2004, 
there was a tsunami that created a huge devastation in Aceh, a province in northern 
Sumatra. This natural disaster was then followed by the eruptions of some volcanoes 
in Indonesian two main islands, Sumatera and Java. Multinational cooperation from 
many countries helped Indonesia to recover by conducting the resettlement of 
residents and reconstruction of infrastructure. Thirdly, poor investment climate 
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became another problem. Lack of infrastructure, local governments’ conflicting 
regulations, and complicated business licensing were factors that made the investors 
reluctant to invest.  
There were mergers among the commercial banks to strengthen the domestic 
banking sector. Four state-owned banks merged to become one bank (Bank Mandiri) 
and sixteen private banks became three banks (Bank Permata, Bank Danamon and 
Bank Century). In its development, the possibility of foreign financial institutions to 
own the domestic commercial banks allowed the foreign penetration to the domestic 
banks (Nasution, 2015, p.114). There are several domestic banks that were sold to 
foreign institutions that hold the majority of equity. At least fifteen foreign financial 
institutions purchased and held the shares of sixteen domestic private banks. Up until 
today, there are discussions regarding foreign ownership in the domestic financial 
institutions whether foreign ownership facilitates modern banking practice and 
enables the local bankers to learn from them or not. Nasution (2015, p. 115) 
underlines the potential problem that may emerge if these banks would mainly 
depend on their source of financing from their parent companies. It is possible that 
these banks transmit adverse events, which may trigger instability in Indonesian 
banking sector, especially when the parent companies or their country of origin face 
problems. 
The Central Bank’s main task was to stabilise the exchange rate as stipulated in its 
law that enacted in 1999. The Central Bank states that the exchange rate regime 
adopts floating exchange rate arrangement, which should be distinguished from free-
floating mechanism. This classification follows the IMF through its annual report on 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 2015. 
According to the IMF (2015), the classification of exchange rate arrangements has 
four categories, which range from hard pegs to floating regimes. Referring to this 
classification, floating exchange rate arrangement is the exchange rate mechanism 
by which the Central Bank may intervene the exchange rate frequently and is adopted 
to lessen the steep changes of this rate and avoid its extreme fluctuation (IMF, 2015, 
p.72). It can be inferred that in practical the floating exchange arrangement that is 
adopted by Indonesia is similar to the managed-floating definition. The rest of the 
study will use the term ‘floating exchange rate’ arrangement to describe Indonesian 
exchange rate regime. By adopting this exchange rate regime, the monetary authority 
has challenges to maintain the exchange rate stability. Thus, the Central Bank may 
undertake the management of the interest rate and, in certain cases, the Central 
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Bank may intervene in the exchange market, which requires sufficient foreign 
exchange reserves. By accumulating the reserves (Nasution, 2015, p. 37), the 
Central Bank can curb excessive exchange rate fluctuation. A less volatile exchange 
rate may facilitate reduced uncertainty for export-import activities.  
In the early 2000s, the government issued government securities in order to finance 
its budget deficit, in addition to the funding that was come from international financial 
institutions. Before the 2000s, some projects obtained their financial support via 
external loans mainly from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic 
Development Bank and bilateral cooperation with some developed countries. Starting 
from 2001 however, the government shifts its strategy on budget financing, from 
institutional financing to market financing. The development of the securities market 
took several stages in order to achieve the objectives to support budget funding and 
as a ‘benchmark’ for state-owned and private companies’ issuance. Up until 2005, 
issuances were made in the domestic market, but it was considered necessary to tap 
from global financial market considering the needs to finance the expenditure in USD. 
This decision was a currency matching strategy. Besides, there were also a series of 
issuances in the form of JPY and EUR securities to achieve market diversification. 
By issuing government securities as a source of financing, the government facilitated 
the domestic private sector to have a benchmark for the issuance of corporate 
securities. Up until today, there is no restriction on non-residents purchasing and 
owning government securities. The foreign ownership of government securities tends 
to increase from time to time, and there are two different views on this matter. On the 
one hand, some institutions, such as rating agencies and international financial 
institutions, put their concerns on the government securities management. On the 
other hand, foreign ownership shows global or foreign investors’ confidence in the 
Indonesian bonds market. Similar to foreign ownership in the equity market, the 
foreign ownership of government securities can make the financial market 
vulnerable. In this case, government securities are considered as the liquid financial 
assets. So, they can be sold, and the ownership can be moved easily. As the financial 
system, recovered from the crisis, non-residents and foreign banks privatised some 
commercial banks.  
In the capital market development, the equity market has also developed markedly. 
The number of companies in the Indonesian stock market is increasing, and the daily 
trading typically begins with positive trends in its composite index. In 2007, there was 
a merger of two stock exchange companies to form the IDX. 
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In the second semester of 2005, the Indonesian financial market faced a mini-crisis. 
It started in the first quarter of 2005 when domestic investors felt discomfort at the 
increasing global oil price. They concerned by the sustainability of the government 
budget since a large portion of the budget was allocated for fuel subsidies (Abimanyu, 
2009, p. 137; Ministry of Finance, 2016). If the domestic oil price was kept stable, the 
amount of fuel subsidy would be increasing and would lead to the widening of fiscal 
deficits. These investors predicted that the only way for the government to find the 
funds for its budget was via an additional issuance of government securities, though 
the additional issuance would add the outstanding debt and might make the 
government budget unsustainable. An additional issuance was believed by certain 
domestic investors to potentially create a crowding out effect for private corporations. 
Additionally, the continuing increase in global oil prices left the government with very 
few policy options, in this case, that of increasing the domestic oil price. There were 
two rounds of oil price increases, the first round in March 2005 by an average of 26%, 
and in August 2005 by an average of 126% (Abimanyu, 2009, pp. 136-137)8. As a 
result of this decision, there was an increase in general prices, which created an 
expectation of higher inflation and by the end of the year, the inflation rate in 2005 
reached 17%, the highest rate in the post-crisis period. The monetary authority took 
action by increasing the policy rate. The positive movement of policy rate had an 
impact on the increasing time deposit rate, which offered a higher rate than the rate 
of returns in mutual funds9. Some investors, especially those who are new and do 
not have sufficient knowledge of financial instruments, shifted their investments from 
the mutual funds to the time deposits that was followed by the redemption for cash 
or taking a long position on the foreign financial instruments, leading to the increase 
in gross capital outflows. 
The advent of GFC in August 2007 can be seen from the shock in the global financial 
market as BNP Paribas decided to freeze its funds that were exposed by the 
subprime mortgage. This decision triggered the increasing towards investors’ 
sentiment and caused the risk aversion among global investors. One of the impacts 
is the evaporation of global liquidity (BBC, 2009). Moreover, the BBC (2009) 
                                                
8 The domestic oil price is determined by the government, which sets and announces the official price 
for LPG, premium gasoline, and diesel fuel. 
9 A mutual fund is a type of investment security that is used by a group of investors to gain returns under 
the management of an investment manager. 
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described that global financial market entered into a more serious situation as the 
cost of credit increased sharply. Some Central Banks, for example, the US Federal 
Reserve, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of Japan, and Bank of England tried to 
intervene. The US Federal Reserves injected liquidity and cut the Fed rate several 
times. However, these policies did not show any significant impact. This situation also 
gave impact on Indonesian financial system, especially the stock market and bonds 
market. The IDX plummeted to reach 1,355.4 in December 2008. This December 
2008 figure was nearly half of its January 2008 figure, which recorded at 2,627. In 
the bonds market, the 10-years government bonds yield also experienced almost a 
similar situation. In January 2008, on average the yield was at 9.95%, but then it 
sharply increased to reached 16,1% in November 2008.  However, this condition was 
not last long since in the following period the financial system was recovered from 
this shaky condition. Some factors that possibly affect this improvement are the policy 
to set the low-interest environment in the developed countries, the higher interest rate 
in the domestic market, and Indonesian good economic performance amid the GFC. 
These factors are then also attracted the foreign capital to flows into the domestic 
financial system.  
To deal with the high capital inflows as a result of the GFC in the period of 2007-
2010, the Central Bank passed some regulations. The first regulation, which was the 
one reinstated in 2011, concerned the ceiling for external borrowing by the banking 
sector. According to this regulation, all commercial banks should maintain the amount 
of their short-term debt at less than 30% of their capital. The second regulation is the 
minimum holding period in purchasing the CB certificates. This regulation has been 
amended several times, for example, in 2010 the minimum holding period was one 
month, and then it was revised in 2013 to six months. The Central Bank used the 
momentum of high flows of capital that came into the domestic financial market to 
implement these regulations and gain a positive response from the financial market 
investors. There was no adverse effect in Indonesian financial market such as that 
which occurred in Thailand when the implementation of government policies in 
dealing with foreign capital flows created a sharp drop in Thailand’s stock index, and 
then Thai’s government abandoned this kind of policy.  
2.07 The fragile financial system 
The government policy to implement financial reforms starting from the 1970s have 
the intention to ensure the availability of financing source and boost the economic 
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growth. The policy option that was taken by the government for pursuing this 
objective is by modernising the financial system through the adoption of financial 
liberalisation, which covers internal financial liberalisation and external financial 
liberalisation. From the point of view internal liberalisation, it is expected that the 
implementation of financial liberalisation will increase savings, which are argued to 
become a source of financing. With increasing funds availability in the financial 
market, economic agents have access to finance their investments or business 
expansions. Meanwhile, the external liberalisation facilitates the country obtaining 
foreign funds.  
One principle of financial liberalisation is minimising government intervention in the 
financial market. Within this principle, modernising the financial system is done by 
shifting the government dominance into the market-oriented financial system, which 
is then translated into several dimensions (Cole and Slade, 1996, pp. 355-356) or 
policy implications (Arestis, 2006, p. 351). Firstly, the government lessens its role for 
facilitating targeted groups, for example, farmers and small merchants under a 
specific allocation of credit programme. Secondly, the government no longer sets the 
ceiling on lending and deposit interest rates; these rates are market determined. 
Thirdly, to ensure the easier access for economic agents to obtain funds, the 
government lifted its restriction for commercial banks to open its branches. Fourthly, 
the policy allowing the private sector to borrow from abroad was enacted in the 
1980s, as well as the opening the capital market for foreign investors.     
Following the implementation of financial liberalisation, some economists argued that 
these policies elevate Indonesian economy since they gave a better access for 
financing (Juoro, 1993; Harris et al., 1994; Goeltom, 1995). However, at the same 
time, financial liberalisation may bring serious consequences. At least several 
indicators can show how financial liberalisation gives impact on the fragility of the 
domestic financial system such as the increasing volatility of non-FDI flows, 
increasing stock market volatility, and trend of increasing short-term external debt.    
2.07.1 Increasing volatility of non-FDI flows 
One dimension of financial liberalisation is the increasing flows of capital that come 
into Indonesian domestic financial market. This study defines capital flows as cross-
border financial transactions (Bluedorn et al., 2013) and considers the origin of the 
investors, whether they are residents or non-residents of a country in purchasing or 
selling the financial assets. According to Bluedorn et al. (2013), gross capital inflows 
are the country’s external liabilities, which would be represented by a positive sign if 
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the country has more external liabilities than its assets, and a negative sign if the 
country’s external liabilities are declining. Gross capital outflows are understood as 
the increasing of external financial assets held by residents, which means positive 
outflows and decreasing external financial assets when residents sell their foreign 
financial assets or negative outflows.  
Figure 2.3 shows the movements of some categories that construct the flows, which 
consist of direct investments, portfolio investments, derivatives, international 
reserves, and other investments (IMF, 2009). This study excludes the monetary 
authorities and general government from ‘other investments’ to emphasise the role 
of the private sector and banks. It is argued that the omission of the official flows will 
help to capture the private and banking sector movements during the volatile period 
(Bluedorn et al., 2013; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2015). 
Figure 2.3 Indonesian gross capital flows (Ratio of GDP) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS-IMF and Bank Indonesia 
From Figure 2.3 in the left column, by comparing the period before and after the 
financial crisis, there is a shift in the type of capital flows. Before the 1997/1998 
financial crisis, the source of financing is in the form of direct borrowing with a small 
portion of portfolio investments and direct investments. Meanwhile, in the post-crisis 
period, the flows are mostly in the form of portfolio investments and direct 
investments. It can be inferred that in the post-crisis period the development of the 
financial system plays an important role in the availability of financial instruments for 
investors to place their funds into the equity market, rather than through direct 
borrowing or export credits mechanism. Through the gross inflows figure, the portfolio 
investments and other investments showed a tendency to become negative during 
the crisis period, meaning that foreign investors pulled out their funds by selling their 
financial assets and the country experienced declining external liabilities. These 
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
19
95
Q
1
19
95
Q
4
19
96
Q
3
19
97
Q
2
19
98
Q
1
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
3
20
00
Q
2
20
01
Q
1
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
3
20
03
Q
2
20
04
Q
1
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
3
20
06
Q
2
20
07
Q
1
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
3
20
09
Q
2
20
10
Q
1
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
3
20
12
Q
2
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
3
20
15
Q
2
Gross inflows
directinv portinv otherinv grossinflows
-0.25
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
19
95
Q
1
19
95
Q
4
19
96
Q
3
19
97
Q
2
19
98
Q
1
19
98
Q
4
19
99
Q
3
20
00
Q
2
20
01
Q
1
20
01
Q
4
20
02
Q
3
20
03
Q
2
20
04
Q
1
20
04
Q
4
20
05
Q
3
20
06
Q
2
20
07
Q
1
20
07
Q
4
20
08
Q
3
20
09
Q
2
20
10
Q
1
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
3
20
12
Q
2
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
3
20
15
Q
2
Gross outflows
directinv portinv otherinv reserves grossout
30 
 
events occurred in 1997/1998 during the Asian financial crisis, in 2008 during the 
subprime mortgage crisis, and in 2011 with the deepening Eurozone debt crisis. The 
right column of Figure 2.3 shows the gross outflows between 1995 and 2015. In 
certain cases, this figure reveals the domestic investors’ activities in purchasing or 
selling foreign financial instruments. In the period of 2004 onwards, the net capital 
outflows mostly take on negative signs. With regards to portfolio investments, the 
negative signs mean that the domestic investors were reducing their ownerships of 
foreign financial assets. This phenomenon happened in the period of 2008-2011 
when developed countries experience financial crises. Within this period, most of the 
domestic investors that invested their money in the global financial market sold their 
foreign financial assets and invested their funds in the domestic financial market. 
As depicted in Figure 2.3 above, the flows of capital can take the form of direct 
investments, portfolio investments and other investments. Direct investment is 
considered the type of flow that is less volatile, while the portfolio investment is very 
volatile and easy to be moved by the funds’ owners from one financial market to the 
others. Considering the characteristics each type of flow, the portfolio investment is 
argued as the most fragile type of flow and can cause fragility within the domestic 
financial market. With this reason, this study will explore the way that portfolio 
investment contributes to the crisis occurrence. Thus, it is necessary to exclude the 
flows of foreign direct investments from the analysis. By focusing on the portfolio 
investment, the figure on the short-term capital flows is expected to draw out the 
emergence of financial instability in the open-market system. Figure 2.3 tries to 
convey this message. As portrayed by Figure 2.4, when the government enacted the 
regulation to widen the possibilities for foreign investors to purchase private sector 
shares in the stock market by the end of the 1980s, some portfolio inflows show the 
tendency to be positive. During 1981–1989, the average capital inflows reached only 
USD 149million a year. The significant development was shown in the period of 1989 
up until 1996, before the crisis period, when the average of inflows reached USD 
1,284.6million. However, at the beginning of 1998, there were negative inflows 
experienced by the Indonesian financial system up until 2002. On average, the capital 
inflows to the country was negative USD 1.205million a year during 1998 up until 
2002. By examining the movement of non-FDI inflows, this figure also confirms the 
way that financial instability is formed by the volatility of short-term capital inflows.  
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Figure 2.4 Non-FDI inflows (USD millions) 
  
Source: Own calculations based on IFS- IMF 
Note: For a better presentation, the figures on non-FDI inflows are divided into two periods.  
The left panel is the pre-crisis and crisis period, while, the right panel is the post-crisis 
period; the vertical line shows the financial liberalisation measures in the stock market; the 
dash area highlights the crisis period. 
Even though in the post-crisis period the non-FDI inflows are mostly positive, by 
examining its movement, one may see that there is a perceived risk contained in this 
type of flows. A series of increase amounts of non-FDI inflows, which is followed by 
significant amounts of their reversals can create the volatility of the flows. In this 
section, the volatility of the inflows to the domestic financial market is calculated 
simply by its standard deviation. The post-crisis period has the highest standard 
deviation, suggesting growing instability in the financial system. 
2.07.2 Increasing of role of foreign investors 
In the period of 1984-1996, Indonesia experienced relatively stable net capital 
inflows. However, there was a shift in investors’ expectation, which then changed the 
condition and the country faced a sudden reversal of capital inflows. This event was 
the onset of the financial crisis that severely hit the country’s economy during 
1997/1998. In this section, the discussion will focus on exploring and comparing the 
1997/1998 financial crisis with the current condition.  
The previous section shows that portfolio investments and private investments 
entered the Indonesian financial market starting from the 1980s, and based on the 
left panel of Figure 2.5, the net capital flows rose, especially in the late 1980s up until 
the beginning of the 1990s. This movement is in line with the movement of the 
sovereign rating that moves quite modestly from the late of the 1980s, implying the 
positive expectation toward the domestic financial system. As the government 
encourages foreign investors to invest their money, the domestic financial market 
receives a significant amount of inflows, which is being reflected in the increasing 
IDX composite index starting from 1989. However, there is a shift in investors’ 
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expectations that reflected a sharp decline in the country rating. This event leads to 
the investors’ decision to sell out their financial assets, which can be shown by the 
negative inflows. The portfolio investments dominate the inflows to this country. 
Hence, once there is an unfavourable condition in the domestic market, the foreign 
investors will respond it by selling the most liquid instruments, which are their financial 
assets (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2015). In the domestic market, the unstable 
financial market is reflected by the sharp decline in the domestic composite index, 
and at the same time, the government policy response to the instability fails to have 
any impact. The widening interest rate spread cannot attract the capital back to the 
country and, even worse, it hits the real sector. The weakening of the domestic 
currency creates more burdens for the economic agents that have debt obligations 
in foreign currency.  
Figure 2.5 Risk taking, assets prices and the financial crisis: 1995-2003 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, US-Federal Reserves, ICRG and CEIC 
Note: The country rating is used to show the investors’ risk preference. Some papers use 
the VIX index to represent this indicator; however, as the data available does not cover the 
period of the 1980s, this study employs the monthly country rating based on the survey of 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)  
A similar pattern of financial fragility also happened between 2004 and 2015, 
especially in the wake of the GFC in 2008. The investors use the stable country rating 
during 2004–2007 to invest in the regions that offered higher interest rates, expecting 
higher returns. Capital flows into the domestic financial market, pushing up the 
composite index. Figure 2.6 displays the sharp increase in assets prices that is 
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represented by the IDX Composite Index from around 900 at the beginning of 2004, 
rising to become almost 2,700 at the end of 2007.  
Figure 2.6 Risk taking, assets prices and the financial crisis: 2004-2015 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, US-Federal Reserves, ICRG and CEIC 
In the third quarter of 2008, there was a positive trend of the country rating, 
suggesting that the view towards domestic financial system was improving and the 
investors expected positive movements in the financial market. When there is a 
negative change of investors’ expectation, it may lead to the sudden reversals of 
capital inflows that will be followed by the declining of the composite index. If this 
event happened, the monetary authority could adjust the policy rate, which results in 
the positive gap between foreign and domestic interest rate. Following the U.S 
subprime mortgage crisis, the Central Bank did not make any substantial change in 
the policy rate. However, at the same time, U.S. Federal Reserves adopted a lower 
interest rate policy that made the interest differential between Indonesia and U.S 
became wider than the previous period. Accordingly, the financial market investors 
responded this event by purchasing domestic financial assets, expecting for high 
returns. This phenomenon can explain the carry trade mechanism in the developing 
countries amidst the GFC. In addition to this, the IDX rebounded to reach its previous 
level of 2700, and it continued to reach the highest level of 5500 in April 2015. 
However, the increasing of assets prices had been followed by a declining trend or 
the boom became a bust, especially when this increasing price was constructed from 
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the fragile instruments that are volatile or easy to change, which is portfolio 
investment. 
From this discussion, the decision to attract foreign investors to the domestic financial 
market brings the country to be exposed by the external vulnerability. The external 
vulnerability in the domestic financial market can be built up from negative events 
that occur in other countries and create instability. In this case, weak economic 
fundamentals do not cause the instability, but mostly it is triggered by the financial 
market investors’ intention to find a favourable place for investing their money. 
However, when their view of the country’s condition changes negatively, they will pull 
out and place their funds in other safer financial markets, creating reversals of capital 
inflows. The declining of capital inflows together with the depreciation of the domestic 
currency and, to a certain extent, the declining of foreign ownership in domestic 
financial assets are the examples of the external vulnerability that currently happens 
in most of the developing countries. This phenomenon also creates a challenge on 
the way to handle the external vulnerability, which is contributed by financial market 
investors with their portfolio investments.  
2.07.3 Increasing trend of short-term external debt 
The government enacted a policy to open access for the banking and private non-
bank sectors to obtain external loans. This policy contributed to the increasing 
amount of external debt; especially the one belongs to the private sector. The need 
to obtain the source of financing drove these corporations to find additional debt from 
off-shore financial institutions. The problem could be recognised when there was a 
shift in the borrowers’ preferences towards the shorter type of financing. The portion 
of the short-term debt to total debt accelerated and outperformed the longer-term 
debt commencing from the end of the 1980s up until the crisis period in 1997/1998. 
It is suspected that the domestic corporation was willing to borrow short-term debt 
since this type of debt offers a lower interest rate, which subsequently may push 
down its cost of borrowing. However, they forgot the risk exposure that is contained 
within this type of debt, namely the maturity risk, currency risk and interest rate risk.  
By examining the level of short-term debt to the reserves ratio during the 1990s, one 
can identify the mismanagement of macro-prudential regulation. The historical data 
on the short-term debt shows that before the crisis period, the outstanding external 
and short-term debts are higher than the international reserves. At the macro-level, 
this condition might lead to increasing fragility, especially when there are massive 
claims on repayment of loan obligations. During this period, it was the private sector 
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that aggressively obtained an external source of financing from off-shore financial 
institutions. Unlike the public sector that should deal with its lenders to obtain external 
debt that is limited by a ceiling issued by the government, the private sector could 
make any debt agreements with their lenders without any oversight from the 
government.  
Figure 2.7 Total and short-term external debt 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS- IMF and BIS 
Note: the external debt is obtained from the international claims of BIS reporting banks 
Figure 2.7 depicts the development of the external debt of Indonesia based on data 
from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This data is calculated from the 
consolidated banking statistics on the international claims of the reporting banks, 
which is based on its maturity. In a period of 30 years, the movement of total external 
debt outstanding shows a cycle of boom and bust, where the period of expansion will 
be followed by a period of a contraction. In 1995-1996 and 2013-2015, the left panel 
of figure 2.7 shows the period of increasing amounts of external debt. It can be 
inferred that during these years, the economic agents tried to expand the business, 
leading them to find the funding to finance their activities. It was during 1998-2003, 
as the financial crisis got under way in 1998, the debt outstanding presented a 
negative movement, which then reached its bottom in 2003. The period after 2003 
had the opposite trend of positive external debt outstanding that started from 2004 to 
2013, with a small shock in 2009. When the corporations succeed in doing their 
business within the tranquil period, they tend to ignore the adverse event or crisis 
period that had just been passed by. It is a phenomenon of a myopic hindsight, which 
describes the tendency of an economic agent to do the same things or repeat the 
same decision without considering the perceived risk (Lavoie, 2014, p.253). 
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2.07.4 Increasing volatility of stock index 
From the aftermath of the 1998 crisis onwards, the government of Indonesia has 
faced great challenges in maintaining the open capital market as a consequence of 
financial liberalisation and growing concern for its fiscal sustainability. Besides, 
another challenge also emerges since the government needs to deal with domestic 
and global investors to maintain their confidence in investing their funds in the 
domestic financial market. These challenges are also coupled with the pressure 
coming from the increasing volatility, along with the development of an active and 
deep financial market since, for the policy makers, volatility tends to threaten the 
financial market and may transmit adverse effects to the economy. According to 
Grabel (1996), the increasing volatility leads the financial market investors to shift 
their investment preferences from long-term to short-term. The financial market 
investors make this investment decision to minimise loss or take the opportunity to 
obtain the capital gain.  
Figure 2.8 The volatility of stock market return 
 
Source: Own calculations based on CEIC 
Note: IDX_daily is the daily stock market composite index 
         FL stands for financial liberalisation 
As provided by Figure 2.8, the volatility of financial markets tends to increase during 
and following the implementation of financial liberalisation. This phenomenon can be 
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seen from the calculation of the daily return volatility10 between the pre-liberalisation 
that took place in the period of before 1988 and the post-financial liberalisation that 
took place in 1989–2015. Comparing the historic volatility of the daily return of the 
IDX Composite Index in the period of 1983–2015, the mean volatility of pre-
liberalisation is 0.0055, while post-liberalisation volatility is 0.017. The post-
liberalisation period is divided into three sub-periods: pre-financial crisis (1989–
1996), financial crisis (1997-2003), and post-financial crisis (2004–2015). The 
increasing volatility can be understood in the sense that the capital mobility from 
abroad to Indonesia and vice versa is easily executed. However, it should be noted 
that there are some extreme events that potentially became a source of problems for 
the domestic financial market in the post-crisis period, for example: 
- The crisis occurrence in other countries including the tequila crisis, the Russian 
crisis to the U.S sub-prime crisis, and the European debt crisis. In other words, 
global financial markets have an impact on the Indonesian domestic stock market. 
When the subprime mortgage crisis hit the U.S. financial market in 2008, the 
Indonesian Stock Market trading was suspended for almost a week. This stock 
market suspension was taken considering the sharp decline in the composite 
index following the volatile movements of Indonesian macroeconomic indicators. 
However, a few months after this suspension, the market recovered and reached 
its peak as the U.S government decided to implement a low-interest policy.  
- The volatility of global financial market because of policy made by developed 
countries, for example, the Federal Reserves’ policy to raise its low-interest policy 
in 2013.  
- The worsening of macroeconomic indicators in neighbouring countries also 
affected the IDX, for example, when China’s economic growth was realised to be 
lower than financial market predictions. 
The above explanation shows that the government’s intention to build a modern 
financial system through the implementation of financial liberalisation may affect the 
instability of the domestic financial market. The movement of several financial market 
indicators – the non-FDI flows, stock market index, the role of foreign investors, and 
short-term external borrowing – tend to increase after the post-liberalisation policies 
were implemented. By comparing the period before and after the implementation of 
                                                
10 The calculation of volatility has been done using the standard deviation of the first difference of the 
stock exchange daily return (Clark et al. 2004) 
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financial liberalisation, this study finds that the volatility of non-FDI flows and stock 
market return in the post-liberalisation period are higher than a pre-liberalisation 
period.  Also, there is a tendency that in the post-liberalisation period, the external 
debt follows the business cycle – a pattern that shows a series of the period of 
expansion, crisis, and recovery. The tendency of increasing external debt should be 
treated carefully since it contains market risk and maturity risk, which may deteriorate 
the borrowers’ balance sheets.   
2.08 Conclusion 
There were drastic changes that transformed Indonesia from a country that received 
a huge amount of funding to one that lacked resources, as an impact of the continued 
decline in oil prices between the 1970s and 1980s. As a response, the government 
of Indonesia shifted its policy to allow the movement of capital as a means to finance 
its investments. Several packages of financial reform had already been prepared and 
then launched in a two-step implementation. The first step took place at the beginning 
of the 1980s, which led to the policy of reducing the allocation for subsidised credit 
programmes, removing the interest ceiling, as well as deregulation. The other step 
was taken in 1988 with the liberalisation of the banking sector and the stock market.  
In the following period, Indonesian economy performed better than any other Asian 
countries. However, by the end of the 1990s, Indonesia experienced a financial crisis, 
causing a negative growth. The financial crisis became a milestone for reforming 
Indonesia’s financial system that was manifested, by introducing new responsibilities 
for the Central Bank and the issuances of government securities. In the post-crisis 
period, it appeared that the financial market of Indonesia experienced a vulnerable 
condition as a result of the domestic mini-crisis and a series of financial crises that 
occurred in several developed countries.  
In this context, the government is capable of achieving its intention for building a 
modern domestic financial system. However, the authorities had to face a broad 
range of issues that needed to be resolved, such as the difficulties in maintaining the 
open capital market, allocating limited resources amid a growing concern for the fiscal 
sustainability, and coping with domestic and global investors’ confidence.  
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Chapter 3  
An analysis of the models and features of financial crises 
frameworks 
3.01 Introduction 
In response to more frequent crisis occurrence during the past 30 years, policy-
makers and economists have sought to identify the causes of financial crises and 
accordingly establish methods of management. There are some financial crisis 
models, which are dubbed as first-, second- and third-generation models, aiming at 
explaining the mechanisms of financial crisis. The objective for constructing these 
models hinges on the idea that the authorities will be eased in locating the cause, 
prescribing the policy response, and, if possible, predicting the occurrence of a 
financial crisis. With such crisis models, however, it is held by some—as this chapter 
argues—that the foundation in constructing the models is based on specific events 
in a particular country or region, which may not be applicable to other financial 
systems. Therefore, if there is an occurrence of a new financial crisis, there will be 
an advent of another crisis-generation model. This chapter seeks to gain a 
perspective onto the mechanisms of financial crises under the mainstream views, 
factors that cause crisis episodes, and the way to respond a crisis.  
Many economists have attempted to determine the mechanisms of financial crisis, 
which leads to the argument that financial instability could create a financial crisis 
(Mishkin, 1999b). Based on this view, Mishkin (1999b) described the process of 
financial instability in leading to financial crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
presented a database on the banking crisis, discussed the policy responses that have 
been taken by the authorities and proposed a methodology to record the dates of the 
crises. They highlighted three main types of financial crisis, namely banking, 
currency, and sovereign debt crises. In line with such types of crisis, the authors 
emphasised the definition of each crisis by outlining criteria for each crisis condition. 
Based on these two terminologies describing the state of a financial system, namely 
financial instability and financial crisis, it is admitted that the need for financial stability 
is fundamental for every country so as to facilitate the avoidance of such events. 
Schinasi (2006, p. 11) underlined that the stability of a country’s financial conditions 
is necessary for ensuring the presence of stable macroeconomic conditions.  
Efforts are being made in policy-making circles and elsewhere in mind of developing 
techniques that assess factors suspected of causing financial crisis. These efforts 
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have several aims: for example, firstly, equipping the authority to construct a policy 
response and other economic agents to anticipate the adverse financial market 
situation; secondly, gaining better understanding of how an instrument can be 
developed to enable authorities to monitor, evaluate and assess the financial 
condition; and thirdly, finding ways of increasing the country’s resiliency to cope with 
an adverse situation. Furthermore, according to Schinasi (2006, p. 3) the need to 
maintain the stability of the financial system is one solution for managing the 
increasing trend of financial vulnerability as an impact of the liberalisation and 
globalisation of the financial system.  
This chapter explores the models of financial crises, the type of financial crises, and 
various features of mainstream views for defining, finding the cause, and responding 
to the financial crisis.  
3.02 Financial crisis models 
The explanations of financial instability are associated with the attempts of various 
economists to develop an understanding of the mechanisms recognised as triggering 
financial crises. There are some models that seek to formalise the mechanisms of a 
crisis and the way in which a financial system becomes vulnerable. Such models 
expose the causes and thereby link some variables that are suspected of triggering 
crises. Since these models have occurred in sequence, most economists label each 
generation as the first-, second- and third-generation models. The first-generation 
was developed by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), all of whom 
emphasised the needs to prioritise the implementation of prudential macroeconomic 
policies to maintain economic fundamentals. Focusing on investors’ behaviour, 
Obstfeld (1994) and Eichengreen et al. (1995) developed the second-generation 
model. This model explains the occurrence of a crisis because of government 
decisions to defend the value of its currency, and the impact of such on the 
fundamentals. The third-generation model was proposed following the Southeast 
Asian crisis and links the role of the country’s economic units, its balance sheets, and 
the exchange rate pressure (Krugman, 1999). Such models will be explored briefly in 
the following sub-sections. 
3.02.1 First-generation models 
Krugman (1979), extended by Flood and Garber (1984), developed this model, 
arguing that the consistency of fiscal and monetary policies supports the 
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implementation of the fixed exchange rate arrangement. A financial crisis under the 
first-generation model is caused by the inconsistency of government policy on the 
implementation of the budget deficit and the adoption of fixed exchange rate regime. 
Moreover, Krugman’s argument involves speculative attacks, as an exogenous 
factor, which occurred in a period of distress, where such an attack triggers the 
financial crisis (Iancu, 2011).  
The mechanism of crises can be described with the government intention to raise the 
debt to finance the budget deficit, causing the increasing amount of debt outstanding. 
The condition was seen to worsen when the government financed the deficit by 
printing money. This caused the money supply to increase and, with a stable demand 
for money, this condition may cause the rate of interest to decrease, which then 
triggers capital outflows (Pilbeam, 2013, p. 455). At the same time, the country adopts 
the fixed exchange rate. Hence, in an effort to maintain the value of domestic 
currency, the Central Bank uses its foreign exchange reserves, which leads to a 
decline in the foreign reserves. Thus, with the authority upholding its fixed exchange 
rate regime, a speculative attack can occur. Should speculators understand the 
condition of domestic economy, an attack may be carried out through taking a short 
position on the domestic currency. Such speculation will continue until the foreign 
reserves fall to reach a certain level.  
There are various issues with this model. The first is linked to the assumption on the 
government’s decision to keep the exchange rate fixed, where such a decision may 
cause the country to experience a financial crisis. This assumption cannot be easily 
accepted since it does not exactly describe the real condition. The first-generation 
model applies to the Latin American crisis of the 1960s and 1970s (Kaminsky, 2003). 
However, when the European Exchange Rate Market (ERM) crisis occurred at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the model could not explain clearly the mechanism of the 
crisis. The second-generation model was developed in an attempt to explain how this 
crisis erupted. 
3.02.2 Second-generation models 
Obstfeld (1994) proposed the second-generation model following the ERM crisis of 
the early 1990s. This model argued that the government policy to devalue or not 
devalue its currency is based on the trade-off between the cost and benefit of the 
choice of adopting the fixed or floating exchange rate regime (Allen et al., 2002). 
Through his model, Obstfeld (1994) sought to answer the question on the weakness 
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of the first-generation model by adding government policy choices to remain with or 
find an alternative to the fixed exchange regime. Within this model, the government 
will be more active, and takes necessary action to avoid its exchange rate being 
attack by speculators. In other words, this model explains how the financial market 
investors’ expectations may affect the formulation of macroeconomic policy (Iancu, 
2011).  
The following explanation aims at simplifying the mechanism of the second-
generation model. Suppose that the authority adopts two policies that may create a 
trade-off: for instance, the government wants to maintain the fixed exchange rate 
policy; however, at the same time, the efforts to defend the currency from speculative 
attack involve the costs corresponding to the devaluation, such as increased inflation 
(Burnside et al., 2007; Pilbeam, 2013, p. 460). In this model, when investors have a 
low expectation that the government will devalue its currency, the cost of maintaining 
the currency is also low. Hence, the government will be unlikely to devalue its 
currency. In a case when the currency is overvalued but the government does not 
take the decision to devalue it, this condition may create a tendency of low expected 
inflation11. Thus, this condition will lead national output to become lower than 
expected. In line with this decision, the government’s policy to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate regime creates a loss of output (Burnside et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
Pilbeam (2013, pp. 460-461) and Iancu (2011) explained that the government can 
devalue its currency so as to minimise the loss because of the expectations of 
financial market players12. In other words, market players’ expectations will have an 
important contribution to the government decision since they will determine the cost 
that will be borne by the government. In this regard, the market perception also plays 
a critical role since it can change the country’s condition, regardless of economic 
fundamentals.  
Nevertheless, this financial crisis model faced a challenge when used to explain the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. The occurrence of the Asian financial crisis was 
different to previous crises since the Asian crisis countries demonstrated good 
economic performance, consistent macro-policy involving fiscal and monetary 
                                                
11 The currency overvaluation will lead to the condition that domestic goods are more expensive than 
foreign ones, which may push the import of goods to increase. 
12 Financial market players in this study refer to those who actively involved in the financial market 
transactions, for example, debt issuers, investors, dealers, etc. 
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policies, and relatively stable political conditions. Accordingly, the Asian financial 
crisis led to the advent of the third-generation model.  
3.02.3 Third-generation models 
During and following the period of the Southeast Asian Crisis, as the first- and 
second-generation models failed to explain the 1997/1998 financial crisis, the third-
generation model was developed. The third-generation model analyses that the 
cause of a crisis is not a result of government failure, but rather as a result of the 
private sector role. There are factors that act as the trigger for events of crises, such 
as the increasing of the private sector’s proportion of short-term debt and the 
increasing of non-performing loans in the banking sector, for example. Such issues 
were complicated, with an imprudent financing utilisation, such that the economic 
agents borrowed short-term debts to finance long-term projects.  
Some authors (Krugman, 1999; Mishkin, 1999b; Burnside et al., 2007) explained the 
mechanisms and occurrence of the financial crisis in various ways. Firstly, from the 
point of view of moral hazards, which occur as the borrower has an opportunity to 
take a riskier transaction or project since the lender covers the risks. Moral hazard 
problems emerge when economic agents notice a blanket guarantee, which is 
provided by the authorities to ensure all depositors or trouble institutions are 
protected (Mishkin, 1997 and 1999b). The blanket guarantee then leads to excessive 
borrowing by the private sector. Secondly, according to Krugman (1999) and 
Burnside et al. (2007), one key problem causing countries to be vulnerable is the 
deterioration of the private sector balance sheets as a result of the mismanagement 
of their debt obligations. Two examples of this mismanagement are currency and 
maturity mismatches. Thirdly, the financial crisis was triggered by a combination of 
investors’ panic and inaccurate government measures in responding to such. These 
factors led to massive sudden reversals of capital inflow and increasing capital 
outflow, subsequently causing the domestic financial market to experience financial 
market turbulence (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). 
Within the third-generation model, some authors (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Calvo and 
Reinhart, 1999; Fratzscher, 2003) explored the role of the contagion effect in 
triggering the outbreak of a financial crisis. As emphasised by Pilbeam (2013, p. 463), 
the contagion is possible when interdependence, for example, in the financial sector 
or trade amongst countries is seen to exist. This statement is in line with the argument 
of Kaminsky et al. (1998), where the policy to devalue the currency of one country 
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could lead its trading partners to take similar action in an effort to maintain their 
competitiveness (Tularam and Subramanian, 2013). 
All of these models claim to have the ability to explain and provide the mechanisms 
of financial instability that may trigger financial crises. According to these models, it 
is expected that a country will eradicate and overcome a financial crisis when it solves 
the problems lying within domestic economy, such as weak domestic institutions, and 
when there are strong economic fundamentals in the absence of government 
interventions (Kaltenbrunner and Painciera, 2015). However, these models were 
developed based on a situation that occurred in a specific country or region. The 
construction of each model was adapted from a specific mechanism in a crisis 
country (Tularam and Subramanian, 2013) and then formalised as it may be applied 
to other countries. Thus, the models may only apply to a certain condition of a country 
in a certain time and cannot be used to explain a financial crisis that may be erupted 
in another country or region in the near future. Based on the above discussion, the 
first-generation that was built as a response to the Latin American crisis could not 
clearly explain the following crisis that occurred in the European region and Mexico. 
This fact led to the advent of the second-generation model. Nevertheless, when the 
Southeast Asian crisis occurred, the first- and second-generation models were 
unable to justify the mechanism of this crisis, which then led to the development of 
the third-generation model. When the GFC occurred, it seems that the first-, second-
, and third-generation models also faced difficulties in predicting and explaining this 
crisis event. Therefore, should another crisis occur and be seen to spread, there 
would be the possibility that another generation model would need to be devised.       
3.03 The definition of financial crisis  
Based on historical events, Laeven and Valencia (2013) categorised the types of 
financial crisis into three distinct groups, namely banking, currency and sovereign 
debt crises. According to these authors, when seeking to define each crisis that 
occurs in a country, the following criteria should be considered. Firstly, a banking 
crisis occurs if there are bank runs, an increase in non-performing loans, and the 
decline of the banking sector’s assets. The World Bank (2016) defines a banking 
crisis as a situation when there are depositors’ runs on commercial banks, where the 
majority of private and financial sectors face defaults and fail to fulfil their debt 
obligations on time, which, in turn, accelerate the increase of non-performing loans. 
During recent decades, there have been a series of banking crises, based on these 
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criteria, which have been witnessed in several countries, such as Iceland in 2008, 
Ireland in 2008 and Nigeria in 2009. Secondly, a country experiences a currency 
crisis when there is a depreciation in the country’s exchange rate of more than 30% 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008). From this criterion, the currency crisis can be defined 
as a crisis that occurs in a country that experiences a steep decline in the value of its 
currency. The countries seen to have suffered from this type of crisis include some 
East Asian countries during the financial crisis of 1997/1998, Argentina in 2001, and 
Turkey in 2001. The third type is the sovereign debt crisis, which occurs when a 
country has a huge amount of public debt, where fears spread pertaining to the 
financial market about the country’s ability to pay its debt obligations, which 
subsequently results in a state of default. With no ability to pay its debt obligations, 
the country needs to renegotiate with its creditors (Pescatori & Sy, 2004). Examples 
of the debt crisis were witnessed in Mexico in 1994, Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 
2002; these countries were then categorised as debt crisis countries. 
Up until the occurrence of the Southeast Asian crisis, the definition of the term 
‘financial crisis’ had not explicitly explained the process of the fragility of a financial 
system. Under the framework of the third-generation model, economists have sought 
to explore the connection between the fragility of a financial system and subsequent 
financial crisis by emphasising the role of external borrowing in affecting the 
deterioration of the private sector’s balance sheets (Tularam and Subramanian, 
2013). Furthermore, Borio and Drehmann (2009) have argued that it is necessary to 
distinguish the phases of a banking crisis based on its severity. There are at least 
three periods that are introduced, namely the existence of a tranquil period, an 
instability period, and the financial crisis. Based on these stages, the authors define 
financial instability as the situation before financial crisis, in which a disturbance 
creates significant damage to the financial system and ultimately leads to financial 
crisis. 
Within the mainstream views, however, the terms ‘fragility’ and ‘instability’ are used 
interchangeably, which suggests that there is no precise differentiation between 
them. Some factors that create additional problems in defining financial instability 
include the lack of consensus in terms of its analytical framework, the sophistication 
of the structure of the financial system, and, to a certain extent, the clarity of its 
institutional arrangements (Schinasi, 2004; Gadanecz and Jayaram, 2009; Creel et 
al., 2015).  
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Schinasi (2004) emphasised various basic principles in defining financial stability. 
Such principles consist of the following: the concept of financial system development 
that covers the instruments, institutions and markets; the wide role of finance in the 
economy; the resiliency of an economy that should be developed based on the 
dynamic characteristic of the financial market; and the financial crisis’s impacts, 
which should be measured in terms of the real economy’s level of severity. Based on 
these principles, Schinasi (2004) proposed a definition of financial stability as follows: 
‘…a financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating the 
performance of an economy, and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise 
endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events…’ 
(Schinasi, 2004).  
This definition captures two basic concepts of instability, namely (i) that one should 
be aware of the real disturbance and its real impact on economic fundamentals, and 
(ii) the ability of such an economy to become resilient from adverse effects or to 
recover from the crisis. Schinasi (2004) emphasised several fundamental points in 
this definition. The first point is the range of stability that explains the state or position 
of financial system stability in a tolerable boundary, which can be measured by the 
ability of finance in promoting the economic performance. The second point is the 
ability of the financial system to facilitate the performance of an economy, which 
intends to explain the role of finance to help the financial market to efficiently allocate 
resources, accelerate the rate of growth and maintain the performance of the 
economy. Moreover, the above definition seeks to combine two sources of instability 
by emphasising the endogenous factor and the exogenous factor. According to 
Schinasi (2004), the endogenous factor is the process of the accumulation of 
instability as the financial system—in this case, the banking system—is prone to a 
liquidity crisis. This problem may occur in connection with the banking sector’s role 
in gathering the funds from savers and investors and distributing these funds in the 
form of a loan to the borrowers. Meanwhile, the exogenous factor is the existence of 
shock or various adverse events that occur to affect the financial system. 
3.04 The causes of and responses to deal with financial crisis 
The causes of financial crises under mainstream views can be summarised into two 
factors. The first mechanism is related to weaknesses in the financial system, which 
covers the government and market failure; the second channel is the liquidity problem 
in the banking sector. In some cases, the occurrence of a crisis is the combination of 
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both of these factors and the presence of adverse shock attacking the financial 
system (Mishkin, 1997, 2001; Krugman, 1999; Corsetti et al., 1998).  
From the crisis-generation models, the first- and second-generation models 
explained the mechanisms of the occurrence of a financial crisis, and have discussed 
their causes, emphasising the role of government policy and speculative attack. The 
first-generation model has underlined the inconsistency of government policies as 
the cause of financial crisis. One of the common policy responses that should be 
taken by authorities under this model is the avoidance of the occurrence of a financial 
crisis by preventing the conflict between fiscal and monetary policies. The second-
generation model emphasises the shift of financial market expectations towards the 
government’s decision to maintain its fixed exchange rate. Since market expectations 
can affect government decisions, the second-generation model prescribes the policy 
in terms of how the government should take the decision in the period of currency 
crisis, such as minimising costs by devaluing its currency (Flood & Merion, 1996). 
Under the third-generation model, the explanation of the causes and policy 
responses to the financial crisis are different to the previous two models.   
Mishkin (1997, 2001) framed his analysis in line with the assumption of financial 
market imperfection. According to Mishkin (2001), the financial market cannot 
efficiently perform its function to channel the funds to the economic agents since they 
do not have perfectly similar or identical information on such transactions or financial 
instruments. Mishkin (1997) explained four factors as being the causes of financial 
instability, comprising increasing interest rates, balance sheets deterioration, the 
deterioration of non-bank balance sheets, and increasing uncertainty, which are 
considered as adverse shocks. The financial system becomes unstable when these 
factors are transmitted to the financial system and are seen to hinder the flow of 
information, which creates an ill-functioning and inefficient financial market. As a 
result, Mishkin argued that the government should be more active in undertaking 
prudential supervision, promoting market-based discipline, strengthening domestic 
institutions, and improving risk management. 
The analyses of financial instability under mainstream views commonly focus on the 
relationship between financial instability and the structure of financial system, 
especially in the banking sector. Banking sector distress is argued as being the 
central problem that creates disruption into other sectors in the country, leads to the 
deterioration of macroeconomic indicators, and is expected to cause increasing 
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financial crisis costs (Borio & Lowe, 2002). Moreover, in the case of developing 
countries, private sector reliance on the banking sector is much greater than those of 
some developed countries. If there is a vulnerability within the banking sector, 
negative effects on the economy may be witnessed. In most cases, when a crisis 
occurs, domestic financial institutions face liquidity problems as they experience a 
shortage in liquid assets.  
Commercial banks are exposed to liquidity risk, which may create vulnerability across 
the banking sector. According to Knittel et al. (2006, pp. 258–260), in its daily 
operations, commercial banks have a task as intermediaries to channel funds from 
depositors to borrowers. Within this operation, there are two dimensions of the 
utilisation of money that affect the commercial banks, namely short-term and long-
term. In lending funds to borrowers, commercial banks engage in long-term 
transactions since loan repayment from borrowers depends on the schedule provided 
in the loan agreement. On the other hand, the customers may claim their money at 
any time. In the normal period, commercial banks can manage its liquidity by 
obtaining credit from the banking system, encouraging their customers to make 
deposits, selling financial assets on the capital market, and using the Central Bank’s 
lending facility (Knittel et al., 2006, p. 259). However, during the crisis, it is difficult to 
meet customers’ demand for cash since the process of converting assets to cash or 
finding a lending facility cannot be performed simultaneously. Accordingly, a liquidity 
crisis or liquidity problem will be experienced by commercial banks as their liquid 
assets—which are their stock of liquid reserves—are seen to be less than or cannot 
cover their liabilities—more specifically, their deposits. In an effort to deal with this 
problem, the Central Bank can step in by providing liquidity support to the illiquid 
banks. As an example, during the period of the 1997/1998 financial crisis, the 
Indonesian Central Bank used liquidity assistance and operated as the lender of last 
resort to save the condition of the banking sector, accompanied by a higher interest 
policy. This practice can also be found during the current European debt crisis, when 
Greece supplied liquidity to its banks (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012). The effort to 
help the banking sector out of its liquidity problem is one of the mainstream view’s 
policy prescriptions; in many cases, however, the implementation of tight monetary 
policy causes the corporation to experience burdens. Tight monetary policy in the 
crisis circumstance is argued as worsening economic conditions and weakening 
private sector balance sheets. With a high-interest rate policy, the debt-to-equity ratio 
in the private sector will change drastically as a result of the escalation of its 
numerator, which is the outstanding debt. In other words, besides the problem of 
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liquidity, there is another problem of solvency; this is seen to have a crucial impact 
and endures in the longer period. 
3.05 The approach to measuring financial instability 
Tymoigne (2010) described two different approaches to financial instability, the 
evolutionary or dynamic approach, and the static approach. The first approach is the 
evolutionary or dynamic approach, which considers financial instability as a process 
within the financial system that changes the structure of the economy to become 
fragile and where this change may occur even in a tranquil period. The examples of 
dynamic approach will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  
The second approach is a static one that assumes financial fragility as a state and 
treats the exogenous shock as the cause of the financial system becoming unstable, 
and may lead the country into the stage of crisis (Schroeder, 2009; Tymoigne, 2010). 
This approach uses different variables to develop an index that is expected to give a 
signal that policy-makers can take as an indication of the occurrence and severity of 
a financial crisis. Some economists (Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Goldstein et al., 2000) developed the instrument with this approach, which 
intends to send a signal before the crisis outbreak and has named it the EWI. In 
developing the instrument, the method involves existing variables capturing financial 
system movements, such as macroeconomic indicators including real, household 
and corporate sectors, financial liberalisation indicators, the external sector and the 
financial market indicators. Furthermore, there are efforts focused on building the 
instrument in mind of assessing the condition of a financial system by developing 
such index. This effort arises in response to the growing need amongst policy-makers 
to anticipate and implement the necessary policy for handling financial fragility.  
3.05.1 Early Warning Indicators 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) proposed the so-called EWI to gauge the vulnerability 
of economic conditions. Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio and Drehmann (2009) and 
Drehmann et al. (2011) expanded this method by focusing on banking crises. The 
main purpose of such studies was to determine effective indicators that could prevent 
a country from crisis occurrence. The analysis is conducted by identifying the gap 
between the long-term trend and the current level of each concerned variable. This 
step is followed by setting up the threshold to capture the extreme movements and 
assessing the accuracy of each variable by comparing it with the crisis episode. 
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Some indicators that are commonly used include the ratio of private credit to GDP, 
economic growth, exchange rate movement, stock prices movement, monetary 
aggregates, and the Central Bank policy rate. 
3.05.2 The Financial Instability Composite Index 
Bordo et al. (2002) developed the US financial instability index by aggregating four 
sub-indices that consist of the rate of business failures, banking system conditions, 
real interest rate, and interest rate spreads. Through this analysis, the annual sub-
index is computed from the annual values minus its median, which is divided by each 
sub index’s standard deviation. These sub-indices are summed to obtain the 
composite index, which is meant to be a forward indicator of a financial crisis. Bordo 
et al. (2002) set the threshold based on the value of the standard deviation of the 
composite index to determine the crisis period, and further classifies the crisis period 
when the index exceeds 1.5 standard deviations. With this threshold, it seems that, 
when the index reaches 1.5 standard deviations, the financial system has already 
entered the crisis period. In other words, the index cannot fulfil the intention as a 
forward indicator.  
Following the attempt to develop and measure the financial instability index, Illing and 
Liu (2006) maintained that the structure of a financial system is fragile to experiencing 
a shock. When there is an economic shock, the shock will be transmitted to each 
economic unit within the financial system and will accordingly affect the economic 
unit’s financial condition. As a result, the economic units will experience cash flow 
and balance sheet problems. The authors argued that one should emphasise the 
banking sector, foreign exchange market, debt market and equity market. With these 
four sub-systems, it is possible to develop an index that measures financial conditions 
and predicts the state of instability. Following this work, there are methods focused 
on developing the crisis index, as presented in the works of Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009), Hollo et al. (2012), and Louzis and Vouldis (2013). 
These methods are extended and improved by involving the current techniques on 
econometrics, adding other financial market variables, or using high-frequency data. 
There are several steps to developing the index: for example, one should calculate 
the sub-index of each market segment based on the relevant variables. This step can 
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be done by standardising13 or manipulating market segment data using common 
techniques, such as principal component analysis, cumulative distribution function, 
or weighted-average, so as to produce an index. These methods are argued as 
showing the ability to capture financial instability that may lead to the financial crisis. 
Once each sub index of the market segment is obtained, all sub-indices can be 
aggregated to achieve the composite index. However, Borio (2009) emphasised two 
aspects of financial instability measurement: the first deals with the assessment of a 
financial instability measurement that was done and taken by the authorities, or an 
ex-post financial instability measurement; the second factor is the ex-ante financial 
instability measurement, which focuses on the measurement of the level of current 
instability, and whether or not it pressures the financial system. By understanding the 
level, authorities will be well positioned to identify the strategy or response needed to 
tackle the problems. The author asserts that the instrument for measuring the 
instability of a financial system is needed by the government and agencies 
concerned, such as the Central Bank and Financial Service Authority, in helping them 
to evaluate their performance in decision-making and supporting them in assessing 
the current economic or financial condition. According to Borio (2009), most of the 
instruments offered have sufficient sensitivity and ability to measure past and current 
conditions, but are weak in forecasting future situations. In other words, the ex-ante 
measurements lack the capability to capture the financial conditions and transmit the 
useful information that permits authorities to respond with a more precise strategy. 
The following chapters, namely Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, will discuss the methods 
commonly used in dealing and measuring financial instability, based on the 
frameworks previously discussed. The intention is to explore the applicability of these 
frameworks using empirical data, which then needs to be examined in line with the 
facts or historical events, either in the case of domestic or global events. 
 
                                                
13 Two types of data rescaling are standardisation and normalisation. The first term refers to the process 
of data transformation to have mean of 0 and standard deviations of 1. Bordo et al (2002) used 
standardisation process in calculating the index. The latter refers to the process for finding a same 
range of value in order to minimise biases. The normalisation scales all data to have value in the 
range of 0 to 1.  
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3.06 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter is to gain a more in-depth understanding of financial 
crises mechanisms under the mainstream views by exploring three financial crisis-
generation models. The chapter discusses the way in which each generation model 
was developed and further highlights the weaknesses of each model in explaining 
crisis occurrence. From the discussion, this chapter finds that the crisis-generation 
models are formulated and developed based on a specific crisis event in a country 
or region and formalised into a model. When the analyses are based on a specific 
crisis event in a certain period, it is possible that the model will be difficult to predict 
or explain the occurrence of a financial crisis that may be erupted in a country in the 
near future. 
The analysis also highlights several features of financial crisis under the mainstream 
views. First, it seeks to clarify the definition of a financial crisis. There are three types 
of crisis, namely banking, currency and debt, as identified in the literature. Each of 
these crises has its own definition, which is based on a criterion. In mainstream views, 
one may find that there is a distinction between financial instability and financial crisis; 
however, the terms ‘financial fragility’ and ‘financial instability’ are used 
interchangeably. 
Second, this chapter succinctly provides an explanation of the factors seen to trigger 
financial crises, such as weaknesses in the financial system and liquidity problems in 
the banking sector. By identifying the cause of the crisis, the policy that should be 
implemented so as to handle the problem focuses on prudential supervision, 
improvement of market-based discipline and risk management. Within the 
mainstream views, the crisis that occurred in Southeast Asian countries, as well as 
the GFC, is argued as representing the issue of liquidity crisis. The policy option that 
can be adopted by the government in an effort to solve this crisis should focus on 
providing liquidity support to the illiquid financial institutions. 
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Chapter 4  
Financial Instability Hypothesis:  closed and open economy 
frameworks 
4.01 Introduction 
In the late 1970s, the U.S. began to liberalise its financial system by introducing the 
deregulation of financial market that was followed by the decision of the U.S. 
authorities not to supervise its financial sector (Orhangazi, 2014; Arestis, 2016, p.23). 
The process of liberalisation came to its peak when the government revoked the 
Glass-Stegal Act in 1999. Glass-Steagal Act is the law that regulates the separation 
of commercial bank and investment bank. Furthermore, there is a new law pertaining 
to Commodity and Futures Modernization Act that was enacted in 2000, which makes 
transactions in the form of credit default swap and asset-backed securities 
unregulated (Orhangazi, 2014). Starting from 1999, securitization occurred 
extensively since there is no regulation to separate the commercial and investment 
bank. The mechanism of securitization has commonly been used by financial 
institutions to get rid of their loan portfolio. At the same time, house prices were very 
high and it opened the opportunity for households to obtain new loans. When the 
housing prices started to decline, it led to the increasing mortgage loan rate, which 
gave burden for the borrowers. In addition, the condition was worsened as a result of 
the borrowers’ inability to repay their mortgages. Following this condition, the asset-
backed securities that used the mortgages as the underlying transaction lost their 
value, which then adversely affected the capital market. 
To deal with the crisis that occurred in 2007/2008, the U.S. authorities responded 
through the implementation of conventional and unconventional accommodative 
monetary policies, as well as the fiscal stimulus and bank bailouts, to maintain the 
level of domestic economic performance. In particular, with regards to monetary 
policy, the U.S. monetary authority sets low-interest rate, which was assumed to 
increase domestic economic activity and encourage growth. However, when the level 
of interest rate is low or near zero, the U.S. monetary authority may not be willing to 
push down the interest rate further. One alternative policy is by imposing the 
Quantitative Easing. This is the unconventional policy as the Central Bank prints 
money to purchase the government bonds from the secondary market. This 
mechanism has the ultimate objective to boost the private sector’s expenditures 
(Joyce et.al, 2011). 
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With the high degree of openness among countries and capital mobility among the 
financial markets, the policy of the U.S. monetary authority cutting their interest rate 
triggered the funds’ owners to find the most profitable place and instruments. The 
motive of funds’ owners is clear: maximizing their profit; hence, a possible way to 
attain a high profit is avoiding the low-interest environment and seeking a place or 
instrument elsewhere that offers high rate of returns, even though this decision may 
involve a higher risk. The developed countries’ monetary policy that set lower interest 
rates may lead to large capital inflows into the developing countries, which adopt 
higher interest rate. However, this may create a problem for the developing countries 
especially when the inflows are in the form of portfolio investments (Grabel, 1996). 
The portfolio investment is a type of flow that is easy to move to other financial 
markets. If the U.S. authority then increases the interest rate, there is a tendency that 
the investors will pull out their money from the developing financial markets, which 
then create negative inflows, or, in the worst cases, the sudden reversal of capital 
inflows.  One reason for the global financial market investors is still investing their 
funds in the U.S. financial market deals with the investors’ view that the U.S. is the 
safe haven. 
There are studies that have explored the cause of the crisis, which are inspired by 
the work that is developed by Hyman Minsky (1986). Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (FIH) originally starts the analysis on the firm’s behaviour to respond 
tranquil economic conditions. The favourable economic conditions motivate this firm 
to expand the business capacity by finding external funds. This decision leads to the 
positive movement of debt to equity ratio. When the firm tends to obtain external 
funds to finance its investment, this condition may change the firm’s financial 
structure to become more speculative. As more firms in the country have the same 
decision, the country will experience a transformation to become more fragile 
financial structure (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2001, p. 86). 
Minsky’s explanation of financial instability is quite different to the common 
understanding of financial instability that focuses their attention on the exogenous 
factors, for example, relaxed government regulation and the occurrence of external 
shocks. Minsky’s work conveys the idea that instability lies inside the financial 
system, and that a stable financial system becomes fragile, and stability breeds 
instability (Arestis and Glickman, 2002; Kregel, 2007). The FIH introduces the view 
that a crisis happens when the structure of financial system has become unstable. 
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This chapter will focus the discussion on the financial instability and financial crisis 
from the perspective of this specific features of FIH.  
Minsky’s argument is framed in a closed-economy analysis and is explained by 
identifying important elements that have the potential to create instability. Arestis and 
Glickman (2002) listed five elements in explaining Minsky’s framework under the 
closed-economy analysis. First, the motive to innovate financial instruments is to gain 
high profits. As one of the economic units that plays a central role, the commercial 
banks try to attract their customers by creating a new financial instrument. This 
activity includes the process to innovate financial product in addition to their daily 
activities as lenders (Minsky, 1986, p. 237). Second, the behaviour of each economic 
unit in financing their debt obligations will determine the type of financing units, 
whether it is a hedge, speculative or Ponzi finance.  In the closed-economy analysis, 
with these type of financing units, it is possible to explain the transformation of a 
robust economy to become fragile as the structure or composition of the units 
changes. Third, the carry trade mechanism allows the economic units to take the 
opportunity to borrow from the financial institutions with a lower interest and invest 
the funds in the higher interest financial instruments to obtain a higher return. Fourth, 
the phenomenon of ‘success breeds success’ motivates the economic agents to gain 
profits regardless of the risks that may be embedded on the transactions. Fifth, the 
triggers of a crisis lie within the financial system.  
Arestis and Glickman (2002) extended Minsky’s closed-economy analysis to an open 
economy. The discussion emphasised the existence of capital movements between 
countries resulting from the foreign investors’ decision to maximize their profit through 
the carry trade mechanism. This phenomenon occurs, particularly when the domestic 
interest rate is higher than the foreign interest rate and the exchange rate is relatively 
stable, which has the power to attract foreign funds. The capital inflows to the 
domestic financial system, however, may create another problem, for example, when 
these flows are followed by the increased government debt to absorb the funds 
available, or it takes the form of short-term financing (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 
2015). In most cases, capital inflows to a country occur when there is an entity that 
looks for a foreign borrowing from abroad; creating a build-up of liabilities of borrower 
regarding foreign currency and, for the Central Bank, accumulating the foreign 
reserves.   If the debt to reserves ratio is low, the country is categorized as a hedge 
financing unit. Conversely, when the debt to reserves ratio increases, it suggests that 
there is a growing amount of domestic institutions’ liabilities, which could make the 
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country a more speculative or a Ponzi financing unit. The increasing debt to reserves 
ratio may provide a negative signal for investors or speculators, who then intend to 
sell their financial assets. When this event occurs, the price of domestic assets will 
drop, which then has a negative impact on the assets and liabilities of the lenders 
and borrowers. 
This chapter will also cover the discussion on the concept of FIH that is developed 
by Hyman Minsky. The following section will present the framework that commonly 
used to discuss the FIH, in the closed and open economy, including the famous types 
of financing unit. The last section is an exploration of the implications of the FIH. 
4.02 General concept 
Minsky (1986, pp. 68-69 and pp.183-184) framed the discussion of the FIH within a 
capitalist economy. The term capitalist economy could be described as a system  
‘using complex, elaborate and expensive capital equipment and as a sophisticated, 
complex, convoluted, and evolving financial system that makes the indirect 
ownership of wealth possible’ (Minsky, 1986, p. 68). 
The capitalist economy involves the activity of economic agents, i.e. public and 
private sectors, households, and their interrelationships in a financial system that 
comprises financial institutions, markets, and instruments. The factor that plays an 
important role in Minsky’s analysis is the relationship between non-bank institutions 
and the banking sector, particularly in financing processes. When a firm intends to 
expand the business, there are various sources of financing, for example, cash 
financing, equity shares, and debt. Cash financing is the internal source of financing, 
which can be used to undertake corporate actions. Since the firms still need to 
finance its daily activities, however, sometimes there are constraints on utilizing cash 
financing to meet all the investment needs. If there is a limited amount of cash 
available or none at all, the firm may obtain the funds by issuing its shares in the 
stock market. Issuing shares have the consequence of declaring the buyers of the 
stocks as new owners of the firm and hence, the firm is obliged to generate profits 
and pay dividends to these owners (Minsky, 1986, p. 69). The third alternative is 
financing from debt, either in the form of direct borrowing or debt securities. These 
debt instruments have the consequences of the debtor needing to fulfil their 
obligations to those it borrowed from. The potential fragility of an economic system 
will be explored by using this framework. 
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Further, Minsky (1992) emphasised the banking sector, including the activities of 
commercial banks, as a particularly important entity in his analysis. The reason to 
include the banking sector in the FIH is based on the common characteristic of 
commercial banks. In its daily routine, commercial banks are the credit creators 
(Lavoie, 2014, p.188). Banks can expand their balance sheets by creating new 
lending to its customers. As the borrowers draw on the loan commitment, they will 
spend the funds to finance activities and transfer the money to their counterparts, 
which would be deposited in a bank account. Hence, this is the mechanism of how 
loans create deposits. In addition to the money creation function, bankers can also 
obtain profits by charging the borrowers an interest margin or mark-up in addition to 
the Central Bank interest rate. Other than the interest rate, bankers maintain their 
relationship with the customers, and some banks also offer their expertise in financial 
arrangements to the customers. The effort to maximize profits is natural since 
bankers need to be compensated for the risks that are embedded in every transaction 
they are involved in. In so doing, besides undertaking its activity through lending and 
borrowing mechanism, the banking sector also innovates, creating new financial 
instruments (Minsky, 1986, p.72; 1992). 
4.03 The closed economic system 
Minsky’s argument is developed within a closed economy analysis (Arestis and 
Glickman, 2002; Matsumoto, 2007) and explained via an example of the relationship 
between commercial banks and firms. The central argument of the FIH rests on the 
relationship between non-bank institutions and the banking sector, especially in 
dealing with the external sources of financing. External funds can be obtained 
through direct borrowing from financial institutions. In other words, there are two 
parties involved based on their role in an economy, namely non-financial institutions 
– consist of corporations, households, government - and financial institutions. In the 
lending-borrowing framework, the first conducts itself as the entity who will obtain the 
funds to finance its investments or activities or as the borrower; while, the latter have 
an important role in providing or lending their funds to the borrower. 
The investment decision proceeds in stages: a corporate action that is being made 
in the current period will provide an amount of return in the next period. While the 
returns received today are the result of investment decisions that were made in the 
past. In the context of investment financed by external funds, the process of obtaining 
debt to finance investment is brought forward to emphasise the importance of 
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borrowers’ expectation of securing loans and lenders’ expectation of lending 
assessment. As a consequence of the lending and borrowing activities, there will be 
a schedule of cash flows and liabilities. How firm deals with its income and expenses 
or payment obligations will determine the firm’s types of financing, whether it is a 
hedge, speculative or Ponzi financing unit. The firm’s type of financing is one of the 
central topics of the FIH. The types of financing will be discussed further in the next 
subsection, which then will be followed by a discussion of the potential problem 
created when the structure of these types of financing changes. 
4.03.1 Type of financing units 
In investment decisions, a corporation will be expected to generate cash flows on 
income, portfolio, and the balance sheet (Minsky, 1986, p.201). The income cash 
flows are defined as flows that are generated from the production process, for 
example, wages, salaries, the production expenses, and earnings after taxes. An 
economic unit that has income cash flows that meet with the repayment schedule is 
relatively immune to experiencing a financial crisis. The portfolio cash flows are flows 
generated from the operation of the purchasing and selling of the corporation’s assets 
or the acknowledgment of new liabilities. The third cash flow is balance sheet cash 
flows that are generated from the existing liabilities. At the aggregate level, these 
three cash flows can influence the financial system vulnerability.  
There are three types of financing units that can be identified by combining the cash 
flows of the economic agents with their debt or liabilities. These types of financing 
units consist of: hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance (Dymski and Pollin, 1992). 
Minsky (1986, p. 206-208) described the definition of these three types of financing 
units, which were distinguished by the level of the expected income and payment of 
obligations or commitments. Hedge financing units are entities whose income cash 
flows exceed the current and future obligations. Even though a hedge financing unit 
has debt, but the amount of its debt is low. In other words, the hedge financing unit’s 
cash flows are sufficient enough to fulfil its liabilities commitments (Tymoigne and 
Wray, 2014, p.22). Speculative financing means that corporations can partially repay 
their debt obligations (interest payment), but roll over their amortization of principal. 
This refinancing practice takes place because of insufficient income to fulfil its debt 
obligations. The speculative financing unit borrows the short-term financing to make 
a cash payment and maintain its solvency. The last entities are called Ponzi financing 
or interest-capitalization financing (Tymoigne and Wray, 2014, p.22) that capitalizes 
its interest and principal payments. Ponzi financing uses new borrowing to refinance 
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all its debt obligations.  Similar to speculative units, Ponzi financing units have greater 
expenses than income. With this practice, Ponzi financing generates an 
accumulation of outstanding debt. Among these three units, Ponzi financing should 
obtain at higher risk premium from the commercial banks than the others when they 
propose to obtain the debt. 
4.03.2 Definitions of financial fragility and instability 
One factor that may affect the financial fragility is the economic units’ expectation or 
risk preference with regards to economic performance. The adjustment of the risk 
preference depends on the financial market situation which affects the financial 
institutions in assessing their risk tolerance or ‘margin of safety’. When the financial 
market is ‘bullish’, and the economic units’ confidence is high, the borrowers will shift 
their source of financing from an internal source to an external source to increase 
their investment (Weise and Barbera, 2010, pp. 215-216). Minsky (1995) maintained 
that the attitudes of the borrowers and lenders towards risk will change because of 
the improvement in the financial market condition. In the early stage of economic 
recovery, the borrowers and lenders are risks averse. This attitude affects their 
investment behaviour by setting large margins of safety and prioritizing the internal 
source of financing. In the case where they use the external sources; they keep 
maintaining their position as Hedge financing units.  As economic conditions are 
improving, this attitude may change to become risk neutral, and there will be 
increasing corporate actions via external financed investments. At this stage, we may 
consider this behaviour that of speculative financing units. Finally, as the economic 
recovery continues, and the economic units being comfortable to expand their 
business, the attitude will change to become risk acceptance, and the economic units 
will tend to use Ponzi borrowing schemes to finance investments. 
The change of liability structures (Schroeder, 2002) and the transformation of the 
proportion of financing units will determine the state of the economy (Minsky, 1995). 
The firm’s liability structure is determined by the decision to obtain external financing, 
which in turn will increase its indebtedness. However, if this decision does not 
increase the firm’s profit and improve the ability of the firm to repay its debt 
obligations, the firm may be categorized as a speculative or Ponzi financing unit. The 
increasing ratio of firm’s liabilities to its profits will increase the fragility of the firm, 
and when most of the firms in the economy face this same situation, this condition 
can yield a financially unstable economy (Schroeder, 2002).      
60 
 
In a capitalist economy, the financial system may frequently change from robustness 
or resilience to fragile (Dymski and Pollin, 1992, p. 40). To emphasise the difference 
between these terms, Minsky (1986, p. 204; 1995) explained that robustness is the 
economic state where it can easily absorb and handle shocks that emerge, and 
resilience means that the economy can recover quickly after experiencing a shock. 
Whereas, financial fragility is a condition when the economy is unable to respond to 
a shock.  In other words, financial fragility is negative relative to robustness and 
resilience. This proposition implies that the state of robustness and resilience 
contains a high proportion of Hedge financing units, whilst fragility suggests a high 
proportion of Ponzi financing units.  
According to Tymoigne (2010) and Tymoigne and Wray (2014, p. 40), financial 
fragility as characterized by a high proportion of Ponzi financing can trigger increasing 
levels of financial instability. By having a high proportion of Ponzi financing units, the 
economy will be sensitive to a change in variables, namely the interest rates and 
exchange rates that are associated with the balance sheets and income statements. 
For example, when there is a sudden increase in the interest rate, the balance sheet 
of Ponzi financing units will quickly deteriorate.  In addition, a deep currency 
depreciation affects the ability of firms that have external debts. Based on this 
argument, the definition of financial fragility is a condition when the financial system 
is sensitive to the movement of the interest and exchange rates and changes in these 
variables will have an impact on the financial system to become unstable. Therefore, 
when financial fragility emerges and grows in the economy, it will result in more 
severe financial instability (Tymoigne, 2010).  
From this point of view, there is a distinction between financial fragility and financial 
instability. It can be inferred that financial fragility is the trigger for financial instability. 
Hence, financial instability can be defined as a condition that can create an adverse 
impact on the economy, especially the ability of financial instability to affect the price 
instability that may cause the debt deflation (Tymoigne, 2010; Lavoie, 2014, p. 286; 
Tymoigne and Wray, 2014, p. 41). 
4.03.3 The cause of financial instability 
Minsky (1986) started his analysis with the premise that financial fragility and 
instability are endogenous. Minsky argued that instability is embedded in the 
capitalist economy, and the fragility may create financial instability (Kregel, 2007). 
This argument means that crises happen because of internal factors already located 
within the financial system that causes the economy to become unstable with regards 
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to the behaviour of economic agents during the tranquil period (Papadimitriou and 
Wray, 2008). There are, at least, three mechanisms that may explain the endogeneity 
of financial fragility and instability. 
First, when the circumstances support doing business, profits are positive, and firms 
try to increase their capacity with new investment. The increasing confidence 
together with positive profit expectations will be accompanied by the availability of 
credit. At the same time, the stock market also experiences similar conditions with a 
rising trend of stock market indices, representing the rising of assets prices, which 
build strong expectations among the financial market investors of obtaining capital 
gains (DeAntoni, 2010, p.198). The promising conditions for doing business, together 
with the availability of funding in the credit market will encourage businesspeople to 
expand their business and find an external source of financing. When they obtain the 
debt commitment, on the liability side, the expenses to serve the debt obligations will 
also increase. DeAntoni (2010) argued that debt commitments could increase faster 
than a firm’s profit, and at a certain level, exceeded it. This condition may bring the 
consequence that a firm’s revenue cannot fully serve the debt obligations, which then 
may lead the transformation of the structure of the economic units. With this 
condition, there will be a high possibility of increasing speculative and Ponzi financing 
units, a condition that forms the fragility of a financial system. 
Second, the intention to get a lower cost of borrowing drives economic agents to find 
short-term financing. There are two main reasons why the amount of shorter maturity 
debt with flexible interest rates are increasing in a prolonged period of economic 
growth (Tymoigne, 2010). The first reason is a shorter maturity debt has a cheaper 
cost of borrowing compared to longer ones. This comparison can be seen from the 
pattern of a normal yield curve that has an upward slope with horizontal line showing 
the maturity of financial instruments and the rate of yield in the vertical line. From the 
structure of its yield, the shorter maturity financial instrument has lower cost since it 
contains less risk exposure. The second reason is the possibility to roll over the debt 
principal. The refinancing practice allows the borrower to have options to manage 
their risks, in particular, the refinancing risk.  Because of these reasons, however, the 
borrowers become more vulnerable and will be exposed to changes in economic 
conditions. 
Third, the transformation from robustness to fragility is possible in an environment of 
profit-maximizing entities. The commercial banks will guide and accommodate their 
customers’ need (Arestis and Glickman, 2002) to find the way in obtaining more 
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profits through investing in a certain financial instrument. To attract customers, 
commercial banks will seek to create new financial products. Minsky (1986, p. 72, 
198 and 229-230) noted that a successful financial innovation would generate more 
profits and spread to the other entities. The success of financial products will be 
followed by the innovation of instruments, a new type of financial contract and new 
customers. The disadvantage of new innovative instruments is that they may contain 
high risks and have a structure that potentially creates financial lost in the adverse 
economic events.  One example of how financial innovation can trigger financial 
instability and crisis is the U.S. subprime crisis episode. The crisis occurs as a result 
of the subprime lending that is bundled or packaged in the form of mortgage-backed 
securities. This type of lending is characterized by low quality of borrowers, with low 
credit rating or high risk. By repackaging it into a new financial instrument with higher 
rate of returns, the financial market investors will be attracted and intend to buy it. 
To deal with this endogeneity problem, the proposal is to strengthen the financial 
system by involving a stringent government regulation. This proposal is quite similar 
to the mainstream views’, but the substance and object of the regulation are different. 
Lavoie (2014, pp.272-274; 2015) explained several points on this proposal. Starting 
from the lender side, the regulations should have the aim of restricting the 
entrepreneurial attitude of bankers to lessen the pace of financial innovations. 
Second, regulation can promote the borrower’s circumspection and prevent the 
borrower from low-quality lending. One proposal that can be considered is the 
implementation of strict regulations on the advance payment required in lending-
borrowing mechanisms. Following the magnitude of capital movements among 
countries under the open economy framework, one policy that could be implemented 
is capital controls or the management of capital flows (Arestis and Glickman, 2002; 
Epstein, 2005; Grabel, 2016). It is typically capital controls that have lately been 
abandoned by most of the countries as a result of free market principles ruling the 
global financial system. 
The prolongation of an economic boom will eventually experience a turning point and 
crisis. As pointed out by DeAntoni (2010, p.198), the persistence of the economic 
expansion may generate the pressure on the inflation rate. When the inflation rate 
hikes, the monetary authority will impose a tight monetary policy. This policy will 
subsequently result in a higher rate of interest. In other words, monetary policy affects 
the solvency of a firm. The mechanism by which the policy of the monetary authority 
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affects a firm’s condition will be explored in the next subsection by discussing the 
association between the policy rate and the solvency of firms. 
4.03.4 Financial instability and firms’ solvency in a closed economy 
The concept of solvency is important in dealing with the ability of a firm to be able to 
handle and cover its liabilities by having sufficient assets. It is quite different from the 
concept of liquidity, which refers to the ability to pay the short-term obligations using 
current assets and it links to the cash flows problem. The issue of solvency deals with 
long-term financial obligations, and within this concept, if an entity is insolvent, it has 
a problem with its capacity to pay the debts over the long-term. These two concepts 
should have received an equal attention from the monetary authority as they may 
have a serious impact on the economy.  
A corporation that tends to obtain the external source of financing via obtaining debt 
may face solvency problem. When a corporation faces a solvency problem, it does 
not have sufficient assets to cover its total debt. As more and more companies in a 
country have assets less than their liabilities, the country is possible to enter into an 
insolvency condition. With the increasing insolvency of corporations in a financial 
system, the occurrence of an adverse event may trigger debt deflation. According to 
Tymoigne and Wray (2014, p.41) debt deflation occurs when the borrowers, which 
may have a problem in their cash flows want to pay their debts by selling their assets. 
As a result, there is a massive declining in the asset prices. This declining of prices 
will affect the net worth of other economic units that previously do not face any 
difficulties. The authorities need a longer time to deal with solvency crisis compared 
to liquidity crisis since this issue touches the borrowers’ and lenders’ financial 
structure. However, according to Tymoigne and Wray (2014, p. 335), the economic 
agent that requires the help from the authorities is the borrowers. This policy can be 
implemented by helping the borrowers in restructuring the debts to increase borrows’ 
ability to pay the debt service. It is expected that this policy can have an impact on 
the lenders as they will gain their long-run profitability. However, in handling the 
financial crisis, most of the government focuses their attention to save the financial 
institutions. Hence, instead of focusing mainly on the illiquidity of financial institutions, 
it is necessary that the authorities pay attention to these two problems, namely 
liquidity crisis by actively conducting as lender of last resort and solvency crisis 
(Brancaccio and Fontana, 2013; Tymoigne and Wray, 2014, p. 335). 
As mentioned, the solvency of borrowers may be affected by the way the monetary 
authority determined the level of the domestic policy rate. Wolfson (2002) 
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emphasised the stance of a Central Bank in setting up the policy rate and this may 
be relevant to borrowers. Brancaccio and Fontana (2013) developed a model that 
could explain the mechanism by which a Central Bank’s policy influences the 
economic agents’ ability to deal with its long-term obligations. There are two 
explanations with regards to the solvency of an economy that involve the firms and 
workers. However, to get an idea of the mechanism as pertains to firms, this chapter 
focuses only on the solvency rule model constructed for firms.  
The solvency rule involves three equations consisting of the equilibrium of 
macroeconomic condition, the solvency conditions for firms, and the interest rate 
model. The first equation describes the relationship between the rate of profit (𝑟) and 
its deviation (𝛾) on left side with some main indicators, such as, the rate of inflation 
(𝜋), the growth rate (𝑔), the ratio of expenditure to income (𝑧), the firms and workers’ 
savings (𝑠௙ and  𝑠௪), and the quantity of product per unit of worker (𝑓(𝑘)) in the right-
hand side.  
(1 + 𝛾𝑟) = (ଵାగ)
௦೑
∗  ቈ(1 + 𝑔) + 𝑧 ௙(௞)
௞
−
ೞೢೈ
ು
௞
቉ …………………..(1) 
With this equation, the left-hand side shows the function of firms’ income and the 
right-hand side depicts the expenditure of the firms. The firms will enter solvency if 
their expenditures, on the right-hand side, are lower than or at least similar to their 
incomes. When the incomes are lower than the expenditures, the firms are insolvent. 
Departing from this assumption and including the variable of external financing into 
the model, the second equation describes the solvency condition of firms, as follows:   
(1 + 𝑖)(1 − 𝜆) ≤ 𝑠௙(1 + 𝛾𝑟) ……………………………………….(2) 
According to Brancaccio and Fontana (2013), the variable 𝜆 explains how borrowers 
refinance their debt obligations, which may show the level of financial instability. On 
this basis, the hedge financings unit will repay their debt principals and interests when 
these debt obligations fall due with the value of 𝜆 = 0. The speculative financing units 
need to roll over their debt principals and the value of 𝜆 =  ଵ
(ଵା௜)
 . Since the Ponzi 
financing units rely on and use new borrowing to refinance all the debt obligations, 
their value of 𝜆 is  ଵ
(ଵା௜)
 ≤  𝜆 ≤ 1. 
It is possible to draw the equation for the interest rate (𝑖) that is matched with the 
firms’ solvency by combining these two formulas. 
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𝑖 = ଵ
(ଵିఒ)
∗ ቂ1 + 𝑠௪(1 + 𝑟) + ቀ1 + (𝑧 − 𝑠௪)
௙(௞)
௞
ቁ 𝜋 + 𝑔ቃ − 1 …………………..(3) 
The right-hand side represents the level of firms’ profits and shows that when the 
value of 𝜆 is low or around 0, the level of profit is high. Conversely, when the value 
of 𝜆 is high or around 1, the firms’ profit is very low. It can be inferred that with low 
profit, the firms face a solvency problem and highly possibility of experiencing 
bankruptcy.  
To maintain the solvency of the borrowers, the rate of interest needs to be set to 
ensure equilibrium in these equations. If the Central Bank set the interest rate above 
the value of the equation, there is a high possibility that firms will experience 
insolvency.  With a higher interest rate, the borrowers need to put an additional 
portion of their budget to serve their debt obligations, leading to declining amount of 
profits. The condition will become worse for the firms that pay their debt obligations 
by refinancing it, i.e. issuing new debt to pay the interests and rolling over the debt 
principals. These firms have limited option for dealing with this problem since the 
effort to obtain a new debt will be difficult as a result of the sharp decline of future 
confidence. The borrowers may lessen the debt obligations by selling the assets and 
pre-paying the debt, but this option is also not easy to do since it is the illiquid asset. 
4.04 Financial instability in an open economy 
In developing his argument concerning the open economy, Minsky (1990) explained 
financial instability with the same framework as the closed-economy that the 
economic units’ balance sheets and income statements affected the robustness, 
resiliency, and instability of a financial structure in the economy. In an open economy, 
a similar relationship occurs in the way that economic units tend to deal with sources 
of funding. The intention to obtain more funding for expanding their businesses 
becomes one reason that foreign funds flow into the country. Some economists 
(Kregel, 1998; Dymski, 1999; and Arestis and Glickman, 2002) underlined the role of 
capital mobility among countries.  As an example, where there are low-interest rates 
in the developed world, the developing countries that have a higher interest rate will 
have an advantage with respect to capital inflows. The capital inflows may occur 
when there is a decision of foreign investors to make a placement in developing 
countries. These investors’ purpose to invest in developing countries is to acquire a 
higher potential positive rate of return. Referring to the firms’ behaviour in lending 
and borrowing framework, the FIH under open economic system also can be applied 
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to emerging market economies or developing countries that depend on foreign funds 
from international financial market to finance their development (Kregel, 2004, p.4). 
4.04.1 The relevant factors in foreign borrowing 
The consequences of using foreign funds to finance the investments depend on two 
variables: the movement of exchange rate and the interest rate changes. For entities 
that borrow from abroad, they should repay the debt obligations and, in most cases, 
they will expose themselves to currency risk since the movement of the exchange 
rate will affect the debt obligations’ payments. This mechanism also applies to a 
country that borrows from abroad. When indebtedness increases and at the same 
time there is a currency risk embedded in the foreign debt transactions, a country will 
become fragile and crisis-prone. In the case of Asian crisis 1997-1998, Arestis and 
Glickman (2002) explored one possibility of the transmission of financial crisis, which 
could be transmitted from an external financial system to a domestic financial market. 
The accumulation of foreign indebtedness leads to an increasing debt to reserves 
ratio and suggests a growing amount of domestic institutions’ liabilities, which could 
bring the country to resemble a more speculative or a Ponzi financing unit. This 
condition may serve as a negative signal for the financial market players, including 
investors and speculators, who then intend to sell their financial assets. There are at 
least two mechanisms that can affect a country’s condition adversely. Firstly, when 
the financial market players decide to liquidate their domestic financial assets, the 
price of domestic assets will drop, which then leads to the deterioration of the assets 
and liabilities of lenders and borrowers. Secondly, when the country finally devalues 
the domestic currency, the entities that have foreign currency liabilities while their 
revenues are in the domestic currency, will face a problem of currency mismatch 
(DeAntony, 2010, p.166).  
If there is a depreciation of the domestic currency, the amount of money in terms of 
domestic currency to serve the principal and interest payments will increase 
proportionately. In other words, the sudden appreciation in foreign currency may 
affect the cash flow of speculative financing units. This appreciation of foreign 
currency may cause the occurrence of currency mismatch since the firms’ outcomes 
of the investments only generate domestic currency.  Paula and Alves (2000) made 
a simulation that described the combination of firms’ revenue and expenditures. 
These authors showed how the change of foreign currency has an impact on the 
firms’ incomes and expenditures. 
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From this simple simulation, Table 4.1 describes the impact of foreign currency 
appreciation on various types of companies. Two types of companies that are 
relatively free from the impact of currency appreciation or depreciation are company 
1 and 4, whose incomes and expenditures are in the same form of currency. If there 
will be a depreciation or appreciation of the foreign currency, these companies are 
free from additional expenses since they do not have exposure to the currency risk. 
Company 2 will enjoy the windfall profit in the case that the foreign exchange 
depreciation occurs. As one may see from Table 4.1, this company’s revenues are 
denominated in USD. Conversely, Company 3 suffers from loss or declining profits if 
the domestic currency is weakened against the USD.  
Table 4.1 A simulation of revenue & expenditures based on type of currency 
 Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4 
Revenue USD USD IDR IDR 
Expenditures USD IDR USD IDR 
Impact from USD 
appreciation 
neutral + - neutral 
Source: Own calculations based on Paula and Alves (2000) 
The second variable that affects the use of foreign capital relates to the interest rates. 
There are two mechanisms that are labelled as carry trade and interest rate changes. 
The carry trade mechanism can be defined as the decision of the economic units to 
obtain a return by borrowing in a low-interest rate and investing the money in a 
financial asset that offers a higher return (Lavoie, 2014, p.471).  In a global context, 
this mechanism allows the flow of funds to go to the place that offers a higher profit, 
for example, when a financial institution borrows at a low short-term interest rate in 
one country and lends the funds to another entity at the higher long-term interest rate 
(Wolfson, 2002). Arestis and Glickman (2002) emphasised that the decision to use 
the external financing rather than internal financing as a source of finance would not 
be necessary make them as a speculative unit. Nevertheless, the decision of 
economic units to use a carry trade mechanism will have an impact on the fragility of 
financial structure. Since the speculative financing units borrow money in the short-
term and lend it in the long-term, maturity mismatch potentially occurs as these 
financing units are not able to refinance their obligations, or they cannot find the 
source of financing because the borrowing cost is too high. This condition can make 
the country vulnerable to experiencing a financial crisis. Also, increasing interest 
rates may also threaten domestic firms when the funds that are obtained use a 
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floating interest rate since the interest expense will increase. The increasing interest 
rate expense will create a burden for the speculative financing units, which in a 
certain stage will pass on the cost to the Hedge financing units. The increasing 
portion of Hedge financing units that are transformed to become speculative financing 
units may lead the country into vulnerability. 
4.04.2 The solvency rules in the open economy  
Wolfson (2002) maintained that in the global context, two factors were relevant for 
borrowers that borrowed from abroad, domestic monetary policy and the rate of 
interest in the lender’s country. One example that it is worth noting is the U.S. Federal 
Reserve policy of increasing the rate of interest in the 1980s, which affected the 
Mexican government and firms asking their lenders to reschedule their commercial 
loans (Whitt, 1996; Rabobank, 2013). The interconnections among open-economic 
countries will create the complexity in an attempt to draw the mechanism of the 
domestic monetary policy, the interest rate, and the movement of the exchange rate. 
To solve this problem, Brancaccio and Fontana (2015) offered an explanation of the 
solvency rule in two countries with the framework of a monetary union. The authors 
used the monetary union as a case study to simplify the complex mechanisms that 
exist in the financial system. However, this model can portray the association 
between the monetary policy and the relevant variables, as well as its impact on the 
movement of capital between the countries. 
Following the work of Brancaccio and Fontana (2015), the construction of the model 
in the open economy framework is much more complicated than the closed economy. 
The model involves two countries within a monetary union, which means there will 
be a Central Bank issuing the currency. Within this model, there are three equations 
that are involved in explaining the mechanism of the policy of monetary authority for 
each country. These three equations can be extended to examine other variables, 
such as the sustainability of fiscal policy and the policy to devalue the currency. 
The first equation shows the profit of firms (𝛾𝑟) as a function of their expenditures, 
where 𝜋 represents the rate of inflation, 𝑔 represents the capital accumulation of the 
countries, and 𝑚 denotes parameters with regards to export and import. The prime 
variables show the other country’s conditions, which are represented by the rate of 
inflation (𝜋ᇱ), the capital accumulation (𝑔′), and imports elasticity (𝑚ଵ′). There are two 
variables in connection with parameters 𝑚, those are 𝑚଴ that represents the share 
of profits to purchase the goods from abroad and 𝑚ଵ is the imports elasticity of the 
country. Assuming that 𝑚ଵ = 𝑚଴′, the first equation will be as follows: 
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(1 + 𝛾𝑟) =
(1 + 𝑚଴)(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑔) + (𝑚଴)(1 + 𝜋ᇱ)(1 + 𝑔ᇱ) + (𝑚′ଵ − 𝑚ଵ)(𝜋 − 𝜋ᇱ)
(1 + 2𝑚଴)
 
Based on this equation, the variables that may affect the value of profit are the 
inflation rate and capital accumulation, whether they come from the domestic 
financial system or abroad.  
The solvency rule in an open economy tells a similar story to the close economy that 
the firms in the domestic economy will stay solvent if the sum of the profits and the 
external financing is at least equal to the total expenditures in the production process. 
This expenditure covers the expense of purchasing raw materials or goods from 
abroad, repayments of debt obligations, and the acquisition of foreign assets. 
Departing from this proposition, the next step is to derive the solvency rule and 
involve some new variables, such as the Central Bank’s policy rate (𝑖), interest margin 
or mark-up (𝑠) that is set by commercial banks in domestic financial market, the net 
acquisition of financial assets (𝑁𝐹𝐴). According to Brancaccio and Fontana (2015), 
the 𝑁𝐹𝐴 that is incorporated into this model shows the position of a country; when 
the sign is positive, it means that the country becomes the net creditor and when 
negative it means that the country becomes the net debtor, and the change of net 
financial assets (𝛿). Besides this variable, there is another variable to represent the 
trading activity of financial assets (∆𝐾஺) between the countries. The sign of this 
variable will show the result of this activity; it is positive if the domestic firms purchase 
the financial assets and negative, if they sell the assets to its foreign counterparts. 
Considering both sides of the equation, when the firms’ profits are higher than their 
expenditures, the solvency of the firms is maintained. 
(1 + 𝛾𝑟) ≥
1
1 − 𝑚଴
ቈ(1 − 𝜆)(1 + 𝑠𝑖) + 𝑚ଵ(𝜋 − 𝜋ᇱ) + (1 + 𝜋∗)
∆𝐾஺
𝐾
+ (𝛿 − 𝑠𝑖)
𝑁𝐹𝐴௧
𝑃௧ିଵ𝐾
቉ 
The financial instability indicator is represented by 𝜆 by which the firms have a 
tendency to repay their debts, whether they use the internal finance (hedge 
financing), roll over the principal (speculative financing), or refinance all the debt 
obligations (Ponzi financing). Combining two equations in the framework of an open 
economy, one will get the solvency condition by obtaining the value of net sales or 
acquisition of the financial assets (𝑔௖), which can be called the rate of centralisation. 
This variable is different to the previous variable 𝑔 or 𝑔′, which describe the level of 
accumulation of capital. The positive sign of variable 𝑔௖ indicates that the domestic 
firms purchase the physical capital of another country and vice versa. 
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𝑔௖ ≤
(1 − 𝑚଴)ଶ(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑔) + (𝑚଴ − 𝑚଴ଶ)(1 + 𝜋ᇱ)(1 + 𝑔ᇱ)
(1 + 𝜋∗)(1 + 2𝑚଴)
 
+ ቈ
(1 − 𝑚଴)(𝑚ᇱଵ − 𝑚ଵ)
(1 + 2𝑚଴)
− 𝑚ଵ቉
(𝜋 − 𝜋ᇱ)
(1 + 𝜋∗)
−
(1 − 𝜆ᇱ) − 𝛿𝑛𝑓𝑎
(1 + 𝜋∗)
−
(1 − 𝜆) − 𝑛𝑓𝑎
(1 + 𝜋∗)
 𝑠𝑖 
Brancaccio and Fontana (2015) argued that there will be a connection between the 
Central Bank policy rate and the rate of centralization, which is shown by this 
equation. Using this relationship, one may conclude that the monetary policy has an 
important role in setting the interest rate since it also determines the allocation of 
ownership of physical capital. The negative relationship between these two variables 
suggests that the higher the interest rate, the lower the rate of centralization will be. 
On the other hand, the level of the centralization rate has a positive relationship with 
the financial instability (𝜆). It can be inferred that the acquisition of foreign assets, 
shown by positive sign of 𝑔௖, indicates increasing financial instability in the form of 
speculative transactions. 
4.05 The implications of the Financial Instability Hypothesis 
One factor that can trigger the turning point in a period of expansion to become the 
period of crash or downturn is a sharp increase in the policy interest. There are two 
different implications. Firstly, within the framework of the closed-economy, the 
increasing of the domestic interest rate will affect the domestic debt market since it 
will increase the cost of debt. This policy also has a negative impact on the ability of 
the borrowers to service their debt obligations. Secondly, within the framework of the 
open-economy, the increase in the domestic interest rate will affect the flows of 
capital. Assuming the international interest rate is stable, the increasing domestic rate 
will widen the interest rate differential, a factor that may attract inflows of capital. 
In a closed-economy framework, when the interest rate increases, automatically the 
interest payment will rise. The firms with debt commitments need to manage their 
budget and expenditures carefully due to the increasing portion of interest payment 
obligations. As a consequence of the increasing cost of borrowing, these firms will 
experience lower profits than expected. In addition to this, the borrowers who 
refinance their interest payment by issuing the new debt will also experience an even 
worse financial condition. As mentioned earlier, they have a limited option for 
repaying their debt obligations, in which can be done by selling their assets with a 
potentially low price. By observing the debt to equity ratio, one will notice the firms’ 
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financial level of difficulty in dealing with their finance in the case of increasing interest 
rate. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the impact of changing monetary policy and the interest rate on 
the economic condition. This figure describes the U.S. experience during the 2000–
2009 period, which has been explained by Weise and Barbera (2010, pp. 222–225). 
At the initial stage, with good economic conditions, the financial market players and 
businesspeople feel optimistic to expand their business; this condition leads to an 
increase in investment expenditure. The increasing consumption and investment shift 
the TS (Term Structure) schedule from 𝑇𝑆ଵ to 𝑇𝑆ଶ in the left panel of Figure 4.1, 
leaving the declining interest rate to reach 𝑟ଵ with the policy rate is set at 𝑓∗ and a 
positive gap of the national output at 𝑦ଵ. This process shows the expansion of the 
economy within the low interest rate environment. As the expansion is going on, there 
is a growing concern toward the economic condition due to the higher rate of inflation, 
which could bring the implementation of tight monetary policy and lead the Federal 
funds rate higher than the previous period. If the firms anticipate this condition and 
find a way to deal with the increasing interest rate, they will reduce their leverage or 
have re-negotiations with their lenders on how to get rid from the increasing cost of 
borrowing. In the case that the firms are not aware, they will face a financial problem 
and need additional financing to run the business. The right panel of figure 4.1 depicts 
that the TS schedule shifts up and the interest rate rises. The increasing of interest 
rate (𝑟) is possible since lenders re-assess the borrowers condition and offer a more 
expensive cost of borrowing. This condition causes the decline in investment and 
leads the output gap to become negative. 
Figure 4.1 The business cycle and monetary policy 
Minsky’s booms Minsky’s bust 
 
Source: modified from Weise and Barbera (2010, p. 224) 
Note: TS schedule shows the real long-term interest rate and represents the expectations of 
the term structure of interest rate (Weise and Barbera, 2010, pp. 220) 
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In an open-economy framework, the increasing domestic interest rate triggers foreign 
investors to invest their money in the domestic financial market, which creates the 
inflows of capital. This event happens especially when the interest differential widens, 
and the foreign investors take the opportunity to make the carry of a financial asset. 
Arestis and Glickman (2002) emphasised that the domestic banks will receive the 
increasing amount of deposits as well as an open opportunity for foreign borrowing. 
In this framework, the episode of instability is slightly different from the closed-
economy as mentioned above. The boom phase will end when there is a threat to 
economic performance as the inflation rate increases, which leads the monetary 
authority to adopt a tight monetary policy by increasing the interest rate. In fact, the 
policy to increase the domestic rate will not have a strong influence on managing the 
inflationary pressure (Arestis and Glickman, 2002), especially in the floating currency 
regime, since the higher interest rate has the ability to attract the capital inflows 
(Paula and Alves, 2000). With a high-interest rate and sufficient amount of capital 
inflows, the monetary authority will take action to compensate for the flows of foreign 
capital that can lead to increasing government debt. As a result, there is a tendency 
that the public sector will transform into speculative or Ponzi financing units as the 
government debt outstanding is increasing in the same direction as the interest rate 
payments.  
Concerning the government debt, Brancaccio and Fontana (2015) provided an 
explanation on the sustainability of government debt in relation to monetary policy. 
Within a framework that describes the relationship of two countries within a monetary 
union, the model incorporates the government expenditure (𝑧), the tax rate (𝜗), 
government debt (𝑑), and the tax revenue (𝑥). The identity of the outstanding 
government debt follows the concept of 𝐷௧ = 𝐷௧ିଵ + 𝑠𝑖𝐷௧ିଵ + 𝑍௧ − 𝑋௧ with 𝑑௧ =
𝐷௧/(𝑃௧ିଵ𝐾). This identity includes the accumulation of the principal and interest 
payments commitment plus the budget deficit. The condition that maintains the 
sustainability of the government debt is set at 𝑑௧ ≤ 𝑑௧ିଵ, which suggests that the 
amount of current government debt is less than previous period, or the accumulation 
of capital is higher than the previous period. In addition to this, the government 
expenditures that keep the debt stable follows the function of 𝑧௦ ≤ [(𝑔 + 𝜋) − 𝑠𝑖]𝑑 +
𝑥; hence, it follows: 
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𝑧௦ =
(1 + 𝜗)[(1 + 2𝑚(1 − 𝜗)]
(1 + 𝜗) − 𝑚(1 − 𝜗) + 2𝑚(1 − 𝜗)ଶ − 1
∗ 
ቊ[(𝑔 + 𝜋) − 𝑠𝑖]𝑑
+
[1 + 𝑚(1 − 𝜗)](1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑔) + 𝑚(1 − 𝜗)[(1 + 𝜋ᇱ)(1 + 𝑔ᇱ) + 𝑧ᇱ] + (𝑚ଵᇱ − 𝑚ଵ)(𝜋 − 𝜋ᇱ)
(1 − 𝜗)ଶ(1 + 2𝑚)
ቋ 
From this equation, one may see the negative connection between the monetary 
policy and the stabilisation condition of public spending; it suggests that the 
increasing interest rate may push the public expenditure and the outstanding 
government debts upward. Increasing public expenditure can be understood as a 
result of the increasing of firms’ insolvency. To maintain the level of firms’ profit and 
avoid the acquisition of foreign ownership of domestic physical capital, the 
government needs to increase its spending to bolster the economic activity. Given 
the constant level of tax revenue, however, this decision will have an impact on the 
increasing of the external financing needs by raising debt. In other words, within the 
increasing rate of interest, the decision of the government to maintain the 
sustainability of its debt may affect the increasing insolvency of the private 
corporations (Brancaccio and Fontana, 2015). 
4.06 The effort to detect financial instability 
There are two approaches in measuring the state of instability, there are static and 
dynamic approaches (Tymoigne, 2010). The static approach has been discussed in 
Chapter 3.05 as an approach that treats the exogenous shock as the cause of the 
financial system becoming unstable. On the other hand, the evolutionary or dynamic 
approach is an approach that treats financial instability as an endogenous process 
that changes the structure of the economy to become fragile and where this change 
may occur even in a tranquil period. The efforts to measure how the financial fragility 
develops into instability and then crisis are based on this approach, for instance, the 
balance sheets approach, structural transformation analysis and financial fragility 
index. 
4.06.1 Balance sheets approach 
Minsky (1990) maintained that in analysing instability one could use the firms’ 
financing position. With this argument, it is worthwhile using firms’ financing positions 
through their balance sheets and income statements. Considering the balance 
sheets’ structure, the balance sheets contain assets and liabilities, which include the 
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commitment to pay the debt obligations. Whereas, the income statements cover the 
revenues and expenditures of each unit and usually take the form of cash flows. The 
relationship between the balance sheet and income statement is located on the 
structure of repayment on commitments, income as a source of fund to fulfil the 
obligations, and refinancing mechanism (Minsky, 1990), which specifically can be 
viewed from the internal structure of a corporation. Minsky’s argument also can be 
explained by the basic principle of the relationship between lenders and borrowers, 
especially the position of commercial banks as lenders and non-bank economic 
agents as borrowers that have the intention to finance their investments. In the case 
of an adverse situation experienced by the borrowers, this will affect the lenders’ 
position since each borrowers’ debt will be reckoned as lenders’ assets (Kregel, 
2004, p.4). 
In line with this argument, Cozzi and Toporowski (2006) made an empirical study of 
three Asian countries using the balance sheets of selected financial and non-financial 
companies. They employed the development of some financial ratios, for example, 
the gearing ratio, debt ratio, current ratio, as well as the development of assets and 
liabilities during the observation period. The authors found that analysing the assets-
liabilities movement proves very useful tools for understanding the behaviour of 
economic agents. In the countries under observation, there was a trend that the 
increasing liabilities cause the increasing assets, but not as a result of increasing 
income. 
4.06.2 Structural transformation analysis 
Schroeder (2002, 2009) examined countries’ financial fragility, namely Thailand and 
New Zealand, using the FIH. Following Schroeder’s approach, Blancas (2007) used 
the same method and applied it to the case of Mexico. The authors (Schroeder, 2002 
and 2009; Blancas, 2007) employed several variables and compared their 
movements to capture the evolution of the financial system. Three variables that were 
used, such as the interest rate, rate of profit, and growth. By comparing these 
variables, one may gauge and understand the state of the financial system, whether 
hedge, speculative or Ponzi financing units. It is expected that this method may help 
the authorities in monitoring the economic condition of a country and detecting the 
financial fragility stage that may bring the country to financial instability and crisis.   
Mulligan et al. (2010) showed the development of financial structure by analysing the 
impact of changes in interest rate, movement of the exchange rate, and the level of 
leverage in the companies’ performance. The authors emphasised the impact of 
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interest rate on companies’ level of investments. In the tranquil situation, lower 
interest rates encourage firms to borrow more as they expect higher profits in the 
next period. This condition transforms Hedge financing units into speculative 
financing units and speculative financing units to Ponzi financing units. Mulligan et 
al. (2010) maintained that the movement of exchange rates also has an impact on 
the structural transformation of the financing units since currency depreciation can 
create an additional burden for firms that engage in foreign borrowing.  
4.06.3 Financial fragility index 
Tymoigne (2011, 2012) offered a method for developing an index to detect financial 
fragility by focusing on the financial system under Ponzi financing behaviour. This 
index measured the financial condition by focusing on the households, non-financial 
corporation, and business sectors. In generating this index, the author differentiated 
the variables of interest for households and companies. For households, the author 
employed the total liabilities, debt service ratio, cash-out refinancing loans, and the 
proportions of consumers’ debts. While, for the companies, the author used data 
consisting of total liabilities, the net worth of the companies, the debt-service ratio, 
the monetary instrument to outstanding liabilities ratio, and the ratio of short-term 
debt to total debt. According to Tymoigne (2011, 2012), these variables are used to 
provide information on the refinancing and liquidation risks. The former shows the 
inability of a borrower to refinance its debt. The latter explains the risk that emerges 
when the entity is unable to sell the illiquid assets to pay its debt obligations.  
After looking at the summary of these methods, the approaches under the FIH are 
argued to have their advantages especially in describing the transmission 
mechanism of each component within the financial system. Besides, the FIH contains 
a comprehensive explanation to understand the core problem that occurs in a 
financial system. It can be inferred that under this framework, the economic units’ 
behaviour in pursuing profits and the inherent fragility of the financial system become 
the factors that cause financial fragility. There are several factors that show the 
current condition of financial system or behaviour of the economic agents, which 
become a central discussion in this framework. Firstly, the hedging instruments that 
previously were meant to protect the parties involved in a financial transaction are 
now changed, becoming a structured product or derivative to pursue capital gain. 
This financial product transformation becomes the source of financial problem. 
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Taking as an example is the Credit Default Swap14 (CDS), at first, it was meant to 
cover the risks against default borrowers. However, when speculators that do not 
necessarily own CDS use it for increasing their returns, this instrument can bring a 
negative impact on the financial system. Secondly, the commercial banks in their 
daily operations are exposed to liquidity risk. At the same time, they must meet the 
capital adequacy ratio15. To deal with the liquidity risk and maximise the profit, the 
banks see the opportunity to issue Collateralized-Debt Obligations (CDO), which 
allows them to sell securities that are linked with their income from the payment 
obligations of loans. This instrument contains higher risk when the borrowers fail to 
pay their debt obligations, which will affect the cash flows stream of CDO. However, 
this instrument and its structured product created a problem as the U.S. faced a 
turbulence in its financial market in 2008. Thirdly, companies will expand their 
business when the expectation of future profit is high, which implies that all the 
obligations will be repaid on time. However, the companies or borrowers’ over-
optimism can be replaced by lenders’ over-pessimism that leads to the revision of 
loan term and conditions. The increasing debt obligations create additional burdens 
for these companies, which may cause a decline in firms’ profit. Fourthly, as the 
financial system developed, the economy becomes more open to the international 
financial transactions. To attract the flows of capital from abroad to domestic financial 
market, the monetary authority set a higher interest rate. For domestic firms that need 
financing from external sources to finance their investments, higher domestic lending 
interest rate encourages them to obtain external debts. In the end, this investment 
decision can lead the domestic financial market to become fragile. At a certain point, 
there is a tendency that international investors begin to doubt to the performance of 
the country and its ability to serve its debt obligations or to defend its currency. The 
financial instability can transform to a financial crisis when the exchange rate is 
sharply depreciated, and the interest rate is increasing; this condition may change 
the structure of economic units to become increasingly dominated by Ponzi financing 
units. 
                                                
14 CDS is one of financial instruments that was created to provide insurance for financial market 
investors that purchase securities or to hedge the default risk (Noeth and Sengupta, 2012). 
15 The liquidity risk is embedded in commercial banks’ operation especially when they pool the 
depositors’ money and lend the money to the borrowers. For some reasons, the capital adequacy 
requirement is an additional cost for commercial banks since the funds are idle or do not generate 
income but the banks should pay the interest for their depositors (Barnett-Hart, 2009). 
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4.07 Comparing the main features of two financial instability 
frameworks 
The discussions on financial instability hypothesis help to find a better approach to 
understanding the concept of financial instability. Table 4.2 describes the summary 
of the discussion on the main features of financial instability, namely the definitions, 
the causes, the type of crisis, the policy response and the objective of measuring the 
financial instability. 
Table 4.2 Competing frameworks of financial instability 
Main features Mainstream views Financial Instability Hypothesis 
The definition of 
financial instability 
The incapability of a financial 
system to accelerate and maintain 
the economic performance and 
solve the problem of financial 
imbalances  
A condition that can create an 
adverse impact on the economy, 
especially the ability of financial 
instability to affect the price instability 
and cause the debt deflation 
The cause(s) of 
financial instability 
The weaknesses in the domestic 
financial system and the presence 
of adverse shock make the financial 
system unstable. 
The endogenous problem that lies 
within the financial system as the 
economic agents become more 
speculative in finding the source of 
financing during the tranquil periods. 
The type of crisis Liquidity crisis Solvency crisis 
The policy 
prescription 
The authorities should impose 
prudential supervisions, promoting 
market based discipline, and 
strengthening the domestic 
institutions. 
The Central Bank needs to provide 
the liquidity assistance for the 
financial sector and combine it with 
a tight monetary policy. 
The proposal on stricter regulations 
that rule over all agents, particularly 
lenders and borrowers.  
The authority needs to pay attention 
to the borrowers’ ability to pay the 
debt service, e.g. by restructuring the 
debt. When there is a liquidity 
problem, the authorities must conduct 
as the lender of last resort. 
The approach of 
measuring financial 
instability 
Most of the analyses intent to 
measure and predict the state of 
financial system by using the static 
approach  
The analyses try to detect the state of 
financial system by using the dynamic 
approach  
Source: Own construction. 
In mainstream views, financial instability is defined as the situation before the 
financial crisis in which an external shock creates a significant damage to the financial 
system (Borio and Drehmann, 2009). According to Schinasi (2004), financial 
instability can be defined as the incapability of a financial system to accelerate and 
maintain the economic performance and to solve the problem of financial imbalances. 
These definitions cover the terminologies of financial instability and financial crisis 
but have not emphasised the different between financial fragility and financial 
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instability. Under FIH, financial fragility is characterised by a high proportion of Ponzi 
financing that can trigger the increasing of financial instability because the economy 
will be sensitive to interest rates and exchange rates movements. For example, the 
sharp currency depreciation will affect the ability of firms that have external debts. 
Tymoigne and Wray (2014, p. 40) defined financial instability as a condition that 
creates a negative impact on the economy. In FIH there is a clear difference between 
financial fragility and financial instability, which is rarely found in the mainstream 
literature.  
Mainstream views emphasise the weaknesses in the domestic financial system and 
the presence of adverse shock that makes the financial system unstable. Therefore, 
in dealing with financial instability and financial crisis, the prudential supervision and 
market-based discipline should be undertaken by the authorities. Meanwhile, FIH 
focuses on endogenous problems that lie within the financial system, which is related 
to the behaviour of economic agents that become more speculative in a period of 
positive growth.  
The problem in the banking sector is argued will affect the financial system 
negatively. This perspective is based on the thought that private sector reliance on 
the banking sector in obtaining the funding may give an adverse impact, especially 
when the banking sector experiences liquidity problems as they experience the 
shortage of liquid assets. This condition is called a liquidity crisis. The effort to help 
the banking sector out of its liquidity problem is one of the mainstream views’ policies 
prescriptions together with the implementation of the tight monetary policy. The FIH 
underlines the significant impact of solvency crisis on the economic agents. This 
framework suggests that the government should facilitate the borrowers by aiding 
them to improve their financial condition so that they can fulfil their debt obligations. 
In this case, FIH offers a solution that answers the need for handling the financial 
crisis events, especially for the Southeast Asian crisis and the GFC. 
There are two approaches to measuring the fragility of a financial system, static and 
evolutionary approaches. The first is commonly used by the mainstream views to 
develop the instruments to measure the state of instability and predict the occurrence 
of a financial crisis. The latter, which is also called the dynamic approach mostly is 
used by the proponents of FIH and focuses the measurement in detecting the state 
of financial fragility of the economy.  
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4.08 Conclusion 
The Southeast Asian financial crisis, followed by series of crises in developing and 
advanced economies led economists to seek an alternative explanation for the crisis. 
The existing crisis models cannot fully explain the Southeast Asian crisis and the U.S. 
sub-prime mortgage financial crisis as has been done by the FIH. In the original 
framework, Minsky builds the argument from a closed-economy approach and claims 
that the robust economic condition may become the source of instability.  
This chapter lists several factors that may cause financial instability. Firstly, the 
intention of economic agents to get higher profits increases the use of external 
sources of financing. Secondly, to get a lower cost of borrowing, the economic agents 
choose short-term financing, which is argued to have a cheaper borrowing cost and 
easier debt principal rolling over. Third, to obtain and maintain the level of profitability, 
most of the financial institutions use financial innovations. The innovations involve 
existing instruments that may contain a risky financial product (Tymoigne, 2014, p. 
55).  
The analysis of the open-economy framework has been developed by presenting the 
existence of capital mobility among countries. In this mechanism, the investors will 
try to find the most favourable place to invest their money, which subsequently 
increases the capital flows that go to the countries that have a high-interest rate 
differential. For the recipient or borrower countries, however, there are risks 
embedded in this mechanism since the sudden reversals phenomenon may lead the 
country to experience a financial crisis. 
Several basic features of financial instability have been explored by making a 
comparison between two competing frameworks; those are mainstream views and 
FIH. By juxtaposing these features, one may get the understanding of the way to 
explain the mechanism of crisis. Since in its analysis the FIH has a comprehensive 
explanation such as an understanding of the core problem in the financial system, 
considering various aspects and complexity of crisis events, and involving various 
methods in its discussions, it offers the solution that can answer the problem in a 
country’s financial system.       
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Chapter 5  
Financial liberalisation and financial instability: Indonesian 
case 
5.01 Introduction 
The development of financial systems has been widely promoted to enhance 
economic growth and development starting from the early 1970s. There are two basic 
frameworks that are widely known, namely financial development and financial 
liberalisation16. The emerging controversy over the impact of the development of 
financial systems via its financial reforms creates a new area of discussion that it is 
worth exploring. Thus far, the discussion has involved debates focused on whether 
or not financial liberalisation has reached its objectives. Furthermore, the increased 
occurrence of financial crises, both in developed and developing countries, leads to 
an argument as to the detrimental effects of financial liberalisation on the financial 
system. 
The dominant mainstream views argue that financial liberalisation accelerates and 
improves economic performance. Based on their findings, it is argued that financial 
liberalisation supports economic performance by lowering the costs of capital 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2000), raising economic growth (Quinn and Toyoda, 2008) and 
helping the country to lessen the occurrence of crisis (Beck et al., 2006). However, 
there are economists who remain sceptical on the implementation of these 
frameworks. They argue that financial liberalisation as a part of financial system 
development tends to make countries’ financial system more fragile (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1996, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Weller, 2010). Moreover, Schinasi (2006, p. 3) highlighted the 
tendency of financial systems to become unstable and prone to experiencing adverse 
events as the countries adopted expansion, liberalisation and globalisation policies. 
Indonesia adopted financial liberalisation and financial development in a series of 
policies packages that impacted on its financial sector. Beginning from the early 
                                                
16 Financial development can be depicted as an evolution of a financial system that allows the 
increasing access to financial source (Fry, 1995, p.299). The World Bank defines financial 
development as well-functioning institutions, instruments, markets, and legal framework that allow 
the lowering transaction cost in a financial system. While, financial liberalization refers to the 
elimination of government regulations, involvements, or restrictions, for example, in its banking 
sector. 
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1970s up until the beginning of the 1990s, the process of financial reforms took place 
with the support of international financial institutions. At least until the middle of the 
1990s, this process was going on track and resulting in good economic performance. 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis hit the country in 1997/1998, raising doubt as to the 
soundness of financial reforms in supporting Indonesian development.  
This chapter’s objective is to engage in this discussion by focusing on the concept of 
financial liberalisation and the way it impacts the country’s financial system and, 
whether or not it provides a positive impact, as expected. In so doing, this chapter 
discusses the financial liberalisation thesis and reviews various empirical studies 
centred on the impacts of financial liberalisation on economic performance and 
financial stability. This section will be followed by the empirical analysis on Indonesian 
financial reforms and how it affects to the volatility of its exchange rate. In addition to 
this exploration, it is considered important to examine the contribution of financial 
reforms to economic growth. In order to perform this empirical analysis, instead of 
using the panel data model, as has already been done by economists, this study will 
use a time series method.  
The discussion of this chapter involves two elements of financial reform, namely the 
domestic financial liberalisation and capital account liberalisation in which their 
development will be represented by constructing the Financial Liberalisation Index 
(FLI). This is the first attempt at constructing an FLI on a monthly basis. The aim to 
generate the monthly index is focused on gathering understanding into the detailed 
progress of financial liberalisation in Indonesia. With this monthly index, the empirical 
analysis using higher frequency macroeconomic and financial indicators will be 
possible to undertake. Furthermore, the empirical analysis involving the volatility of 
the exchange rate to represent financial fragility and financial liberalisation indicators 
is also carried out. These two empirical analyses are expected to act as the 
contributions of this study to the literature. 
This chapter consists of seven sections. Following the introduction, the subsequent 
sections will summarise the theoretical framework of financial liberalisation. The fifth 
section explains the construction of the FLI based on the stages of the process of 
liberalisation in the Indonesian financial system. The next section seeks to explore 
and describe several variables in connection with the implementation of financial 
liberalisation, which is then followed by the empirical analysis.  
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5.02 Financial liberalisation, economic growth and financial instability 
The concept of financial liberalisation was pioneered by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) through their arguments to expedite economic growth. In developing his 
argument, McKinnon (1973, pp. 5–8) maintained that government policies tend to 
intervene at almost all levels of economic activity, which contributes to the creation 
of inequality of income and fragmentation amongst economic agents. McKinnon 
(1973, pp. 5–7) provided some examples of these policies, such as government 
subsidies, government protections on certain industries, regulations on imports, and 
tax concessions. These policies are conducted when the government feels or 
assumes that the regulation of banks and financial markets is required. This 
proposition hinges on the thought that there is no assurance that every economic 
agent can get similar access to the efficient prices of factor production and 
technology. Therefore, McKinnon (1973, p. 8) argued that the government should 
cease to intervene in the capital market. 
Together with Shaw (1973), McKinnon (1973) maintained that the level of growth can 
be accelerated by encouraging the level and quality of investments. According to the 
authors, the country should actively raise its savings in an effort to achieve the 
targeted level of investment. Moreover, it is noted that the accumulation of capital 
through saving enables financial institutions to serve the demand of private sector 
loans. It is assumed that, under the framework of McKinnon and Shaw, the level of 
investments is equal to the level of loans; that is, an investment is funded by banks. 
Hence, once savings can serve investment demand, the country’s economic 
activities will improve. Within financial repression, the low deposit interest rate 
hampers the effort to encourage savings. The works of McKinnon and Shaw argued 
that a higher deposit interest rate would encourage willingness to save, and 
increased savings lead to the increased availability of loanable funds. With support 
from financial institutions acting as intermediaries, the increasing availability of funds 
will enable borrowers to get easier access to different sources of financing. Other 
than this, the high reserve requirements obliged by the Central Bank to be fulfilled by 
commercial banks is another factor impeding commercial banks in allocating banks’ 
lending. In a condition where financing is abundant, investments will flourish, 
meaning this condition may stimulate economic growth.  
In order to achieve the optimum level of capital accumulation through savings, 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggested that the government should get rid of 
financial repression and accordingly shift the policy to financial liberalisation by 
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removing the control on interest rate and credit programmes, as well as reducing 
reserve requirements. Following the analyses of McKinnon and that of Shaw, Fry 
(1995, p. 26) set out, in detail, the drawbacks of financial repression. First, by placing 
a ceiling on the level of interest rates, the authorities create a lending rate of interest 
at which the demand for loans exceeds the supply of loans. Consequently, this 
condition may give a bad signal for financial market participants, especially 
depositors, borrowers, and lenders. The depositors that are households will have 
lower savings as their expectations of receiving higher returns do not meet the offered 
rate of return. The commercial banks as the intermediaries could participate in low 
yielding projects. Finally, the non-bank private sectors acting as borrowers will be 
stimulated to shift their preference to financing relatively capital-intensive 
investments. Second, banks as lenders will be obliged to set aside a certain portion 
of their assets to provide loans for the credit programmes. The credit programmes 
potentially lead to inefficiency in the loan distribution since the implementation of 
these programmes is not directed towards productive investment; therefore, it 
potentially increases the non-performing loans. Third, high reserve requirements will 
lessen the flexibility of the banking sector in allocating their assets to productive 
investment. 
The same mechanism also applies to external liberalisation by opening the domestic 
economy to the global market. As explained previously in Chapter 2, the government 
policies to deregulate capital control or capital account liberalisation and impose trade 
liberalisation are to be included in external liberalisation. The elements of external 
liberalisation consist of capital account liberalisation, trade liberalisation, and stock 
market liberalisation. However, one may find that there is no strict rule when 
discussing these elements; in other words, whilst economists emphasise the trade 
liberalisation and capital account liberalisation (Johnston, 1998), others focus on the 
domestic financial sector, capital account, and stock market liberalisation (Kaminsky 
and Schmukler, 1999).  
In line with financial liberalisation, trade liberalisation refers to the policy to open the 
country for the exchange of goods and services. This condition can be achieved when 
the country removes barriers to allowing free trades of goods and services, such as 
by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. Capital account liberalisation is the element 
of external liberalisation that focuses on the efforts to remove the barriers on capital 
movements to and from a financial system. Capital account liberalisation covers 
several policy areas, including the removal of capital control, allowing foreign 
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investors involvement in the domestic capital market, and permitting domestic 
investors to own foreign financial assets (Ghosh, 2005). One of the objectives 
underpinning capital account liberalisation is the facilitation of the mobility of capital 
between countries. 
When increasing capital mobility to and from the domestic financial market, a country 
will garner benefits, especially in receiving foreign funds. Eichengreen and Musa 
(1998) emphasised two main advantages of capital flow, namely portfolio 
diversification and risk-sharing. The former is associated with the argument that 
foreign funds have a positive impact on the domestic financial market since residents 
have an opportunity to protect themselves and find an alternative source of financing 
should adverse events occur in the home country. The latter is related to investors’ 
decisions to find a place to invest their funds in order to obtain higher rates of return. 
With a higher return, these authors argue, savings and investments will increase. 
However, in a recent paper, Eichengreen (2001) underlined the ambiguity of the 
relationship between capital account liberalisation and economic growth. The author 
gathered and explored empirical studies on the relationship of capital account and 
growth, and found that there are three strands of argument. The first argument 
emphasised that capital account restrictions have a detrimental effect on 
development. The second argument maintained that capital account liberalisation 
does not give a clear impact on economic performance. Whereas, the third argument 
claimed that capital account liberalisation has an association with the financial crisis. 
Considering the elements of external liberalisation, the IMF and World Bank (2005, 
p. 318) suggested a step-by-step implementation of these liberalisations. The IMF 
and World Bank (2005) argued that the correct sequencing of these elements would 
help the country to facilitate the stability of its financial system and would allow the 
country to avoid a severe financial crisis. Additionally, sequencing is important in 
regards the performance of the domestic banking sector (Bayraktar and Wang, 
2004). By prioritising the development of the domestic financial system in the first 
stage, it is expected that the domestic financial market can strengthen itself to use 
the funds efficiently (Johnston, 1998), build its resilience and mitigate the risks (IMF 
and the World Bank, 2005, pp. 318–320).  
Bayraktar and Wang (2004) provided the various steps of domestic financial reform 
with reference to McKinnon’s argument. The authors explained that the first step was 
a country decision to prioritise the balancing of government finance, which was then 
followed by the opening of the domestic capital market and, as the final step, the 
85 
 
liberalisation of the country’s foreign exchange. However, one may find that there is 
no assurance for the country that follows this sequence that it will be problem-free. 
The series of financial crises, which occurred frequently starting from the 1990s 
reveal that sequencing is not the most important factor. 
There are various models that have intended to clarify whether or not financial 
liberalisation provides positive effects on the financial system. Hau (2002) offered a 
model that was based on the argument that a higher level of external liberalisation 
facilitated the country with a more stable exchange rate. The author explained this 
argument by describing the effect of increasing imported goods and services on the 
flexibility of domestic price level, stating that such flexibility would reduce any effect 
of money supply shock on the economic agents’ balances, which then lessened the 
volatility of the exchange rate. Hau (2002) proposed the model with the following 
equation: 
𝑉𝐸 = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝐶𝑂𝑃 + 𝛼ଶ𝑍௜ + 𝑢௜ 
The volatility of the exchange rate (𝑉𝐸) is calculated as the standard deviation of the 
exchange rate changes over the window of three years. Variable country openness 
(𝐶𝑂𝑃) shows the degree of trade openness in a country, which is measured by the 
ratio of import to GDP. The third variable is 𝑍௜, which represents some different 
control variables such as economic growth, political stability, oil-exporter country, and 
dummy variable for exchange rate arrangement.   
In a similar vein, Kose et al. (2003) argued that there was a non-positive relationship 
between macroeconomic volatility and financial liberalisation. They framed the 
discussion by assuming that the higher level of external liberalisation would lessen 
the volatility of macro-indicators, which consists of the volatility of growth, 
consumption or income. In their research, the authors utilised two external 
liberalisation policies, namely trade liberalisation and capital account openness as 
the main indicators. Their model can be written as follows: 
𝑣𝑜𝑙 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐿, 𝐼𝐿) 
where 𝑣𝑜𝑙 represents the volatility of macroeconomic indicators as the dependent 
variable, which is computed as the standard deviation of the relevant variable, such 
as exchange rate or growth volatilities. 𝐸𝐿 refers to external liberalisation, which is 
represented by numerous variables, such as terms of trade and capital account 
openness, for example. Moreover, 𝐼𝐿 represents the internal liberalisation that is 
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represented by the M2 to GDP ratio. In addition to these two main variables, the 
authors considered additional macro variables, such as inflation rate and fiscal deficit.  
Following the authors, other studies (Stancik, 2006; Eozenou, 2008; Tayebi and 
Torki, 2010) used these models to examine the impact of financial liberalisation on 
the volatility of macroeconomic indicators. Eozenou (2008) modified Kose’s model 
and applied it in the following equation: 
𝑣𝑜𝑙 = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑃 + 𝛼ଶ𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 + 𝛼ଷ𝑍௜ + 𝑢௜ 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑂𝑃 refers to current account openness and 𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃 is capital account 
openness, whilst 𝑍௜ pertains to some independent variables that consist of different 
macro-economic variables. Using 90 countries over the period spanning 1960–2000, 
Eozenou (2006) examined the relationship between financial liberalisation and the 
volatility of three macro-indicators. Based on the findings, external liberalisation was 
seen to have a positive association with a higher volatility of consumption growth.  
Tayebi and Torki (2010) replicated the above models and applied them to the 
Southeast Asian countries that experienced financial crisis. They modified the model 
and used it to test the effect of financial liberalisation in line with growth, exchange 
rate and investment volatilities. Based on their empirical analysis, the results showed 
that the effect of financial liberalisation was positive to the volatility of the independent 
variables.  
5.03 Financial liberalisation and growth: some empirical studies 
It is the advocacy of McKinnon and Shaw in regards financial liberalisation that claims 
that financial liberalisation and deepening will boost growth. Balassa (1989) and 
Laeven (2003) argued that this framework would promote the overall functioning of 
intermediaries so that the financial market became more efficient. King and Levine 
(1993) provided an empirical study involving 57 countries over the period spanning 
1960–1989. The authors found that financial development had a positive relationship 
with economic growth, and the level of financial development was a good predictor 
of long-term economic growth and had a strong association with future improvements 
in capital efficiency. According to Levine (2004), the financial liberalisation ensures 
the availability of information on investments, and a better implementation of 
corporate governance facilitates risk management and mobilises savings.    
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In addition, there has been extensive studies that assess the interrelation between 
financial liberalisation and growth. Based on the findings, it can be concluded that 
the nexus between these two variables at least can be divided into two groups. The 
first group has findings that support the positive relationship between financial 
liberalisation and growth. There are studies that seek to prove this relationship, such 
as the methodology developed to explain the increasing role of foreign investors who 
are able to have a positive impact on domestic stock markets and could potentially 
lower the cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000). Quinn and Toyoda 
(2008) examined the relationship of capital account liberalisation and growth using 
capital account openness index and found a positive relationship between these 
variables. Another scholar focused on the relationship using cross-sectional data and 
found that financial liberalisation had a positive effect on economic growth (Levine, 
2001).  
For the case of Indonesia, Juoro (1993) emphasised the important role of financial 
liberalisation in alleviating Indonesian economic growth. By examining financial 
liberalisation indicators in the period of 1978–1990, this author argued that 
Indonesian financial reforms succeeded in integrating the money market, promoting 
banking sector competition, improving the overall efficiency of the banking sector, 
and increasing economic activities. However, Juoro (1993) described potential 
problems as a result of financial liberalisation, where, for example, higher interest 
rate can bring about a detrimental effect in terms of increasing public distrust for the 
domestic financial market and accordingly resulting in higher risk-taking, which 
intensifies the problem of moral hazard. Furthermore, Goeltom (1995) studied the 
implementation of financial liberalisation in Indonesia over the period 1981–1988. 
The author found that the implementation of financial liberalisation increased lending 
rates, but helped small-scale enterprises to have access to credit and further 
improved the allocation of funds to efficient firms, which then had an effect on the 
overall efficiency of investments. 
On the other hand, some economists have come to recognise that the relationship 
between financial liberalisation and growth cannot be explained clearly. Arestis and 
Demetriades (1996, 1997) provided an analysis of financial liberalisation and growth 
with focused on the role of the banking sector and stock market. In their 1996 paper, 
Arestis and Demetriades studied the causal association between financial 
liberalisation and growth. These authors argued that one should consider the 
institutional structure of financial systems and financial sector policies in each 
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observed country. A lack of consideration towards such factors could lead to incorrect 
conclusions. Furthermore, Arestis and Demetriades (1996) examined the causality 
between finance and growth using 12 countries data. The authors found that the 
structure of financial institution and policies in each country determined the causal 
link between finance and economic growth. In line with their previous paper, Arestis 
and Demetriades (1997) underlined the relationship between financial development 
and growth, which would be determined by institutional factors. In this study, the 
authors also showed that the causality of finance leading to higher growth was 
somewhat inconclusive.  
Recently, there has been a growing number of researchers questioning the 
relationship of financial liberalisation and growth (Beck et al., 2013; Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi, 2015). Beck et al. (2013) carried out a study on the association between 
the growth of financial industries as a result of financial liberalisation and economic 
development. In so doing, the authors focused on examining the size of a financial 
system and the degree of intermediation using a sample of 77 countries in the period 
1980–2007. They found that there was a positive association in the long-run between 
financial sector size and economic growth. However, based on their estimation, this 
association was becoming weaker over time and, for the specific case of developed 
countries, the size of the financial system would affect the increase of growth volatility 
(Beck et al., 2013). Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) studied the effect of growth on 
the financial sector and the growth of real total factor productivity. Data from 15 
developed countries was used; it was found that the growth of the financial sector 
has a negative effect on the growth of total factor productivity. They explained that 
this phenomenon occurred as a result of the growth of financial sector reducing the 
growth of total factor productivity. In other words, the development of financial sector 
does not support but rather competes with the other sectors in the country in 
absorbing the available resources.  
5.04 Financial liberalisation and financial instability: some empirical 
studies 
Beck et al. (2006) undertook a study centred on the relationship between bank 
concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility. The authors argued 
that bank concentration facilitates the financial system in becoming less fragile. Using 
data from 69 countries over the period of 1980–1997, the study concluded that the 
implementation of financial reforms through banking sector liberalisation, such as 
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allowing bank entry and ensuring wider bank activities, had increased banking 
system resiliency and accordingly, reduced its fragility. The authors found that 
countries with a competitive banking sector would experience a lower probability of 
banking crisis.  
Focusing on the policy to liberalise the capital flows, Glick et al. (2006) argued that a 
country that implements capital account liberalisation has a lower likelihood of 
experiencing currency crises. The authors employed a matching method that was 
used to minimise sample bias and examined the role of capital account policy, which 
focused on the implementation of capital control in lessening the probability of crises. 
The implementation of a restricted capital account—for example, the control on 
capital outflows—opened the possibility of crises since investors in the financial 
market would be reluctant to invest in the country. This would affect the country to 
become less attractive to international investors and to suffer from a lack of sources 
of funding. Also, Kose et al. (2009) explained that there were many empirical studies 
that showed the positive impact of financial liberalisation—in particular the policy of 
external liberalisation—in boosting the domestic financial market and helping the 
country to alleviate its economic growth. The authors synthesised the findings of 
some empirical studies on the effects of external liberalisation. They found that capital 
account liberalisation has a minor contribution in terms of the volatility of the financial 
system.  
Based on the research that was conducted by Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), 
financial liberalisation, as one part of a financial system’s development, tends to 
make countries’ financial systems more fragile. Using the panel data method of 53 
countries for the period 1980–1995, they investigated the nexus between the 
implementation of financial liberalisation and financial fragility. Based on their 
analysis, they found that the banking crisis occurrence tends to increase in a country 
that implements financial liberalisation. This finding was based on the mechanism of 
increasing the role of financial institutions, especially the banking sector, as an 
intermediary that could lead to the moral hazard problem. As a result, the financial 
systems become prone to experiencing a financial crisis. 
In term of external liberalisation, there is growing concern as to the flow of capital, 
especially the funds that have shorter maturity. The financial crisis seen to have 
occurred in Southeast Asian countries is a perfect example of the impact of external 
liberalisation on the financial system (Arestis, 2016). The adoption of free capital 
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mobility between countries suggests that the government lifts its control on capital 
flows. This mechanism allows foreign investors to place their funds in the domestic 
financial market in an effort to gain higher returns or pull their money from the 
domestic market when other financial markets offer favourable returns. The 
increasing portion of foreign ownership in the equity market or the form of portfolio 
investments gives a signal of increasing vulnerability of domestic financial market. 
When the view of financial market investors is shifted against the domestic market, 
there will be the sudden reversal of capital inflow. This condition places further 
pressure on exchange rate management since most countries, during this period, 
have applied a fixed exchange rate arrangement.   
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) analysed 20 countries for the period 1975–1995, 
arguing that the financial crises in many countries occur after the implementation of 
financial liberalisation. They examined the causes of banking and currency crises by 
assessing the movements of different macroeconomic indicators both before and 
after the outbreak of crises. Their findings suggested that there is the tendency of an 
increased asset bubble in the period of post-liberalisation. The authors described the 
implementation of domestic and external liberalisation in failing to ensure the financial 
system was in a stable condition. Following the implementation of financial 
liberalisation, the countries have experienced good economic performance with 
stable inflation, increased economic growth and, in certain cases, fiscal surpluses. 
However, owing to the weak banking supervision and inadequate financial market 
regulations, the problem in the banking sector has been intensified, causing the ability 
of the authorities to be affected in terms of supporting its exchange rate (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999). In line with the previous study, Weller (2010) claimed that 
financial liberalisation in emerging economies leads to currency and banking crises. 
In completing this research, 27 developing countries were examined over the period 
1973–1998, with a comparison drawn between the period of pre-liberalisation and 
post-liberalisation. According to Weller (2010), countries with financial liberalisation 
policy tend to receive greater funding, which can then be used to finance productive 
or unproductive investments. The author found that there is a tendency for increased 
unproductive investments, with the funding being directed towards speculative 
expansions. As a result, this investment decision increases the higher probability of 
default, which may stimulate capital outflows or sudden reversals of inflows.  
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Before engaging in the empirical analysis of financial liberalisation, the next section 
will provide the Indonesian financial liberalisation stages, which are transformed so 
as to produce an index that will be used as a variable of interest in the analysis.  
5.05 Measuring the stages of financial liberalisation 
In discussing financial liberalisation and the way in which it is implemented, 
researchers (Bandiera et al., 2000; Laeven, 2003) have used several elements of 
financial liberalisation, such as the interest rate liberalisation policy, credit 
programmes, and the level of reserve requirements. Bandiera et al. (2000) and 
Laeven (2003) used a dummy variable to show the progress of the financial 
liberalisation that reflects the date when these elements of financial liberalisation 
have been adopted; these take the value of 1 when the liberalisation measures are 
applied and 0 otherwise. As an example, Bandiera et al. (2000) proposed an index 
that is developed from six indicators, namely the implementation of interest rate 
liberalisation, the policy on the lowering of entry barriers to foster the level of 
competition, the policy to reduce the reserve requirements, the elimination of the 
credit programme, the process of privatisation, and the implementation of prudential 
regulations. However, this method has the disadvantage of being inflexible since it 
provides only two options or choices for every financial liberalisation indicator, 
regardless of whether or not it has been adopted. In other words, this method is 
unable to capture another stage or type of government measure that could be found 
in between these two choices. 
Abiad et al. (2008) wrote a paper and offered a similar approach to examining the 
implementation of financial market liberalisation policies. This paper explored seven 
policy dimensions of financial market liberalisation, consisting of credit programmes 
and reserve requirements, deposit and lending rate liberalisation, banking sector 
entry barriers, privatisation policy, capital account openness, the securities market, 
and banking supervision. In order to get the score for each indicator, the paper 
provided a list of questions concerning the government policy on or the condition of 
the domestic financial system. One can transform the results into a score ranging 
from 0 (financially repressed) to 3 (fully liberalised).  
The FLI proposed by Abiad et al. (2008) has the advantage that it features a reversal 
principle. This principle suggests that there is the possibility of a country experiencing 
an increasing score when the policies are considered to be more liberalised or 
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decreasing score when there is a shift in the policy that is considered less-liberalised. 
Taking into consideration this advantage, this study uses this method to construct the 
Indonesian FLI. Based on the assessment of each policy dimension, the FLI can be 
obtained by adding all the scores; this final result will be divided by the number of 
policy dimensions. 
The first step in developing the index is to identify and record the government policies 
in each financial liberalisation indicator, as provided above. This study investigates 
each relevant policy based on their sequences in order to get the detailed description 
of each policy that has a relation with financial liberalisation.  
Table 5.1 Indonesian financial liberalisation policies 
 
Source: Own construction based on Cole and Slade (1996) and Bank Indonesia (2014) 
Note: the information on the enactment of banking sector entry and the implementation of 
credit programme policies are available only in the year of its implementation, which is 1968.  
The second step is classifying each policy into the related policy areas or dimensions. 
These policies and their dates are then classified and categorised based on the 
indicators of financial liberalisation measures (Abiad et al., 2008). Referring to 
Dimension/ Policy areas Sub-dimension Date Remarks
Credit programme 1968
In 1968, the government introduced BIMAS, a rice intensification 
programme, which then was followed by another credit programme called 
investment credit.
Ceiling on Reserve 
Requirement
…- Oct. 1988
Nov. 1988
Feb. 1996
Apr. 1997
Jun. 2004
Oct. 2010
Required reserve : 15%
required reserve: 2%
required reserve : 3%
required reserve : 5%
required reserve : 5% for IDR and 3% for foreign currencies
required reserve : 8% for IDR and 1% for foreign currencies
Subsidized sector - Up until present, Government of Indonesia provides interest subsidy (subsidized rate) especially for small scale industries
Credit ceiling Jun. 1983 Government policy to eliminate credit ceiling
Deposit Jun. 1983
Lending Jun. 1983
Foreign bank branch 1968 The government allowed the foreign banks  to open their branches
Banned of new 
domestic banks 1968
The government regulation pertaining to the restriction of the opening of 
the new domestic banks, but this regulation had been revoked in third 
quarter of 1988.
Branching restriction Oct. 1988 Branching restriction has been eased
Banking sector 
activities Dec. 1968
Banking sector covers wide ranging task: banking activities, insurance, 
investment.
Exc. Rate Apr. 1970 Exchange rates fully convertible and unified
Restric. KI
Apr. 1970
Sep. 1991
Jun. 2005
- No tight restriction on capital inflows exist.
- Presidential Decree pertaining to the ceiling on foreign borrowing. 
   However, starting from 1994/1995, it was no longer effective.
- In June 2005, the Central Bank enacted a regulation on the maximum of 
  banking sector foreign borrowing, which then was revoked in 2008. 
  This regulation has been reinstated in 2011.
Restric. KO
Apr. 1970
Jul. 2010
- No tight restrictions exist
- The implementation of the Central Bank regulation pertaining to 
  the minimum holding period
Privatization Nov. 1996 BBNI was the first state-owned bank doing IPO in Nov. 1996. The other state-owned banks followed this step in the 2000s.
Development measures
Jun. 1999
Dec. 2004
Oct. 2005
The establishment of security commision under the Ministry of Finance.
The introduction of primary dealer system
The attempt to broaden the investor base.
Foreign ownership Sep. 1989 The equity market is open for foreign ownership
CAR Dec. 1993 The implementation of Basel I: capital adequacy ratio 7%
CB independent May 1999 Based upon the Central Bank Law that enacted in 1999
Supervisory Dec. 1968 Based on the Central Bank Law that regulates the on-off site supervisory 
Supervisory coverage Dec. 1968 Supevisory covers all banks
Credit control
Government policy to eliminate interest rate control
Banking sector supervision
Interest rate Liberalization
Banking sector entry
Capital account transaction
Securities market
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Chapter 2, Table 5.1 provides the detail on the financial liberalisation policies and the 
dates they have been enacted or implemented. Instead of focusing only on seven 
financial liberalisation indicators, Table 5.1 incorporates one additional indicator, 
namely credit ceiling, to be included in the calculation. The inclusion of credit ceiling 
as one indicator is based on the basic framework of financial liberalisation, which 
underlines the important of the government decision to eliminate the credit ceiling. 
Moreover, the government policy to abolish the credit ceiling in June 1983 became a 
milestone in the implementation of the Indonesian financial reforms. Hence, there will 
be eight indicators that will be involved in the construction of this index.  
Figure 5.1 Monthly FLI 1970–2015 
  
Source: Own calculations based on Abiad et al. (2008) 
Note: The vertical lines show two critical steps of financial liberalisation measures in 
1983 and 1988 
The third step is providing the score for each financial liberalisation dimension, which 
is constructed from the score of several sub-dimensions. According to Abiad et al. 
(2008), there are two dimensions that do not have sub-dimensions, namely the credit 
ceiling and privatisation. The rule in scoring these dimensions or sub-dimensions is 
provided in Appendix A.  Following the reversals principle, as explained above, when 
there is any new policy that affects a specific dimension, the score of this sub-
dimension or dimension should be adjusted; therefore, when the policy leads to the 
more liberalised situation, the score is increasing, and if it makes the financial system 
less liberalised, the score is then seen to be decreasing. For each dimension with its 
own sub-dimensions, the score is calculated from the total ‘raw-score’ of each sub-
dimension’s score. The monthly FLI is obtained from the summation of monthly 
0
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3
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financial liberalisation score divided by the number of financial liberalisation policy 
dimensions. In the case of Indonesia, however, the FLI calculated using seven policy 
areas, as suggested by Abiad et al. (2008), has a value that is almost similar to the 
index calculated using eight policy areas, which has been done in this study. Figure 
5.1 shows the monthly FLI spanning 1970–2015. 
The monthly FLI provided in Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the process completed in 
order to obtain a higher frequency of FLI on the development of financial liberalisation 
is possible. There are several advantages associated with constructing a higher 
frequency financial liberalisation: for instance, (i) this index allows the researcher to 
use it with other higher frequency indicators in the empirical analysis; and (ii) a higher 
frequency index can portray the detailed development and accordingly describe the 
phase or process of financial liberalisation policies. Thus far, this is the study of 
financial liberalisation that implements the first effort in constructing the FLI by 
examining the change of government policies on a monthly basis.  
5.06 Empirical analysis 
5.06.1 Autoregressive Distributed Lag technique 
Most of the empirical analyses in economics examine a long-run relationship between 
independent variable(s) and the dependent variable. The assumption that needs to 
be fulfilled by the data series is that they are stationary. Brooks (2008, pp. 207–208) 
underlined the importance of stationary data in time series analysis for its ability to 
give a better estimate in the long-run. On the other hand, the non-stationary series 
are argued to give an unreliable estimate since they can produce a false statistical 
evidence17. However, in an effort to make a variable stationary, researchers need to 
employ the first-differencing or de-trending technique. Meanwhile, utilising this 
technique may imply a loss of important long-run information of the relationship 
between the variables interest (Nkoro and Uko, 2016).  
Recent developments in the econometrics technique offer a way out in terms of 
dealing with the above challenge. Cointegration is one of the econometrics methods 
that may be used as a tool in examining the long-run relationship between variables 
interest. There are several techniques in testing the cointegration: for example, a two-
                                                
17 In line with Brooks (2008), Gujarati and Porter (2009, p. 741) explained that it would be difficult to 
study a long-term behaviour of such series if the data were non-stationary data for they only provided 
information for a specific period. As a result, the forecasting could produce less-precise outcome.  
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step procedure that is formalised by Engle and Granger, the Stock-Watson common 
trends test, and the Johansen cointegration test. Such tests offer the solution of long-
run relationship, although these tests require all variables involved to be non-
stationary and have the same level of integration order, which is I(1). 
One technique that is widely used is the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
model, as developed by Pesaran et al. (1999, 2001). This technique has various 
advantages compared to others in the way that: (i) it considers the problems of serial 
correlation and endogeneity by involving lagged values in the estimation process, 
both for dependent and independent variables; and (ii) it can estimate short- and 
long-run parameters simultaneously, irrespective of order of cointegration of each 
variable is, whether I(0) or I(1). 
In general, the ARDL model can be formulated based on the following basic equation: 
𝛥𝑦௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑𝛽௜𝛥𝑦௧ିଵ + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑥ଵ௧ି௝ + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑥ଶ௧ି௞ + 𝛿଴𝑦௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଵ𝑥ଵ௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଶ𝑥ଶ௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ 
In this equation, 𝛼଴ denotes the intercept, 𝑦௧ is the dependent variable, 𝑥௧ denotes the 
independent variables and 𝜀௧ is the error term. There is specific characteristic of an 
ARDL equation, which contains an Error Correction term (EC). In the above equation 
it is represented by 𝛿଴. The EC describes the adjustment speed of the model to its 
equilibrium when there is a shock. EC has to meet the stability condition and takes 
the value between -1 < 𝛿଴ < 0. This negative value shows that the process of 
adjustment is convergence, which means that if the value of error correction term = 
–0.5, it can be inferred that, after the shock, 50% of the speed of adjustment takes 
place in each period or quarter or year. The above equation is similar to the traditional 
error correction model (ECM). However, the usual error-correction term is replaced 
by 𝑦௧ିଵ,  𝑥ଵ௧ିଵ, and 𝑥ଶ௧ିଵ or the lagged level of the dependent and independent 
variables. 
In the case of the ARDL technique, Pesaran et al. (1999, 2001) use bounds-testing 
to assess the cointegration of the variables interest. The null hypothesis that will be 
examined centres on there being no long-run association between variable interests. 
Within this process, the Wald test, which is derived based on the model constructed, 
allows the researcher to examine the existence of co-integration (Ononugbo, 2012, 
p. 202). The null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis of the Wald test can be 
presented as follows: 
𝐻଴:  𝛿଴ = 𝛿ଵ =  𝛿ଶ = 0  (there is no long-run relationship) 
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𝐻஺:  𝛿଴ ≠ 𝛿ଵ ≠  𝛿ଶ ≠ 0  (there is a long-run relationship) 
To examine the computed F-statistics, Pesaran et al. (1999, 2001) provide the F-
statistics critical values that consist of lower and upper bound critical values. The first 
critical value assumes that the variables involved in the model are integrated of order 
zero, I(0), which means there is no cointegration between the variables interest. The 
latter assumes that all variables involved are integrated of order one, I(1), which 
means that the cointegration between variables exists.   
These lower and upper bounds critical values will be used to assess the computed 
F-statistics (Pesaran et al.,1999, 2001; Nkoro and Uko, 2016). When the value of the 
computed F-statistics reaches a point beyond the critical bounds, the lower and upper 
bounds, one can then draw a conclusion as to whether or not there is a long-run 
relationship between variables involved. The decision that the long-run relationship 
exists can be made if the computed F-statistics is greater than the upper bound; on 
the other hand, there is no long-run relationship if the value of computed F-statistics 
is below the lower bound critical value. However, if the computed value falls in 
between of these bounds or lies within the lower and upper bounds, the result is then 
inconclusive, which requires that the researcher take another test of unit root and 
order of integrations of the variables interests.  
Following the conclusion of the long-run relationship, one can proceed the estimation 
using ARDL. This next step is the process of estimating the long-run relationship 
coefficients and error correction term. However, when undertaking this process, the 
selection of lagged length for each variable involved is required so as to ensure that 
the model has Gaussian error terms (Nkoro and Uko, 2016). In other words, this 
model can provide a reliable output when the values of the maximum lags are 
appropriately selected. In order to generate a parsimonious model, one usually faces 
a trade-off between the choice of lowering the sum squared residual or losing the 
degree of freedom. The decision to add the lagged length may reduce the residual of 
sum square; however, this decision has an association with decreasing the degree 
of freedom. The selection of the lags values can be done using the ordinary selection 
criteria: for example, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SIC). These selection criteria enable researchers to examine whether or not 
the model fits the data. According to Brooks (2008, pp. 232–233), these information 
criteria contain two important features: a term to measure model fit, which is a 
function of the sum squares residual; and a penalty when there are additional 
parameters that will reduce the degree of freedom. 
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After reviewing the technique to be used in the analysis, the following subsections 
will discuss the empirical analyses on the impact of financial liberalisation on 
exchange rate volatility and economic performance.  
5.06.2 Exchange rate volatility and financial liberalisation 
Financial liberalisation is argued as helping a country in terms of providing the source 
of funds and accordingly reducing the volatility of its exchange rate. Following this 
argument, the hypothesis of this chapter is that financial liberalisation has a negative 
impact on exchange rate volatility. Referring to this hypothesis, an analysis will be 
undertaken to examine the impact of financial liberalisation on Indonesian financial 
stability. At the first stage, this chapter will explore the association of financial 
liberalisation with the volatility of exchange rate. It is supposed that there is a negative 
association between these indicators, which leads to the conclusion that the process 
of liberalisation in the financial market supports the Indonesian economy by lessening 
its exchange rate volatility. In so doing, this study extends the model proposed by 
Hau (2002) and Kose (2003), as discussed in Section 5.02, as follows:  
𝑉𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐿, 𝐼𝐿, 𝑍) 
In this study, the macro-indicator that intends to be examined is the exchange rate 
volatility. In order to represent financial liberalisation, this chapter will employ several 
macroeconomic indicators, for example, domestic liberalisation (𝐼𝐿) covers the 
development of stock exchange, which will be represented by the return of stock 
index and the development of banking sector credit to the private sector. In terms of 
the external liberalisation (𝐸𝐿), the movement of the domestic interest rate may attract 
the flow of capital and trade openness represented by the term of trade. FLI will be 
involved so as to represent all processes of liberalisation in the financial system. In 
addition to these, there are several macro-economic indicators that will function as 
independent variables. 
The choice of exchange rate volatility is inspired by the fact that, in the last Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/1998, Indonesia suffered a sharp decline and high volatility in 
its currency. Even though a currency crisis does not always follow high exchange 
rate volatility, this indicator may reveal a problem for the country. Some researchers 
define currency crisis based on how deeply the currency has depreciated and in 
consideration to the overall volatility of the currency. As an example, Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) argued that the currency crisis occurs when there is a nominal 
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depreciation of a currency of at least 30%18. Frankel and Rose (1996) define the 
currency crisis as the movement of the exchange rate that reaches two or three 
standard deviations in a particular period.  
Danielsson et al. (2016) maintained that the high volatility of a financial market would 
contribute to the economic agent’s view of the future, especially when financial 
market volatility diverges from economic agents’ expectations. The volatility of a 
financial market indicator that is increasing may lower investors’ or economic agents’ 
confidence. This argument is in line with Kohler (2010) who emphasised the 
increasing probability of a financial crisis with increasing exchange rate volatility.  
Table 5.2 List of variables interest 
Variable Description Data source 
𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 Exchange rate volatility is calculated 
using 12-month rolling standard 
deviation 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS– IMF) 
1991–2015 
𝑔𝑑𝑝 The quarterly data of real economic 
growth 
OECD statistics 
1991–2015 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 The first difference of Central Bank 
policy interest rate deflated by inflation 
rate 
IFS– IMF  
1991–2015 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑟𝑒  The change of credit to the private 
sector in the form of natural logarithm 
BIS  
1991–2015 
𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 The return of stock index that is 
calculated from the natural logarithm of 
stock market index  
CEIC  
1991–2015 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 The natural log of the consumer price 
index 
IFS  
1991–2015 
𝑓𝑙𝑖 The FLI based on the method 
developed by Abiad et al. (2008). The 
monthly data is converted to become 
quarterly data. 
Own calculations 
Source: Own construction 
This sub-section endeavours to investigate the association of the volatility of the 
exchange rate (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) with several other independent variables. The volatility of an 
                                                
18 The authors of the paper did not explain further how they determined the 30% as the limit of the 
volatility. However, it can be inferred that the percentage is calculated based on the average 
exchange rate volatility of countries that are experienced a financial crisis. 
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exchange rate in this study follows Clark et al. (2004) that defined exchange rate 
volatility as the standard deviation of the first difference of the exchange rate natural 
logarithm. In this analysis, the exchange rate volatility is calculated using 12-quarter 
rolling standard deviation. The independent variables to be included in this study 
consist of the inflation rate, the real interest rate, the stock market index and the FLI. 
The inflation rate (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) is argued as having a positive impact on the overall 
volatility of the exchange rate. One variable that can influence the decision of foreign 
investors in investing their funds into the domestic market is inflation. The higher the 
inflation rate, the more reluctant investors are to invest their funds. Another variable 
that may affect investors’ decision is the domestic interest rate (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒). Most 
developing countries have a higher rate of interest compared to developed countries. 
The change of interest rate from its previous period may affect the volatility of the 
exchange rate. A country’s financial reforms can be portrayed by the development of 
its stock market. A higher return of stock market index (𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) may attract 
domestic and foreign investors to make the domestic equity market more active and 
liquid. It is expected that the change of stock index will cause impacts on the 
exchange rate volatility. Moreover, when investigating the impacts of financial 
liberalisation on the dependent variable, this study adds variables with regards the 
implementation of financial liberalisation, such as the credit to the private sector and 
the financial liberalisation index (𝑓𝑙𝑖), for example. These data are expected to 
represent the macroeconomic condition and the implementation of financial 
liberalisation in the country. There is another variable that was intended for use in 
this analysis—the terms of trade—but, considering the presence of multicollinearity, 
this variable was excluded from the estimation. The observation period for this 
analysis ranges 1990–2015, using quarterly data. A list of the variables can be seen 
in Table 5.2. 
The problem with structural breaks is a common problem in a model that involves 
macroeconomics variables. The existence of a structural break can result in the 
misleading interpretation or unreliability of a model. In the process of the date of break 
identification, most researchers may locate the structural break phenomenon, such 
as by the eye-balling process, for example. However, this process sometimes does 
not precisely determine the break date. To deal with this problem, this study applies 
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the methodology of Bai and Perron in examining structural breaks19. There are 
several advantages to using the Bai-Perron method, such as that one can identify 
multiple break dates and estimate the structural change at an unknown date 
(Troncoso-Valverde, 2004). By examining the exchange rate volatility, this study finds 
that the structural break occurs starting from the third quarter of 1997 up to the 
second quarter of 2002, which displays a significant shift and evolves over several 
quarters. One may suspect that this period covers the period of financial crisis seen 
to have occurred in Indonesia, which then shifts the series of the variable concerned. 
It then can be inferred that, during the period of crisis, the volatility of the exchange 
rate moves beyond the normal period. In response to this structural break, the dummy 
variable of break is constructed, which contains binomial numbers and has the value 
of one for all observations over this period, and zero otherwise. 
Table 5.3 Unit root tests 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The unit root tests are conducted using the ADF and Phillips-Peron methods, which are 
based on the MacKinnon critical values that correspond to -3.497, -2.890, and -2.582 of 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
As provided in Section 5.06.1, the first step in using this method is the examination 
of the order of integration of each variable involved in the model, either I(0) or I(1). 
This step is considered critical since it will determine whether or not the estimation 
can use ARDL. If the orders of integration across all variables involved are similar, 
the method that will be used is the error correction model (ECM). If there is a mixture 
of the order of integration amongst the variables, one can employ ARDL. Table 5.3 
displays the results of the unit root test using the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) and 
the Phillips-Peron methods. It can be inferred that all of these variables have a mixed 
                                                
19 To apply the Bai-Perron method in identifying the break date, this study uses the statistical software 
Eviews 9. The objective of this method is to estimate the unknown coefficient regressions and the 
period or date of the structural change occurs under a certain number of observations (Troncoso-
Valverde, 2004). 
Decision Decision
excrate -2.897 ** -2.773 * I(0) -1.814 -5.004 *** I(1)
gdp -7.141 *** -15.081 *** I(0) -7.141 *** -40.18 *** I(0)
privcre -3.288 *** -8.164 *** I(0) -3.821 ** -7.306 *** I(0)
idxreturn -10.34 *** -11.606 *** I(0) -10.348 *** -57.17 *** I(0)
inflation -6.606 *** -5.718 *** I(0) -3.487 ** -4.171 *** I(0)
realintrate -3.451 *** -8.29 *** I(0) -3.236 ** -8.308 *** I(0)
fli -1.225 -7.882 ** I(1) -1.261 -7.828 *** I(1)
Variables Level 1st different Level 1st different
ADF Phillips-Perron
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order of integration. Since the orders of integration are mixed, the analysis may 
proceed with ARDL. 
Table 5.4 Bounds test results 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Based on the results of having the order of integration, the next step is to calculate 
the bound testing and compare the computed F-statistic with the critical value. Before 
undertaking this step, the maximum number of lags needs to be set. In so doing, this 
study uses Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to determine the lagged values of the 
model, which provides the result of four as the maximum lags. With four as the 
maximum lags, one may proceed to the bounds test to check the existence of the 
long-run relationship amongst the variables interests. Table 5.4 provides the number 
independent variables (k), the value of computed F-statistics, and two critical values, 
namely the upper (I(1)) and lower (I(0)) bounds. Based on this table, the output of the 
bounds test is above the upper bound at 1% significance level. According to Pesaran 
et al. (1999, 2001), the critical value of the upper bound assumes that all variable 
interests have the order of integration one, I(1), which suggests that co-integration 
does exist. This explanation leads to the decision of the rejection of 𝐻଴ that no long-
run relationship exists. In other words, this result demonstrates the existence of a 
long-run relationship between variables interest since the F-statistic is above the 
critical value. 
The long-run relationship between the variables in the model with ARDL (3, 4, 0, 3, 
4, 0, 0) for the exchange rate volatility is as follows: 
𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧ = −0.027 − 0.036𝑔𝑑𝑝௧ −  0.009𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧ − 0.07𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑟𝑒௧ + 0.00003𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧ 
      [-3.094]         [-0.077]   [-1.58]  [0.022]       
− 0.04𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛௧ +  0.052𝑓𝑙𝑖௧ + 0.027𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 +  𝜀௧ 
              [-1.18]                  [2.19]           [5.03] 
R-squared = 0.816   Adj.R-squared = 0.782  S.E.of regression = 0.007  No. obs=100 
Note: The numbers in brackets are the t-statistics 
The sign of each coefficient estimate may reveal the long-run association between 
the dependent and independent variables. In this observation, the variables that are 
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
6 8.6549 4.43 3.15 3.61 2.45 3.23 2.12
k F-statistic
Critical values
at 1% level of 
significant
at 5% level of 
significant
at 10% level of 
significant
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seen to positively affect the volatility of the exchange rate (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) are the real 
interest rate (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) and the FLI (𝑓𝑙𝑖). However, from these two variables, it is 
only the FLI that is statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, there 
are some independent variables that have a negative association with the dependent 
variable. Those variables are growth (𝑔𝑑𝑝), which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level, private credit (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑟𝑒), and the inflation rate (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), as well as the stock 
market return (𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛). These two last independent variables are not significant.  
From this output, one can see that the increasing economic growth may have a 
positive impact in terms of reducing exchange rate volatility. On the other hand, the 
increasing FLI, all other things being equal, will increase the exchange rate volatility. 
To sum up, not all the indicators representing the implementation of financial 
liberalisation have similar movements to the currency volatility. However, the 
development of financial liberalisation as the focus of this study and represented by 
the FLI shows a positive relationship. It can be inferred that the implementation of 
financial liberalisation in Indonesia has a positive association with the volatility of the 
exchange rate. In addition to the long-run relationship, this model has a negative and 
statistically significant error correction term at the 1% level (error correction value is 
–0.242 with t-statistic –7.723). This result indicates the speed of adjustment of the 
model in the long-run. In other words, the system has a recovery speed at 0.242 to 
return to the long-run equilibrium if there is a shock. The detail error correction of the 
estimation of ARDL is provided in the Appendix B.III. 
This study also carries out diagnostic tests, such as the serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity tests, for example. The diagnostic test of serial correlation LM test 
shows that the probability of F(4,71) is 0.5932, which is above the p-value of 0.05. 
The value of the Lagrange Multiplier (Obs*R-squared=3.65) is lower than the critical 
value (2 =9.487), with a probability of Chi-square equals to 0.4551. This output 
shows that these tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The 
output of the White test for detecting heteroscedasticity, which is the value of 
Lagrange Multiplier (Obs*R-squared=20.77) is below the critical Chi-squared (2 
=22.36). It can be inferred that the test cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity.  
5.06.3 Economic growth and financial liberalisation  
In addition to the analysis of the impact of financial liberalisation on the volatility of 
the exchange rate, as above, this study deems it necessary to examine the impact of 
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financial liberalisation on growth. So far, the association between finance and growth 
nexus is under intense discussion. As discussed in Section 5.02, Fry (1995) 
underlined the extensive studies that showed a positive relationship between these 
two variables and emphasises the causal link that finance supports growth. His 
argument was based on the thought that the availability of funds in the financial 
market will facilitate economic agents to expand their business capacity. The 
availability of funds will increase as the government stimulates saving by liberalising 
the interest rate. The increasing availability of funds allows the financial sector to play 
a significant role in channelling the funds to the private sector. With this argument, 
the mainstream views describe the model of finance-growth nexus as follows 
(Elsayed, 2013): 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑓(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the economic growth obtained from country’s income in the form of 
its natural logarithm. The 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 and 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 refer to the indicators that 
represents the role of banking sector and stock market in domestic financial system. 
King and Levine (1993) applied this model by focusing on the role of the domestic 
banking sector and tried to establish this relationship with the following equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃ଵ + 𝛼ଶ𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘௧ + 𝛼ଷ𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡௧ + 𝛼ସ𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐺𝐷𝑃௧ + 𝑢௧ 
Following Arestis and Demetriades (1997), in an effort to test the association between 
the financial liberalisation and economic growth, this chapter will use several 
variables, such as economic growth (𝑔𝑑𝑝), the ratio of M2 to GDP (𝑚2𝑔𝑑𝑝), the ratio 
of credit to GDP (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝), the stock market volatility (𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑝), and the stock market 
capitalisation (𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑐𝑎𝑝). It is common that the analyses of financial liberalisation 
emphasise the role of the banking system in the financial sector, which, in most 
studies, is represented by the ratio of M2 to GDP and the ratio of private credit to 
GDP. The indicator of M2 over GDP is argued as an indicator that shows the level of 
the financial-deepening of a country. This variable corresponds to the ability of the 
financial sector to provide sufficient liquidity for transactions (DeGregorio and 
Guidotti, 1995). The credit to GDP ratio is commonly used to represent the role of the 
banking system in channelling money to the private sector. The ratio of credit to GDP 
may capture the intermediation process of the banking sector so as to provide the 
private sector’s needs to source of funds. The availability of funds in the domestic 
financial market will provide access for the private sector to achieve its objectives in 
terms of expanding their business. This will lead to increased economic activity in a 
country. In addition to the banking sector, this study also involves the role of the stock 
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market in providing economic units, especially the private sector, with sources of 
financing. The second aspect of financial liberalisation is the increasing role of the 
stock market in the financial system. Levine and Zervos (1998) emphasised the 
important role of the stock market and banking sector in terms of spurring on 
economic growth. In this context, several indicators measure the importance of the 
stock market, such as liquidity, size and volatility. One indicator commonly used to 
examine the size of a stock market is stock market capitalisation. This indicator, 
according to Levine and Zervos (1998), is measured by the value of the listed 
domestic shares as a ratio to the GDP. This variable relates to the ability of a financial 
system to mobilise the funds available and diversify risks (Arestis and Demetriades, 
1997). However, in the case of Indonesia, this data is available starting from 1993 
onwards; hence, its number of observations are inconsistent with the other variables. 
For this reason, market capitalisation is excluded from the estimation. The second 
indicator is stock market volatility. The volatility of stock market returns, in certain 
cases, may not have had a positive contribution on economic growth. Nonetheless, 
Levine (1996) noted that stock market volatility and liquidity can demonstrate future 
economic growth. It is expected that the results of the model will show the positive 
relationship between the independent variables in association with its dependent 
variable. This study also attempts to include an additional variable, which is the FLI 
that is constructed based on the method developed by Abiad et al. (2008).  
The data set for this analysis covers the period 1991–2015. The sources of data are 
the IFS–IMF, the CEIC, OECD statistics, and BIS. Table 5.5 provides the list of 
indicators involved in the analysis. 
Table 5.5 List of variables 
Variable Description Data source 
𝑔𝑑𝑝 The quarterly data of economic growth OECD statistics 
1991–2015 
𝑚2𝑔𝑑𝑝 The ratio of broad money to GDP IFS– IMF 
1991–2015 
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝  The credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP IFS– IMF and BIS  
1991–2015 
𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙 The volatility of stock index obtained from the 12-month 
rolling standard deviation of the first different of natural 
logarithm of stock market index  
CEIC  
1991–2015 
𝑓𝑙𝑖 The FLI based on the method developed by Abiad et 
al. (2008). The monthly data is converted to become 
quarterly data. 
Own calculations 
Source: Own construction 
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Similar to the previous subsection, the first stage involves examining the presence of 
unit root. The unit root test is undertaken using the ADF test and is further validated 
by the Phillip-Peron (PP) test. In this step, the variables’ integration order can also 
be defined, which are expected as I(0) or I(1). Based on the unit root tests carried 
out, Table 5.6 displays the results of unit root test and further concludes that the t-
statistics for these variables are mixed between I(0) and I(1). Since the results are 
inconclusive, the analysis may proceed and use the ARDL and bounds testing that 
are apt to the results, which show a mixed order of integration. 
Table 5.6 Unit root tests  
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: The unit root tests are conducted using the ADF and Phillips-Peron methods, which are 
based on the MacKinnon critical values that correspond to -3.497, -2.890, and -2.582 of 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
After defining the order of integration, the next step is to set the maximum number of 
lags. This study uses AIC to determine the lagged values of the model, which is down 
to four as the maximum number of lags. Subsequently, the next step is the bounds 
test to check the existence of the long-run relationship amongst the variables 
interests. Table 5.7 provides the detail of the bounds tests result. From this table, the 
lag-length can be identified, which is down to 4 lagged. The value of computed F-
statistics for this case is 16.12, which is higher than the critical value of upper bound, 
which has a value of 5.06 at the 1% level of significance. The result of the bounds 
test demonstrates the existence of a long-run relationship and accordingly rejects the 
null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between variables interest. 
Table 5.7 Bounds test result 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Decision Decision
gdp -7.141 *** -15.081 *** I(0) -7.141 *** -40.180 *** I(0)
credgdp -1.476 -5.371 *** I(1) -1.642 -10.458 *** I(1)
m2gdp -1.540 -15.819 *** I(1) -2.282 -15.246 *** I(1)
idxvol -2.004 -10.088 *** I(1) -2.004 -10.090 *** I(1)
fli -1.225 -7.882 *** I(1) -1.261 -7.828 *** I(1)
Variables ADF Phillips-PerronLevel 1st different Level 1st different
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
4 16.12 5.06 3.74 4.01 2.86 3.52 2.45
k F-statistic
Critical values
at 1% level of 
significant
at 5% level of 
significant
at 10% level of 
significant
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The following equation provides the long-run relationship between the variables in 
the model of ARDL (1,0,3,0,0) and the economic growth as the dependent variable: 
𝑔𝑑𝑝௧ = 23.2 − 0.12𝑚2𝑔𝑑𝑝௧ − 4.24𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝௧ − 0.1𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑣𝑜𝑙௧ − 8.32𝑓𝑙𝑖௧ + 𝜀௧ 
               [-0.1]   [-3.84]               [-1.44]          [-4.3]             
Note: R-squared= 0.579 Adj.R-squared= 0.560  S.E.of regression:1.32  No. obs. = 100 
the numbers in brackets are the t-statistics 
Based on the above equation, from four independent variables, two variables are 
statistically significant. The variables of the ratio credit to GDP (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝) and FLI 
(𝑓𝑙𝑖) are statistically significant at the 1% level. The interpretation from this equation 
is that, in the long-run, an in the credit to GDP ratio, all other things being equal, may 
reduce the economic growth. In line with Weller’s (2010) argument, the credit from 
the banking sector may go to the unproductive investment activities. As a result, the 
funds distributed to the private sector do not generate a direct impact on economic 
activities. This also applies to the FLI, which may also slow down the growth rate if 
the index increases; in other words, based on this observation, two indicators 
representing financial liberalisation and financial development, namely the ratio of 
credit to GDP and FLI, can be seen to have a detrimental effect on economic growth. 
It can be concluded that the implementation of financial liberalisation in Indonesia 
has had a different effect to what is commonly believed. 
In addition, this model has a negative and statistically significant error correction, 
which has a value of –0.884 at the 1% level of significance. The error correction term 
shows the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium of 0.884. This value shows 
the recovery speed of the system following a shock. The error correction of the 
estimation of ARDL is provided in the Appendix B.III. 
This study also performs diagnostic tests. The serial correlation LM test shows that 
the probability of F(4,84) is 0.995, which is above the p-value of 0.05. The value of 
Lagrange Multiplier (Obs*R-squared=0.229), with a probability of Chi-square, equals 
0.993 and has the value above the p-value of 0.05. It can be inferred that there is no 
evidence of serial correlation. However, one problem detected is the 
heteroscedasticity. The output of the White test for detecting heteroscedasticity, 
which is the value of Lagrange Multiplier (Obs*R-squared=29.1) exceeds the critical 
Chi-squared (2 =15.50) shows the presence of heteroscedasticity. This test suggests 
that the estimation uses the robust standard error.  
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5.07 Conclusion 
The financial system development is argued to help the country in terms of 
accelerating and improving its economic performance. One aspect of financial 
system development is that it is argued as having the ability to support economic 
performance by lowering the costs of capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000), raising 
economic growth (Quinn and Toyoda, 2008), and lessening crisis occurrence (Beck 
et al., 2006). However, some economists claim that financial liberalisation has a 
negative effect on the financial system.  
This chapter’s objective is to engage in this discussion by focusing on the concept of 
financial liberalisation and the way in which it impacts the country’s financial system, 
whether by providing a positive impact, as expected, or not. In so doing, this chapter 
has discussed the financial liberalisation thesis and reviewed various empirical 
studies focused on the impacts of financial liberalisation on financial stability and 
economic performance. The discussion of this chapter involved the concepts of 
domestic financial liberalisation and capital account liberalisation.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by observing the implementation of financial 
reforms in the Indonesian context and assessing its association with the instability of 
Indonesia financial system using the most recent data available. Besides, this chapter 
provides the first effort to constructing FLI on a monthly basis in an attempt to garner 
understanding into the detailed progress of financial liberalisation in Indonesia. With 
this monthly index, the empirical analysis using higher frequency macroeconomic 
and financial indicators has been possible to undertake.  
This chapter has provided several findings in association with the implementation of 
financial reforms in Indonesia. First, financial reforms are argued as having an impact 
on supporting a country in achieving a better economic performance; inside this 
framework, however, a number of damaging effects can be seen. The empirical 
results show that Indonesia entered into an unstable financial condition after adopting 
financial liberalisation. Second, this study finds that the process centred on obtaining 
a more detailed description of the development of financial liberalisation by 
constructing a monthly FLI is possible. By having higher frequency data, the analysis 
can capture the heterogeneity and characteristics of the observations much better 
than low-frequency ones. Third, the implementation of financial liberalisation creates 
financial system vulnerability. By employing the ARDL method, this study rejects the 
hypothesis that financial liberalisation reduces exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, 
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when investigating the association between financial liberalisation and economic 
growth, the study finds that the output displays a negative long-run relationship.  
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Chapter 6  
Assessing the measurement of financial instability  
6.01 Introduction 
Almost all countries experience the negative impacts that come from financial crisis 
when it occurs, such as negative growth, a substantial increase in unemployment, 
and a decline in asset prices. As a result, crisis countries need a period to recover. 
In the case of Indonesian, since the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 hit 
the country severely, it needed more than five years to get back to pre-crisis 
conditions. Because of these impacts, no single country expects to experience a 
crisis. This condition encourages economists and the authorities to search for the 
correct methods to prevent their country from experiencing financial crisis by 
improving the country's stability overall. 
The need for financial stability in the global economic condition overall has not been 
accompanied by the construction of an effective policy framework. The first question 
to be raised is in connection with the performance of the policy framework in 
preventing, maintaining and dealing with a crisis. In order to answer this question, 
there are criteria that have been used to ensure that quality and effectiveness has 
been maintained in the construction of the framework. Besides, the framework needs 
to reach a consensus on the definition of financial stability, its coverage, and the way 
to measure it.  
Recent developments in the prevention of financial crisis have reached the stage of 
developing a tool to measure and predict crisis episodes. There are efforts to 
construct an instrument for measuring and predicting crisis occurrence. However, 
there are challenges concerning the accuracy and precision of the instrument. 
Besides, the sophistication of modern financial systems puts pressure on this effort. 
One method that has been initiated and is meant to give a signal of a crisis 
occurrence is an EWI. This method became the foundation for the next generation of 
financial crisis measurement tools. Despite its weaknesses, especially its poor 
capability for crisis prediction, this method facilitates its users to explain and evaluate 
the crisis episodes. 
This chapter provides a contribution to the literature by developing the instrument of 
EWI using the most current available dataset. In this chapter, this study endeavours 
to investigate the applicability of the EWI by applying it to the Indonesian case. This 
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study focuses on the assessment of the macroeconomic variables that are commonly 
used as crisis indicators referring to previous studies and extending to include one 
additional variable, namely short-term debt; this will be to investigate its performance 
when it comes to being a leading indicator of crisis. In so doing, the analysis will 
explore the monthly data on the Indonesian economy over the period from 1990 to 
2015. It has been argued that using higher frequency data can capture the diversity 
and specific characteristics of the observation much better than low-frequency ones. 
The higher frequency data is also expected to capture a more sensitive signal, which 
is required in building the EWI.  
Following the introduction, the next section is a short exploration of some studies that 
have constructed methods to measure the financial instability. The third section will 
explore the method of construction for the EWI, and its application to the Indonesian 
case. The last section will discuss the results, which is then followed by the 
conclusion. 
6.02 Theoretical review 
6.02.1 The methods to find the leading indicators 
Since the 1990s, economists have developed tools for preventing the financial 
system from crisis. They have offered forward extensive methodologies to build a 
reliable instrument to predict financial crisis. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) 
categorised three methods for developing this instrument. The first method is the 
behaviour analysis that is considered to be the earliest technique to select crisis 
leading indicators. This method examines the behaviour of several variables in the 
run-up to a crisis by differentiating the countries under observation in to two groups: 
crisis and non-crisis countries. Then this method compares the movement of the 
variables of interest that belong to each group. The second method is the signal 
approach that selects some of the macroeconomic indicators to be crisis leading 
indicators, and sets the threshold for each indicator by which the border between 
crisis and non-crisis period is determined. The third method is a linear regression or 
a binary regression approach, which uses linear regression to test the statistical 
significance of some of the variables under observation. Furthermore, there are more 
recent techniques that have been developed for identifying the variables of interest.      
Kamin (1988) conducted a study on the movements of macroeconomic indicators 
before, during and after the countries under observation went through a period of 
currency devaluation. The intention of this observation was to understand the inter-
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relationship between the movements of the variables involved and whether or not 
there were any difference in the movements between the crisis and non-crisis 
countries. This method used three steps to observe the variables of interest. The first 
step was examining the value of all macro-indicators before, during and after the 
period of devaluation within a seven-year window. The second step was to calculate 
the average value of each indicator for all of the countries under observation. Finally, 
the third step was comparing the movement of each indicator that belonged to the 
devaluing countries from the entire sample during the same period (Kamin, 1988, 
pp.7-8). By comparing the movements of the variables between the crisis and non-
crisis countries, the author claimed that it is possible to differentiate the behaviour of 
the variables of interests. 
Under the second method, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) observed some 
macroeconomic variables that were suspected to have relationship with the balance 
of payment and banking crises. In their paper, these variables were examined to go 
on to become the best crises predictors, and to became known as EWI. The first 
objective of this research was to observe the economic and financial variables that 
have unusual movements in the outbreak of such crises. By examining and 
comparing the movements of each variable in both normal and crisis periods, 
economists may get an impression of how the financial system can become unstable 
and, if possible, the variables can also show the date or timing of a pending crisis 
with some degree of accuracy. The second objective was to explore these crises, 
and whether or not they have any relationship to one another. The examination of 
the behaviour of the relevant variables is meant to obtain an insight into the cause of 
the crises, especially if there are any variables that have similar movements which 
may explain the outbreak. The most important step in this analysis is the way that is 
used to determine the crisis outbreak, for it will affect the rest of the analysis.  
The third method intends to find the crisis leading indicators by using regression 
techniques, namely linear regression and binary regression. Various variables which 
may indicate a country’s vulnerability are chosen. Economists will undertake a 
probability test; in this case, a crisis occurrence serves as the dependent variable 
that is determined by a set of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is 
determined based on the criteria that are applied to the crisis occurrence, whether it 
is currency crisis (Eichengreen et al. 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996) or banking crisis 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Similar to the second method, the 
identification of the crisis also becomes one critical step in this analysis.   
112 
 
One of the challenges in constructing the EWI was how to translate the definition of 
crises in relation to determining the onset of the crisis. There are definitions of crises 
that are relevant to this discussion, as provided in Chapter 3 - Section 03. In short, 
one can refer to the World Bank’s definition of a banking crisis as a situation when 
there are bank runs, and all sectors in the country face a difficult financial situation 
and fail to pay their contract obligations on time (World Bank, 2016). Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998) set four conditions that describe the banking crisis. Those 
are the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system being 
more than 10%, the bail-out cost to support the banking sector reaches at least 2% 
of the GDP, the banking sector problem leads into the nationalisation of banks, or 
there is the occurrence of massive bank runs. If one or more of the conditions above 
hold, then a country is then categorised as a banking crisis country. 
The second type of crisis is a currency crisis, which occurs when there is a deep 
depreciation of the country’s exchange rate. Frankel and Rose (1996) proposed the 
cut-off point of deep depreciation as reaching more than 25 % to translate the 
definition of a currency crisis that enables a researcher in categorising a crisis 
country. Laeven and Valencia (2008) set the limit of the currency depreciation when 
it reaches not less than 30%. According to Frankel and Rose (1996), however, this 
criterion of a minimum level of depreciation is constructed arbitrarily. Most of the 
studies refer to these approaches and will set the date of the beginning of the crisis 
as when the limit is breached (Frankel and Saravelos, 2010).  
6.02.2 The financial crisis measurements 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) proposed 
an instrument to anticipate the occurrence of a crisis by developing EWI. According 
to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Borio and Lowe (2002), the important stages 
of developing this instrument was choosing the variables, classifying the crisis event, 
and setting the precise date of the crisis itself. The criteria to determine whether a 
chosen indicator performs well consists of two factors; firstly, it must have the ability 
to predict the episode of a financial crisis. Secondly, it should not give a false signal, 
which is the forecast of a crisis that does not materialise, too often. The other critical 
part involved is setting the threshold precisely because it affects the performance of 
the indicator overall. The threshold is the boundary between the crisis area and non-
crisis area. When the threshold is set randomly, an inaccurate indicator may turn into 
a good one, or vice versa.  
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Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) focused on indicators that consisted of several 
elements, such as the financial sector, the external sector, the real sector, and the 
fiscal sector. The financial sector was measured by examining some of the variables 
that are expected to describe the banking sector’s condition. These are the M2 
multiplier, domestic credit to GDP ratio, real interest rate, lending to deposit rate ratio, 
M2 to reserves ratio, bank deposits and the excess of M1 balances. They argued that 
in the domestic financial sector, a problem within the domestic banking sector has an 
important role in triggering the occurrence of a crisis. The external sector aims to 
capture the external vulnerabilities of a country by examining several variables such 
as exports, imports, real exchange rate, the level of international reserves, and the 
interest rate differential. Instead of using the real exchange rate as suggested by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), this study has employed real effective exchange rate 
data from the BIS. Lang (2013) argued that the real effective exchange rate can be 
used to analyse the onset of a crisis since it considers the price level and the basket 
of any main trading partners. The third element is the real sector, which is employed 
by examining the movement of the national output and stock prices. The fiscal sector 
uses the ratio of deficit to GDP, and observes the source of funding for the 
government budget, whether it comes from the Central Bank or other sources of 
financing.  
After defining the variables involved in the observation, the next step is assessing the 
movement and the ability of each variable to provide a signal of instability. Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999), who were followed by Borio and Lowe (2002) and Drehmann et 
al. (2011), proposed a mechanism for measuring the variables that are defined as 
the deviations of the current level from some notion of what a ‘normal period’ is. Borio 
and Lowe (2002) used the long-term trend of a variable to represent the normal 
period. This long-term trend is measured using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with 
smoothing parameter λ taking the value of 14,400 since the data is monthly. It is 
supposed that each variable depicts the correct signal; hence, one should be 
concerned in the case of a wider gap, as it may indicate a more vulnerable financial 
system.   
There are three important steps in applying the EWI method; those are the 
determination of the crisis outbreak, the crisis period and the normal period. With 
regards to the determination of the outbreak, some studies (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Laeven and Valencia, 2013) provide the 
information on the definition, date and type of crises. These authors analysed a series 
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of crises based on the experiences of the crisis countries. From this date, one can 
generate and distinguish between the period of crisis and the normal period. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) suggested that the window in which a crisis period is 
observed may range from twenty-four months to thirty-six months, or forty-eight 
months. They also defined the normal period as being a period when the country 
does not experience the crisis. Hence in order to obtain the value of the normal 
period, one must find the average value of each concerned variable in the remaining 
period outside of the crisis period. 
To ascertain whether or not a variable can capture the possibility of a crisis, there 
needs to be an evaluation on each variable’s ability to have a low noise to signal 
(N/S) ratio. This ratio explains the ability of a variable to provide a more precise signal. 
There is a crucial step that needs to be carried out to get this ratio, namely, the setting 
of the threshold. This threshold is the limit that sets the upper boundary of an 
indicator. When the value of such an indicator goes beyond this limit, this indicator is 
considered as issuing a signal of a crisis (Guru, 2016). The challenge in performing 
this stage comes since there is a trade-off in setting the threshold. For example, when 
the threshold value is too high, the indicator may not capture the crisis signal, and 
when it is set too low, the variable may send too many false signals. Economists use 
several techniques in defining this threshold. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) used a 
fine-grid approach and Lang (2013) set 1.5 standard deviations as the threshold; so, 
when the value of a variable breached this threshold, it will be counted as the crisis 
period.  
Guru (2016) applied the extreme value for setting the threshold. The crisis is 
categorised as a rare and extreme event, which has a small probability compared to 
the existence of a tranquil period. According to the author, if one decides to specify 
that a crisis event will have a probability at level p, which at this level is considered 
very small, then a value of the concerned variable that goes beyond 100(1 − 𝑝)th 
percentile will portray the crisis period (Guru, 2016). In other words, 100(1 − 𝑝)th is 
the threshold value to distinguish the border between the stress event or crisis and 
non-crisis. For example, the stress probability is set at 5%, it means that the 95th 
percentile will be included as the stress-threshold (Guru, 2016).  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) selected the value of the threshold by carrying out an 
examination on each variable and deciding the value of the stress probability or the 
critical region of a maximum 30%. Considering the number and characteristics of the 
observation, these authors set a different level of stress probability for each different 
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variable. In so doing, the result will commonly give two types of error (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Drehmann et al., 2011): firstly, that no signal 
is sent but a crisis occurs (Type I error), and secondly, that there is a signal that can 
be recognised but no crisis occurs (Type II error). To obtain the appropriate variable 
for the EWI, a variable should have a low N/S ratio.  
6.03 The application of the early warning signal 
This study employs a monthly data set of twelve variables ranging from January 1990 
to December 2015 to generate the EWI. This data was mostly retrieved from the IFS-
IMF, Indonesian Central Bank, and OECD statistics. Following Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999), this study has examined the movement of each variable by looking 
at the series of deviations between the actual rate relative to the normal period. It is 
expected that the deviation of each variable within the crisis period can provide the 
signal of fragility. This study will observe most of the variables that have a connection 
to the three sectors, namely the financial sector, the external sector, and the real 
sector. In this study, the indicators that have a link with financial sector are 
represented by M2 to reserves ratio, lending to deposit ratio, bank deposits, total 
credit, and real interest rate. The foreign sector will be represented by several 
indicators such as the interest rate differential, reserves, exchange rate, exports, and 
imports. The indicators linked to the real sector are economic growth, which is 
represented by the index of industrial production and stock market index. There are 
a few pieces of data that cannot be obtained in a higher frequency or are only 
available in a shorter period, for example, the budget deficit, government 
expenditures and government debt. Hence, this study does not involve the 
examination of the indicators within the fiscal sector. In analysing the series of each 
indicator, the long-term trend is measured by the average of the normal period. 
Except for the interest rate and stock market index, all of the variables will be 
calculated from their 12-month changes. 
The choice of the above indicators is based on theoretical considerations, especially 
the way that the indicators explain the economic condition and have the ability to 
show the signal of a crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Referring to Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999), the following paragraphs will summarise the reason for picking 
the above indicators. Within the financial sector indicators, the M2 to reserves ratio 
is used to show that a low and continually declining value of this variable indicates a 
problem in the financial sector. This indicator describes the ability to meet the 
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economic agents’ demands for foreign currency. In the crisis period, economic agents 
may rush to convert their domestic currency into foreign currencies. If there are 
insufficient reserves, the financial system will have a serious problem (Kim et al., 
2007). The second indicator is the loan to deposits ratio that is expected to portray 
the quality of the lending-borrowing process. Usually, this indicator will increase since 
the banking sector is aware of the increasing of borrowers’ credit risk before or during 
the crisis period. The bank deposit will represent the banking sector indicator, 
especially for portraying the possibility of bank runs. In the crisis period, the indicator 
of the bank deposit will decline below the normal period, which can be captured by 
the negative movements of bank deposits. The fourth indicator is the credit to GDP 
ratio which is expected to portray the banking sector’s credit expansion. The 
increasing credit to GDP ratio usually occurs before the onset of a financial crisis. 
The fifth indicator is the real interest rate. In a crisis period, the real interest rate will 
be higher than in the normal period. This indicator can capture the banking sector’s 
intention to maintain its deposit and prevent massive withdrawals. 
Under the foreign sector, there are five indicators that represent the conditions of the 
capital and current accounts of the country that is under observation. Firstly, a higher 
interest rate differential can show the decision of a country to attract foreign capital 
and prevent the deterioration of the exchange rate of the domestic currency. 
Secondly, the negative movements of international reserves describe the loss of the 
Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves. Before and during the crisis period, the 
international reserves will be depleted, and this condition usually recovers when the 
country devalues the currency or shifts its policy to a floating rate arrangement. The 
third indicator is the exchange rate movement, which is expected to show deep 
depreciation in a crisis period. Prior to the crisis period, a sharp decline in domestic 
currency against foreign currency shows the possibility of a currency overvaluation. 
The behaviour of exports and imports may also indicate a problem with the country. 
A negative growth of exports can portray the weak performance of the domestic 
industry. Besides, the declining nature of exports also shows that the country is facing 
a slowing down in its economic activities. However, the behaviour of its imports can 
be ambiguous. On the one hand, declining imports can be interpreted as a growing 
sign of a country’s own products, which also shows the potential of trade to balance 
improvements. On the other hand, since in the crisis period the countries mostly 
experience a decline in their economic activities, the growth of imports will also 
decline. To deal with this, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) emphasised that a decline 
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of imports is also a sign of crisis since a crisis country may experience a sharp decline 
in the import of both goods and services. 
The real sector is represented by economic growth and the stock market index. In a 
time of crisis, the economic growth of a country is highly likely to become negative. 
While, when the stock market index continues to decline at the same time, this 
condition may show the deterioration of the real sector. Capital market investors 
usually will sell their stocks during an unstable condition that will affect the sharp 
decline of the stock market’s composite index. In the onset of a crisis, most of the 
crisis countries face this condition that makes them suspend daily trading to prevent 
the index from further declining. Appendix C shows the summary of the variables, the 
range, median, and their various sources. 
According to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the crisis period lies within a twelve, 
eighteen, or twenty-four-month window, prior to and after the occurrence of a crisis. 
The crisis definition in this study follows that given by Reinhart et al. (2000), who 
defined a currency crisis as the sharp depreciation of the value of domestic currency. 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) argued that the level of a sharp depreciation must reach 
at least 30%. Based on this criterion, Indonesia experienced a currency crisis in 
January 1998, when the average daily value of IDR experienced deep depreciation 
against USD from IDR2450 in June 1997 to become IDR10,375 in January 1998. 
This finding is in line with Lang’s argument (2013) that provides the monthly period 
of the Indonesian crisis ranging from November 1997 up until January 1998. With 
eighteen months prior and post-crisis period, the crisis period spans from July 1996 
to June 1999. 
Figure 6.1 depicts the results of the movement of the deviation of each variable of 
interest within the crisis window. The first column provides information on the 
development of the domestic financial market in the period before and after the 
outbreak of the crisis. The first variable is the M2 to reserves ratio, starting eighteen 
months before the crisis occurred. The gaps of this ratio were below its normal period 
and continued to decline, reaching its lowest level at the onset of the crisis. The 
negative value of the gaps occurred before the outbreak of the crisis due to the 
declining of M2 as the numerator that happened to start from the second quarter of 
1997. It should be noted that the calculation of this ratio involving the conversion of 
the M2 into USD using the nominal exchange rate. As there was a series of 
depreciations of IDR against USD from January 1997, thus, other things being equal, 
the amount of M2 in term of USD would have also declined. The movement of the 
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gaps reversed in the sixth month after the crisis date and had a positive value relative 
to the normal period in the fifteenth month after the crisis.  
Figure 6.1 The variables and the gaps 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS – IMF, CEIC and Bank Indonesia 
Note: The vertical lines show January 1998 as the crisis date. The horizontal line is the 18-
month window pre- and post-crisis period. 
 
For eighteen months before the crisis date, the credit to GDP ratio moved slightly 
above its normal period and accelerated about nine months after that. The 
breakdown of this ratio showed that the growth of domestic credit during this period 
outperformed the GDP. As seen in the third row of Figure 6.1, the gap was then 
followed by a slowdown in November 1997. One event that may explain this 
phenomenon is the government policy to close 16 banks as a part of IMF’s rescue 
package for Indonesia. However, in December 1997, it seems that the gap was 
shooting up, which created the possibility of a policy implementation to boost the 
amount of credit available for households and corporations (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
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1999; Lang, 2013). The increased gap in credit to GDP was followed by a sudden 
drop, which indicates the onset of the crisis. Below the credit to GDP ratio, in the 
fourth row and first column, is the figure of the bank deposits. Before the crisis, the 
movement was similar to the movement of credit to GDP. However, two months 
before the crisis erupted, it is evident that the gaps were positive. These gaps 
suggested that the increasing amount of bank deposits were relative to its normal 
period. Comparing the movement of the credit to GDP and the bank deposits’ gaps, 
in line with Lang’s (2013) findings, it can be inferred that the bank deposits cannot be 
considered to be the main source of private credit financing. 
The top centre column shows the evolution of the real interest rate around the crisis 
period. It has positive gaps that are relative to the normal period, with lowering gaps 
a month before and after the crisis date. However, starting from the second month 
into the crisis period, the gaps sharply increase. In other words, the real interest rate 
remains positive in the pre- and post-crisis period. This movement suggests that the 
Central Bank set the high policy rate as a form of tight monetary policy, and that 
private banks offered a high deposit rate to prevent their customers from withdrawing 
their money. This movement is also confirmed by the gap explaining the lending to 
deposit rate ratio. As provided in the second row of the first column, on average, the 
evolution of the gap of this ratio is lower than when in its normal period. There are 
two variables involved in this ratio; the lending rate and the deposit rate. When the 
gap shows a negative trend, it means that the actual rate is below that of the normal 
period. With this condition, one can observe this further by looking at the value of 
each variable that constructs the ratio. When the ratio is low, it can be inferred that 
the value of the numerator, which is the lending rate, is supposedly lower than the 
denominator, which is the deposit rate. In other words, the deposit rate should have 
a degree of growth that is higher than the lending rate. Based on the average 
movement of each interest rate, the lending rate during 1997/1998 reached the 
highest level of 24% p.a. and the deposit rate reached 31% p.a.    
The other figures in the second column examine the evolution of the variables with 
regards to the external sector. Until sixth months before the crisis erupted, the real 
effective exchange rate gap in the Indonesian case showed a tendency of lying 
slightly above the value of the normal period. Figure 6.1 displays the evolution of the 
exchange rate gap that moved below the average value during the crisis period. The 
negative gap remained for twelve months, suggesting a long period of recovery. This 
movement has an association with the explanation of the evolution of international 
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reserves, as the Central Bank faced difficulties in defending the domestic currency 
and the decision to shift to the new exchange rate arrangement in the third quarter of 
1997 (McLeod, 1998, p. 34).  
With regards to the international reserves, until three months before the crisis 
outbreak, its gap moved above its normal period. The signal of the declining trend of 
the reserves can be seen from the beginning of 1997, and this is followed by volatile 
movements in this variable for eight months before the crisis date. There is a 
possibility that the Central Bank used its reserves to intervene in the depreciation of 
the exchange rate, especially in the second semester of 1997. In the second months 
before the crisis date, the 12-month percentage change of the reserves declined and 
reached its lowest point in the first month after the crisis outbreak. The interest rate 
differential’s movement was a response to the domestic financial system’s situation. 
The high domestic deposit rate compared to foreign deposit rate, particularly after the 
onset of the crisis, shows that the monetary authority wanted to attract capital inflow. 
This phenomenon can be seen from the positive gap relative to the normal value on 
the second month of the post-crisis period. The first two panels of the third column 
display the imports and exports to and from the country relative to its long-term rates 
in the normal periods. On average, the export gap was below its normal period for 
almost all of the two-year window. First, this may have been caused by the weakening 
of economic activities overall as the crisis approached. Second, the external 
competitiveness of Indonesian goods and services was low compared to its trading 
partners. Before the crisis date, the real effective exchange rate could be considered 
as overvalued, making domestic products less competitive because their price was 
higher than foreign ones. On the imports side, the gap was over its normal period but 
declined just before the onset of the crisis. After the crisis, the gap was below its 
normal period. The import gap underperformed in the normal period, reflecting the 
poor performance of the economy during the crisis period. Besides, the weakening 
of IDR compared to the currencies of their trading partners created another burden 
for domestic importers as the relative price of foreign products became higher than 
in the previous period. 
The rest of the third column is the real sector that involves the movement of the stock 
index and economic growth (output). The combination of the overvaluation of the IDR 
and the low performance of exports, as provided above, may deteriorate the output, 
as the Industrial Production Index slowed down six months before the crisis outbreak. 
The gap in the industrial production index widened until the second semester of 1998, 
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which was followed by a period of a positive gap. The behaviour of the stock index 
gap in the pre-crisis period are difficult to justify since its movement were shaky. 
However, it seems that the stock market anticipated the slowing down of the domestic 
economy by the negative gap starting six months before the crisis and reaching its 
lowest point around the crisis date. It is possible that the decline of the stock index 
was caused by the worsening of corporate balance sheets (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999). The rise in the lending rate that came to above 20% per annum during 
1997/1998 burdened borrowers, especially those who had borrowed at a variable 
rate. Besides, the weakening of IDR against the main currencies also put another 
form of pressure on firms who had an external loan denominated in USD or other 
foreign currencies. With these two simple variables, during 1997–1998, the firms 
were exposed to interest and currency risks that deteriorated their balance sheets. 
Figure 6.2 The gap of Short-term debt to reserves ratio 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS – IMF and BIS, 2015 
Note: The vertical line shows January 1998 or quarter 1 1998 as the crisis 
date. The horizontal line is the 6-quarter window pre- and post-crisis period. 
Furthermore, this study will examine one indicator that is suspected to have a 
significant impact on crisis eruption, namely short-term external debt. In this study, 
the short-term external debt to reserves ratio is used to capture the vulnerability of 
the country in relation to financial crisis (IMF, 2008). The increasing short-term 
external debt exposed the economic agents in the country to the maturity and 
exchange rate risk. It is different with the other indicators, which have monthly data; 
the short-term debt data is available only in the form of quarterly data. Therefore, the 
analysis of this indicator is done separately from the others and there needs to be 
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some adjustments. For example, the crisis period on a monthly basis is adjusted to 
become a quarterly basis20.  
As provided by Figure 6.2, the movement of the gaps of this indicator before the crisis 
shows the increasing portion of short-term debt compared to the reserves. This 
phenomenon leads to the country to becoming vulnerable to experiencing financial 
crisis. When there is a problem that makes the value of domestic exchange rate 
depreciate, the outstanding short-term debt will sharply increase. After the onset of 
the crisis, this ratio declines, which suggests the declining of the short-term external 
debt that is outstanding and the increase of foreign reserves.  
6.04 The signal measurement 
After examining each variables’ gap and its movement, the next step is to assess the 
performance of the involved variables. The first step is to obtain the threshold value 
(Guru, 2016), which can be identified by setting the tail region of each variable. The 
threshold value shows the extreme values of each variable that may reflect the period 
of crisis. With this method, one can use two critical steps to decide the threshold. The 
first step is to estimate the tail-quantile of the distribution of a particular variable that 
will be conducted as the stress probability. For example, when the stress probability 
is set at 5%, the 95th percentile will be the stress-threshold. The next step is to include 
all of the observations whose values are above 5% as the extreme observations. In 
a case where the stress probability is set at 5%, the largest 5% of the observations 
will be the extreme observations on which the focus of the analysis will be 
undertaken. 
This study considers the threshold within the range 20% as the stress probability. By 
setting the value maximum to 20% as the critical region, the observations of each 
indicator that exceeds the threshold are considered to be the extreme observations. 
However, to locate the rejection region and to decide whether the indicator lies on 
the upper or lower tail of the distribution, one must refer to the theoretical framework 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). For example, in making the observations on the 
exchange rate indicator, deep depreciation will affect the values of the gap between 
the crisis and tranquil periods to become negative. In other words, one will find the 
                                                
20 The crisis period for the monthly data is assumed ranging for 18 months and spans from July 1996 
to June 1999; therefore, in the case of quarterly data, it needs to be adjusted to cover the period 
of the third quarter of 1996 to the second quarter of 1999. 
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values of the gap as being negative or located in the lower area in the crisis period; 
the lower the value of the gap, the more severe the condition is. This condition will 
lead to the decision to select the stress probability in the left quantile of the 
distribution. If the stress probability is set at 20%, it means that all observations below 
the 80th percentile will be included as extreme observations. Conversely, when the 
examination moves on to the real interest rate variable, the higher rate will result in a 
wider gap between the crisis and tranquil periods. The values of the gap in crisis 
period will be in upper region or positive; the higher the value of the gap, the more 
critical the condition is. Hence, the decision related to the stress probability will be in 
the right quantile of the distribution, and the observations that have a value that is 
more than this limit will be considered to be extreme observations.  
Since the setting of the threshold will determine the border between the normal and 
crisis condition, it needs careful consideration. The selection of the threshold value 
is expected to choose the one that can produce a high accuracy signal, a lower value 
of errors and a comparative N/S ratio. The calculation of this ratio will involve the 
number of errors that are produced by a variable of interest; the lower the number of 
errors or the N/S ratio, the better the variable is. The four quadrants of signal 
performance, as presented in Table 6.1, were proposed by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). This quadrant is used to help generate the results. 
Table 6.1 The performance of crisis prediction 
 Crisis occurs No crisis occurs 
Variable sends a 
signal 
A B 
Variable does not 
send a signal 
C D 
Source: Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
In Table 6.1, quadrant A is the number of correct signals when a crisis occurs. The 
upper right-hand panel (B) is the number of false signals when the variable sends a 
signal but fails to predict the crisis occurrence. The left bottom panel (C) is the number 
of crisis occurrences that cannot be captured, and the last one (D) is when the 
variable does not issue a signal, and there is no crisis event. There are various 
methods to assess the performance of such variables based on their accuracy to 
generate a signal (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999 and Guru, 2016): 
(a) The percentage of precision [(A+D)/(A+B+C+D)]  
(b) The percentage of correct prediction signal [A/(A+C)] 
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(c) Type I error [C/(A+C)] 
(d) Type II error [B/(B+D)] 
(e) Noise to signal ratio [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)] 
A variable with a good degree of performance will have a high percentage of precision 
(a) and correct prediction (b), but low in Type I (c) and II (d) errors, as well as being 
low in its noise to signal (N/S) ratio. The threshold in Table 6.2 contains information 
on the rejection region. The decision to choose the threshold will affect the level of 
the variable’s performance and, in some cases, it will involve a trade-off in 
maintaining a low level of the percentage of the type I error. This is with the 
consequence that the N/S ratio will increase, or vice versa. Besides, the choice also 
involves the decision maker’s preference on risk when the person is risk averse; then 
they will prefer to have a threshold that produces a low Type I error (Guru, 2016). 
6.05 The performance of variables 
From the groups of variables that have been observed in this study, bank deposits 
will be excluded from the observation since it provides a different interpretation and 
the wrong type of signal in the period of crisis. The signal of this variable shows a 
different result compared to the common understanding, which implies the negative 
movement of bank deposits. However, the empirical data shows that the movement 
of bank deposits is positive, and the gap also outperforms than the gap in the normal 
period. In the end, it gives the wrong signal and becomes a noisy indicator. 
Table 6.2 provides the summary of the twelve variables that will be examined to 
predict financial crisis based on the method that has been developed by Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999). The interest rate variables, namely the interest rate differential 
and real interest rate, show the ability to predict the crisis occurrence more accurately 
than the other variables. The two variables are also able to recognise the crisis with 
a minimum number of errors. These results suggest the importance of the role of 
monetary authority in the crisis period, especially by setting an interest rate policy. 
An appropriate level of interest rate will affect the banking sector’s lending and 
borrowing processes, and how firms maintain the solvency of their balance sheets. 
Moreover, the level of the domestic interest rate will also affect investors’ decisions, 
which may encourage the flow of capital to the domestic financial market. 
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Table 6.2 The performance of variables of interests 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: except for ST-debt to reserves ratio, all computed variables cover 252 observations 
for each variable. In the threshold value column, a ‘<’ sign represents that the stress 
condition or rejection region is placed at the left quantile or the bottom tail of the distribution 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) 
Among other variables, the one that has the highest level of prediction is the short-
term external debt to reserves ratio. This is not surprising since external short-term 
debt is one of the variables that is suspected as being the cause of the Indonesian 
1997/1998 financial crisis. However, in relation to the future vulnerability of the 
financial system, this variable might not be the leading indicator but could serve as a 
variable to detect the vulnerability of the financial system. 
There are three variables under the external sector indicator that have a lower 
ranking of N/S ratio compared to the others, which are exports, imports, and reserves, 
and one variable with a lower ranking of N/S ratio under financial sector, which is the 
credit to GDP ratio. Based on the calculations, these variables show a low level of 
precision at capturing the crisis period, a low percentage in predicting the crisis 
occurrence, and high N/S ratios. In other words, these variables cannot be included 
as the leading indicators to predict the probability of a crisis event. Instead, they are 
variables that are good for measuring the level of distress when the crisis is going 
on. Furthermore, Borio and Drehmann (2009) emphasised the need to consider 
variables that have the ability to detect signals of instability before (ex-ante) the crisis 
actually erupts. 
Variables Threshold value Precision Prediction
Type I 
error
Type II 
error N/S ratio
Real interest rate > 0.88 0.92 0.49 0.51 0.00 0.00
Int. rate diff. > 0.86 0.91 0.46 0.54 0.01 0.02
M2/reserves < 0.08 0.91 0.43 0.57 0.00 0.01
Exc.rate < 0.06 0.90 0.38 0.62 0.01 0.04
STdebt to reserves > 0.89 0.88 0.69 0.31 0.09 0.12
Growth < 0.02 0.89 0.35 0.65 0.01 0.04
Lending to deposit rate < 0.05 0.86 0.43 0.57 0.00 0.00
Stock index < 0.05 0.85 0.32 0.68 0.07 0.20
Credit/GDP > 0.94 0.85 0.03 0.97 0.01 0.52
Imports < 0.05 0.84 0.30 0.70 0.07 0.23
Reserves < 0.10 0.81 0.19 0.81 0.09 0.47
Exports < 0.10 0.77 0.30 0.70 0.15 0.52
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6.06 Discussion 
In general, several variables are accurate at precisely identifying a crisis period and 
provide a lower N/S ratio, suggesting that these variables can cope with the problem 
of errors. However, based on the results above, there are two issues concerning this 
instrument. First, even though EWI is good at measuring and evaluating the 
behaviour of the variables of interest during the crisis period (ex-post), so far, this 
study finds that the ability to predict the level of instability before (ex-ante) the crisis 
erupted was low. One should recall that the main ambition of the effort to construct 
the instrument is to predict financial crises. Hence, this objective should become one 
consideration in assessing this instrument’s potentiality as a financial instability 
measurement. Second, with a lower ability to predict the crisis, EWI is not sufficient 
to effectively gauge the potential occurrence of financial crises. This issue has a 
serious consequence for the authorities since they will not be able to prepare for 
adverse events that may occur in the near future. Even when they can predict the 
crisis, the time frame is too tight, and so it become too late to take action.   
There are several points that may explain the above issues. First, it is highly possible 
that some of the variables chosen are inadequate to be used in the analysis; even 
though Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argued that the decision to use the variables 
was based on the relevant theoretical frameworks. It could be the case that the 
frameworks are based on a weak theoretical basis (Tymoigne, 2010) or may not 
explain the financial crisis precisely.  
Second, there is the problem of endogeneity. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) had the 
objective that the variables are expected to provide adequate information for policy 
makers to take the necessary actions to handle the crisis. However, when most of 
the ability and performance of these variables are low, it is suspected that the 
variables are those that were affected by the adverse economic condition. In line with 
this finding, Tymoigne (2010) argued that the chosen variables in measuring and 
defining financial fragility in this method are the variables that are the manifestation 
of, or indicate the impact from, a crisis. 
Third, in exploring financial instability, one should consider the paradox of tranquillity 
(Lavoie, 2014, p.20), which explains that stability is destabilising. The state of a 
financial system that seems to be stable, strong, and in a state of good performance 
can be transformed into an unstable and fragile system. In this context, it is highly 
possible that the variable does not send a pre-crisis signal due to the good 
performance of the economy and the signal of distress is issued just after the 
outbreak of the crisis, which may lead to the delay in policy response. 
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Fourth, the gap measurement is based on the information available up to a particular 
period; hence, the financial instability assessment relies heavily on the average 
measurements or trends calculated during the normal or tranquil period. This point 
leads to the need to have a long enough observation period with several crisis events 
in the past, so that one may get enough information by exploring the behaviours that 
were present in each crisis episode before. Also, the observation of a variable will 
provide a better result when there is an effort to incorporate the behaviour of other 
variables (Tymoigne, 2010).  
When it comes to defining financial instability, there is an argument for considering 
the important elements of a financial system (Illing and Liu, 2006; Hakkio and Keeton, 
2009; Hollo et al., 2012; Louzis and Vouldis, 2013). The basic concept of financial 
system development consists of three broad areas: instruments, institutions, and 
markets. These areas are very dynamic, which can be shown by its huge and 
sophisticated development. As a consequence, the ability of an economy to maintain 
its stability should be based on the dynamic characteristic of the financial market. The 
financial crisis’ impact should be measured by the real economy’s level of severity. 
Based on this discussion, the next chapter will explore the other instrument that can 
be used to predict the occurrence of a financial crisis and its ability to measure the 
level of instability in the financial sector. This instrument focuses on this sector as 
most of the crisis has its origin from or is triggered by the fragility of this sector. Since 
the financial sector has a dynamic character, the observation needs to involve high-
frequency data.  
6.07 Conclusion 
Increasing financial instability and the frequency of crisis occurrence motivates 
economists to develop an instrument to predict crisis events. One approach that has 
been initiated and is meant to give a signal of crisis occurrence is an EWI. In this 
approach, macro-indicators were assessed and picked to become the best variables 
of crisis leading indicators. This method has become the foundation for the next 
generation of financial crisis measurement tools. This empirical analysis provides a 
contribution to the literature by exploring the construction of an EWI instrument in the 
case of Indonesia. The instrument was built mostly to focus on the banking crisis 
leading indicators. Following on from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), this study has 
attempted to explore the relevant indicators that also cover other areas, such as the 
external and real sectors.   
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Referring to the output of the analysis, there are several findings that can be 
presented. With regards to the construction of the EWI, this study finds that the EWI 
is good at assessing the behaviour of the variables of interest during the crisis period 
(ex-post), but the ability to send the signal of financial crisis in advance (ex-ante) is 
considered low. Therefore, this instrument cannot fulfil its prime objective as a 
potential predictor of financial instability. Besides, by exploring several factors that 
contribute to the low ability of the EWI to predict a crisis, this chapter has found that 
the chosen variables are inadequate to serve as the leading indicators because there 
is the possibility of an endogeneity problem. Besides, the methodology in 
constructing this instrument needs to be assessed by focusing on the financial sector 
that may become the source of the problem. Furthermore, to get a better result, it 
needs a longer observation period to capture the complex behaviour of such events 
as well as the crisis occurrences in the past.  
There are challenges concerning the accuracy and precision of this instrument. The 
sophistication of modern financial systems puts pressure on this effort. Taking into 
consideration the weakness of this instrument, it is worthwhile examining the 
development and characteristics of the financial sector. There is another method in 
assessing the financial sector instability which is by developing the financial stress 
index. It has been argued that the construction of the composite index will help the 
decision-makers to recognise peculiar movements in the financial system that may 
trigger adverse economic conditions.   
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Chapter 7  
Generating an instrument to measure financial instability 
7.01 Introduction 
The EWI that was designed to predict financial crisis failed to perform adequately in 
capturing the adverse conditions in the financial system. The chosen variables that 
were expected as leading indicators of crisis had a low level of performance in 
sending out the signal of the domestic financial system’s vulnerability. This study lists 
several points concerning this issue, for example, the potential problem of 
endogeneity, the choice of variables being undertaken without a strong theoretical 
framework, and a technical issue associated with the determination of the 
methodology.    
The recent methods for financial instability measurement offer an argument for 
constructing a composite index, which, it is argued, can predict and measure the 
state of the financial system’s stability (or instability). The development of a financial 
instability index was initiated in 2002 when Bordo et al. (2002) developed an annual 
Financial Conditions Index. Following on from these authors, the approaches to 
generating the composite index have evolved. The discussions of the way this index 
is constructed concern areas including the level of instability or stress of a financial 
system, the area of measurement, and the potential variables involved. 
Based on the current development of the financial instability index, this chapter 
explores this index by involving the financial system components that are measured 
by the financial market indicators. Following Hollo et al. (2012) and Louzis and 
Vouldis (2013), this study focuses on two methods for developing the financial 
instability index by employing the indicators as a representation for each component 
of a financial system. Hollo et al. (2012) maintained that a sign of instability can be 
captured by analysing the movement of several financial indicators, which tend to 
become more volatile in a period of instability. To pursue this objective, this study 
uses several daily financial indicators focusing on the Indonesian financial system. In 
so doing, this study attempts to compare two different methods for generating the 
financial instability index. These are the principal component analysis (PCA) method 
and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) method.  
This study’s contribution to the literature on financial instability measurement is 
associated with the effort to develop an instrument that uses daily data. The use of 
higher frequency data is expected to give a more detailed level of movement and to 
capture the dynamic nature of the financial market. So far, the construction of the 
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index or financial market pressure is conducted by employing quarterly or monthly 
data. This effort, to the best of my knowledge, has been the first attempt to construct 
a composite daily index of financial instability for Indonesia. Besides, this chapter has 
also explored two current methods and has compared their performances to 
determine which is the better crisis predictor. Before getting into the analysis, the 
following section will discuss the methods that have been developed by some 
economists. After briefly discussing the latest methods, the description of the data 
and the way it is used to generate the Indonesian financial instability index will be 
presented. This section will be followed by the discussion on the results, and the 
assessment of the indices’ performance. 
7.02 The importance of the financial system in a country 
When a country faces financial instability21, the financial system potentially transmits 
a negative effect on the economy. This affects the public and private sectors within 
the country in relation to achieving their targets (Hollo et al., 2012). This statement 
contains two different ideas about financial instability’s impact on a country’s 
economy. Firstly, financial instability can impede the function of all elements of a 
financial system, which then affects the financial services that it offers. Secondly, 
since the financial system cannot fully provide their services to all sectors of the 
country, corporate actions and public investments are impaired. Hence, a 
households’ consumption, the rate of investment and economic growth will decline. 
In this context, Hollo et al. (2012) put financial systems at the core of their analysis. 
According to the IMF, the financial system can be defined as a system that shows 
the interaction between economic units and financial institutions in providing and 
obtaining financial facilities (IMF, 2006, p. 11). Zysman (1994, p. 57) emphasised the 
nature of a financial system that involves a sophisticated structure and covers the 
tasks to channel funds from savings into investments, and to distribute the funds to 
the borrowers or spenders. In a similar vein, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001, p.3) 
defined financial structure as the combination and interconnection of operations 
among the three pillars of the financial systems that consist of institutions, markets 
and instruments. Illing and Liu (2006) maintained that these elements had a 
                                                
21 Hollo, et al (2012) used the term financial stress to describe the state of financial instability. There 
are two levels of stress that are introduced: firstly, systemic risk that is a potential episode of a 
negative effect that may occur and that it may threaten the financial system. Secondly, systemic 
stress which is defined as the systemic risk that has been materialized. 
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significant impact on the strength and stability of the financial systems. When there 
is an adverse event and this affects the financial systems’ elements, the financial 
conditions of the economic agents and financial institutions will deteriorate since their 
financial flows and balance sheets will be disrupted. 
Hollo et al. (2012) explained that there are, at least, two levels of measurements that 
should be considered when developing the financial instability index, namely the 
upper and lower levels. These levels will provide guidance in determining the 
measurement coverage and the variables that will be used in the assessment. The 
upper level is meant to explore the coverage and conditions of the financial system, 
which consist of the market structure, institutions acting as financial intermediaries, 
and financial infrastructures. From this level, it is possible to break down each of 
these components into the lower level that can then be transformed into an individual 
indicator of financial instability or sub-indices. In other words, the upper level is an 
aggregate of lower level computations. Hollo et al. (2012) argued that in determining 
the composite index, the lower level should represent the important parts of a 
financial system; this includes the financial intermediaries, money markets, equity 
markets, bond markets, and foreign exchange markets. In order to capture the 
developed countries’ financial systems, the authors include the derivative markets in 
their analysis. Based on this explanation, the indicator that will be developed is 
expected to capture the conditions of the selected financial system. 
At a certain level, the characteristics of financial market’s segments of a country will 
be a factor that has an important role in the construction of this indicator. Illing and 
Liu (2006) and Hakkio and Keeton (2009) argued that one should emphasise these 
segments that are comprised of banking, foreign exchange, debt markets, and equity 
markets.          
The measurement of financial instability focused on an abnormal situation in the 
financial market and the main signs22 as shown by an index (Hakkio and Keeton, 
2009; Hollo et al., 2012; Louzis and Vouldis, 2013). Based on these studies, there 
are some factors that create instability. For example, increasing levels of volatility, 
increasing asymmetric information, and a decline in the willingness of economic 
agents to hold illiquid financial assets (flight to liquidity) and risky assets (flight to 
                                                
22 A number of authors (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009; Hollo, et al, 2012; Louzis and Vouldis, 2013; among 
others) emphasised the signs that were exhibited by the index or sub-indices as the symptoms 
associated with the episode of crisis. 
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quality). These factors will be compiled through the financial system market 
segments, which are comprised of the banking sector, debt markets, equity market 
and foreign exchange markets. Several previous studies developed the financial 
instability index that has been summarised in Table 7.1.   
Table 7.1 The list of previous studies 
Author(s) Objective and 
coverage 
Research method Type of data 
Bordo et al. 
(2002) 
 
The U.S. financial 
instability index 
(FSI) 
Calculating the sub-indices 
on the banking system’s 
conditions, business failure 
indicator, and interest rate. 
Annual 
Illing and Liu 
(2006) 
Developing the FSI 
for Canada by 
comparing several 
FSI methods  
Using PCA, CDF, credit 
weight, variance equal-
weighted average 
A crisis episode is detected 
when the index is above two 
standard deviations. 
Daily financial 
market data from 
four sectors in the 
country over the 
period 1981–2005 
Cardarelli et 
al. (2009) 
Developing a 
quarterly FSI for 17 
developed 
countries 
Using the variance-equal 
weighted average 
An episode of a financial 
crisis is identified when the 
FSI is above one standard 
deviation from its long- term 
trend. 
Market data from 
banking sector, 
securities, and 
foreign exchange 
markets, ranging 
from 1998 –2009 
Hakkio and 
Keeton 
(2009) 
Developing a 
composite index of 
FSI for Kansas City  
Using PCA to generate the 
composite index. 
Monthly U.S. 
financial market data 
ranging from 1990–
2009 
Louzis and 
Vouldis 
(2013) 
Developing the 
systemic financial 
stress index for 
Greece 
These authors adopted the 
previous studies and used 
time-varying correlations 
between the financial 
market segments. 
Combining daily 
market and monthly 
balance sheet data 
using Greece’s 
financial market and 
economic data 
ranging from 1987–
2011 
Bank 
Indonesia 
(2014) 
Developing an FSI 
for the Indonesian 
Financial System 
Using a method, called 
statistical normalisation 
 
Monthly data 
focusing on the 
banking sector 
Source: Own construction 
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The factor that affects the construction of the financial instability index is the 
characteristics of each financial market segment. It is not an easy task to capture the 
behaviour of economic agents; even though, there is now a range of variables offered 
to measure the financial pressure. However, by investigating each segment of the 
financial market, it is expected that the index can capture every event that has 
occurred in the financial market. According to Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Hollo et al. 
(2012), and Louzis and Vouldis (2013), the data that will be used to develop the index 
should follow some requirements. For example, it must have a relatively long time 
frame, so that the data is sufficient to capture the movement of certain indicators, 
especially in the period of financial distress. The authors also suggested that the data 
needs to have a high frequency. They argued that the daily or weekly data has to be 
able to measure the instability in real time. Furthermore, they also emphasised that 
the higher frequency data predicts the crisis and depicts a movement of the financial 
instability more precisely than low-frequency data. 
7.03  Data and methodology 
There are many variables that can represent the current condition of a financial 
market, whether or not it is under stress. However, the typical developing country’s 
challenge in relation to this is the availability of data, particularly high-frequency data 
over the long-term. As a result, only a few of the financial markets’ variables can be 
utilised in this chapter. The chosen variables are expected to draw a picture of the 
financial market’s instability condition and offer an observation period sufficient to 
cover the period of Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998. In this study, the construction 
of the financial instability index intends to use four market segments, namely the 
money market, the bond market, the foreign exchange market and the equity market. 
However, taking into consideration that the bond market was only developed in early 
2000, this study develops the index by using three market segments in the period 
before 2003 and using the full number of segments after that. Following the previous 
studies (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009; Hollo et al., 2012; Louzis and Vouldis, 2013; 
among others), the market segments that will be investigated have specific 
characteristics, such as:  
 The movement in the money market will be captured by the volatility of the 
interbank market rate. A sharp increase in the money market rate will create 
pressure for banks, who need short-term funding. Another variable that will 
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be involved in this section is the interest rate differential between domestic 
and foreign interest rates.  
 The level of equity market activity can be seen by the volatility of the stock 
exchange index, which is argued to show the investors’ behaviour in response 
to financial market uncertainty. Following Hollo et al. (2012), this study will 
employ the idiosyncratic risk that will be divided into two groups: the non-
financial sector that is expected to represent the real sector in the country, 
and the financial sector that represents the condition of the financial 
institutions. In addition, the sharp decline of stock market indices that 
indicates pressure on the financial market will be adopted. This variable is 
measured by CMAX transformation (Hollo et al., 2012; Louzis and Vouldis, 
2013): 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑋 =  
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥௧
max [𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ∈ ൫𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥௧ି௝ห𝑗 = 0,1,2൯]
 
 
Where 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥௧ is the stock market index at time t. 
 The movement of the daily foreign exchange will measure the foreign 
exchange market. When the domestic currency depreciates sharply, it may 
create pressure for the country’s balance sheet. If this phenomenon occurs 
over a longer period, in the real sector, many importer companies or foreign 
debt borrowers will suffer and encounter difficulties in their payment 
obligations. This study will utilise the movements of IDR against several major 
foreign currencies; these are USD, JPY, RMB and EUR.  
 The activity of the bond market is measured by the volatility of the on-the-run 
government bonds. This study will use the 10-year-government bond yield 
movements as the variable of interest. It is expected that the yield volatility of 
this variable acts as a sign of investor demand for riskless financial assets. 
The other variable that will be used is the change in foreign ownership of 
government bonds that is believed to show the phenomenon of a flight to 
quality in the securities market. 
The summary of the variables interest that are used in this chapter including their 
sources have been provided in the Appendix D.I 
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7.03.1 Calculating the sub-indices 
There are several methods for calculating the sub-indices when developing the 
financial instability index. This study has tried to use and compare the results of two 
methods proposed by Hollo et al. (2012) and Louzis and Vouldis (2013). The first 
method generates the sub-indices using PCA, and the second method employs a 
CDF. 
(i) PCA method 
PCA is a method used to analyse several variables that are highly correlated and 
represent one or more common factors (Elsayed, 2013). The use of PCA has the 
objective to lessen a large data set, to take the important information of the data, and 
to simplify the features that are contained in the data set (Abdi and Williams, 2010). 
From these objectives, one may conclude that this method has advantages. For 
example, (i) the various dimensions of the data can be simplified, but the information 
that is contained in each variable can be maintained; (ii) this method allows for the 
transformation of the data set or for the correlated variables to become new or 
uncorrelated variables, which are commonly called ‘Principal Components’ (PCs). 
This method can be described using the following equations (Ruiz-Porras, 2009): 
𝑏ଵ = 𝛼ଵଵ𝑎ଵ + 𝛼ଶଵ𝑎ଶ + ⋯ + 𝛼௡ଵ𝑎௡ 
𝑏ଶ = 𝛼ଵଶ𝑎ଵ + 𝛼ଶଶ𝑎ଶ + ⋯ + 𝛼௡ଶ𝑎௡ 
…… 
𝑏௡ = 𝛼ଵ௡𝑎ଵ + 𝛼ଶ௡𝑎ଶ + ⋯ + 𝛼௡௡𝑎௡ 
In these equations, (𝑎ଵ, 𝑎ଶ, … . . , 𝑎௡) is the data set or correlated variables and  
(𝑏ଵ, 𝑏ଶ, … . . , 𝑏௡) is the new or uncorrelated variables. Davies and Fearn (2004) and 
Herve and Williams (2010) explained the rules of PCs: (i) the first principal 
component, which referred to as 𝑏ଵ is the new variables that constitute and describe 
the large proportion of the variability in the data set or have the largest variance; (ii) 
The second principal component, 𝑏ଶ, is placed at the right angles of or being 
orthogonal to the first principal component and constitutes the remaining variability; 
and (iii) the third, 𝑏ଷ, and subsequent principal components must be orthogonal to 
the second or previous PCs. These new variables have values that are commonly 
called as ‘scores’.   
In order to calculate the composite index using PCA, the first step is to generate the 
sub-indices, which consist of at least three variables of interest within each sub-index. 
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In their paper, Louzis and Vouldis (2013) offered a method by using the principal 
component analysis in constructing the sub-indices based on each group of the 
market segments that will be observed. In this analysis, each variable within the 
relevant market segment conducted as the correlated variable will be estimated to 
produce the sub-index of the market segment. This study only involves the first 
principal component in the calculation. Once the value of sub-indices has been 
obtained, all of the sub-indices will be scaled in a range from 0 to 100. Prior to this 
step, each index is standardised by adjusting it with the sample mean and the 
standard deviations. In order to lessen the number of outliers in the transformation 
process, if necessary, these sub-indices can be filtered. The transformation of these 
sub-indices uses the following formula (Louzis and Vouldis, 2013): 
 𝑠௜௧ =
ଵ଴଴
[ଵାୣ୶୮(௦ഢ೟෦ )]
 
where 𝑠ప௧෦ is the original standardized sub-indices prior to the transformation. The 
result will show the level of crisis severity; the higher the index, the more distressed 
that the financial condition is. The summarised statistics of each variable as the data 
input to be processed under PCA method has been provided in Appendix D. II. The 
results of the transformation of the data into sub-indices can be summarized in Table 
7.2, as follows: 
Table 7.2  Summary statistics of sub-indices: PCA 
 
Source: Own calculations 
(ii)  CDF method 
According to Hollo et al. (2012), alongside its advantages, the use of PCA in 
generating the index also contains some drawbacks. Hollo et al. (2012) claimed that 
PCA methods tend to exacerbate the problem of sub-sample robustness. According 
to the authors, this problem occurs due to the sensitivity of the PCA in relation to the 
outliers. Hollo et al. (2012) constructed the sub-indices using a method, called the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF).  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Stationary
Foreign exchange 5216 47.802 14.788 32.995 99.984 Stationary
Money market 5216 48.618 20.118 23.823 99.193 Stationary
Stock market 5216 48.577 19.568 21.085 98.587 Stationary
Bond market 3239 50.753 18.856 0.004 99.150 Stationary
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CDF is a method used to portray the distribution of the variables by looking at which 
one can compute the cumulative probability of the variables. CDF can be used to 
calculate the probability of a random variable, whose value is less than or equal to 
another specified value. CDF allows us to generate a function that plots the values 
of the observations in terms of their percentile rank. In its basic form, the cumulative 
distribution function of a random variable 𝑆 is the function given by, for example, 
𝐹௡(𝑠) = 𝑃(𝑆 ≤ 𝑠). The first step is to put all of the observations in order according to 
their rank. This step will be followed by calculating the probability of a variable (𝑆) 
using the given function that takes on the value below or equal to 𝑠. In its application, 
referring to the previous function, this probability can be obtained by dividing the rank 
of each observation with the total number of the observations.  
The CDF method is argued to have more advantages compared to the PCA method, 
since it can be an alternative method for the construction of the financial instability 
index, especially when the problem of data availability emerges, and the range of the 
data differs. Following Hollo et al. (2012), to generate the index, one needs to rank 
the data within the observations and then to manipulate it using the following function: 
 
 
 
Where 𝑠௧ is the set of a raw data with n total number of observations, r is the ranking 
number of 𝑠௧, and the 𝑆௧ is the stress indicator that is transformed to the stress factor. 
The set of raw data 𝑠௧ in this study is the dataset of each variable that belongs to the 
relevant market segment. The value of each variable is manipulated by generating 
the ranks of the data and calculating its probability according to the above function. 
Basically, in the CDF, the value of 𝐹௡(𝑠௧) is constrained between 0 at the minimum 
level and 1 at the maximum. This transformation can be used to predict the probability 
of a certain event. In this case, the transformation will be used to construct and 
measure the sub-indices of each market segment, which has scale range from 0 to 
1. The highest scale or the value of 1 is considered to be a rare or extreme value. 
Therefore, the result of the computation of each variable that has the value of 1 is 
considered as being in a crisis period.  
The results of the transformation of each variable become the input to construct the 
sub-indices. This process can be done by using the arithmetic mean of each group, 
         ௥
௡
 for 𝑠[௥] ≤  𝑠௧ ≤ 𝑠[௥ାଵ],    r=1, 2, 3,….,n-1 
𝑆௧ = 𝐹௡(𝑠௧) ∶= 
         1 for 𝑠௧ ≥ 𝑠[௡] 
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once aggregated to calculate the composite index. The summary of the results are 
as follows: 
Table 7.3  Summary statistics of sub-indices: CDF 
 
Source: Own calculations 
7.03.2 Generating the composite index 
After developing the sub-indices for each indicator, the next step is to generate the 
composite index. The most common method for generating the composite index is to 
use PCA, and involving the sub-indices. In this method, the value of all of the sub-
indices will be calculated to highlight the data variation. It is possible to generate a 
component score that is calculated from certain variables at a selected point in time. 
However, the existence of outliers can hamper the analysis since this method will 
capture the particular outliers as part of the observation’s pattern or characteristic 
(Hollo, 2012). Besides, PCA needs a sufficient number of variables as inputs. Even 
though it is advised that it should involve a minimum of three variables in a row, there 
is no precise answer as to how much data should be considered sufficient (OECD, 
2008b).  
The other method used to generate the composite index is time-varying cross-
correlation (Hollo et al., 2012; Louzis and Vouldis, 2013). With this method, two sub-
indices are combined to get the cross-correlation coefficient. One purpose of this 
method is to measure how strong the correlation between two sub-indices is. 
Following on from the portfolio theory (Louzis and Vouldis, 2013), it is argued that a 
strong correlation will have two consequences. On the one hand, if everything is 
going well, all of the variables will support each other to make the financial condition 
much better. On the other hand, if there is an adverse effect, highly correlated 
variables may aggravate the financial system since these variables will tend to move 
in the same direction. According to Louzis and Vouldis (2013), a strong correlation 
between the sub-indices will provide a useful guide to giving a systemic risk 
measurement. The time varying correlation matrix (𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡) can be estimated by 
implementing several econometric techniques, for example, using multivariate 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Stationary
Foreign exchange 5216 0.730 0.280 0.046 1 Stationary
Money market 5216 0.754 0.184 0.223 1 Stationary
Stock market 5216 0.752 0.189 0.193 1 Stationary
Bond market 3239 0.747 0.198 0.045 1 Stationary
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generalized auto-regression conditional heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) (Louzis and 
Vouldis, 2013), integrated generalized auto-regression conditional heteroscedasticity 
(IGARCH) and an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) (Hollo et al., 
2012). Following on from Hollo et al. (2012), this study will use the EWMA method in 
estimating the time-varying correlation matrix. This method is widely used to forecast 
daily volatilities and the correlations of stock prices. In its calculations, EWMA 
involves a smoothing parameter and different weight for the different variances or, in 
practical terms, the more recent observation will have a greater weight. According to 
Alexander (2008), it is argued that this method will lessen the bias of the forecast of 
volatility as a result of the occurrence of a shock or extreme movement in the financial 
market. 
With this method, the first step is finding the covariance, variance and volatility of 
each sub-index at time t using the formulas as follow (Hollo et al., 2012): 
𝜎௜௝,௧ =  𝜆𝜎௜௝,௧ିଵ + (1 −  𝜆)?̃?௜,௧?̃?௝,௧ 
𝜎ଶ௜,௧ =  𝜆𝜎ଶ௜,௧ିଵ + (1 −  𝜆)?̃?ଶ௜,௧ 
𝜌௜௝,௧ =
𝜎௜௝,௧
𝜎௜,௧𝜎௝,௧
 
Where i and j are equal to the number of each financial sector or market, t represents 
the number of sample under observation, 𝑠෤ represents the value of each sub-index 
at time t minus its mean, and the parameter λ represents the smoothing factor that 
has constant value of 0.93. 
The composite index used to measure financial instability can be developed based 
on the value of each sub-indices. Questions may be raised when the characteristics 
of one financial market segment are different from others, and this fact would then 
need to be incorporated. One way that can be used is by adding weights in each sub-
index depending on the importance of each market segment in the financial system. 
However, if each market segment is considered to have an equivalent role, one can 
put a similar weight across all of them. Hollo et al. (2012) emphasised that the results 
between the methods will not differ significantly. Considering the weights and the 
sub-indices, the formula used to generate the financial instability index is as follows: 
Financial Instability Composite Index = ඥ𝑠௧𝐶௧𝑠′௧ 
where 𝐶௧ is the time-varying cross-correlation coefficient 𝜌௜௝,௧ matrix.  
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7.04 The results 
This study attempts to list important events, which originate from the domestic 
financial market or the one that comes from the global financial market. These events 
have been described in Chapter 2. The first event is the East Asian financial crisis in 
1997/1998, which was considered to be a new type of crisis since it differed from the 
Mexican crisis that was triggered by increasing government debt (Hale, 1998, p.266; 
Ito, 2007). The second event is the domestic financial market crisis or mini-crisis of 
2005. The mini-crisis occurred because of the increasing global oil price that put 
pressure on the domestic economy.  
The third event is the occurrence of the GFC that started from U.S. subprime 
mortgages, which was then followed by the European debt crisis in 2008. The way 
that the GFC has impacted Indonesia can be identified via two main, financial and 
trade channels (Bank Indonesia, 2009). From the financial channel, the increasing 
uncertainty in the global financial market and the tendency of the profit losses that 
was faced by the financial market investors led investors to take the short position in 
the domestic capital market. Oh (2011) argued that the massive reversals in 2008 
from the Indonesian financial market were mainly caused by the process of 
deleveraging as a consequence of US sub-prime mortgages. At the same time, there 
was a shift in the investors’ risk preference from risk acceptance to becoming more 
risk averse, which drove the flight to quality. As a result, the domestic capital market 
became under pressure as the stock index and the price of government bonds 
declined sharply during quarter four of 2008. From the trade channel, the sub-prime 
mortgages made the US economy slow down. This phenomenon led to the decline 
of US imports by Indonesia, which then influenced Indonesia’s trade balance. As 
Indonesia’s trading partners are concentrated in several countries, and the top three 
of them are the US, Japan and China, when a problem occurs in one of these 
countries, Indonesia’s trade account will be affected. 
The external crisis episodes described above had a direct or indirect impact on the 
Indonesian economy, and most of these were transmitted through the financial 
market. Each event affected the domestic financial market, which can be seen from 
its indicators that will usually show a different behaviour in crisis periods. This chapter 
has tried to capture the movements of each indicator and to portray the impact that 
there has been on each sector, namely the money market, stock market, bond 
market, and the foreign exchange market. The domestic and global events that 
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occurred, and that might have influenced the Indonesian financial system, have been 
listed in Appendix D.III. 
Figure 7.1 The financial instability composite index 
 
Source: Own calculations  
Notes: 
The index during 1996-2003 is generated using three market segments; while, for the period 
of 2003 – 2015, there are four segments involved. 
The shaded areas indicate the domestic crisis events: the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 
and the mini financial crisis in 2005. The vertical line shows the external events, for 
example, the 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the onset of 
the European debt crisis, and the uncertainty on the lifting of Quantitative Easing policy 
Figure 7.1 depicts the two composite indices that have been constructed using CDF 
and PCA. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to construct daily 
Indonesian financial instability index using two different methods. From Figure 7.1, 
the composite index using the PCA method can provide better information on how 
high the index is when the financial system faces distress. The index can capture the 
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important events that have occurred between 1997 and 2010 that had a direct impact 
on the Indonesian economy, for example, the Asian financial crisis and the domestic 
mini-crisis. As a response to the outbreak of the European debt crisis, this index 
would be able send a warning signal that allows the policy makers to take the 
necessary actions to defend the domestic economy. With regards to the U.S. crisis, 
this index shows a positive movement in 2013 when the U.S. government had 
planned to review the lower interest rate policy. 
From this figure, the CDF composite index sent a warning signal in 1996 before the 
Asian crisis occurred in 1997/1998. This index has also captured the crisis episodes 
during the observation period, including the so-called mini-crisis of the domestic 
financial system in 2005. However, it appears that the results via the CDF method 
are somewhat sensitive since the composite index shows many signals without 
confirmed crisis episodes. Based on Figure 7.1, besides the above-mentioned crisis 
episodes, there were domestic events that were not considered to be at the level of 
a financial crisis, but that have been portrayed by this method. Firstly, in 2002 and 
2003, there were a series of terrorist attacks that had an impact on the country’s 
financial indicators. However, the decline of the index and some of the financial 
indicators was not too severe in how they changed their behaviour. Secondly, during 
2004, the CDF index was higher compared to its previous period, and the two market 
segments that provided the contribution for this high-level composite index were the 
stock and debt markets. Two domestic events are thought to have created this 
pressure. The first event was the general election, that was known as the first direct 
Presidential election, which is one of the biggest democratic events. The Presidential 
election was a kind of test case for Indonesia’s political stability, which would create 
anxiety, especially for financial market investors. The second was the first terrorist 
attack where people from various countries were killed and injured. This event 
became a test case for the Indonesian authorities to maintain national security and 
political stability. The third event was the Aceh tsunami in December 2004 that could 
be categorised as a large natural disaster and used up great amounts of Indonesian 
resources in the recovery. Even though these two events did not have a direct 
relationship with the financial markets, they could still change the financial conditions.  
Responding to GFC and the U.S.’s low-interest policy, Figure 7.1 shows that these 
indices are still below the long-term average and therefore, below the threshold. The 
carry trade mechanism can explain this phenomenon in responding to the financial 
market’s condition. During the occurrence of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the 
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financial market was depressed since most of the investors held on to their money, 
and undertook a flight to liquidity strategy. In the medium term, the condition of the 
developing countries’ financial markets, which were characterised by higher interest 
rates, became milder, especially when the U.S. government adopted the Quantitative 
Easing policy. The U.S. government’s policy to maintain a lower interest rate created 
the opportunity for the developing financial markets, like that of Indonesia, to enjoy a 
huge amount of portfolio inflow. 
Considering the above explanations, it can be inferred that there is a very short time 
frame between the transmission of a signal and the occurrence of an actual event. 
With such a short period, authorities will face difficulty in preparing and formulating 
the necessary actions to handle the problem that has emerged. Besides, when the 
policy has been announced, it will also need to have a certain period to make an 
impact on the financial system. In other words, it may be too late to take action since 
the problem has built up long before the signal of crisis is sent (Tymoigne, 2010). 
7.05 The signal measurements 
To examine the performance of the indices in providing sufficient information on crisis 
episodes, following Guru (2016) this study will use the extreme value approach. This 
method is intended to identify the series of data within an observation period that has 
the value that exceeds the one in the normal period. Chapter 6 has briefly explained 
this method, which contains several steps. The first step toward obtaining the 
extreme value is setting the threshold value that will be used to find the value of the 
index that is considered to be as in a normal situation and the value of the index that 
would indicate a crisis. The setting of this threshold needs to involve a careful 
consideration of the trade-off between the number of extreme observations and the 
performance of the index. If the threshold is too high, some events probably cannot 
be captured; but when it is too low, there will be too many signals that may send 
incorrect information. This study chose 10% of the highest observations as the 
extreme condition for the crisis, which resulted in 520 extreme index values.  
Following the method adopted by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for assessing the 
performance of the output of the analysis, this study also uses the four quadrants of 
signal performance to help generate the results and to provide accuracy, as provided 
in Table 6.1. Table 7.4 presents the information of this assessment, by comparing 
the performance of the two indices. The PCA method seems to outperform the CDF 
method and obtains higher scores in all aspects. Two aspects that bring the CDF 
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method’s performance below the PCA are that its ability to predict is too low, and that 
it produces higher Type I errors. The example of errors that can be detected in the 
CDF method can be demonstrated by looking at Figure 7.1 above. 
Table 7.4 The performance of the two methods: PCA and CDF 
 
Source: Own calculations 
However, these indices do not offer a better performance compared to EWI. The 
ability to predict the crisis occurrence is similar to the EWI, even though some of the 
leading indicators of EWI have a better degree of precision and N/S ratio than the 
indices.  
The idea to develop the composite index comes from the need for analysing domestic 
conditions efficiently and effectively. By having the composite index, the user only 
focuses on one indicator and, if it is necessary to get into more detailed data, the 
composite index can be expanded to include the sub-indices. Nevertheless, the 
dynamic nature of the financial system’s condition requires continuous improvements 
on these methods of analysis through considering several aspects. However, when 
recalling several problems in constructing the EWI as provided in Chapter 6, it is 
highly possible that the construction of these indices also faces the same problem. 
Concerning the issue of the index’s low performance, this study suspects that this 
method is also facing endogeneity problems; in other words, the variables involved 
are the ones that are influenced by the dynamics of the crisis itself. When an analysis 
uses the influenced variables, the results will be misleading. As an example, the use 
of foreign ownership in government bonds intends to capture the increasing pressure 
on the domestic bond market. When foreign ownership is declining sharply, it shows 
the distress of the financial system and will cause the instability index to increase. 
However, the decisions of foreign investors are also affected by their expectations, 
risk preference and the market’s condition. If the market’s condition, their preference, 
and expectations are not in favour of the domestic financial market at that time, they 
will pull their funds out of Indonesia that may cause the Indonesian financial system 
to become under pressure. Therefore, it could be the case that the movement of 
foreign ownership weakly predicts a future crisis, but strongly reflects the dynamics 
of the financial market. 
Method Threshold value
# of obs. 
above 
threshold
Precision Prediction Type I error
Type II 
error N/S ratio
Index PCA > 90% 520 0.883 0.448 0.552 0.030 0.067
Index CDF > 90% 520 0.802 0.207 0.793 0.079 0.381
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Other than the problem of endogeneity, this study has also identified several issues 
associated with the construction of the index. First, it is probable that the variables 
chosen cannot fully represent the market segments that are to be measured. Unlike 
more developed countries that have high-frequency data over a sufficiently long 
period, most developing countries’ financial markets do not have this privilege. There 
are two possibilities concerning this matter: it seems that the developing countries 
realise the importance of maintaining good data after facing an economic disaster, or 
that their domestic financial markets have only been developing during the 1990s. 
This fact should be admitted as one of the disadvantages of measuring the 
developing countries’ crisis episodes, as this needs reliable and wide-ranging data to 
work most effectively. The problem of limitations in the variable chosen leads to the 
consideration of putting in additional variables to capture the current financial 
market’s situation. For example, the stock-bond correlation (Hollo et al., 2012), and 
non-deliverable forward (NDF).  
Secondly, the methodology should be revisited periodically to provide better 
measurements. The ultimate goal of the measuring of financial instability is to predict 
the occurrence of financial instability and crisis, and to capture the stress level of a 
given financial system (Illing and Liu, 2006). The challenge arises when the policy 
makers use this measurement. The need to understand the stress levels and to 
decide whether a current situation should be called an extreme or normal situation is 
crucial at the level of implementation. To make sure of having the best presentation 
and measurement, it is expected that the index should also incorporate stress testing 
to capture the movements of the variables in the future.  
By understanding the methodology and obtaining the results of the financial instability 
measurements, one may notice that there are some limits in achieving the main 
objective of the construction of the instrument. According to Tymoigne and Wray 
(2014, p. 256), the effort to predict the occurrence of an event is a difficult, or worse, 
is an impossible task. Since predicting a future crisis is difficult, a possible way to 
deal with this challenge is to change the objective of the construction of the financial 
instability measurement from predicting the occurrence of a financial crisis to 
detecting the state of the financial system. It is expected that the detection of the 
state of the financial system will provide information to the authorities in advance. By 
detecting the condition of the financial system, the authorities can better prepare for 
the tendency of there being an unstable financial system over time. This is made 
possible by undertaking pre-emptive measures through finding and locating the 
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causes of increasing financial fragility. In brief, this method may become an 
alternative method for the construction of a financial instability measurement. To 
understand the performance of this method in dealing with a crisis occurrence and 
how the instrument is to detect the state of fragility that has developed, the next 
chapter will discuss and explore the details of this method.   
7.06 Conclusion 
This chapter’s contribution to the literature is the attempt to construct the daily 
financial instability index for Indonesia. Different methods have been examined and 
compared to gain an insight in to which instrument performs better in predicting a 
crisis. The financial crisis – it has been argued – may occur when the financial system 
is in a state of instability, so that measuring the level of instability is expected to 
predict the severity of financial system.  
When the episode of a financial crisis occurs more frequently but the available 
instruments to predict these events fail to send reliable signs in most cases, 
economists are motivated to find a more powerful tool to deal with financial crisis 
prediction. Some economists try to construct an index to predict the crisis occurrence 
and measure the financial system’s condition. This study has tried to explore the 
construction of this index by involving the financial system segments.  
Based on the results, this study has found that the movement of the index can capture 
the crisis episodes. However, one should be careful in examining the prediction level 
and dealing with the problem of typical type II errors, and the ability of this index as 
a crisis predictor (ex-ante). In addition, this chapter has explained the problem of 
endogeneity as one of the issues associated with construction, and has also identified 
another problem in the process of choosing the relevant variables.  
Furthermore, it appears that the index captured the crisis event just before or at the 
time of the crisis eruption. As a result, the authorities may face a difficult situation in 
designing policies to respond the signal of crisis, especially if the signal is sent so 
close to the crisis outbreak (Tymoigne, 2010). According to Tymoigne and Wray 
(2014, p. 256), predicting the occurrence of a crisis is a difficult thing to do. Hence, 
rather than focusing their efforts on predicting financial instability, one possible way 
to deal with financial instability is to detect its potential occurrence. To deal with this 
proposal, the next chapter will discuss financial instability assessments by examining 
another approach under the Financial Instability Hypothesis.    
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Chapter 8  
Assessing financial fragility under the Financial Instability 
Hypothesis  
8.01 Introduction 
The efforts to predict financial crises and measure the level of financial instability 
have shown developments in the techniques that have been used. The focus of the 
measurement involves wide range of indicators or variables. In the case of Indonesia, 
the results show that the ability of these instruments to capture the crisis occurrence 
is high but the performance to predict the crisis occurrence is low. This study 
identified several problems in this construction. These include the potential 
endogeneity of the chosen variables, and the process of choosing variable based on 
a weak theoretical basis. To deal with these issues, this chapter will explore and 
discuss another approach under the framework of Financial Instability Hypothesis 
(FIH). 
Hyman Minsky (1986; 1995) proposed the FIH as a framework to understand how 
financial stability evolves into instability and then crisis. This framework emphasises 
the importance of assessing economic agents’ balance sheets that provide the 
information on the future cash commitments as covered on the liabilities side and the 
revenues on the asset side. From the balance sheets, the attitudes of lenders toward 
providing and borrowers toward obtaining more debt, can be found. In other words, 
by assessing the balance sheets, one can explore the behaviour of economic units 
and how they interact each other. The interconnection among each economic unit is 
then expected to explain the transmission mechanism for positive or negative effects 
on other units. 
The intention to increase the production capacity of a company or the need to invest 
in a certain area will require additional funding, which can be found from internal or 
external sources. When a company chooses to obtain external financing, they need 
to find commercial banks to obtain loans. Lavoie (2014, p.187) argued that the loan 
process can be the source of instability.  Departing from this argument, this chapter 
will explore the mechanism of lending and borrowing and how it has impact on the 
stability of the financial system. Furthermore, this chapter considers the interactions 
between six groups of economic agents that have a significant role in the economy, 
namely the government, the Central Bank, the Commercial or private banks, 
households, the private sector, and the foreign sector.  
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The contribution of this study to the literature is on the investigation of Indonesian 
financial system’s state of instability using FIH. The existing analyses of the financial 
instability measurement in Indonesian case mostly use the common methods, two of 
them are discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. In other words, the empirical study 
that uses FIH and focuses on the Indonesian case are not easy to find. For the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first study to observe Indonesian financial crisis and its 
state of financial system ranging from 1990s to 2015 employing the FIH. Thus, this 
study fills the gap by empirically developing the ideas in constructing a financial 
instability index based on FIH and examining the balance sheets approach with the 
recent available and, to a certain extent, using quarterly data.  
Following the introduction, this chapter explains the basic framework by exploring 
several economic units’ balance sheets and emphasises the factors that connect 
these units. Based on this framework, the later part discusses the commercial banks’ 
balance sheets in more detail.  The choice of commercial banks as the focus of the 
discussion is simply because this unit has interactions with almost all the other units 
and mostly through debt mechanisms. The next section is the discussion of the 
portfolio and risks approach to analysing some variables related to the lending-
borrowing process, as well as a description of the empirical data that supports the 
FIH. The last section will discuss the construction of financial instability measurement 
to detect the state of the domestic financial system. 
8.02 The simplified balance sheets approach 
The FIH underlines the importance of exploring private sector balance sheets since 
it can explain the period of fragility, especially when the companies’ balance sheets 
and their ratio of financial indicators have worsened (Lavoie, 2014, p.253). This 
argument expands the use of balance sheets that, so far, have only been employed 
as a tool to measure the performance and achievement of a company. In addition, 
this argument also emphasises the importance of the balance sheets for forming the 
missing link between the macro or aggregate level and the micro or individual level 
in explanations of financial fragility. By exploring this connection, the source of 
fragility and the way it creates adverse conditions for an economy can be examined 
and explained.  
The balance sheet describes an entity’s assets and liabilities that should be balanced, 
which suggests that the increasing assets corresponds to the increasing liabilities. 
From its structure, the balance sheet contains assets and liabilities, and hence the 
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company’s net worth. An entity’s asset consists of several components that are 
purchased or developed to generate revenues or make profit from the daily 
operations. These components are the company’s properties, fixed assets, and 
financial assets. When the total amount of asset is higher than liabilities, the value of 
the economic units is increase. On the other side of the balance sheet is liabilities 
that show the way the assets are financed. Liabilities contain several elements to 
support the entity’s operations and finance the entity’s commitments. The funds to 
finance the operations may come from internal source or external sources. Several 
components of liabilities are wages, taxes expenditure, accounts payable, accrued 
interests, and so on. In other words, liabilities correspond to the source of funds, while 
asset provides information on the use of the funds. If financing comes from external 
sources, the balance sheet presents the type of debt that is obtained and this 
transaction should be balanced with a change on the assets side. Other than this, 
the relationship between the balance sheet and the income statement lies in the 
structure of repayment on commitments, income as a source of fund to fulfil the 
obligations, and refinancing mechanisms (Minsky, 1990), which are specifically 
viewed from the internal structure of a corporation.  
The balance sheet and income statement of the economic agents portray the 
economic agents’ financial condition in a particular period of time. However, the 
balance sheet may provide the necessary information when compared with the 
previous period. Furthermore, it is also beneficial when one tries to trace the balance 
sheet’s element and when comparing it with other businesses, one will find 
substantial information on the interconnections among economic agents. As a simple 
example, the company’s debt will directly explain the relationship between the 
banking sector, representing the lender, and the private sector, representing the 
borrower. Besides, when a private company holds government bonds, this activity 
will be recorded on the asset side of the company and the liability side of the 
government. 
The main assumption that frames the discussion on the lending and borrowing 
mechanism is the endogeneity of money, which emphasises that the creation of 
money is determined by the demand for credit or loans (Howells, 2007; Fontana and 
Setterfield, 2010b, p. 147; Lavoie, 2014, p.187). In doing business, firms may expand 
their capacity that subsequently needs additional funds, which can be financed from 
internal or external source. Because of this expansion, if the internal source of funds 
is not sufficient to finance its activities, the firms will be forced to find an alternative 
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source of finance. In most cases, firms use a loan from a private bank. Hence, the 
effort to finance the firm’s expenditure corresponds to the creation of a loan (Sawyer, 
2010, p. 135). This loan may generate problems especially when there is an event 
that triggers the occurrence of default that may cause the firm fails to pay its loan 
obligations. Here, the lending-borrowing process plays a crucial part since it can 
generate financial instability (Lavoie, 2014, p.187).  
Figure 8.1 The interconnections of economic units’ balance sheets: simplified  
 
Source: Own construction 
To obtain a broad picture of the mechanisms and relationships among economic 
agents, this chapter will explore six sectors that consist of the banking sector, the 
private non-financial sector, the Central Bank, the government, households and the 
external sector, as presented in Figure 8.1. Even though the discussion will be 
complicated, it is expected to provide a closer description of the real condition. While 
in some part these interactions describe common mechanisms across the globe, but 
at some specific cases, the interconnections amongst economic units use the 
Indonesian situation.  
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8.02.1 The Central Bank 
This section presents the Central Bank’s balance sheet based on its common 
structure. The asset side consists of the claims of the private and public sectors, as 
well as the foreign reserves. While the liabilities side consists of the base money, 
demand deposits, government deposits, and the Central Bank (CB) certificates held 
by the Commercial Banks. The CB certificates23 is the short-term debt instrument 
denominated in the local currency. The Treasury bills that are held by the commercial 
banks can be sold to the Central Bank in return for the bank reserves. In other words, 
the Treasury bills have a similar function to a money market instrument to conduct 
open market operations. From its structure, the Central Bank balance sheets also 
show the double-entry bookkeeping principle, for example, the changes in the Central 
Bank claims on the commercial banks will correspond to the changes in the bank 
reserves.  
In this analysis, the Central Bank has a central role in the lending-borrowing 
mechanism, especially as the lender of last resort for the banking system. However, 
the Central Bank did not have direct interaction with the private sector or households; 
rather, it has the task of providing the banking sector’s reserves. The role of the 
Central Bank was to meet the commercial banks’ requests so that the supply of base 
money was available when the commercial banks required it (Knittel, 2007, pp. 258-
259; Sawyer, 2010, p. 137). In this case, the Central Bank’s role is that of lender of 
last resort. 
Besides, the Central Bank also plays an important and active role in foreign reserves 
management via the sterilization process. The sterilization mechanism is commonly 
used by the Central Bank by selling the CB certificates (government securities) when 
there are capital inflows and purchasing the CB certificates (government securities) 
when there are capital outflows. This is a typical mainstream argument for the role of 
the Central bank in affecting the monetary base. In so doing, it is expected that the 
amount of the stock of base money can be managed (Lavoie, 2006, p.29; Weise and 
Barbera, 2010, p. 229; Lavoie, 2014, p.464)  
                                                
23 In the Indonesian case, from 1984 this debt instrument has been issued by the CB as a money market 
instrument. When the Treasury bills were issued in 2007 by the government, the CB gradually 
discontinued the CB certificates issuance programme -especially those that have maturity similar 
with the T-bills - to avoid domestic market segmentation. 
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8.02.2 The commercial banks 
The interrelationship between commercial banks and the other sectors is substantial 
in this discussion since the role of commercial banks is to supply credit to private 
companies and households. Private companies and households will use the loans 
obtained from the commercial banks to finance their expenditure. As previously 
stated, this study uses the endogenous money framework that emphasises the loan 
as the origin of the process. However, in its daily activities the banking sector may 
encounter conditions when the availability of cash is lower than the demanded credit 
or the amount of deposits’ withdrawn. This condition may lead the commercial banks 
to experience liquidity problems, which can be responded to by obtaining loans from 
other banks or asking for additional reserves from the Central Bank (Knittel et al. 
2006, p. 259; Fontana and Setterfield, 2010b, p. 146).  
From commercial banks’ balance sheets, it can be seen that commercial banks have 
a broad relationship with other economic units. This framework shows the function of 
a commercial bank as a financial intermediary that goes between the depositors and 
borrowers, as well as managing short-term with long-term assets. The commercial 
banks are financial institutions that facilitate the depositors’ money and then channel 
it to the firms or individuals who need it. Furthermore, the commercial banks conduct 
the significant function in money creation by granting new loans to borrowers. In this 
role, the commercial banks act as ‘the creator of credit flows’ (Lavoie, 2014, p.188). 
When firms or individuals demand credit, the commercial banks will assess their 
eligibility and check the potential borrowers’ collateral. The decision to grant a loan 
to a borrower will directly affect both lenders’ and borrowers’ balance sheets. Once 
the loan commitment is withdrawn by the borrower and spent to finance expenditure, 
the money increases the aggregate demand (Fontana and Setterfield, 2010b, pp. 
148-149; Lavoie, 2014, p.188).  
8.02.3 Private companies 
The essential part of the relationship between the commercial banks and the private 
sector is that of lending and borrowing. To increase its production capacity, a 
company can find the financing source that comes from commercial banks. When a 
company looks for direct borrowing, it will propose to the commercial banks. 
However, commercial banks as lenders will not directly approve this proposal. There 
are some activities that should be done by both parties before the loan creation, for 
example, the company should find the potential lender; meanwhile, the bank has to 
conduct the appraisal to respond to the company’s proposal. In so doing, the 
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commercial bank has to collect all available information about the potential borrowers 
to get the good assessment result, especially for calculating and evaluating the 
company’s solvency (Bellofiore and Ferri, 2001, p. 66). A critical point will be reached 
in the lender-borrower relationship when both parties sign the loan agreement. By 
signing the document, they agree to the term and conditions of the loan, such as the 
amount of the loan, the rate of interest and fees, the instalment of principal payments, 
and the settlement of the dispute. 
In the lending-borrowing framework, the interaction between lender and borrower can 
take many forms. Besides one-off borrowing, the lender may offer a line of credit, 
which opens the possibility of long-term access to finance for the borrower. The line 
of credit will be offered when the performance of the borrower is found to be good. 
This type of borrowing gives an advantage to the borrower since they have more 
flexible access to the financing source with the flexible amount of funds. The cost of 
the lent funds is usually agreed in advance, whether it is a fixed cost or a variable 
one. Both of these costs reflect the changes in the market rate by requiring the 
borrower to pay a certain amount to cover the movement in the financial market – in 
the case of fixed costs – and an additional mark-up on top of the reference rate – in 
the case of variable costs. As time goes by, when the debt outstanding has increased, 
the lender usually imposes a higher cost for the funds to compensate for the 
perceived risk of the borrower (Lavoie, 2006a, pp.67-68). 
8.02.4 The government sector 
Similar to the private sector’s balance sheet, government assets are comprised of 
non-financial assets and financial assets. However, since it is difficult to assess the 
value of non-financial assets, most governments’ balance sheets only cover financial 
assets and liabilities. The government balance sheets indicate that the government 
and the Central Bank have a close interaction in various ways. The first form of this 
interaction is the role of the Central Bank as the government’s fiscal agent. In 
conducting this role, the Central Bank becomes the underwriter of the government’s 
securities issuance. In addition to this, the Central Bank also conducts itself as an 
administrator of the government’s securities issuance, especially in clearing and 
settlement. In dealing with tax revenues, the government account in the Central Bank 
receives tax payments from households and firms. These payments usually go 
through taxpayers’ accounts in commercial banks, which are then transferred to the 
government account in the Central Bank. When the government runs its activities, 
and needs to pay the contractors or repay its debt obligations, then the government 
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withdraws the money from its account in the Central Bank. The second relationship 
is the role of the Central Bank in collecting the foreign currency flows. When the 
government issues global bonds or obtains foreign loans, the funds will go to the 
government account in the Central Bank. 
8.02.5 Households 
Households’ balance sheets may be thought to have a much simpler structure than 
that of the other economic agents, but that is not the case. Within the households’ 
balance sheets, the asset consists of the income, interest income and deposits with 
the commercial banks. In modern society, one may find that households also own 
the government securities, private bonds, or shares in firms. From its balance sheet 
elements, households have a precautionary motive by having the deposits in the 
commercial banks. In other words, as argued by Godley and Lavoie (2006), the 
deposits become a ‘buffer’ for households that anticipates them receiving less than 
their expected income. On the other hand, households’ liabilities consist of mortgages 
and/or bank loans. They finance their expenditures with their total income plus loans 
obtained. In this case, these households sacrifice some of their income to pay debt 
obligations in each period. 
8.02.6 The foreign sectors 
The foreign sector’s balance sheet in Figure 8.1 is a simplified one. In the real world, 
the mechanisms and parties involved are much more sophisticated. This diagram 
intends to bring to light the broad mechanism of foreign entities’ role within the 
domestic financial system. Currently, most economic agents within the country have 
a relationship with their foreign counterparts, for example, the export-import of goods, 
lending-borrowing activities, selling-buying of financial assets, and sending money. 
One thing that makes a difference amongst economic agents in doing business is the 
magnitude of the transactions. In this mechanism, the Central Bank is one entity that 
makes a significant contribution to managing the international reserves. As every 
transaction that involves foreign currency will affect the foreign reserves, which is an 
asset component of Central Bank’s balance sheet. Some transactions that potentially 
increase the number of foreign reserves are the purchasing of domestic financial 
assets by non-residents, export transactions, external loan withdrawals by domestic 
institutions, and worker’s remittances. Meanwhile, the selling of domestic financial 
assets by non-residents, import transactions, and payment of debt obligations, bring 
about a decline in international reserves.  
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The connection between the foreign sector and the Central Bank’s foreign reserves 
as a consequence of the above transactions may disrupt the Central Bank’s balance 
sheet. To manage its balance sheet, the Central Bank needs an instrument known 
as the compensation thesis. According to Lavoie (2014, p.479), the compensation 
thesis can be defined as the change in the foreign reserves amount that is then be 
followed by the other change in other components of its balance sheet. The process 
of compensation involves four channels which entail that the balance sheet is 
maintained: the reduction of the commercial banks’ loan to the Central Bank, the 
reduction in the government claims, an increase in government deposits, or the 
increase in CB certificates.  
8.03 The commercial banks’ balance sheet 
Departing from the simple description on the balance sheets above, one unit that has 
interactions with most of the economic units is the commercial banks. In its daily 
operations, the commercial banks have a close relationship with the Central Bank, 
the government, and the private sector. By exploring the commercial banks’ balance 
sheets, it is expected that the relationships between the commercial banks and the 
private sector, and between the commercial banks and the Central Bank, can be 
explained.  
The first relationship is between the commercial banks and the Central Bank, which 
can be drawn from, for example, the bank reserves. The bank reserves are the asset 
of commercial banks and, with double entry bookkeeping, at the same time the 
reserves become the liability of the Central Bank. The reserves allow the Central 
Bank to conduct monetary operations by buying the T-bills held by the commercial 
banks or by issuing the Central Bank’s certificates to the commercial banks. By 
selling T-bills to the Central Bank, the commercial banks have the opportunity to hold 
bank reserves (Lavoie, 2006a, p.62). Aside from the purpose of conducting monetary 
operations, bank reserves are meant to secure the withdrawal of the deposits by 
customers, which in certain cases may in large amounts.  
For the Indonesian case, Table 8.1 shows the banks’ reserves and its changes and, 
in line 6, this table describes the decline of the banks’ reserves in 2008 and 2009. It 
can be inferred that during this period there might have been a massive withdrawal 
by the banks’ customers, which could affect the condition of the commercial banks. 
However, during this period, there was no commercial banks that collapsed, and no 
banking crisis occurred. Hence, one needs to examine the other items on the balance 
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sheets that are suspected to increase. In the same period, one component of the 
commercial banks’ balance sheets titled claims to the Central Bank, which is the 
ownership of CB certificates escalated about 60%. On the other words, there was a 
decision by commercial banks to shift its demand deposits to CB certificates, which 
offer a better interest rate for those who purchase or hold it. 
The second relationship is between the commercial bank and the private sector. 
From the commercial banks’ liabilities side, Table 8.1 provides the development of 
time deposits and demand deposits for the selected years between 1990 and 2015. 
One of the roles of a monetary authority is to set the interest rate in order to manage 
the rate of inflation (Bellofiore and Ferri, 2001, p.6). A high policy interest rate may 
reduce the potential interest margin that can be obtained by the commercial banks. 
As a consequence, a commercial bank will tend to maximize their profits by 
increasing the total number of loans given to borrowers to increase their revenues or 
increasing the cost of borrowing. Table 8.1 provides this claim by showing the 
negative change of claims of commercial banks to the private sector (line 5) in 1999. 
This declining trend suggested that the loans to the private sector were slowing down 
in this period as the lending rate was increasing.  
Furthermore, increasing time and demand deposits, especially prior to 1997/1998 
Asian financial crisis, reflects the mobilization of domestic funds' by setting a higher 
real interest rate (Komatsu, 1996, p.84). However, in 2004 the amount of time 
deposits declined substantially to IDR 418,578 billion. One likely reason for this sharp 
decline is the development of the securities market, which offered a higher return 
than the deposits. Looking at the other commercial banks’ balance sheets 
components, namely the claims to the private sector, it seems that the increasing 
amount of credit to the private sector is not determined by the amount of the deposit 
that is received by the commercial banks. It is suspected that the commercial banks 
do not need to accumulate the deposits to provide the private sector’s financing 
needs. As long as the borrower is credible enough and has appropriate underlying 
assets, the credit will be granted by the commercial banks. This will be discussed 
further in the next section. 
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8.04 The private sectors’ balance sheet 
In order to conduct the analysis, this chapter uses a simple financial analysis by 
presenting the movements of each financial ratio that shows and gives information 
on the area of firms’ financial leverage and solvency. Ross et al. (1999) explain that 
in measuring the capacity of a firm to repay its obligations, a researcher mostly 
focuses on the comparison between the availability of assets and the liabilities. The 
indicator that is being used to evaluate the firm’s liquidity is the current ratio, which is 
calculated by dividing the current assets by its current liabilities. It is expected that 
the higher this ratio, the easier it is for the firm fulfils its obligations. When the value 
of its ratio is less than 1, it can be inferred that the problem may arise, since the firm 
is unable to pay its obligations on time. The other indicators that provide information 
on the ability of a firm to repay its debt are the leverage ratio, which at certain level it 
also reveals the firms’ reliance on external financing in comparison to the equity. 
There are two advantages to this indicator: from the creditors’ point of view, the 
indicator makes it possible for them to evaluate the firms’ financial condition so that, 
they will be protected from a financial problem, for example, from the firm’s 
insolvency. From the firms’ point of view, the use of this indicator helps them conduct 
self-assessment before making any decision to borrow funds from financial 
institutions.  
At the aggregate level, there is no data available that can support the measurement 
of these indicators. One possible way is to get into an individual company’s balance 
sheet and income statement. Extending the work of Cozzi and Toporowski (2006), 
this study collected data from 63 listed non-financial companies in the period of 1991–
2015. These companies represented sectors in the IDX, which comprise of mining, 
basic industry and chemicals, consumer goods, property, infrastructure utilities and 
transportation, trade and services, and miscellaneous industries. Following Cozzi 
and Toporowski (2006), this data will be used as a proxy value for the whole country’s 
economy and it is expected that the data represents the aggregate country data. 
The selection of companies that are used in this study is based on four 
considerations. Firstly, as the discussion on the banking sector balance sheets has 
been done in the previous section, it includes only non-financial companies. 
Secondly, the initial public offering of the companies was made in 1991 so that they 
conform to the observation period of this analysis. Thirdly, it is expected that all the 
listed companies that are chosen have stock market quotation up to 2015. In other 
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words, the company does not have any experience of being delisted from the IDX. 
Fourthly, the sample of these companies represents each of the different sectors of 
the economy. Because of the limited number of firms engaged in agriculture, this 
sector is included with miscellaneous industries. However, most of the companies in 
the agricultural sector failed to be included as their initial public offerings were done 
after the crisis period. 
Figure 8.2 The current and debt ratios 
 
 
Based on Figure 8.2, the first indicator is the current ratio, which compares the current 
liabilities to the current assets. During the period of 1990-1995, the indicator of the 
current ratio had a value of more than 1 for all sectors. The movements of this 
indicator were modest and took the average value of 1.5. In 1997/1998, even though 
the average value was still around 1, there was a declining trend in this indicator, 
which slowed down to reach its lowest value for the entire observation period. The 
general cause for this declining trend was increasing current liabilities. Based on the 
structure of the companies’ balance sheets, the growth of current liabilities exceeded 
the growth of current assets. Focusing on the detailed structure of this variable, some 
sectors that experienced the lowest ratio are those that relied on imported goods or 
needed to purchase machinery. One factor that gave impact on this condition was 
the weakening of domestic currency. The imported components of the process of 
production might increase the current liabilities. Most of the companies will come 
across this problem when their revenues are mostly denominated in domestic 
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currency while the companies must repay their debt obligations in USD or another 
foreign currency. 
By investigating the current ratio, one can gauge the ability of this company to deal 
with short-term liabilities. In other words, this ratio shows how a company can tackle 
its liquidity problem. The movements of the Indonesian current ratio show that during 
1997/1998, there was a weakening of the liquidity of the private sector. The inability 
of a company to meet the repayment of its obligations and to fail to extend the period 
in which the obligation is due, may create a debt default. At the national level, this 
condition will trigger financial fragility in the whole economy. In the post-crisis period, 
the average of the current ratio has been recovered and reached its position above 
the critical value. The value of this indicator was consistently maintained beginning 
from 2002 to the present.  
The second indicator is the debt ratios that consists of the debt to assets ratio and 
debt to equity ratio. The debt ratios try to find the movement of the companies’ debt 
and compare it to the assets or equity. In general terms, this ratio is meant to capture 
the companies’ ability to meet its obligations using all of its assets or equity. The 
higher these ratios, the higher the risk a company faces. Considering there is 
insufficient data on each company’s debt, this study uses the total liabilities as a proxy 
for the amount of the debt. This approach is in line with the broader definition of debt 
as provided by Ross et al. (1999, pp.23-24). These authors explain that liabilities 
have similar characteristics to debt, for example, they have contractual obligations, 
needs a cash payments, and a finite time-period.  
Figure 8.2 depicts how the debt to asset ratio was increased during the Southeast 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Before the crisis period, this ratio had experienced 
a positive trend that indicated potential problems. The increase in this ratio showed 
the trend of firms’ decisions to finance their assets from an external source of funds 
(Cozzi and Toporowski, 2006). It could be inferred that the positive trend of the debt 
to asset ratio revealed the insolvency of a firm, as well as the increased financial and 
credit risk. When the insolvency occurred, and was experienced by most of the 
private sector, it led to the financial condition of a country becoming fragile as 
experienced by Indonesia in 1997/1998. 
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The debt to equity ratio also measures the company’s leverage and the level of 
financial risk24. The higher the ratio, the higher the risk of this company. Arnold (2002, 
p. 18) points out that the ratio of debt to equity also shows the potential probability of 
the company failing to uphold the shareholders’ rights. In addition, the company with 
a high ratio of debt to equity may fail to repay its obligations, either in the short-term 
or long-term, and this opens the company up to possible insolvency problems. As 
presented in the right column of Figure 8.2, the movement of the average debt to 
equity ratio increases during the financial crisis, but recovers and is stable afterwards. 
8.05 The increasing costs and risks 
Figure 8.3 depicts one operation that connects two or more economic units through 
the financing processes of debt issuance and the lending-borrowing mechanism. 
These two external forms of financing come from different sources, namely loan 
markets and securities markets. However, they are similar in the way that the issuer 
or borrower needs to repay the debt obligations, which consist of the principal and 
other obligations payments, for example, paying the interest and other fees. The debt 
obligations will be the borrowers’ concern since these obligations may increase the 
interest expense and when the borrowers’ revenues or incomes are stable, the 
increasing expenses will have impact on the declining profit. There are two aspects 
that involve in the lending-borrowing mechanisms, namely the cost of borrowing and 
risks. The next subsections will discuss these aspects in detail. 
8.05.1 The cost of borrowing 
There are two aspects of company’s debt that can increase the cost of borrowing. 
Firstly, the internal factor, which is related to the inability of a company to manage its 
cost and risks. As an example, the interest rate payment is classified as a cost, and 
an interest rate in the form of a variable rate contains the market risk. A company that 
has a loan with a variable rate will be exposed to changes in the reference rate. When 
the reference rate increases, the company should pay additional expenses to its 
lenders. Hence, if a company cannot manage its cost and risks properly, this 
company will be burdened by additional costs in the following period.   
                                                
24 Cozzi and Toporowski (2006) defined financial risk as the risk that is borne by stockholders when 
the firm finances its operations by issuing or obtaining debts. 
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Secondly, the external factor that increases the cost of borrowing is related to the 
lenders or investors’ views. The lenders or investors’ views play an important role in 
the financing process, especially when it affects the investors’ or lenders’ willingness 
to provide future debt commitments, and if the debt commitment is available, it is 
likely to come at a higher cost. The increasing cost is meant to cover the risk that 
potentially appears in the borrowing process. Hence, the increasing indebtedness 
affects the private sector creditworthiness, and this is usually reflected in the margin 
of the interest rate or an additional fee called the insurance premium fee. The higher 
the margin or fee, the less creditworthy a borrower is. 
Figure 8.3 The lending rate and composite rating 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS – IMF, ICRG and BIS 
It is taken that the rating represents the borrower’s risk, the lending rate represents 
the cost of borrowing, and the amount of domestic credit is a proxy for the total debt. 
Figure 8.3 describes the tendency of the movement of the lending rate, the composite 
rating index, and the amount of credit25. From this figure, it seems that the rating and 
                                                
25 This study utilizes the lending rate to describe the potential cost of borrowing from domestic banks. 
The ICRG composite index is meant to show the investors’ view of the financial system but since 
there is no data on the private sector credit rating, this study uses the ICRG composite index to 
represent the condition of the private sector. In order to describe the movement of private sector 
borrowing, this study takes data from the Bank of International Settlements. The change in the 
private sector debt is used to emphasise this movement throughout the observation period. 
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the lending rate are negatively related. When the rating is declining, the lending rate 
is increasing. It can be inferred that the negative view of investors or lenders is 
reflected in the cost of borrowing. Before the period of 1997/1998, the interest rate 
was stable and tended to decline at some points. The growth of credit to the private 
sector was also relatively stable. The significant movements of these three indicators 
is shown in the period of 1997 up to 2000 when turbulence hit the country. Figure 8.3 
also captures the signal of an increase in private sector borrowing that occurred in 
the middle of 1996. This positive movement of private sector debt can be interpreted 
as an increasing demand for loans from the banking sector. The increasing demand 
for loan was then responded by the banking sector by increasing the lending rate. 
This phenomenon will create a burden for the private sector when they have to pay 
the interest for both the new and on-going loans, especially for those that use variable 
or floating interest rates. 
8.05.2 The liquidity and refinancing risks 
After discussing the cost of borrowing, this subsection will focus on the risks that 
embedded in the private sector and commercial banks’ transactions. In examining 
the private companies and commercial banks’ balance sheets, this study finds that 
there is a tendency of increased risks, namely liquidity and refinancing risks26. To 
capture this phenomenon, this study uses two different measurements, namely the 
loan to deposits ratio for the banking sector, and the portion of short-term debt for the 
private sector. 
The loan to deposit ratio reveals the commercial banks’ lending to private companies 
compared to the funds from its customers’ deposits. Assuming that a portion of banks’ 
lending comes from the deposits, it should be noted that the process of the funds 
channelling into the lending-borrowing mechanism may create a maturity mismatch 
since the deposits that are collected by the commercial banks can be withdrawn at 
any time by the customers. On the other hand, the loan may be used to finance a 
longer-term investment project. This is the reason commercial banks need to 
maintain the ratio at a certain level - to avoid liquidity problems. Based on its formula, 
when this ratio is more than 1, it shows the liquidity problems of the commercial 
banks, since they provide the private sectors’ loans using funds from the money 
                                                
26 Theoretically, there are several types of risks consisting in market risks, refinancing risks, 
counterparty risks, etc. However, this study only focuses on liquidity and refinancing risks. 
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market. Conversely, the low ratio of loan to deposits indicates the lower revenues 
that will be obtained by the commercial banks. There is no precise level that can be 
used as a benchmark for the optimum level of loan to deposit ratio. 
Figure 8.4 Loan to deposit ratio (%) 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, 2015 
Note: Based on the Indonesian Banking Statistics metadata, the loan to deposit 
ratio is obtained by dividing the net loan that goes only to the private sector 
(excluding the interbank loan) with the deposits.   
 
Figure 8.4 provides the movements of this ratio, which is still below 100% throughout 
the period. Theoretically, this level suggests the use of deposits to serve the loans 
that are demanded by the private sector is manageable. Following the crisis period 
in 1997/1998, however, in December 1999 there is a sharp decline of this ratio to 
reach less than 30%. Does this indicate a problem or show an improvement of this 
ratio? The data series demonstrates that the amount of deposits did not change much 
at that time. The stable positive growth of the deposits shows that the mobilization of 
domestic resources was running well in the financial crisis period. On the other hand, 
difficulties were faced by the private sector that experienced the slowing down of the 
economy. The declining performance of the private sector brought each company to 
reconsider, or in most cases postpone, the plan to expand the business. Besides, the 
financial, political and social instability presented another challenge for the private 
sector. All these factors affected the intention of the private sector to find external 
financing through obtaining new debt. Instead, most of the companies tended to use 
internal financing to expand their businesses or recover from losses that incurred 
during the crisis period. 
Starting from the end of 2001, this ratio moved more positively. The amount of private 
credit and deposits increased but the ratio was still under 10%. Even though the 
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liquidity risk was under control, considering that the global financial condition was not 
stable during 2014–2015, the authority should have paid more attention to adverse 
effects that may occur. These adverse effects would have included, the slowing down 
in domestic economic activities, the weakening of domestic currency starting from 
January 2015, and other countries’ economic policy that affected domestic financial 
and real sectors, i.e. China and the U.S.  
In addition to the liquidity risk, this study also briefly describes private sector’s 
behaviour in choosing the type of financing. On the private sector balance sheets, 
the liabilities are divided into two groups, which consists of short-term and long-term 
debts. There are at least two different relationships that involve a company and its 
counterpart. The first relationship is between a company and another company. In 
doing business, a company may receive the short-term borrowing from other 
companies in the form of trade payable. The following mechanism can describe this 
activity. To maintain the production line as expected, some of the companies get the 
support or provision from their suppliers or vendors, for example, the suppliers are 
allowing them to postpone the payment of business supplies. The company receives 
a short-term debt from the suppliers in the form of trade payable. The second 
relationship is between the company and commercial bank, as the lender, that occurs 
in terms of the lending – borrowing mechanism. The common practice also allows a 
company to borrow from a commercial bank to finance its activities, including paying 
the advance payments to its suppliers and salaries for the employees; however, this 
type of debt will take a lower portion of company’s total debt. Additionally, this type 
of financing is over a short period. 
The problem may come to surface when short-term debt dominates the outstanding 
debt of a company and, in the aggregate level, the private sector mostly uses short-
term financing for their activities. These scenarios are more likely to occur, firstly, if 
the outstanding debt of the company is increasing, which would increase the concern 
of the lender. The lender usually responds to this tendency by lessening some 
commitments, increasing the lending rate, and shortening the loan’s maturity. 
Secondly, if the private sector, in the country level, fails to obtain the approval from 
the commercial banks to get longer term financing. This happens when the 
performance of the borrowers is not good enough to impress the lenders due to 
having a bad record.  Thirdly, if the economic condition of the country is not good 
enough to expand the business plan. When a country’s financial system experiences 
turbulence, the lenders usually make the borrowers should meet more demanding 
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criteria. So, the access to financing, especially loans that are cheaper and that have 
longer maturity, is more difficult for the borrowers.   
Figure 8.5 The ratio of short-term to total borrowing (%) 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the balance sheet and income statement 
data of more than 60 listed non-financial companies. 
Note: The scales of the vertical axis is adjusted for a better presentation. 
Figure 8.5 depicts the portion of the short-term liabilities that is used as a proxy for 
short-term debt to total liabilities. The portion of these liabilities is more than 50%, 
which is precarious from the risk management point of view. In Minsky’s term, most 
of the business-entrepreneurs use speculative and Ponzi schemes to finance their 
investments. Looking at its movements, this indicator experienced a negative trend 
in the period of 1990-1996, showing improvements in risk management and the 
increased performance of internal financing. Following this period, the financial crisis 
led this ratio to increase and reach its highest level during the observation period. 
Besides the crisis period, in 2007 and 2011 this ratio was also increasing.  
8.06 The build-up of instability 
For the purpose of expanding its business, a firm will take corporate action. It is 
argued that the investment will yield a profit. When firm’s performance and the 
business environment is good, the firm has a tendency to expand business, expecting 
more income or profit in the future. As previously explained, the intention to expand 
the business should match the access to finance the company has. The options 
available for the firm are internal or external finance. In most cases, external finance 
is used, which may be obtained from the banking sector. The firm as a borrower and 
the commercial bank as a lender expect that the condition for the next period is good 
for investment. As the project succeeds, the optimism will flourish among the parties 
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involved. However, this optimism can create carelessness, especially when 
commercial banks lower their risk preference on the borrowers, therefore allowing a 
borrower will get a loan more easily. 
Figure 8.6 The debt-equity ratio and macro-indicators 
 
Source: Own calculation  
Note: The debt equity ratio is calculated using the sample of more than 60 listed non-
financial companies. 
The relationship between the balance sheet and income statement lies in the 
structure of repayment on commitments, income as a source of fund to fulfil the 
obligations, and the refinancing mechanism (Minsky, 1990), which is specifically 
viewed from the internal structure of a corporation. The FIH emphasises the 
occurrence of a financial crisis that is triggered by the economic agents’ expansion 
in a robust economic condition. In the good economic environment, the firms 
experience high profit, economic agents feel comfortable do business, and investors’ 
confidence also rises (Dymski and Pollin, 1992; Wolfson, 2002). 
Figure 8.6 shows four variables that are expected to help us understand the crisis 
episode within the framework of the FIH. The positive and high growth is likely to 
attract the businesspeople to expand their production capacity by obtaining external 
financing. The period of 1991-1995 shows a positive trend in the debt to equity ratio. 
However, when the policy interest rate increases and the borrower has the variable 
rate debt, there is a possibility of an increasing cost that the borrower faces to service 
their debt. If the amount of the loan is sizeable, the borrowers will struggle to survive 
financially as they are exposed to the increasing cost and risk. This phenomenon 
happened in Indonesia during 1997/1998, when the borrowing cost increased 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
1
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
1
19
95
Q
1
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
1
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
00
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
08
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
10
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
12
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
20
14
Q
1
20
15
q1
DER (%)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
1
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
1
19
95
Q
1
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
1
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
00
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
08
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
10
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
12
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
20
14
Q
1
20
15
q1
IDR/USD
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
1
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
1
19
95
Q
1
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
1
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
00
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
08
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
10
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
12
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
20
14
Q
1
20
15
q1
Policy rate (% change)
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
1
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
1
19
95
Q
1
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
1
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
00
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
20
06
Q
1
20
07
Q
1
20
08
Q
1
20
09
Q
1
20
10
Q
1
20
11
Q
1
20
12
Q
1
20
13
Q
1
20
14
Q
1
20
15
q1
Real Growth (%)
 168 
 
sharply, and the debt to equity ratio then increased. It is most likely that the borrowers 
had loans in variable rate since the increasing rate of interest was followed by an 
increasing gearing ratio. The positive correlation27 between debt to equity ratio and 
policy rate suggests that the Central Bank should have considered the ability of 
corporations in serving their obligations when it wanted to increase the interest rate. 
Brancaccio and Fontana argued (2013, 2015) that the rate the Central Bank policy 
sets has a direct effect on firms and companies’ solvency. In addition to the 
increasing cost of borrowing, the companies had to shoulder another burden as the 
domestic currency depreciated against the USD. The currency risk may have also 
put pressure on the corporations, especially for those who had a loan from abroad. 
In terms of domestic currency, the total debt of the firms increased. 
Figure 8.7 The non-performing loans (%) 
 
Source: Own construction based on Word Bank data and various publications 
Note: The figure of 1997 is the approximate NPLs up to first semester of 1997 
(Pangestu, 2003). 
In conditions where the interest rate is high, companies are severely burdened by the 
cost of borrowing and, as a result, its ability to serve the debt liabilities declines. This 
                                                
27 Using a simple regression model involving the variables of the debt to equity ratio, growth rate, 
exchange rate and policy interest rate, it is shown that the estimation output is as follows: 
𝑑𝑒𝑟௧ = 1.007 + 0.21𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧ିଵ + 0.24𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧ିଵ − 0.02 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௧ିଵ + 0.27𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝑒௧ 
  [0.054]***  [0.055]  [0.04]   
R-squared=0.393  Adj.R-squared=0.367 S.E.of regression= 0.202  No.of obs=100 
Note = ***, **, * indicates significant at 1%, 5%,10% level 
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phenomenon will trigger a growing amount of bad debts, or non-performing loans. In 
line with the above explanation, Figure 8.7 shows how the percentage of non-
performing loans during 1997/1998 escalated, reaching the highest level for more 
than 20 years. In addition to this, Takayasu and Yokoe (1999) indicated some 
possible causes of the high level of non-performing loans in Indonesia as follows: (i) 
the quality of assessment was low since the loans were provided for the affiliated 
companies, (ii) there was a lack of transparency, (iii) the funds were used to finance 
non-productive investments.   
Based on the discussion above, one may understand the interconnection of 
economic agents in the Minskyan framework. This framework describes the lending-
borrowing process that may trigger financial instability. Even though there is no formal 
model to explain the process of financial fragility, in certain cases, the descriptions 
as have been provided in the previous sections can show the worsening of the 
financial condition prior to the crisis period. So far, the discussion has focussed on 
the interconnections between the commercial banks and the concerned agencies in 
the framework of the lending-borrowing mechanism. In discussing the external 
fragility, however, the starting point is to recall the mechanism as depicted in Figure 
8.1. Within this mechanism, the other unit that also plays a significant role in the 
financial system is the Central Bank. The mainstream views argue that the Central 
Bank takes an active role in the foreign reserves management in order to influence 
the monetary base. The Central Bank may sell and purchase securities when there 
are capital flows. This mechanism will be discussed in detail in Chapter 11. 
8.07 Financial fragility measurement 
This sub-section tries to measure financial fragility drawing on the FIH. Following the 
work of Schroeder (2002, 2009), this study explores three macroeconomics 
variables: the rate of interest, the operating profit, and the investment. Before getting 
into the analysis, this study will present the basic assumption for this measurement.  
8.07.1 The analytical base 
Schroeder (2002, 2009) and Blancas (2007) used Foley’s approach to analysing 
financial fragility and started with a firm’s balance sheets and cash flow identity. The 
first aspect of the model is the balance sheet. To simplify the analysis, the main 
components of the balance sheet are the assets (A) and liabilities (L), which may 
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produce the firm’s net-worth (W) by subtracting those two balance sheet 
components. 
𝑊 = 𝐴 − 𝐿 
The firm’s net-worth is positive when the assets are greater than the liabilities. The 
positive change in a firm’s assets can be made through investment. However, the 
firm has to find the source of financing, whether it comes from internal or external 
source of funds, to finance its investment project. One component that may influence 
the firm’s liabilities is the firm’s borrowing, i.e. the used of an external source of funds. 
In other words, the borrowing will reduce the firm’s net-worth. Hence, the change in 
net-worth equals to the difference between the change in assets and the change in 
liabilities. There is another way to obtain a change in net-worth, which is by exploring 
the statement of cash flow.  
In general, the statement of cash flows contains an identity that shows the firm’s 
source of funds, which is obtained from the operating profit (P) and new additional 
debt (D), and the use of these funds in investments (I) and the servicing of debt (S).  
𝑃 + 𝐷 ≡ 𝐼 + 𝑆 
Based on this identity, there are three types of financing units as described by Minsky:  
- The hedge financing unit is a firm that has a greater profit than its investment plus 
the expense for servicing its debt, or, can be formulated as 𝑃 ≥ 𝐼 + 𝑆.  
- The speculative unit is a firm that has profit greater than its debt service, but the 
profit cannot cover the sum of its investment plus the expense for servicing its 
debt. The speculative unit can be formulated as 𝑃 ≥ 𝑆, but 𝑃 ≤ 𝐼 + 𝑆.  
- The Ponzi financing unit is a firm that has profit lower than its debt service, and 
needs to borrow to meet its debt obligations. The formulation for the Ponzi 
financing unit is 𝑃 ≤ 𝑆. 
The cash flows identity can be expressed in an alternative way by subtracting both 
sides with the operating profit (P): 
𝐷 = 𝐼 − 𝑃 + 𝑆 
Supposed that π is the rate of profit that can be obtained by dividing the operating 
profit (P) with the firm’s assets (A), g is the growth of a firm’s assets that can be 
obtained by dividing the investment (I) with firm’s assets (A), and r is the debt service 
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rate that is equal to the debt service (S) divided by the debt outstanding (B). From 
these equations, one can formulate new additional borrowing as follows:  
𝐷 = (𝑔 − 𝜋)𝐴 + 𝑟𝐵 
Schroeder (2002, 2009) emphasised that in the aggregate or at the country level, the 
formula is also similar, but with some changes in each component. The capital stock 
(K) replaces the assets (A), by which one may derive the average increase in 
investment, g. The operating surplus can be used to represent the profit, π and the 
same method also applies to the total debt service. The author argued that the 
evolution of these three variables and their combinations demonstrate the tendency 
of a financial system to become fragile or unstable. By considering the movements 
of the trends in each variable, the authorities can gain insight into a country’s 
vulnerability. This tendency can be seen from the conditions as follows:  
- An economy is classified as hedge financing when its profit (π) is higher than the 
investment (g) plus the debt service (r). Comparing each variable, there are two 
possibilities within this combination: π > g > r or π > r > g.  
- An economy is classified as speculative financing when the rate of profit (π) is 
lower than the rate of accumulation (g), but higher than the debt service rate (r). 
Hence, the combination of the variables becomes as follows: g > π > r.  
- While, for Ponzi financing unit, there are some possible combinations that show 
the rate of debt service outperforms the other two variables: r > π > g or r > g > π, 
and when the rate of accumulation is higher than the rate of debt service and the 
rate of profit: g > r > π. 
Overall, the above conditions do not necessarily bring country into crisis. The 
measurement is expected to send the signal of a country’s condition, which helps the 
authorities to identify the state of the country and if necessary formulate a policy. 
8.07.2 The empirical analysis 
In implementing this measurement, this study aims to estimate three main variables: 
the profit, the investment, and the debt service. However, instead of finding the 
nominal level of these variables, this study will use the incremental rates. In this case, 
the incremental rates are defined as the rate of change in each variable (Schroeder, 
2002 and 2009; Blancas, 2007). Schroeder (2009) argued that incremental rates are 
more useful for providing information on the structural change of an economy, 
whether it tends to be categorized as a Hedge, a speculative or a Ponzi financing 
system. The reason of utilizing incremental rate lies on its sensitivity to capture the 
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fluctuation of the variables in which it is much better than those at the nominal or 
country levels. In so doing, this study employs Indonesian annual macroeconomic 
data for the period of 1993 to 2015.  
The first variable is the incremental rate of profit (π’). According to Schroeder (2009), 
the variable π is the change in the annual profit (∆P) as a ratio of the change in the 
capital stock (∆K). In this case, the change in capital stock is equal to the level of the 
previous period of investment (𝐼𝑡−1). 
𝜋′ =
∆𝑃
𝐼௧ିଵ
 
In the calculation, there is no information on the income approach to GDP and hence, 
the data on a country’s profit is very limited or unavailable. To deal with this, the 
country’s profit is estimated by subtracting the nominal GDP from the annual wages 
and tax. The amount of wages is calculated from the average annual wages 
multiplied by the number of individuals employed, which includes self-employed 
individuals. For the investment variable, this study uses the series of annual gross 
fixed capital formation as the proxy for the capital stock. The data are retrieved from 
WDI–the World Bank, the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency, and IFS–IMF.  
The second variable is the incremental rate of investment (g’). This variable is 
calculated by dividing the change of the investment (∆I) with the change of capital 
stock. As previously defined, the capital stock equals the previous period of 
investment (𝐼𝑡−1). With this definition, the incremental rate of investment can be 
formulated as follows:  
𝑔′ =
∆𝐼
𝐼௧ିଵ
 
The third variable is the incremental rate of debt service (𝑟′), which is the change in 
debt service (∆𝑆) divided by the change in the outstanding debt (∆𝐵). The change in 
the outstanding debt in this case is equal to the amount of new borrowing that was 
agreed in the previous period, with the following formula: ∆𝐵 =  𝐵௧ − 𝐵௧ିଵ, where 𝐵𝑡 −
𝐵𝑡−1 =  𝐷𝑡−1. Based on this definition, the formula for incremental rate of debt service 
is as follows: 
𝑟′ =
∆𝑆
𝐷௧ିଵ
 
According to Schroeder (2009), the incremental rate of debt service for each unit of 
new borrowing is equivalent to the lending interest rate. However, to see the short-
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term movement of the interest rate, she uses the inter-bank rate that is considered to 
be sensitive to changes in the financial market condition. Following her analysis, this 
study compares two types of interest rate, which are the lending rate and the inter-
bank rate, before applying it in the analysis. The movements and the directions of 
these two interest rates are similar, yet, the inter-bank rate has a more responsive 
movement than the lending rate. The annual figures for the one-month Jakarta 
Interbank Overnight Rate (JIBOR) are taken from the Indonesian Central Bank and 
Bloomberg. 
Figure 8.8 depicts the change of these three variables. This figure shows that prior 
to the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, the movement of these variables was 
relatively stable, with a relatively low interest rate. With relatively high GDP growth in 
1994, the level of profit could be maintained higher than the other two variables. This 
condition led the country to become a hedge financing unit. In the following year, 
however, this condition changed slightly when the amount of investments increased 
and outperformed the profit and interest rates. Between 1995 and 1996, the country 
could be classified as a speculative financing unit. In 1997, when the Asian financial 
crisis started, the profit rate and investment rate changed drastically to become lower 
than the interest rate. Starting from the third quarter of 1997, the monetary authority 
adopted a high interest rate policy as a response to the volatility of Indonesian macro-
economic indicators, for example, a sharp depreciation of exchange rate and low 
international reserves.  
Figure 8.8 The incremental rate of investment, profit and interest 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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In the aftermath of the crisis, there were some periods that show volatile movements 
in each of these three variables, such as in 2001 and 2002. Figure 8.8 shows that at 
the beginning of the 2000s, the positive changes in profits and investments are still 
below the rate of interest, which suggests the condition of a Ponzi financing unit. In 
the rest of the observation period, Indonesia is categorized mostly as a hedge 
financing unit, with the profits rate higher than investment rate and the interest rate. 
In 2004, investment rate reached 0.31, while the profit rate was about 0.39 and the 
interest rate at 0.054. It can be inferred that in this year, every unit of money that was 
spent on new investment would give a profit that was sufficient to cover or meet the 
new debt obligations (Schroeder, 2009).  
Figure 8.9 Financial fragility ‘seismogram’ 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Blancas (2007) 
Note: π is the incremental of profit; g is the incremental of investment; r is the interest 
rate. 
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financing unit. After comparing the value of each variable, the results are quite 
interesting. The first part of this figure demonstrates the volatility of country’s 
condition. The financial crisis in 1997 was preceded by speculative financing in 1995–
1996. However, in 1998 the classification changed to hedge financing. When the 
country was in a fragile condition and entered crisis, the authorities tried to solve the 
problem. The authorities realized that the level of private investment might be lower28 
than the previous year and this required them to take necessary actions. One of the 
policies was to increase the government budget to compensate for the slowing down 
of investment, so that national output could be maintained. The increasing 
government expenditure in 1998 could prevent the national output from decreasing 
further. It was believed that the positive change in national output would lift 
Indonesia’s profits. However, this condition did not last long as from 1999 the 
investment and profit fell below the interest rate and so Indonesia became a Ponzi 
financing unit. 
In addition to the above explanation, Figure 8.9 shows that Indonesia entered a Ponzi 
financing state in 2001 and 2002, when the rate of interest was higher than the other 
two indicators. Since the estimation of profit is made using the GDP, it is suspected 
that the slowing down of the change in investment may affect the low rate of profit. 
From the historical data, in 2001 domestic investment declined to reach minus 36% 
and led to the decline in total investment by about 4%. Moreover, in 2002 both foreign 
direct and domestic investments declined from the previous year, reaching minus 
41% and minus 56%, respectively. There are some events that may have had a role 
in slowing down the firms’ expansion. Recalling the series of domestic events as 
already have been described by Chapter 7, there are at least two events that 
influenced the investment, namely the political instability during the Presidential 
succession in 2001 (Malley, 2002) and the terrorist attack in 2002. It seems that 
investors and corporations wait until these events were resolved to invest their funds. 
Figure 8.9 shows that Indonesia was stable and could be categorized as a hedge 
financing unit during 2005 to 2015. However, when it is compared with Figure 8.8, it 
is interesting to note the movements of profit rate in this period. With relatively stable 
interest rate and investment rate, there are positive changes in profit rate between 
2005 and 2015 though the trend was for this to slow down. This figure may suggest 
                                                
28 Based on historical data, the private investment value, which is obtained from subtracting the public 
investment from country’s total investment declined between 1997 and 1999. 
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the tendency of a lower rate of return from every unit of money invested. It is 
suspected that the declining rate of growth, as the GFC erupted within this period, 
affected this condition. If there is a sudden positive change in the interest rate that 
can alter the debt service obligations, with the other two variables are being equal, 
the country can enter a fragile financial condition. Hence, even though the country’s 
condition is classified as a hedge financing unit, the authorities should have paid 
attention to the detail, such as the movements of other macro-economic or financial 
market indicators. 
These two figures (Figure 8.8 and 8.9) give a new perspective in measuring 
Indonesian financial instability. These figures offer useful information for the 
authorities to take action, if there is any suspicion that the economy may worsen. 
Taking the example of the above case study in the year of 1995 and 1996, when the 
level and the incremental of profit were seen to lower, this condition can lead the 
country to become a speculative unit. With this condition identified, the authorities 
were supposed to apply policies to tackle the source of the problem. If the problem 
lies in the decline of the national output, from the fiscal policy side, the government 
can manage the state budget to accelerate economic activity. The monetary authority 
may use the policy interest rate to transmit monetary policy that boosts economic 
activity. However, with the dynamic condition of the financial system, it seems that 
this measurement needs to be enhanced to capture more detail of the variable 
interests. This enhancement to the measurement can be done by improving the 
frequency of each variable, for example by using quarterly rather than annual data.     
8.08 Conclusion 
As a response to the weaknesses of the crisis predictors that developed in two 
previous chapters, this chapter attempts to discuss financial fragility using a simple 
balance sheets framework. The main assumption of this discussion is not to predict 
the occurrence of crisis but to detect the state of financial instability. This chapter’s 
contribution to the literature is by exploring the financial system instability using FIH 
and examining the interconnections and the roles of several economic agents in 
Indonesia’s case.  
Based on a simple analysis of the lending-borrowing process, there are several 
findings in this study. First, this study finds that the relationships among these units 
are quite sophisticated. These relationships explain that should a problem occur in 
one economic unit, this problem can be transmitted to the others. Second, by using 
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the balance sheet approach, it can help economists to understand the build-up of the 
financial instability and financial crisis. The development of relevant financial ratios 
before, during and after the Southeast Asian financial crisis shows the transformation 
from a normal condition to financial instability and financial crisis. In a specific case, 
the ratio of debt to equity portrays a good example of how financial instability could 
result in financial crisis in 1997/1998. Besides, the balance sheet approach 
emphasises the importance of portfolio and risks management to show the economic 
agents’ financial condition.  
Third, the increasing outstanding debt, both at the country level and at the individual 
level, may aggravate the financial system. The increase in debt outstanding may 
affect the lenders or investors’ view towards borrowers.  With certain amount of debts, 
the changes of the interest rate may create additional burdens for the borrowers. 
There is also the potential for the financing risk to exacerbate the borrowers’ balance 
sheets and income statements. Finally, due to the increasing debt obligations, the 
borrowers could face difficulties in repaying these expenditures as their profits 
decline. Additionally, the commercial banks may experience the increasing numbers 
of non-performing loans. This finding supports Minsky’s FIH that during the tranquil 
period, the firms have a tendency to increase the levels of external financing, but 
when optimism changes to the pessimism, the financial system will suffer from a crisis 
episode. 
This empirical chapter offers a new idea of measuring the state of Indonesia’s 
financial instability by constructing the financial instability ‘seismogram’. From the 
empirical results, the measurement shows the state of fragility in this case. The 
fragility condition began in 1997 when the economy can be classified as a Ponzi 
financing unit. Before entering the Ponzi state, in 1995 and 1996, Indonesia was 
considered a speculative financing unit. With this evidence, this measurement may 
help the authorities to recognise the signal of financial fragility in advance, so that 
they have the capability to prepare for it by setting policies. Overall, this measurement 
may require some improvements, for example, in the attempt to use the higher 
frequency data.   
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Chapter 9  
The capital flight measurement 
9.01 Introduction 
One aspect of financial liberalisation is capital account liberalisation, which often is 
included in structural adjustment policies. Capital account liberalisation permits the 
flow of capital from one country to another. The word liberalisation emphasises the 
crucial part of the reform which minimises – or in an extreme case, eliminates – the 
role of the government in influencing the flow of capital and the mechanisms in the 
financial system, such as the determination of the value of domestic currency against 
its foreign counterpart and the degree of freedom for foreign investors in purchasing 
the domestic financial instruments (Grabel, 2006, p.404). Through the 
implementation of financial liberalisation, the domestic economy has wider access to 
international financial markets. This system opens up the opportunity for all economic 
agents, both local and global market players, to get involved in financial market 
activities, including buying and selling financial assets. 
Between 1970 and 1980, financial liberalisation was widely implemented under 
arguments that the inflow of foreign capital, amongst other factors, would confer 
benefits to the liberalising country. In connection with the assumptions of neoclassical 
views, the advocates of financial liberalisation claim that it enables improved 
efficiency and the distribution of funds across the global financial market. Moreover, 
the economic agents have better access to funding sources and an opportunity to 
diversify their portfolios (Singh, 2003). Based on data from the Institute of 
International Finance (2016), the trend of capital flows into emerging market 
economies has been increasing. By the end of 2002, the net private flows that 
entered the emerging market were recorded to reach USD 202billion, with a further 
increase to USD 1,285billion in 2007. In the period of 2010–2013, the net private 
inflows to the emerging markets showed positive trends. The series of data show that 
the movements of capital were very volatile, leading to a vulnerable situation, 
especially when there were reversals of capital inflows and capital outflows. 
The movements of capital from the domestic financial market in the forms of capital 
outflows and negative inflows are usually extremely high during the crisis period. 
However, the condition worsens when the data portraying these flows are not 
available. Chapter 2.05 emphasises this message in the case of Indonesia 
throughout the crisis period. There are no sufficient data that become the source of 
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information for decision-makers to know the financial market situation. Hence, it 
deems necessary the presence of an alternative way or instrument to calculate or 
measure the flow of capital that may be unrecorded properly.  
Departing from this problem, this chapter intends to apply the method in mind of 
investigating and measuring the unrecorded flows by utilising the ‘capital flight’ 
formula. This empirical chapter is expected to provide a contribution to the literature 
by exploring the method in calculating capital flight in the case of Indonesia and 
accordingly utilising the most current and, to some extent, higher frequency data 
series. This study calculates the trade misinvoicing involving 150 trading partners 
countries using monthly data. Furthermore, the previous studies focused on exploring 
the capital flight from Indonesia are subject to the limited data availability or are 
performed on a yearly basis. As a result, these studies are unable to describe the 
detail movements of capital flight, which may lead to an indefinite policy prescription.  
The rest of this chapter presents the theoretical framework of capital flight that covers 
the definitions, methodology and several empirical studies on capital flight. The next 
chapter provides a short description of Indonesian private capital flows, followed by 
the methodology intending to be used in this chapter. The last section provides 
discussion and the conclusion.  
9.02 Capital flight: an alternative approach to investigate capital 
outflows 
Nowadays, the flow of capital between countries is increasing in its magnitude and 
frequency. These movements of funds have two different outcomes: it may provide 
the domestic financial system with a source of funds, but it potentially creates a 
problem of triggering financial instability. One of the unsolved issues within the 
management of capital flows is the existence of unrecorded capital outflows, 
commonly understood as capital flight. This type of flows increases the complexity in 
estimating the capital flow to or from the country and setting the policy to handle the 
management of capital flows.  
Considering the unclear and complex mechanisms involved in capital flight, 
economists have not come to a coherent, agreed upon conclusion on its definition. 
There is the argument on differentiating capital flight from the type of transactions 
carried out, suggesting that capital flight should be distinct from normal transactions. 
Based on this argument, capital flight covers the illegal transaction, and therefore 
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should be distinguished and separated from legal transactions (Ajayi, 1997). This 
definition leads to the question of how illegal transactions can be translated into the 
empirical analysis for there is no sufficient data on such transactions.  
The unavailability of data in supporting the search for the amount of capital flight 
inspires economists to identify another definition and method for facilitate the 
calculation of capital flight in the real world. Cuddington (1986) defined the short-term 
speculative capital that flows from the domestic financial market, using the term ‘hot 
money’. In this definition, capital flight was classified as capital flows that are 
unrecorded. Cuddington (1986) argued that the process of measuring capital flight 
was both challenging and difficult. To make this term doable in the empirical research, 
the author suggested that economists can measure capital flight by considering 
different variables, such as errors and omissions, and trade misinvoicing. 
Furthermore, Dooley (1988) offered a definition of capital flight as an increase of 
external claims without yielding income for the country since the assets are beyond 
the control of the authorities (Ajayi, 1997; Beja, 2005). Beja (2005, p. 56) argued that 
capital flight is the unrecorded capital that flows away from the country and which 
may, in some cases, involve illegal activities.  
Based on the above descriptions, Epstein (2005) formulated a definition of capital 
flight with consideration to the motive of flight and its determinant. In so doing, the 
definition of capital flight is presented as follows: 
‘The transfer of assets abroad to reduce the loss of principal, loss of return, or loss 
of control over one’s financial wealth due to government-sanctioned activities…[that] 
involves the motives for capital outflows [so] it is inherently difficult, if not impossible, 
to measure accurately…’ (Epstein, 2005, p. 1) 
This definition underlines the motive of flight that can be caused by the effort to avoid 
government regulations and as involving an illegal activity. 
Claessens & Naude (1993) showed four well-known methods in measuring capital 
flight. According to the authors, the first approach belongs to the World Bank, which 
uses the residual method. In this method, capital flight is calculated through the use 
of the balance of payment identity. The residual is obtained by finding the difference 
between different sources of funds, which cover the net official inflows and flow of 
FDI and the uses of such funds, which cover current account deficit and addition 
international reserves. Capital flight can be identified when the sources of funds are 
greater than the uses of funds. Meanwhile, when the result is negative or when the 
uses of funds are greater than sources of funds, it is classified as ‘inward capital flight’ 
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(Claessens & Naude, 1993). The second technique is referred to as the Dooley 
method. The objective of this method is to obtain the stock of foreign assets held by 
the private sector but which do not yield any income to the country. The calculation 
can be performed by summing capital outflows based on the balance of payments 
assets, which then undergo adjustment by adding net errors and omissions. Through 
this method, the adjustment of unrecorded claims will also be included in the 
measurement. The unrecorded claims can be obtained by calculating the first 
difference of the outstanding external debt plus the cumulative of the balance of 
payment liabilities. Finally, the third variable included is the capitalised non-FDI 
income, which covers the flow of other investments divided by the domestic market 
interest rate. The third measurement technique is the hot money method, which 
involves the calculation of net error and omissions, other short-term capital, other 
bonds and corporate equities. The fourth technique is trade misinvoicing. Through 
this approach, country export misinvoicing and import misinvoicing are calculated 
and adjusted from a CIF (cost, insurance, freight) basis to FOB (free-on-board) basis. 
So far, there are various studies that aim at measuring capital flight. Claessens & 
Naude (1993) provided an extensive discussion by comparing the results of capital 
flight based on some commonly used methodologies, as previously explained. Their 
study involved 84 countries in the period of 1971 up to 1990. The authors found that 
the phenomenon of capital flight is global; however, those regions experiencing 
higher amounts of capital flight compared to others are North Africa and the Middle 
East, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Ajayi (1997) carried out a research on capital flight, with Nigeria presented as a 
specific case study. The author used four different methods, namely the World Bank, 
the Morgan and Trusty, the Cline, and the Duwendag methods. The observation used 
yearly data ranging from 1972 to 1989. This research found that each method gives 
different results, and the contribution of misinvoicing to the measurement of capital 
flight tends to increase in the case of Nigeria. 
Beja et al. (2005) wrote a paper to examine capital flight in the case of Thailand. 
Through the adoption of the residual approach and the employment of yearly data 
spanning 1980–2000, the authors explained that the problem of capital flight was 
seen to increase during the Southeast Asian crisis of 1997/1998. The authors found 
that increasing capital flight is also recognised as having a positive association with 
the implementation of financial liberalisation. 
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Boyce  and Ndikumana (2008) examined the link between capital flight and external 
borrowing in the case of Sub-Saharan African Countries. The study was done to 
observe 40 African countries over the period 1970–2004 using the adjusted residual 
approach. According to the authors, in the case of Sub-Saharan countries, the capital 
flight phenomenon is strongly linked with external borrowing.  
In the case of Indonesia, the studies examining the capital flight are very few. 
Istikomah (2003) explored the factors determining capital flight in Indonesia during 
1990–2000. This author estimated capital flight using World Bank’s residual method, 
with its application alongside the use of quarterly data. Yuniarti (2005) observed the 
relationship between capital flight and external debt for the period 1974–2002. In her 
paper, capital flight was computed as using the adjusted residual method as 
suggested by Boyce & Ndikumana (2001). In calculating trade misinvoicing, the 
author examined nine trading partner countries. 
9.03 The net capital flows at a glance 
The issue of capital flows becomes an important aspect for policy-makers and 
economists, particularly when the behaviour of these data is relevant to 
understanding the fluctuations of macroeconomic indicators, such as the exchange 
rate and international reserves. Figure 9.1 describes the movements of Indonesian 
short-term capital flows. In this figure, the data is represented by portfolio 
investments, other investments and the current account. This figure shows the 
country’s experience of portfolio investments, which were seen to sharply decline in 
1997/1998—the period when the financial crisis erupted. From 2003 onwards, a large 
swing in portfolio investments can be observed. Despite its volatile movements, 
starting from 2003 up to 2015, the average capital inflow is positive. However, one 
may see that there are some negative movements, especially in the period following 
the GFC. Figure 9.1 provides an example of such downward movements, firstly in 
the middle of 2008 when the European debt crisis occurred, and, secondly, at the 
beginning of 2011, when there was uncertainty in the financial market following the 
downgrading of Greece’s credit rating. 
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Figure 9.1  Current account and short-term investment (millions USD) 
 
Source: Own calculations  
Figure 9.1 also depicts other investments that demonstrate very similar movements 
to private capital flow. The figures for such types of flow can be obtained from one 
component of the balance of payments, referred to as other investments, by 
excluding the monetary authority and general government financing. It therefore only 
covers the banking and other sector flows (Bluedorn et al., 2013; Kaltenbrunner and 
Painciera, 2015). From this figure, the private sector flows can be seen to slightly 
increase at the beginning of the 1990s, which is likely to be an impact of the financial 
system reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. In line with such reforms, the number of 
banks developed remarkably, with foreign financing increasingly entering the 
domestic financial market. In the third quarter of 1997, the private flows were seen to 
be negative, suggesting the repayment of external debt obligations. From Figure 9.1, 
one may observe that a number of other investments before 2011 were negative. 
There are several explanations for this phenomenon: firstly, there were an increasing 
number of private sector units and banks that borrowed from abroad and had to pay 
back their loan obligations during this period; secondly, according to the Balance of 
Payments and International Investment Position Manual (IMF–BMP manual), other 
investments take the form of other equity, which may be defined as the equity in 
quasi-corporations for branches and notional units for land ownership if the share of 
voting power is less than 10% (IMF, 2007, p. 111); there is a suspicion that the 
domestic private sector invested their money in this type of financial assets; and 
thirdly, it could be the case that the domestic banking sector also provided borrowing 
facilities for non-residents.  
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However, Figure 9.1 only portrays those transactions that were recorded, both in the 
financial account and trade account, and therefore does not show the real figures of 
capital flow in terms of those unrecorded. In examining this data, this chapter will use 
the residual method and adjusted residual method. 
9.04 The estimation of capital flight 
This study seeks to estimate the figures for capital flight from Indonesia to foreign 
financial markets during the observation period. In so doing, it is worthwhile following 
the methodology developed by the World Bank (Beja, 2005, p. 64), as refined by 
Boyce and Ndikumana (2001, 2008). 
The point of discussing the measurement of capital flight lies in distinguishing 
‘ordinary capital outflows’ and capital flight, which also has the content of capital 
outflows. In order to obtain the figure for capital flight, this study uses the method 
most commonly applied by the World Bank (Beja, 2005, p. 70–71) for defining and 
measuring capital flight. In addition, there is another tool to able to measure capital 
flight, which involves adding the component of trade misinvoicing to the capital flight 
measurement proposed by the World Bank. 
Based on its name as the residual method, the World Bank formulates capital flight 
using the change in external debt outstanding (∆𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧) and adding this variable to 
the net Foreign Direct Investments (𝐹𝐷𝐼௧). These two variables construct the first part 
of the formula, which is argued as representing capital inflow. The second part of the 
formula consists of the current account deficit (𝐶𝐴௧) and the change in the 
international reserves (∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠௧), which combine to represent the capital outflows 
components. Referring to its name, capital flight can be obtained by deducting the 
second part from the first part. Therefore, the formula is presented, as follows: 
𝐾𝐹 = (∆𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧ + 𝐹𝐷𝐼௧) − (𝐶𝐴௧ + ∆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠௧) 
In order to measure capital flight, one needs to adjust the figures of export and import 
(Ndikumana and Boyce, 2008). The adjustment is needed since there is the case of 
trade misinvoicing, particularly for developing countries. This study calculates the 
trade misinvoicing by finding the export and import discrepancies. The first step is 
focused on idetifying the total import and export discrepancies. This step can be 
obtained by comparing the value of a country’s imports (M) and the value of a trading 
partners’ imports (PX) from the country, and the value of a country’s exports (X) and 
the value of trading partners’ exports (PM) to the country. When applying this method, 
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one should consider the adjustment factor of export and import data, as most 
developing countries value their exports as FOB; on the other hand, imports are 
valued as CIF. According to the IMF (1993, p. 10), the adjustment factor is 10% of 
the import value of the importing country. Total import discrepancies (DM) and export 
discrepancies (DX) are seen to be equal to the misinvoicing (MISINV). The formula 
for calculating misinvoicing is as follows: 
     𝐷𝑋௧ = 𝑃𝑋௧ − 𝑐𝑖𝑓 ∗ 𝑋௧ 
     𝐷𝑀௧ = 𝑀௧ − 𝑐𝑖𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑀௧ 
𝑀𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑉௧ =  𝐷𝑋௧ + 𝐷𝑀௧ 
Hence, the adjusted capital flight is equal to: 
  
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝐾𝐹 =  𝐾𝐹௧ +  𝑀𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑁𝑉௧ 
In this calculation, with the case study of Indonesian trade misinvoicing, this study 
uses data from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)–IMF covering the period 
1985–2015. In addition to this, the calculation of capital flight mostly uses data from 
IFS–IMF, except the data of short-term external debt, which is retrieved from BIS. 
9.05 Empirical analysis 
There are two steps involved in measuring capital flight: the first step is calculating 
trade misinvoicing, which is computed from the discrepancies in a country’s total 
exports and imports with its trading partners; the second step is calculating the 
residual total capital inflows. This step computes the first difference of the country’s 
external debt outstanding plus the net foreign direct investments and capital outflows, 
which involve the current account balance and the change in international reserves 
(Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001; 2008; Beja, 2005, pp. 63–65).  
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Figure 9.2 The estimation of trade misinvoicing (millions USD) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on DOTS-IMF and Bank Indonesia 
The first step is computing the trade misinvoicing of Indonesia based on the monthly 
data of the DOTS–IMF. In performing this step, one should select Indonesian trade 
partners, which in 2015 consisted of approximately 154 countries. The imports 
misinvoicing is intended to calculate the value of import discrepancies by comparing 
trading partners’ exports with the country’s imports. The exports misinvoicing 
calculates the value of export discrepancies by comparing trading partners’ import 
from the country with the country’s exports to its trading partners. The total of imports 
misinvoicing and exports misinvoicing are converted to the quarterly data, allowing 
the similar level of data with other balance of payments variables29 in measuring the 
capital flight. The estimation of invoice faking in the trade transactions is provided in 
Figure 9.2.  
The positive misinvoicing, especially when there are export under-invoicing and 
import over-invoicing, may suggest that the country suffers from capital outflows. The 
way to recognise this phenomenon is by focusing on the export or import figures. A 
positive sign of export misinvoicing shows underinvoicing, whilst a positive sign of 
import misinvoicing shows import overinvoicing. The export underinvoicing may 
occur when the exporters do not fully declare the value of the transactions, which 
mostly are worth less than the real value of the exported items. Conversely, the 
export overinvoicing is a condition when exporters overstate the value of the export 
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to get an additional allocation of export credits (Baker et al., 2014, p. vi). One reason 
that may emerge may be owing to the fact that the parties involved are trying to avoid 
tax payments to maximise profit. This practice also occurs in import underinvoicing 
by declaring a lesser value of imported goods to incur a lesser tax payment. 
According to Baker et al. (2014, p. vi and p.7), import underinvoicing is a smuggling 
practice when a corporation uses a legal mechanism to import goods illegally. The 
import underinvoicing also applies to corporations that seek to get the tax exemption 
or a lower tariff. On the other hand, importers use the import overinvoicing to drive 
up the company’s production costs as the imported goods have higher prices than 
domestic ones; this allows them to get lower corporate taxes.   
Based on the results, this study finds that there is a positive trend of trade 
misinvoicing, especially between 1985 and 1999. Within this period, capital outflows 
have occurred from the source of trade misinvoicing, which was positive import or 
import overinvoicing, and negative export or export underinvoicing. Bearing in mind 
that finding the figures for capitals outflows in Indonesia before the end of the 1990s 
was problematic, Figure 9.2 depicts the positive movements during the 1980s and 
1990s. The figure of positive capital flight may portray the illicit capital outflows during 
this period. Throughout this period, during the Southeast Asian crisis, Indonesia 
experienced negative trade misinvoicing. The trade misinvoicing during this period 
stemmed from negative imports or import underinvoicing and positive exports or 
export overinvoicing. This negative misinvoicing can be considered as illicit capital 
inflow. There are several explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, it is suspected 
that the increasing amount of money came to the domestic financial market 
unrecorded in an effort to take advantage of the very high deposit rate, which reached 
50% per annum in the third and fourth quarter of 1998. Therefore, should these funds 
be deposited, the funds’ owners will get additional profits from interest income. 
Secondly, in the crisis period, the IDR was depreciated; this caused an impact on the 
imported goods, which became more expensive. One way of maintaining affordability 
in terms of the price of goods was to make an invoice faking by declaring a lesser 
value of imported goods.  
From Figure 9.2, the tendency of negative trade misinvoicing beginning from 2000 
onwards should be treated carefully, since this trade misinvoicing has given the 
country additional funds that may, in turn, harm a trading partner’s economy. These 
capital inflows are also quite fragile since they are very flexible and, in most cases, 
beyond the authority’s ability to manage them. When there is a policy that makes the 
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corporations feel uncomfortable, there may be a sudden reversal of inflow from trade 
misinvoicing. In the period of 2000 onwards, the negative trade misinvoicing can be 
determined by two factors: firstly, the import underinvoicing, where importers intend 
to avoid tax and accordingly declare the value of goods as below the market or actual 
price; and secondly, the export overinvoicing, where exporters from trading partners’ 
countries intend to get exports subsidies from their governments. Another 
mechanism of the export overinvoicing is the intention to keep the proceeds of 
transactions away from their countries in an effort to avoid higher tax. These 
exporters can ask their trading partners to make a payment using a bank account in 
the trading partner’s country, or in another safe haven country (Baker et al., 2014). 
This estimation, as shown in Figure 9.2, uses the assumption that all the trade 
transactions used USD as the preferred currency. In the real case, however, export 
and import transactions may utilise the other currencies agreed upon between the 
parties involves. Hence, there is a possibility that this estimation contains 
discrepancies as a consequence of the use of USD as an assumption in the 
computation. 
Figure 9.3 Capital flight: 1985Q1–2015Q4 (millions USD) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS-IMF, DOTS-IMF and BIS 
The next step focuses on calculating capital flight with two methods: firstly, the 
residual method (KF); and, secondly, the adjusted capital flight (AdjKF). The residual 
method is a calculation involving the capital inflow component minus outflow. In order 
to obtain the adjusted capital flight, the result obtained from the residual method will 
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be added to the amount of trade misinvoicing. Figure 9.3 shows that the trend and 
patterns revealed by these two methods are relatively similar; in other words, if the 
concern is focused on exploring the motivation for capital outflows, both methods can 
be used. However, if the concern is to investigate the amount of capital flight, one 
should pay attention to the methods and results in order to garner more precise 
information, given that there is no method able to give adequate or precise figures 
for capital flight.  
A positive capital flight shows the movement of capital from the domestic financial 
market. The positive changes in outstanding external debt have a major effect on 
positive capital flight. The outstanding external debt figures are obtained from Bank 
for International Settlements’ data with regards to the international claims to the 
domestic institutions, which consists of direct borrowing and securities. In the capital 
flight framework, it should be noted that the predicted debt payment cannot be 
considered capital flight; therefore, the residual approach deducts all possible non-
flight sources (Boyce, 1990, p. 43).   
From Figure 9.3, in general, there are three phases differentiated in the observation 
period. The first phase is the period spanning the 1980s to the 1990s with positive 
capital flights. The positive capital flight during this period was mainly contributed by 
the change in debt or debt flows, where the change of this debt also determined the 
movement of capital flight. The opening of capital account liberalisation may be one 
of the causes and may explain the increasing debt flow during this period. With the 
removal of the restrictions to obtaining the funds from abroad, the private sector was 
achieving easy access to foreign funding. As a result, foreign borrowing was 
increased sharply; this also caused another consequence, whereby the value of loan 
withdrawal moved positively. However, by the end of the 1990s, the debt flows were 
taking a negative value. Starting from the third quarter of 1997, the change in debt 
was seen to be negative, meaning that the value of debt repayment was greater than 
its disbursement. There are few possible reasons that may emerge: Firstly, it could 
be the case that some borrowers did not disclose their actual outstanding debts to 
the authorities; secondly, the domestic agents faced difficulties in finding new 
sources of funds in the global financial market with acceptable costs. Referring to the 
value of capital flight during this period, it can be inferred that the above result can 
be used to represent the missing value of capital outflows, or at least, gives the idea 
of the behaviour of the capital outflows. 
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The second phase is 2000–2003, with negative signs of capital flight. During 2000–
2003, when the country was recovering from the crisis period, capital flight was seen 
to be negative. Based on the IMF’s Balance of Payments data, within this period, the 
current account was positive, leaving a negative capital account. Comparing the 
Balance of Payments figure with the result above, one may find that the contributors 
of the value of the capital flight are the debt flows and the misinvoicing, both of which 
have negative signs. The negative misinvoicing, in this case, is significantly 
determined by import underinvoicing and export overinvoicing. 
The third phase is 2004–2010, when the movement of capital flight is volatile as, for 
some periods of this phase, capital flight is positive, whilst for other periods, it is 
negative. It can be inferred that the situation of global financial condition amidst the 
GFC has an impact on the patterns of capital flight in Indonesia. The positive figure 
of capital flight in 2007/2008 portrays this impact. This figure means that the illicit 
capital flows went out from the domestic financial market.  
Finally, the period spanning 2011–2015 has positive signs, which shows the 
episodes of capital flight from the country. Focusing on the period of 2011–2015, the 
magnitude of flight is quite high when compared to the previous period. The 
movement of capital flight in this period is mostly positive. During 2011 up to 2012, 
capital flight is seen to be relatively high; however, in the following years, the volatility 
of capital flight was seen to be lower. It is suspected that some policies aimed at 
handling capital flows provide the impact to lessen capital flight. When the authority 
does not have sufficient tools to handle the movement of capital, the country’s 
economy could be in a dangerous situation. Hence, the regulations covering capital 
ownership and capital movement could be beneficial. 
9.06 Conclusion 
Capital account liberalisation permits the flow of capital from one country to another. 
Through the implementation of external financial liberalisation, the domestic 
economy has wider access to international financial markets. However, the 
movement of capital from the domestic financial market in the forms of capital outflow 
and negative inflow are usually extremely high during the crisis period. Moreover, the 
condition worsens when the data portraying these flows are not available.  
The objective of this chapter was to identify an alternative method to measuring 
unrecorded flow through the utilisation of the ‘capital flight’ formula. This chapter 
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contributes to the literature by exploring the method to calculate capital flight in the 
case of Indonesia whilst utilising the most current data series. In so doing, this study 
calculates the trade misinvoicing—one of the variables to be included in the 
calculation involving 150 trading partner countries’ monthly data over the period of 
1985–2015. 
Using residual and adjusted residual methods, this chapter provides the process 
applied when calculating capital flight. From the calculation of trade misinvoicing, the 
results suggest that there are motives of either exporters or importers to maximise 
their profits through direct involvement in the misinvoicing practice. In computing 
capital flight, this study finds that, during the period of the 1980s through to the 1990s, 
the flow of external debt or external debt changes dominantly determined the value 
of capital flight. It is suspected that the government’s decision to abolish the 
restrictions on the private sector to obtain external borrowing as part of external 
liberalisation contributes to this issue. When the crisis erupted in 1997, the capital 
flight figure moved to the negative area; this implies that there are more illicit inflows 
than illicit outflows. Starting from 2011, the movement of capital flight is recognised 
as positive. This development suggests that there are flows of funds out from the 
country. The declining capital flight in the following years is suspected as being one 
of the effects of the government’s policies in managing capital flow. However, this 
policy has a strong impact on the financial system if there are other additional 
regulations of capital ownership and capital movement. 
  
 192 
 
Chapter 10  
The effectiveness of monetary policies in managing the 
capital flows 
10.01 Introduction 
As previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, external liberalisation leads to the need 
for a greater awareness of the authorities and the way that they manage capital flows. 
In most developing countries, the problem mainly lies in the inability to deal with a 
sudden reversal of capital inflow, and the subsequent massive capital outflows. The 
obvious example of this phenomenon is the series of financial crises which occurred 
in some countries commencing the end of the 1990s onward. One of the regions that 
suffered from this phenomenon was the Southeast Asian countries. Since then, 
financial crisis that have been caused by sudden reversals of capital inflow and 
massive capital outflow has threatened almost all countries. As a result, advocates 
of capital mobility have received challenges and critiques from their opponents since 
the mobility of capital among countries was found to trigger the financial crisis.  
After experiencing a series of financial crises, the need to construct a strategy to 
mitigate the risks and to lessen the impact of financial crisis became increasingly 
more important (Grabel, 2005, p. 360). To respond to this necessity, Grabel (2005, 
p. 366) proposed some measures that arguably, could appropriately cope with the 
current problems. It is expected that developing countries will have the ability to deal 
with adverse conditions as various policy options become more available. There is 
also an alternative policy available that offers broader measure than just controlling 
capital mobility. This broader measure consists of capital management techniques. 
This refers to a combination of capital flow management and the implementation of 
prudential financial regulations (Epstein, 2009; Fritz and Prates, 2013), which have 
the purpose of promoting financial stability, selecting desirable financial flows, and 
enhancing the autonomy of economic policies (Epstein, 2009). However, there is an 
argument that questions the effectiveness of the implementation of the management 
of flows (Cardenas and Barrera, 1997; Concha et al., 2011; Clements and Kamil, 
2009).  
Departing from the debate on the effectiveness of capital flow management, this 
thesis has explored its implementation. Learning from the previous crisis of 
1997/1998 and several events that have potentially threatened the economy since, 
this thesis has endeavoured to examine the impact of capital flow management in 
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Indonesia, especially the strategy for preventing massive capital outflows and 
negative inflows. The focus of the analysis is on the policy options that are used by 
the authorities to deal with this problem, which consist of an exchange rate policy and 
the implementation of a minimum holding period. To the best of my knowledge, this 
study has been the first effort to explore the policy’s effectiveness in handling the 
surge of capital flows to Indonesia by employing the most up to date and to examine 
its impact on the foreign ownership of government bonds. 
The rest of this chapter will present a summary of the framework designed to handle 
the capital flows, the definition of capital flow management and the progress of its 
implementation. This section will be followed by a description of Indonesian capital 
flow management by exploring the policies that have been taken on by the 
authorities. The following sections will provide the data and methodology, while the 
last sections will discuss the empirical results, findings and conclusions. 
10.02 The frameworks to handle the capital flows 
Capital mobility between countries is possible because of the implementation of 
capital market liberalisation, which offers an attractive mechanism for developing 
countries to attain higher economic growth (Stiglitz et al., 2006; Coelho and 
Gallagher, 2013). The proponents of capital market liberalisation argue that the 
cross-border flows of capital enable developing economies to have a wider access 
to cheaper funds. This system also opens up the opportunity for all economic agents, 
both local and global market players, to become involved in financial market activities 
including buying and selling financial assets. In addition, it helps countries to increase 
the stability of their financial system by offering a diversified source of funds. 
However, the implementation of capital market liberalisation is not free of criticism. 
The capital flows to the developing countries are suspected to be a trigger for crisis 
episodes. It is argued that the behaviour of capital flows is pro-cyclical, which means 
that the funds will go to the countries when everything is fine and reverse to their 
origin when there is an economic downturn (Kaminsky et al., 2005; Stiglitz et al., 
2006). This phenomenon may create a sudden reversal of capital inflow. Focusing 
on this phenomenon, Epstein (2009) emphasised studies that found a close 
relationship between capital mobility and sudden reversals of capital inflows between 
1800 and 2008. The occurrence of a sudden reversal of capital inflows is possible, 
especially when portfolio investments dominate the composition of capital flows.  
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A country that has an open economy will have connections with the rest of the world, 
which allows for the country to be exposed to several risks. Grabel (2006, pp. 404-
408) explained the five typical risks that a country will be exposed to, which consists 
of currency risks, flight risks, fragility risks, contagion risks and sovereignty risks. The 
currency risk is the risk that is embedded in the domestic currency since it may 
depreciate sharply. The decline of domestic currency value is often worsened by 
conditions such as herding behaviour and inadequate international reserves. The 
second is flight risk, which is defined as the possibility of large amounts of liquid 
assets flowing out from the domestic financial market. This phenomenon commonly 
occurs in the financial markets of developing countries. The third is the fragility risk 
that shows the vulnerability of a country in coping with an adverse event. This risk 
corresponds to the country’s indebtedness, which is very sensitive to the movement 
of the interest and exchange rate. The fourth is the contagion risk that refers to the 
possibility of a country handling macroeconomic problems that originate from abroad. 
The fifth is the sovereignty risk that shows the constraints on the government in 
dealing with financial crisis. These risks sometimes are connected, and when these 
risks are realised simultaneously, the country’s condition becomes complicated.  
To deal with these risks, a country may exercise the instruments available to mitigate 
them. Based on the lessons learned from the previous crisis, there are several policy 
options that are relevant to current situations (Grabel, 2006, pp.403-419). The first 
proposal is a combination of ‘trip-wires’ and ‘speed-bumps’, which refers to the use 
of EWI and crisis prevention instruments. When the signal shows a potential problem, 
the authorities have to respond by prescribing the appropriate policies. However, a 
challenge may emerge due to the precision of the signal in measuring or predicting 
the crisis occurrence. The second proposal aims to manage capital flows through the 
imposition of a tax on each transaction to purchase securities in the domestic 
financial market. The third proposal tries to replicate the implementation of the 
Chilean unremunerated reserve requirements to stabilise the capital flows (Grabel, 
2003). The fourth is the management of foreign exchange by emphasising the 
importance of the restrictions on currency convertibility. A currency has full 
convertibility when it can be easily changed to another currency without considering 
the purpose of the exchange. To manage foreign exchange, the monetary authorities 
may impose a measure that allows for full convertibility for every transaction for a 
current account, but restricts the convertibility for transactions from a capital account. 
The purpose of this policy is to discourage financial market investors from purchasing 
or selling liquid assets freely. Hence, it may reduce the possibility of capital flight and 
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reduce the pressure or volatility on the domestic currency. In addition, by curbing the 
volatility of the exchange rate, the restrictions on currency convertibility is argued to 
increase the autonomy of the monetary authority (Coelho and Gallagher, 2013).  
In line with these proposals, Epstein et al. (2005, pp. 299–300) emphasised the term 
‘capital management techniques’ to describe the financial policies that deal with 
capital flows. This term refers to the implementation of two policies: capital controls 
and the prudential management of domestic financial institutions. Capital 
management techniques are argued to be instruments used to maintain the stability 
of the domestic financial market, to improve the types of financing, and to strengthen 
domestic policy autonomy. In addition, Kawai et al. (2012) emphasised the 
importance of regulatory measures to deal with or limit the volatility of capital flows. 
According to the authors, capital flow management covers the policies that manage 
the foreign ownership of short-term bonds (India), adopt the minimum holding period 
for the Central Bank (CB) certificates and set the maximum amount of foreign 
borrowing (Indonesia), implement the maximum amount of foreign exchange 
derivative transactions, restrict the use of foreign currency loans (Korea), and to 
impose on the withholding of tax on capital gain from foreign capital assets 
(Thailand). From these examples, most of the countries mentioned have considered 
the importance of policy design, especially when dealing with foreign investors. The 
effort not to discriminate against the foreign investors has become an important point 
to distinguish between capital control and prudential capital flow management (Kawai 
et al., 2012, p.43; Grabel, 2012, pp. 63–64). 
10.03 Capital flows management: definition and its implementation 
The term capital flows management is increasingly used as a substitute for the term 
‘capital control’. Kaltenbrunner (2016) explained that, historically, the term used to 
describe the policy to restrict capital mobility across the border evolved over time, 
from capital control through to capital account management, capital account 
regulations and most recently, to capital flows management. Capital control can be 
defined as policy restrictions, which are imposed on international transactions (Neely, 
1999); Kawai et al. (2012, pp. 42) defined capital flows management based on the 
IMF framework. In a broader perspective, according to the IMF (2011), capital flows 
management is the instrument that can be used by countries to mitigate risks in 
accordance with the problem of capital inflows. The IMF (2011) suggested that a 
country may implement capital flows management without making any discrimination 
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based on the investors’ residency. However, residency based measures can be 
adopted if the other policy options have been implemented or are not practicable to 
the country’s condition (IMF, 2011).  
The need to rebrand capital control to become a milder and more neutral policy 
instrument lies on the reason for the financial market investors’ reluctance, as capital 
control implementation suggests a potential cost and the negative response of 
international financial institutions (Grabel, 2016, p.182). Countries that open their 
economies to become integrated into the global financial market face problems due 
to the increase of short-term flows. This phenomenon is caused by the decisions of 
global investors who always try to maximise their profits by finding the most 
favourable financial market or the one that offers higher returns. Grabel (2016, p.199) 
underlined that the decision to adopt capital flows management is not only frequently 
considered by some developing countries but recently, several developed countries 
have been concerned to apply it. As time goes by, the success story of countries that 
have adopted this policy has attracted other countries to follow the strategy, which 
then may be adapted based on their specific condition. 
So far, there are only few countries that have adopted capital flows management or 
are using its earlier version, known as capital control. Before and during the 
Southeast Asian crisis erupted, examples of countries that restricted the flows of 
capital are Chile, Colombia, Malaysia and to some extent, Brazil. The outbreak of the 
Southeast Asian crisis became a milestone for countries to evaluate their policies 
that dealt with capital flows. However, the countries that have severely experienced 
financial crisis were under the IMF assistance, which always focused on the free-
market principle. As a consequence, the implementation of capital control was 
impossible when it came to being fully adopted by the crisis countries especially in 
the early 2000s. When the GFC occurred, there is a tendency for the increased 
mobility of capital to the developing countries, especially when the low-interest rate 
policy was implemented in developed countries. This phenomenon has led to the 
increasing concern of the ability of these emerging economies to cope with the 
potential problems of sudden reversals. One alternative strategy that has been 
considered by the authorities is carrying out capital flows management.  
Grabel (2016, pp. 187-189) discussed the reasons behind countries using capital 
flows management. Firstly, the policy is meant to strengthen the domestic financial 
system from external vulnerability. When a country faces good economic 
performance, this measure is important to prevent the adverse events that may occur 
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and surge the domestic market. One can find examples in the experience of Brazil. 
It is one of the countries that used capital control by imposing a tax on non-FDI inflows 
in 2009, which was then continued by broadening its coverage to include derivative 
transactions (Fritz and Prates, 2014; Grabel, 2016, p. 188–189). In the same period, 
some Latin American countries, namely Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru 
imposed policies to restrict capital flows. Secondly, authorities can use control on 
capital outflows to stop the financial system from collapsing. The countries that have 
applied this policy include Iceland in 2008 and Cyprus in 2013. However, the fine-
tuning mechanisms in the implementation of capital flows management can be found 
in several countries, especially when and where the authorities feel that the threat 
that comes from capital flows is in decline. The decision of the Brazilian government 
to reduce its tax on non–FDI inflows is one example of the fine-tuning mechanism. 
The management of capital flows leaves room for a discussion on the effectiveness 
of its implementation. Some studies that have focused on the implementation of 
capital control in the aftermath of the Southeast Asian crisis provided mixed findings. 
Edison and Reinhart (2000) studied the effectiveness of capital control in Malaysia 
and Thailand during the crisis period. These authors employed the monthly and daily 
data available to get an insight in to the impact of capital control on the 
macroeconomic indicators such as foreign exchange reserves and capital flows. 
Specifically, these authors also examined the effectiveness of capital control to curb 
the volatility of exchange rate. In their paper, Edison and Reinhart (2000) concluded 
that capital control is found to be ineffective for Thailand, but in the case of Malaysia, 
the implementation of capital control helped the government to shield its financial 
system from greater exchange rate volatility. Edwards and Rigobon (2005) evaluated 
the effectiveness of the implementation of capital control in Chile during the 1990s. 
The authors used high-frequency data ranging from January 1991 up until September 
1999. They found that the Chilean government’s policy to control the capital inflows 
was effective in reducing the impact of external shocks on the volatility of the 
exchange rate. Therefore, the implementation of capital control supports the Chilean 
financial system in maintaining its stability.  
Goldfajn and Minella (2007) explored the implementation of capital control in Brazil 
during 1974–2004. In this paper, the authors described the development of Brazilian 
macroeconomic management in that it showed a level of pervasive control during the 
1980s and moved to capital account liberalisation in the 1990s. However, the 
Brazilian authorities intended to implement capital control on capital inflows to 
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prevent the appreciating pressure on its currency (Edwards, 2007, p.10). Following 
the Southeast Asian crisis and Russian currency crisis, Brazil revoked its capital 
control policy and adopted an inflation targeting policy. The authors concluded that 
capital account liberalisation allowed for the domestic economy to have an improved 
economic fundamental.  
Recent papers have described the effectiveness of capital control in achieving a more 
stable financial market. Sigurgeirsdottir and Wade (2014) presented the 
government’s efforts to tackle the financial crisis that occurred in Iceland in 2008. 
This process involved a policy to control capital outflows, which can be considered 
as having effectively brought the country back from its crisis. The authors 
emphasised the significance of capital control as an instrument in preventing a small-
open economy from entering financial disaster. 
Coelho and Gallagher (2013) investigated the effectiveness of capital control in two 
countries –Thailand and Colombia – during the period 2007 to 2009. Based on their 
analysis, the authors concluded that Colombia and Thailand succeeded in 
implementing the URR. In examining some of the macro and financial market 
indicators, Coelho and Gallagher (2013) found that capital control can curb the 
movement of asset prices, especially in Colombia. However, in the case of Thailand, 
capital control could not achieve its objective. 
10.04 Capital flows management: the Indonesian case 
Before discussing the policy options that can be used to tackle volatile financial 
market conditions, there is one issue that should be considered when discussing the 
flows of capital. This issue pertains to the degree of capital mobility that a country 
has. The flow of funds between countries or regions is possible when a country opens 
its financial market and allows for financial transactions with the rest of the world. 
Based on its magnitude and frequency, capital mobility between countries has been 
increasing in the last 30 years. However, the exact amount of funds that come and 
go from these countries is difficult to measure (Edwards, 2004). To measure the 
degree of capital mobility, some economists (Leamer, 1988; Sach and Warner, 1995; 
Chinn and Ito, 2002; Edwards, 2004) have used the level of openness for capital 
flows. Chinn and Ito (2002) constructed an index of capital openness using the IMF’s 
classifications, as provided in its AREAER.  
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Figure 10.1 depicts the development of capital openness of Indonesia starting from 
1970. Based on the movement of this index, there are at least three different periods 
that reflect the government’s policies concerning the exchange rate regime, capital 
accounts and current account management. Chapter 2 described this chronological 
event, which will be summarised in the following explanations. The first stage covered 
the period 1970 to 1982 as being the earliest development of the financial system. At 
this stage, almost all of the relevant indicators for openness do not show Indonesia 
to be a fully open financial system. During this period, the government imposed a 
restriction on capital flows for concerned institutions and state-owned enterprises that 
were obtaining external borrowing. This policy was meant to maintain the level of 
indebtedness and to ensure their ability to service debt obligations in the future (Cole 
and Slade, 1996, p. 44).  
Figure 10.1 The Indonesian Capital Account Openness Index 
 
Source: Chinn and Ito (2013) 
The second period covered 1983 to 1996 when the financial liberalisation policy was 
implemented. In the middle of the 1980s, the government tried to encourage capital 
inflows in the form of FDI through selective deregulation. This was done to ease 
foreign companies into investing and operating in Indonesia, under domestic 
ownership requirements. At this point, foreign investors could not invest in the 
domestic stock market, and financial institutions were also prohibited from obtaining 
foreign borrowing. Subsequently, the financial reform package at the end of the 
1980s changed the banking sector policy, capital market, and the regulation of capital 
flows. The domestic financial market was opened to portfolio investments, and 
foreign investors were invited to invest in the equity market. The deregulation 
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package also covered permission for the state-owned enterprises and domestic 
companies to borrow from abroad. However, this policy created a problem as direct 
borrowing from the banking sector was mounting, creating a macroeconomic 
complication, and in particular, a high rate of inflation (Johnston et al., 1998) and an 
increasing amount of outstanding external debts. To respond to this problem, the 
government imposed a restriction on the banks’ short-term foreign exchange 
liabilities with up to a two-year maturity (Johnston et al., 1998).  
Following this period, when financial crisis hit the country in 1997 and 1998, there 
were massive capital outflows in the form of portfolio investments, as well as short-
term foreign debt. Efforts were taken by the authorities to gain international support 
and to maintain investors’ confidence in order to recover from the crisis. One idea 
under discussion was the proposal to implement capital controls following the 
success story of Malaysia in curbing the crisis impact. Many of the financial market 
players in Indonesia refused this proposal since the new mechanism might have 
impeded their business motives. As has been previously discussed, liberalisation in 
Indonesia had just come to its peak five years before the crisis outbreak and to adopt 
this proposal, one economist argued, was regressive and would endanger ‘…the 
country’s credibility of its overall commitment to open economic policies…’ 
(Soesastro, 1998, p. 317). Subsequently, this proposal was not followed through with, 
particularly when the financial market sent a signal of disagreement and the 
economic situation became worse with a further depreciation of the IDR and the 
decline of the stock market index (Soesastro, 1998, p.317). This event described how 
sensitive the financial market was to such issues, suggesting that the government 
should pay attention to formulate a policy more prudently. Another example on the 
imposition of capital control is in Thailand, in 2006 (Kawai et al., 2012, p. 42). By the 
end of 2006, Thailand imposed a URR on equity and short-term investments that had 
maturities within a year. However, in a day, this regulation was revoked, especially 
for the equity flows, following the sharp decline of the stock index. This decision 
became a good example of how hard it is to implement capital controls smoothly in a 
time of instability or crisis, since it may trigger a worsening economic situation. It can 
be inferred that during a period of instability, the adoption of a new policy may create 
an uncertain situation where investors lose confidence and so, are reluctant to 
continue to invest. The policy might have been more accepted if it had been adopted 
in a normal situation and is well-communicated with sufficient dissemination of the 
mechanisms involved.  
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The crisis also forced a step forward for the Indonesian monetary authority’s 
management of domestic currency. Starting from the early 1970s, the policy of 
allowing the IDR to be freely convertible in global transactions covered the 
mechanism of IDR internationalisation. The IDR internationalisation meant that the 
authorities permitted the use of IDR in the global market for export and import 
activities, investment and in financial market operations (Sarwono, 2005, p. 171). 
According to Sarwono (2005), the domestic speculators mostly replicated the non-
residents decisions in exchange rate trading. Whilst the activity of domestic traders 
could be managed and monitored by the Central Bank, the trading activity of the non-
residents in the global financial market was beyond the Central Bank’s remit. Based 
on the Central Bank’s analysis, the internationalisation of the IDR had an adverse 
impact on making the IDR more volatile. Considering this problem, in 2001, the 
Central Bank decided to restrict transactions of IDR in the global financial market that 
were conducted by non-residents.  
Responding to the GFC, the Indonesian authorities announced a series of policies 
aimed at stabilising the domestic financial market. These policies focused on 
stabilising the exchange rate and managing the short-term flow of funds, for example, 
the regulations on the minimum holding period for CB certificates (IMF, 2012) and 
the regulation on the ceiling of foreign borrowing. 
Learning from the period of 2008 to 2009 when the volatility of capital flows was 
higher than in the previous period, the authorities prescribed policies to address the 
increasing foreign capital inflows and anticipating capital outflows. Two policies for 
capital flow management in Indonesia were exchange rate management and the CB 
certificates’ minimum holding period. These two policies aimed to stabilise or to 
reduce the volatility of the domestic currency against foreign currencies, particularly 
USD. The monetary authority had an administrative scheme established that was 
designed to restrain the short-term influence of these flows, which were very volatile, 
by containing their scale and influencing their composition.  
With regards to the first policy option, the monetary authority had an alternative policy 
for curbing the volatility of the exchange rate. Firstly, the Central Bank announced 
that the maximum amount of banking sector foreign borrowing was limited to 30% of 
its capital. The regulation that was enacted in 2011 had already been introduced in 
2005, but in 2008 it was revoked by the Central Bank on the eve of GFC that then 
triggered the massive negative inflows, and the domestic financial market then 
needed a source of financing (Bank Indonesia, 2011). Consequently, when the global 
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financial market recovered as well as the level of capital inflows, the Central Bank 
needed to reinstate the 2005 regulation in order to maintain the macro-prudential 
practice. The main aim of this regulation was to encourage the banking sector to 
obtain long-term foreign financing rather than short-term foreign financing. Secondly, 
the government applied the currency inconvertibility measure by restricting the use 
of foreign currencies in domestic market transactions and imposed a policy to 
incentivize exporters to convert their export proceeds into the domestic currency. 
The regulation of the minimum holding periods had been enacted in 2010 to 
anticipate and prevent the massive reversal of capital flows (Grabel, 2012, p. 61; 
Sarwono, 2014). In its implementation, the Central Bank tried to refine this policy 
based on the current developments in the global financial market condition. In other 
words, this fine-tuned mechanism should reflect both domestic needs and the global 
financial system’s condition. As an example, when the global financial system 
signalled an increasing flow of capital to the domestic market, the Central Bank’s 
measure was expected to lengthen the ownership and transaction period of the CB 
certificates. It is argued that in order to strengthen the domestic financial market, the 
CB certificates should have a longer minimum holding periods to minimise the 
transacted securities in the secondary market. Table 10.1 illustrates several 
amendments to the minimum holding period. 
Table 10.1 The adjustment of the minimum holding period 
Date Measure 
1. June 16, 2010 Imposition of the 1-month minimum holding 
period on the ownership of CB Certificates  
2. May 9, 2011 Imposition of the 6-month minimum holding 
period on the ownership of CB Certificates 
3. September 10, 2013 Imposition of the 1-month minimum holding 
period on the ownership of CB Certificates 
4. October 26,2015 Imposition of the 1-week minimum holding 
period on the ownership of CB Certificates 
Source: Own construction  
10.05 Data and methodology 
The signal of instability in the global financial market appeared from the second 
quarter of 2006 onwards, when U.S. economic indicators, such as the employment 
rate and the economic growth rate, were below the previous year’s rate. From this 
time forward, there was a growing concern within the U.S. economy and about the 
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way that the U.S. authorities responded to this condition, leading to uncertainty in the 
global financial market. The big question among financial market investors was 
whether there would be a significant change (increase) in the Federal Reserve 
reference rate within this period (Hollo et al., 2012). Subsequently, the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis occurred, which then followed by the crisis on the European 
continent. The crises then may have triggered adverse effects in the other financial 
systems. As a small open economy, Indonesia also faced a problematic period in 
handling and maintaining the stability of its macroeconomic indicators. Some policies 
were enacted to prevent the country from experiencing difficulties. In this case, the 
authorities focused on calming down the volatility of the exchange rate, and in relation 
to the financial market, it tried to maintain the stability of the equity and bond markets.  
Previous studies (Clements and Kamil, 2009; Concha et al., 2011; Coelho and 
Gallagher, 2013) have expressed concerns over the effectiveness of macro-policies 
by assessing the implementation of the monetary policies designed to achieve capital 
control. In their paper, Clements and Kamil (2009) examined the effectiveness of 
capital controls, their impact on capital flows and the volatility of the exchange rate 
using Colombia as a case study. Coelho and Gallagher (2013) assessed the 
effectiveness of capital controls in managing the excessive inflows of capital, 
minimising the inflows of short-term financial assets, stabilising the volatility of the 
exchange rate, and increasing monetary autonomy. They used Colombia and 
Thailand as the focus of the study.  
To examine the effectiveness of macro-policies in coping with capital flows 
management, this study will use the Indonesian financial market and macroeconomic 
data starting from the early 2000’s up to 2015. The choice of monthly data lies on the 
need to capture the movement of financial market data in more detail, especially 
concerning volatility and the response to the imposition of the policy. It is argued that 
high-frequency data such as monthly, weekly, and daily data has the ability to capture 
and explain the heterogeneity of the observation much better than low-frequency 
ones. This is possible since higher frequency data can be collected without or with a 
minimum level of aggregation. To represent the financial system, this study has 
observed the implementation of two monetary policies on the movement of the 
exchange rate. 
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10.05.1 The effectiveness of capital flows management: the evidence from 
the asset prices 
As pointed out by Levine (1997), the objective of implementing capital flows 
management policies is to help the domestic capital market reduce the potential of 
an assets bubble. Coelho and Gallagher (2013) examined the effectiveness of 
monetary policies on the movement of asset prices. Following the authors, this study 
has investigated the effectiveness of monetary policies in dealing with the volatility of 
asset prices. This chapter argues that the policies used in managing capital flows has 
an impact on curbing the volatility of asset prices. The following function describes 
the relationship of the variables of interest: 
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠) 
where stock index volatility (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘) will represent the asset price volatility. This 
empirical chapter will examine the impact of the changes in the regional index 
(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) that is represented by the natural logarithms of the FTSE Asia Pacific, 
excluding Japan, on the volatility of stock market. The positive estimate shows that 
the regional index has contributed to the increase in the domestic index’s fluctuation. 
Besides the regional index, two additional macro-indicators, namely inflation 
(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) and growth (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ), will also be employed. The higher inflation rate is 
argued to have given rise to future uncertainty, which can affect the investors’ 
decisions to invest their money in the domestic financial market. When the rate of 
inflation has been persistently increasing over time, the real value of money will 
decrease. Hence, the positive coefficient of the estimate shows that the inflation rate 
affects the increasing stock index’s volatility. Economic growth is a variable that 
measures the economic activity in a country and can show the overall performance 
of the economy. Increasing growth will motivate investors to invest in the country. 
The positive coefficient estimate will affect the volatility of the asset prices. In this 
model, there are two policies involved; the implementation of a restriction on the 
foreign currency debt ceiling (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) and the minimum holding period 
(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) of the CB certificate. It is expected that these two policies will 
provide a negative effect on the dependent variable, which means that the policies 
will have an impact when it comes to reducing the volatility. In so doing, this study 
will estimate using the following model: 
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ = 𝛿଴ + 𝛿ଵ𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥௧ + 𝛿ଶ𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௧ + 𝛿ଷ𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௧ + 𝛿ସ𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛿ହ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿଺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿଻𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀௧ 
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The dummy of the date of the announcements (𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) have been introduced in this model. It is expected that there will 
be a slowing down of the volatility of the stock index in response to the 
announcements. 
The variables of interest in this model consist of: 
- The asset prices will be represented by the volatility of the stock index returns 
(𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘). This variable has been calculated by using the standard deviation of 
the natural logarithm of the IDX.  
- The index for the regional stock market (𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥), which is the natural 
logarithm of the FTSE Asia Pacific, excluding Japan. There is one issue of 
endogeneity if this study uses FTSE Asia Pacific since the regional index that 
is involved in the model ideally excludes the observed country. Coelho and 
Gallagher (2013) suggested that endogeneity can be ignored considering that 
the domestic market capitalization and size of the stock market is quite small 
compared to the total size of the Asian market. 
- The inflation rate (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) has been measured by the monthly percentage 
change in the consumer price index. The increasing rate of inflation may 
dampen the investment decisions. Therefore, the positive coefficient estimate 
means that this variable has an impact on the increasing stock index volatility. 
- This study has employed a monthly index of industrial production to represent 
the growth rate (𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ). In this case, the variable growth has been measured 
by using a 12-month percentage change. The increasing growth is argued to 
have a positive impact on investment decisions; therefore, the negative 
coefficient estimate means that this variable will lessen the stock index 
volatility. 
- The announcement (𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 and 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) was the date 
when the policies were introduced. The first policy is the minimum holding 
period of the CB certificate. The authority introduced this policy in June 2010, 
followed by several fine-tuning policies as described in the previous section. 
The second policy is the exchange rate policy on the banking sector’s 
maximum foreign borrowing that was introduced in June 2005, and was 
revoked in October 2008. This policy was reinstated in January 2011. It is 
expected that there was a negative effect on the stock index on the date of the 
policy announcements. 
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10.05.2 The effectiveness of capital flows management: the evidence from 
the exchange rate movements 
One of the objectives of the adoption of capital flows management is reducing the 
volatility of the exchange rate and curbing the currency from further appreciation or 
depreciation (Coelho and Gallagher, 2013). The hypothesis of this empirical 
examination is that the policies in managing capital flows have an impact on curbing 
the volatility of the exchange rate. By managing the policy rate at a favourable level, 
the monetary authority is expected to be able to maintain the exchange rate level. 
Clements and Kamil (2009) and Coelho and Gallagher (2013) used an econometric 
technique called the generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model, which allows for the estimation of the volatility of high-frequency 
data. Cardenas and Barrera (1997) used the ordinary least square (OLS) to examine 
the impact of capital controls on financial assets, while Concha et al., (2011) 
employed the error correction and GARCH models to analyse the effectiveness of 
capital controls on capital flows, and the volatility of exchange rate. 
This study has examined the effectiveness of the aforementioned policies to handle 
the capital flows based on the above objective. Following Coelho and Gallagher 
(2013), the volatility of exchange rate can be determined by several macro indicators. 
The independent variables that are being tested consist of the interest rate differential 
(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒), country rating (𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔), commodity price (𝑤𝑡𝑖), and the policies associated 
with the management of capital flows. The interest rate differential (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) is a 
variable that can portray the direction in which financial market the money will go. 
When a developing country has a higher interest rate than other developed countries, 
with all other things being equal, the investors will tend to invest their money in the 
developing country. The increasing inflows of capital will affect the appreciation of 
domestic currency. A variable that can be used to represent the investors’ view on a 
financial market is country rating (𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔). The improvement of the country rating 
variable can provide a guide for the financial market investors in deciding where to 
invest. The improvement of the rating is associated with the potential of the exchange 
rate appreciation. As suggested by Clements and Kamil (2009) and Coelho and 
Gallagher (2013), the price of a certain commodity that dominates a country’s 
international trade can be used to represent the commodity price (𝑤𝑡𝑖). Based on the 
historical data, the commodity that represents the highest proportion of Indonesian 
international trade is oil. Over the last five years, the portion of imported oil has 
reached 22% on average. Meanwhile, the export of oil has been recorded to reach 
 207 
 
19% on average. Two policies involved in tackling the capital flows will be examined, 
which are the minimum holding period (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) and maximum foreign 
borrowing (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡). It is expected that these two policies can curb the 
volatility of the exchange rate. To analyse the effectiveness of the monetary policies 
on the dependent variable, this will be studied by estimating using the following 
model: 
𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧ = 𝛿଴ + 𝛿ଵ𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧ + 𝛿ଶ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௧ + 𝛿ଷ𝑤𝑡𝑖௧ + 𝛿ସ𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛿ହ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿଺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿଻𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀௧ 
The dummy of the date of the announcements have been included in this model. It is 
expected that there was a slowing down of the appreciation of the domestic currency 
in response to the announcements.  
This model involves the following indicators: 
- The volatility of the exchange rate (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧) has been calculated from the 
standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate 
(IDR/USD). 
- The interest rate spread (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧) has been calculated by subtracting the 
domestic interest rate with the U.S. interest rates. This study has used the first 
difference (period to period change) of interest rate spread. Thus, the changes 
in the interest rate differential affects the increasing fluctuations of the exchange 
rate. 
- The country rating is used to represent the expectations of the investors; when 
its change is positive, it is expected that the domestic currency will experience 
an appreciation. The positive coefficient estimate means that this variable has 
given rise to exchange rate volatility. 
- This study will also examine the association of commodity price movements with 
the exchange rate. This study has utilised the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
price (𝑤𝑡𝑖௧) as the proxy for the commodity price. The changes in the monthly 
WTI quotation will be used in the analysis. The positive coefficient estimate has 
contributed to the increasing volatility. 
- The capital management policies (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) have 
been represented by the dummy variables on the date that the foreign exchange 
debt ceiling and minimum holding period came into effect. This date is June 2005 
until October 2008, and January 28, 2011 up until the present, which is when the 
Central Bank introduced the regulations to set the ceiling for foreign borrowing. 
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Meanwhile, for the minimum holding period that started from June 2010, the 
dummy variables will take the value of 1 when the policies are implemented, and 
zero otherwise. 
10.06 Results 
10.06.1 The evidence from asset prices 
The regression in order to examine the impact of the government policies in dealing 
with capital flows on the asset prices will involve the policies of the minimum holding 
period and the exchange rate policy on the banking sector’s maximum level of foreign 
borrowing. This analysis will involve several variables of interest that consist of three 
macro-indicators and two dummy variables to represent the government policies. 
Each variable has 192 observations. The process of estimation will use an OLS since 
it offers a relatively simple analysis but could provide a good result as long as the 
assumptions are fulfilled. The first step in doing this method is to test whether all of 
the variables involved are stationary, to avoid spurious regression when any errors 
are correlated. In doing this step, this study uses the ADF unit root test. ADF is one 
of the methods that can be used to test for a unit root in a time series data set. In 
interpreting the result, when a tested variable has a negative value in the computed 
t-statistic that is lower than the critical value, this variable will be less likely to have a 
unit root. In this analysis, all of the variables of interest are stationary. The summary 
statistics and results of the unit root test has been provided in Appendix E.I.  
The first step in estimating the model using the OLS method is done by conducting a 
diagnostic test to ensure that the assumptions of the linear regression have not been 
violated. This study has performed several diagnostic tests, such as multi-collinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation tests. This study does not carry out the 
normality test, since the sample size is large enough, covering more than 100 
observations. With such a large amount of data, the assumption of normality will not 
create a major problem (Pallant, 2007, pp. 179-200; Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012).  
In this estimation, it seems that the proposed model does not face any issues with 
the multi-collinearity problem. The diagnostic test of multi-collinearity shows that the 
values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) are very low, as provided in Appendix E.I. A 
problem may arise in the estimation when the assumption of no serial correlation is 
not solved properly. In the present serial correlation, the coefficient estimate is not 
efficient, and its standard error may be inaccurate (Brooks, 2014, p.199). However, 
based on the diagnostic test, there is evidence of serial correlation. The output of the 
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serial correlation LM test shows that the probability of F (2,181) is 0.000, which is 
below the p-value of 0.05. The LM test has a value of 148.5, which is above the 
critical value (2 =5.99). It can be therefore inferred that this model shows the present 
of serial correlation. 
 
Another problem that can be detected is the heteroscedasticity, which may have an 
impact on standard bias errors. Referring to the output of the White test for detecting 
heteroscedasticity, the value of the Lagrange Multiplier (Obs*R-squared=21.19) 
exceeds the critical Chi-squared (2 =14.07) with the p-values being below 0.05. In 
addition, the probability of the F-statistics is also below 0.05. From these two tests, 
the model suggests the presence of heteroscedasticity. The violation of the 
homoscedasticity assumption may lead to a misleading conclusion, since the 
standard errors are biased (Brooks, 2014, 185). 
 
To deal with this problem, this study has used the robust variance estimator to control 
for the presence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity30. 
Based on the regression results as provided in Table 10.2, after controlling for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the model shows that the regional index has 
a negative but insignificant coefficient estimate. Several variables that have positive 
and statistically significant coefficient estimates are growth with a 10% level of 
significance, dummy holding with a 5% level of significance, and dummy restricting 
with a 1% level of significance. In this model, the policies to manage capital flows 
(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) provide negative signs to show the 
independence of the domestic stock market from the regional one, and the ability of 
the policies to cool down the rising domestic index. The negative signs of these two 
policy areas may curb the volatility of the index. 
                                                
30 In doing this estimation, the analysis uses statistical software Eviews9. The robust standard error is 
estimated by the Heteroscedasticity-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC). 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 316.7592     Prob. F(2,181) 0.00
Obs*R-squared 148.5565     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.00
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 3.263035     Prob. F(7,183) 0.0027
Obs*R-squared 21.19438     Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.0035
Scaled explained SS 14.57289     Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.0419
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Table 10.2 Asset prices – OLS regression (robust standard errors) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; 
while,† is significance at 20% level 
The other aspect of the regression results is the announcement of the policies that 
are represented by the variables - 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 - regarding the exchange rate 
policy - and 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 - regarding the minimum holding period. The results 
above depict the failure of these two variables to have a 10% level of significance.  
10.06.2 The evidence from the exchange rate movements  
This section will examine the impact of the government policies on curbing the 
volatility of the exchange rate. As discussed in section 10.05.02, three 
macroeconomic variables and two dummy variables have been used to represent the 
government policies, and have become the independent variables in this model. For 
each concerned variable, the data range is from January 2000 to December 2015, 
which covers 192 observations. Based on the results of the unit root test, all of the 
variables of interest show an ability to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. This 
result suggests that these variables are stationary. The summary statistics of the 
variables involved in this model and the results of the unit root test have been 
provided in Appendix E.II.  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
regindex -0.0189 0.009
inflation -0.141 0.026 †
growth -0.066 0.080 *
dummy_holding -0.006 0.039 **
announce_holding -0.0243 0.008
dummy_restrict 0.008 0.006 ***
announce_restrict -0.021 0.018
constant 0.117 0.005 ***
R-squared 0.493
Adjusted R-squared 0.474
S.E. of regression 0.020
Sum squared resid 0.073
No.of obs. 192
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This analysis also performs the diagnostic tests to ensure that the assumptions of 
the linear regression are not violated. This study also tries to examine the presence 
of some of the potential problems regarding the OLS, for example, multicollinearity, 
serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity. This study does not perform the normality 
test since the sample size is large enough and covers 192 observations.  
To detect the potential problem of multicollinearity, this study runs the value of the 
VIF, and its output has been provided in Appendix E.II. Considering that these 
variables of interests have values of VIF that is less than 3, it seems that there is no 
problem of multicollinearity. After checking the multicollinearity, the next diagnostic 
test is the problem of serial correlation. The diagnosis of serial correlation problems 
has been conducted using the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test. 
 
The output of this test shows that the probability of F(2,183) is 0.000, which is below 
the p-value of 0.05. Furthermore, the output of the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test is 
170.5 with a probability of Chi-square equals 0.000. Since the value of the LM test is 
above the critical Chi-squared (2 =5.99) and the associated p-values are below 0.05, 
it can be inferred that the model rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. In 
conducting the test to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity, this study employs 
the heteroscedasticity White test.  
 
Based on the White test for detecting heteroscedasticity, the output of the Lagrange 
Multiplier (Obs*R-squared=65.307) exceeds the critical Chi-squared (2 =14.07) with 
the p-values being below 0.05. This output suggests that the model cannot reject the 
assumption of no homoscedasticity. To control for the presence of heteroscedasticity, 
this study performs the robust standard error to estimate the second model.         
Table 10.3 provides the regression results with robust standard errors. From seven 
variables of interests, only two of them - namely the policy of minimum holding period 
(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) and the announcement of maximum foreign borrowing 
(𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) - are significant at 20% level. In this analysis, the policy of 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 721.916     Prob. F(2,182) 0.000
Obs*R-squared 170.507     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.000
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 13.550     Prob. F(7,184) 0.000
Obs*R-squared 65.307     Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.000
Scaled explained SS 89.383     Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.000
 212 
 
establishing a ceiling on foreign borrowing (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡) together with the 
announcement of the minimum holding period (𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) are both 
significant at 1% and have a negative coefficient of estimate. It can be inferred that 
on the day, with these policies being effective, they can have an impact on lessening 
the volatility of the exchange rate and/or curb the increasing volatility.  
Table 10.3 Exchange rate - OLS regression (robust standard errors) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note:  - ***, **, * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
while,† is significance at 20% level 
Recalling the results of the estimations of the first model, it seems that the policy of 
the minimum holding period (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) has a low level of significance when 
it is included in the second model. In other words, this variable - even though it is 
economically and statistically significant - its effect on the dependent variable is weak. 
This phenomenon can explain that the policy of the implementation of the minimum 
holding period does not have a strong impact on the dependent variable. It is 
suspected that there is a chance for financial market investors to avoid this regulation 
and to make use of another financial instrument. The following sub-section will 
explore this further.    
10.06.3 Shifting to another risk-free instrument 
It is a common practice for investors to try to find another instrument to invest in that 
offers good returns with low risks. In Indonesia, the monetary authority has a money 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
intrate 0.003 0.007
rating 0.200 0.189
wti -0.0002 0.0002
dummy_holding -0.009 0.007 †
announce_holding -0.032 0.011 ***
dummy_restrict -0.032 0.009 ***
announce_restrict -0.004 0.003 †
Constant 0.068 0.009 ***
R-squared 0.330
Adjusted R-squared 0.305
S.E. of regression 0.028
Sum squared resid 0.145
No. observation 192
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market instrument, the CB Certificate, which aims at enabling better monetary 
policies and liquidity management. Individuals and institutional investors use and 
purchase this instrument to place their funds since it provides interest, and is 
considered to be a risk-free instrument. Other than the CB Certificates, there are 
other financial instruments that are issued by the government and that are also 
considered risk-free financial instruments. Even though the characteristics of each 
instrument are different, these two types of instrument - namely CB certificates and 
Treasury bills or Treasury bonds - represent the two choices of instrument used by 
investors to invest their funds in Indonesia. When the Central Bank adopted the policy 
of a minimum holding period for CB certificates, this policy put an additional 
conditionality on the investor's side that made the instrument less favourable than the 
others. Faced with this kind of situation, it is suspected that investors will shift their 
preferences to another risk-free instrument, which is government bonds. 
To examine this phenomenon, this study has explored the movement of foreign 
investors’ ownership in government bonds. In order to examine the issue, this section 
will involve several financial market variables, namely yield spread (𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑), 
rating (𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔), EMBI (𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖) and the policy to impose the minimum holding period 
(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔). The following function describes the relationship of the variables 
of interest: 
𝑓𝑜𝑟_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑, 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖, 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦) 
Foreign investors became the focus of the analysis since it is easy for them to pull 
out their funds and move them to the other places. In addition to this, the activities 
and decisions of foreign investors may have shaped the behaviour of domestic 
investors in the financial market. Hence, by focusing on the movement of foreign 
investors, it is expected that this study can obtain an understanding of the 
characteristics of the investors. In so doing, this section will investigate the 
association between the capital management policies and the decisions of foreign 
investors. The foreign investors’ decisions will be represented by the movement in 
relation to the foreign ownership of tradable government bonds (𝑓𝑜𝑟_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝). The 
intention of foreign investors to invest in the domestic bond market is determined by 
the expected gain or returns that they will get. The spread (𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑) between the 
developed countries yield and the domestic bonds’ yield may guide foreign investors. 
In addition to this variable, the country rating (𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) will represent the investors’ 
preference to invest their money. In common cases, the better the rating, the more 
money will go into the domestic financial market. The Emerging Market Bond Index 
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(𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖) is one variable that may guide the investors to compare their portfolios. 
Increasing the EMBI spread indicates a problem in the domestic financial market that 
can push the investors to sell their financial assets, leading to the decline of foreign 
ownership. These variables will be analysed together using the following equation: 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝௧ = 𝛿଴ + 𝛿ଵ𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧ + 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଶ𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖௧ + 𝛿ଷ𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧ + 𝜀௧ 
The variables of interest in this model consist of: 
- Foreign ownership (𝑓𝑜𝑟_𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝௧) is the monthly ratio of government bonds 
held by non-residents to the total outstanding of government bonds (in the first 
difference). 
- The bond’s yield spread (𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧) is calculated from the difference 
between the Indonesian government bond and the U.S. government bonds with 
a similar maturity. It is expected that widening the spread will attract more 
investors.  
- The sovereign rating (𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) is expected to represent the investors’ 
preference in investing their funds in the domestic stock market. The rating 
ranges from 0–100; 0 is the lowest and the riskiest place to invest. The 
increasing sovereign rating gives a sign towards an improvement in country’s 
condition.  
- The emerging market bond index, which is the JP Morgan EMBI (𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖௧) global 
spread for Indonesia, is used in the form of its period to period changes. The 
monthly data of the EMBI represents the expectations of the investors; when 
its change is positive, it is expected that the foreign ownership of government 
bonds will decline.  
- In this model, there will be one policy involved, which is the minimum holding 
period (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) of the CB certificates. 
There are five variables, which consist of 150 observations each. The number of 
observations is consistent with the range of the analysis, from July 2003 up to 
December 2015. The variable that has the highest standard of deviation is the EMBI 
spread, which suggests that EMBI has data that is widely spread and dispersed. All 
of the variables that have been included in the model have been checked by the unit 
root test to observe the existence of the unit root. The ADF test has been carried out 
to examine the variables. The results show that all of the variables can reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root. These results suggest that all of the variables are therefore 
 215 
 
stationary. The summary statistics of the variables involved in this model and the 
result of the unit root test have been provided in Appendix E.III.  
This analysis also investigates the potential problems that may arise in the estimation 
by performing diagnostic tests. The first diagnostic test is to check whether there is a 
potential problem of multicollinearity. In this case, all variables of interest have a lower 
value of VIF (all VIF values are below 2). The result of the multicollinearity diagnostic 
test is provided in Appendix E.III. 
Also, the test for serial correlation using the Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation test 
shows that the output of the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test is 1.072 is lower than the 
Chi-square critical value (2=5.99), suggesting the rejection of serial correlation. 
 
After examining the potential problem of multicollinearity and serial correlation, it is 
also necessary to check the existence of heteroscedasticity by conducting the White 
heteroscedasticity test. The output of the test shows evidence that there is a problem 
of heteroscedasticity when the model cannot reject the null hypothesis. Based on the 
result, the F–statistic and Chi–square have p–values lower than 0.05. 
 
To deal with this problem, the regression has been done by running robust standard 
error estimates. Table 10.4 shows the result that all of the variables are statistically 
significant. The country rating as the independent variable has a positive coefficient 
estimate and is significant at 10%. The positive association between rating and 
foreign ownership explains that foreign investors will consider the country’s 
performance and situation before making the decision to invest. In the case of EMBI 
spread, the coefficient estimate is negative and significant at 10% level. This negative 
sign suggests that increasing the EMBI spread has an association with the decline of 
foreign ownership. In other words, the widening spread will have an impact on the 
decision of foreign investors to pull their money out of Indonesia.  
The effect of the variable 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 on foreign ownership is economically and 
statistically significant. The positive coefficient estimate implies that this policy gave 
rise to the foreign investors’ ownership of government bonds. This finding supports 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 0.51478     Prob. F(2,142) 0.5987
Obs*R-squared 1.07253     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.5849
Heteroskedasticity Test: White
F-statistic 4.95062     Prob. F(4,144) 0.0009
Obs*R-squared 18.013     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.0012
Scaled explained SS58.5591     Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0
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this chapter’s argument that foreign investors take advantage to make placements 
using another risk–free financial instrument, which is government bonds. In other 
words, the increasing amount of foreign ownership on government bonds is the result 
of the implementation of the minimum holding period on the CB certificates. When 
the Central Bank imposed this policy, there was no such restriction that was applied 
to government bond ownership. This finding shows the potential of the coordination 
loophole between the government and the Central Bank that affects such policies to 
make them become less effective.  
Table 10.4 Foreign ownership – OLS regression (robust standard errors) 
  
Source: Own calculations 
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistically significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
The numbers in brackets are the robust standard error. 
       
The second variable is the yield spread that has a negative coefficient of estimate, 
and it is statistically significant at 5% level. There are two perspectives when 
interpreting this result. On the one hand, one may directly conclude that the widening 
spread between the domestic and foreign spread will not attract foreign investors. 
This view is supported by the results of the estimation as shown above.  
On the other hand, there is another explanation for this issue. At first, one needs to 
investigate the structure and development of bonds’ yield spread. There are two 
variables involved in the determination of the yield spread; the domestic securities’ 
yield and the foreign one. The improvement in the domestic financial market and 
yieldspread -2.1031 **
[0.986]
rating (t-1) 1.9959
*
[1.198]
embi -0.0405 *
[0.0238]
dummy_holding 4.9440 ***
[1.383]
C 1.4279 **
[0.619]
R-squared 0.2098
Adjusted R-squared 0.1879
S.E. of regression 7.43
No. obs 149
Variable Coefficient
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economic and political stability could reduce the domestic securities’ yield. Even 
though the yield spread tends to be narrow, the investors’ appetite is maintained 
since they feel comfortable in making an investment. For example, when the 
domestic financial market provides a good investment environment, subsequently 
investors will be keen to invest in the market. Figure 10.2 displays this phenomenon. 
In 2004, the yield spread was around 8% and reached around 5% in 2015. The 
change in the yield spread suggests that over 11 years, the trend of the yield was 
negative or declining. However, looking at the development of foreign ownership, this 
variable persistently increased and reached its highest point in 2015. Therefore, the 
negative value of the coefficient estimates of the yield spread does not mean that the 
Indonesian government bonds became less attractive. 
Figure 10.2 Yield spread and foreign ownership 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: the dotted line is the trend line of yield spread 
The foreign ratio is the ratio of foreign ownership over the total tradable 
government bonds  
10.07 Conclusion  
The vulnerability of experiencing crisis episodes brings up concerns for developing 
countries and their financial markets, particularly in coping with capital outflows. After 
a series of financial crisis occurrences, there is a need to construct a strategy to 
mitigate the risks and to lessen the impact of financial crisis. One available option is 
the implementation of capital controls or capital flows management.  
This empirical chapter provides a contribution to the literature by examining the 
association between the policies in handling capital flows, its impact on the exchange 
rate and stock market volatility. This study is the first to examine the implementation 
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of these policies and to link their impact on other variables in the capital market. In 
this case, the foreign ownership of government bonds. 
This chapter has tried to examine the effectiveness of capital flows management in 
Indonesia, especially the strategy to manage the capital inflows, preventing massive 
capital outflows. There are several findings in relation to this analysis. First, during 
these periods, Indonesia implemented a mixture of policies to manage the capital 
flows. These policies are exchange rate management and the implementation of a 
minimum holding period. Based on the empirical analysis, this study finds that the 
implementation of these policies to some extent is effective in handling the capital 
flows. However, the effect of the policy to impose minimum holding period to curb the 
volatility of exchange rate is not too strong. This statement leads to the second 
finding, which shows the positive and significant coefficient estimate of the variable 
of the minimum holding period in association with foreign government bonds. This 
finding implies that foreign investors shift their investments from CB certificates, 
which become the subject of the minimum holding period regulations on government 
bonds, which have no such restrictions. This finding also presents the potential of a 
coordination loophole between the government and the Central Bank that makes the 
policy become less effective.    
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Chapter 11  
The application of the compensation thesis 
11.01 Introduction 
In the context of a closed economy, when a commercial bank grants credit to firms 
or households as borrowers, these customers will be in debt to the bank which here 
acts as the lender. From the borrower’s perspective, possessing a loan requires that 
they pay the debt obligations regularly since they have signed the contract. In some 
cases, the borrowers find that the loan creates a burden. Hence, when borrowers 
have excess money, they will try to reduce their outstanding loan obligations or place 
this excess in a financial instrument with an expectation of obtaining capital gain. This 
mechanism does not only apply to the relationship between the private sector or 
households and the commercial banks, but also can be found in the relationship 
between commercial banks and the Central Bank. The availability of excess reserves 
in commercial banks’ balance sheets motivates them to reduce their loans from the 
Central Bank or place the money in risk–free financial assets in an effort to avoid the 
opportunity costs of holding reserves (Lavoie, 2014, p. 467). Such a decision is 
commonly referred to as a reflux mechanism, which is a change in one component 
of the Central Bank’s balance sheet, and will be compensated by a movement of 
other components within this balance sheet (Lavoie, 2014, p. 462). 
In the context of an open economy, the Central Bank’s policy to set the domestic 
interest rate will have an impact on the capital that flows to or from a country. As an 
example, under the fixed exchange rate regime, a higher rate of domestic interest 
rate, compared to a foreign one, will trigger capital inflows, which, in turn, cause an 
increase in foreign reserves and thereby create a positive movement in the Central 
Bank’s assets. The positive changes on the asset side will correspond to the liabilities 
side. Mainstream views maintain that, as a result of increasing foreign reserves, the 
amount of base money and money supply will increase (Lavoie, 2012). However, 
there is another argument that offers a different explanation. According to Lavoie and 
Wang (2012), in a country that adopts a fixed exchange rate regime, should there be 
any excess liquidity resulting from international transactions, there is a compensation 
mechanism. Such a mechanism is similar to the reflux mechanism; however, this is 
applied in the open economy. The compensation thesis can be described as any 
change in foreign assets that can affect the movement of another assets component 
in an opposite way, or the liabilities components in the same direction.  
 220 
 
The framework of the compensation thesis lies in Endogenous Money Theory. One 
of the key features of Endogenous Money Theory is the argument that money-
creation arises when there is a demand for credit, which is satisfied by commercial 
banks. In this argument, commercial banks have an active role to play in the creation 
of money, owing to the fact they are the entity that grants loans to the private sector. 
Hence, according to Endogenous Money Theory, the Central Bank does not have an 
active role in determining the supply of reserves; rather, it has a control on the interest 
rate.   
This study is expected to provide a contribution to the literature on the implementation 
of the compensation thesis from two perspectives. Firstly, theoretical and empirical 
analyses, both of which focus on the implementation of compensation thesis, and 
Endogenous Money Theory in the Indonesian context is very rare. Most of the studies 
under these topics utilise developed countries as case studies. Secondly, this is the 
first empirical study to examine and investigate the implementation of the 
compensation thesis in the case of Indonesia. Hence, this paper may fill a gap in the 
literature by exploring this topic of discussion with Indonesia as a specific country 
study. 
This chapter intends to examine the compensation thesis implementation using the 
Indonesian Central Bank’s balance sheets’ monthly data spanning the period 2001–
2015. The observation period only covers 15 years as a result of the monthly data 
availability. It is expected that the result will clarify the mechanisms of the 
compensation thesis in real conditions. Following this section, there will be a short 
discussion as to the open–economy theoretical framework. This chapter will also 
explore the Central Bank’s balance sheets, which is then followed by a discussion on 
the data and methodology. The last section will present the results based on the 
analysis undertaken. 
11.02 A summary of open–economy discussions 
The mainstream theoretical framework that enables us to discuss interactions in an 
open–economy is the Mundell–Fleming model. This model is widely used; its 
intention is to explain the foundations of the mechanism of monetary policy and the 
choice of exchange rate regimes. This mechanism substantially influences the 
stability of the exchange rate, the level of foreign reserves, as well as the stock of 
money. The Mundell–Fleming model involves three equilibria: the market for goods 
and services (IS curve), the money market (LM curve) and the balance of payments 
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(BoP) curve (Pilbeam, 2013, p.74; Lavoie, 2014, p.463). This model is the extension 
of the IS–LM model, presented by combining the previous model with the balance of 
payments to get an open–economy analysis (Pilbeam 2013, pp. 74–83; Lavoie, 2014, 
pp. 462–466). The IS schedule depicts the equilibrium positions of the production of 
goods and services in terms of combinations of output and the level of interest rate.  
In this curve, the association of the output level with the interest rate level creates a 
negative slope, suggesting that the decline in the rate of interest will affect the 
increase of national output. In an open–economy framework, the exchange rate has 
an association with the IS schedule through the export–import mechanism. The 
depreciation or devaluation of domestic currency will make domestic products 
cheaper than foreign goods, which, in turn, may lead to the increasing of domestic 
exports and the shifting of the IS schedule to the right. The LM schedule is the 
association between money and liquidity, which explains that the equilibrium of the 
demand and supply of money will affect the level of interest rate. The positive slope 
of the LM schedule suggests that the increasing national income will affect the 
demand for money, which at a given level of money supply will increase the interest 
rate so as to maintain the money market equilibrium. The third is the BoP schedule, 
which represents the relationship of output and the level of interest, meaning that the 
balance of payments is at its equilibrium level.  
In an environment of perfect capital mobility, the Mundell–Fleming model explains 
the process of how macro–policies work. This model divides the analysis using 
reference of two exchange rate regimes (Pilbeam, 2013, pp. 82–83; Lavoie, 2014, p. 
462). The first framework presents the mechanism under the flexible exchange rate 
regime. When the government decides to adopt fiscal policy expansion, it raises 
government expenditure and shifts the IS schedule to the right. Following the shift of 
the LS schedule, the level of interest rate also rises and thereby creates a capital 
account surplus, which subsequently leads to the appreciation of the domestic 
currency. The appreciation of domestic currency decreases the level of domestic 
exports, which creates a declining national output. Under the flexible exchange rate 
regime, expansionary monetary policy increases the money supply, which diminishes 
the level of the interest rate. The lower level of interest rate encourages foreign 
investors to pull out their money from the country, which may lead to the depreciation 
of domestic currency. In the current account side, however, the weakening of 
domestic currency may lift the level of exports of the domestic goods, since they will 
become much cheaper compared to foreign goods. Consequently, this process ends 
with the higher level of output. 
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Within a fixed exchange rate regime, the expansionary fiscal policy has a direct 
impact by increasing the government expenditure that shifts the IS schedule to the 
right and accordingly affects the interest rate to go up. The increasing interest rate 
may have an impact on the attraction of capital to flows into the country and may 
appreciate the domestic currency (Pilbeam, 2013, pp. 82–83). The increasing value 
of the domestic currency compared to its counterpart encourages the Central Bank 
to purchase foreign currency. This decision will add to the Central Bank’s foreign 
exchange reserves and potentially raise the money supply or shift the LM schedule 
to the right with a new level of output. On the other hand, this model argues that 
expansionary monetary policy does not have any significant impact on raising the 
output. The monetary expansion will affect the LM schedule and shift this curve to 
the right, leading to a balance of payment deficit. This condition occurs because the 
domestic interest rate is lower than the world level, and it encourages investors to 
sell their financial assets and place their money in other countries whose levels of 
interest rates are higher. This situation weakens the value of the domestic currency 
and requires the authority to step in by selling the foreign exchange reserves since it 
needs to maintain the level of domestic currency.  
In summary, there are two alternatives to dealing with different exchange rate 
regimes. A country that uses the fixed exchange rate regime will not be able to affect 
the level of output by using monetary policy. Under this exchange rate regime, fiscal 
policy is more effective. On the other hand, monetary policy is much more effective 
under the floating exchange rate regime. This conclusion leads to the Mundell–
Fleming trilemma that a country only can achieve two out of three policy options 
comprising independent monetary policy, free capital flows and a fixed exchange 
rate. 
According to Lavoie (2001) and Lavoie and Wang (2012), the Mundell–Fleming 
model, particularly under the fixed–exchange rate regime, is inspired by the gold 
standard mechanism. The authors argued that this mechanism guides the monetary 
authority to deal with surplus or deficit in the balance of payment, which is referred to 
as the rules of the game. Furthermore, Lavoie (2001) and Lavoie and Wang (2012) 
emphasised the definition of the rules of the game, based on Ethier (1988), as 
follows: 
“A balance of payment deficit should be fully reflected in a reduction in supply of 
money, and a surplus should be fully reflected in an increased money supply” 
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Under the fixed exchange rate regime, a higher rate of domestic interest rate relative 
to a foreign one will trigger capital inflows. This condition eventually leads the country 
to have a balance of payment surplus, which generates an increase in foreign 
reserves and creates a positive movement in the Central Bank’s assets. The positive 
changes on the asset side will correspond to the liabilities side and, mainstream 
views will argue, the amount of base money and the money supply will increase 
(Lavoie and Wang, 2012). The policy option to deal with this condition is the open 
market operation by sterilisation. Referring to the explanation in Chapter 8 section 
8.02, this operation can be defined as the monetary authority policy to influence the 
monetary base as a result of a change in foreign assets by selling or purchasing the 
government’s securities. As pointed out by Nurkse (1944, pp.66–68), the rules of the 
game emphasised the need to use sterilisation policy to cope with changes in the 
Central Bank’s foreign reserves by undertaking simultaneous changes in the money 
supply. Within this mechanism, it can be inferred that the Central Bank may take 
control of the money supply; however, questions should arise on the way in which 
the Central Bank provides money to or withdraws money from the financial market 
and how the Central Bank determines the amount of money they need to supply.  
11.03 The compensation thesis 
The argument on the active role of the Central Bank to control the money supply in 
the above way does not align with the tenets of the heterodox approach that focuses 
on the argument for demand–led money creation. Under the framework of 
endogenous money, the need to finance the investment projects leads the private 
sector to obtain loans (Sawyer, 2010, pp.134–136; Fontana and Setterfield, 2010b, 
pp.146–147). When the private sector and households get the loans, the money 
supply expands and then circulates. However, this process will be possible when the 
commercial bank decides that the borrowers are worthy of receiving the loan. In the 
implementation, as long as the borrower fulfils their creditworthiness requirements, 
the commercial bank will provide the loan. Consequently, when the demand for loans 
is high, the commercial banks give their efforts to meet this demand and seek out 
any necessary reserves (with the Central Bank), if required by the Central Bank 
(Sawyer, 2010, pp.132–137). The Central Bank supplies the reserves and facilitate 
the commercial banks’ demand. At this stage, the active role in the creation of money 
comes from the commercial bank. 
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In the context of an open economy, Nurkse (1944) completed an analysis on 26 of 
the Central Banks’ balance sheets and how the balance sheets components 
demonstrated change. The author claimed that the movement of foreign assets had 
an association with the changes in domestic credit. This finding has a different 
conclusion with the rules of the game, which argues that the increase in foreign 
reserves (gold) would be followed by an increase in the monetary base. Furthermore, 
the transmission mechanism in Nurkse’s analysis examines whether or not the 
Central Bank plays an active role in the money supply.  According to Nurkse (1944), 
in this mechanism, the one that has the initiative is not the Central Bank; the balance 
sheets of the Central Bank shows this process as the movements in foreign assets 
will be compensated for in other elements of the liabilities. In other words, Nurkse’s 
findings are in line with the endogenous money framework, which emphasises that 
money supply is driven by the demand for credit. 
Figure 11.1 The mechanism of compensation thesis 
 
Source: Own construction based on Lavoie (2001 and 2014) 
Figure 11.1 illustrates and summarises the compensation thesis that engages in 
foreign transactions (Lavoie, 2001, 2014, pp. 458–462, 470–472). There are at least 
four channels through which the capital inflows to the country, these affect the 
changes in the Central Bank’s foreign reserves. The first channel is through foreign 
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investors who want to invest their money in the domestic financial market. When the 
domestic interest rate is higher than the foreign one, foreign investors tend to place 
their funds in the domestic market. These investors may then purchase domestic 
financial assets. The second channel is through the banking sector, which facilitates 
other sectors in obtaining external funds, for example, the private sector or 
households that seek funds from abroad. In this case, the commercial banks facilitate 
their customers to find the source of financing from the global financial market. The 
third channel is the private sector, which might look for the external financing sources 
directly. Through this channel, the private sector can get foreign financing from three 
options, such as through obtaining a direct loan from the foreign banks, issuing global 
bonds, and making a public offering. Lastly, the government sector might obtain 
foreign borrowing or issue global bonds to foreign investors. This transaction involves 
the transfer of money from foreign investors to the government, which increases the 
government’s balance sheets. 
Based on the mechanism depicted in Figure 11.1, it is possible to describe an 
example of the process of the compensation thesis involving the domestic private 
sector and the banking sector. As transactions are conducted in foreign currency 
whilst the daily operation uses domestic currency, this unit asks the bank to convert 
their receipts into local currency. After converting these receipts, the commercial 
bank calls the Central Bank. The Central Bank receives the foreign currency, which 
increase its foreign assets and its liabilities, adding up the bank reserves. The 
commercial banks, on their balance sheets, record the exchanged money in the bank 
reserves on the assets side and the deposits on the liabilities side. Following this 
step, there are two different channels by which excess reserves are used. Each 
channel shows the system adopted by the country, which consists of the asset–based 
economy and the overdraft–economy. The former is the financial system in which 
economic agents hold sufficient financial assets to manage their income and 
financing needs. Meanwhile, the latter is the financial system in which firms rely on 
advances from commercial banks, and commercial banks rely on loans from the 
Central Bank (Lavoie, 2006b, pp. 18–19). 
In the case of an overdraft economy, after having the additional cash on their balance 
sheets, commercial banks have excess reserves. The excess reserves that are held 
by commercial banks will not affect their ability to offer credit to their customers. In 
this system, however, most commercial banks have loans from the Central Bank. 
Hence, when commercial banks have excess reserves, logically they will prepay or 
 226 
 
make an early repayment of their debt obligations to the Central Bank. On the other 
hand, if the commercial banks do not have any excess reserves, the system allows 
the commercial banks to access the Central Bank to get a loan, especially when there 
are new loan proposals from borrowers. Through this mechanism, there will be no 
impact on the Central Bank’s balance sheets. According to Lavoie (2001), in an 
overdraft economy the increasing foreign assets will be followed by the claims on 
domestic private banks. 
The second type of economy considered relevant to this part of the thesis is the 
asset–based economy. The following explanation describes the mechanism of the 
compensation thesis in an asset–based economy. After receiving domestic currency 
from the Central Bank, commercial banks try to find a source of income using this 
money. They may use the excess reserves on their balance sheets to offer new 
loans, especially when the demands for loans from the private sector or households 
are increasing. If there is no demand from other economic units, the excess reserves 
may be used by commercial banks to purchase a risk–free asset, such as 
government securities. However, this decision is different from the overdraft 
economy. In the asset-based economy, it is common that there is a penalty or 
additional cost for early repayment or prepayment of a loan. When the cost of 
prepayment is greater than the cost of saving, economic agents tend to place their 
excess liquidity in the financial assets, as in the case of government bonds, for 
example. In this case, the mechanism is similar to the process of sterilisation; 
however, it is not a Central Bank initiative; rather, the commercial banks are the 
initiators of the mechanism. 
To know how the mechanism works in the real world, the next section will discuss 
the empirical analysis by exploring the Indonesian Central Bank’s balance sheet. This 
analysis is strongly inspired by the work of Lavoie and Wang (2012) who examine 
the compensation thesis in the case of China. At the time of writing, there is a paper 
with a similar nature—notably that developed by Bozhinovska (2015)—which 
examines the compensation thesis in the case of Macedonia. 
11.04 The Indonesian Central Bank’s balance sheet 
As stipulated in the Central Bank Law year 1999, the Indonesian Central Bank has 
the main goal of achieving and maintaining the stability of the domestic currency 
value. According to Kenward (2013), however, this provision does not send a clear 
message in terms of what area on which the Central Bank needs to focus, whether 
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on maintaining low inflation or keeping the exchange rate stable. Following the 
enactment of this law, with the IMF’s assistance, the Central Bank began to use 
inflation targeting as its monetary instrument at the beginning of 2000. Starting from 
2005, the implementation of inflation-targeting made another milestone as its 
operational target was changed from base money to the adoption of the Taylor-rule 
reference rate (Kenward, 2013; Nasution, 2015, p. 56). This reference is referred to 
as ‘BI rate’, which is expected to be reflected in the overnight interbank rate and 
followed by the change in other interest rates, such as lending rate. In setting the 
target, the Central Bank is in consultation with the government, and announces this 
target when the government and Parliament discuss the macro-assumptions for the 
next year budget. More recently, the Central Bank changes the BI rate as the 
reference rate and uses the BI 7-day repo rate (BI 7DRR), which has the tenor of 7 
days. According to Bank Indonesia (2016), the reason for this decision hinges on the 
intention to speed-up the transmission of the policy rate to the financial market. The 
changes or adjustments of BI 7DDR may have an impact on inflation via several 
channels (Bank Indonesia, 2016). Firstly, it will have an effect on bank deposits and 
lending rates. When this new reference rate declines, the lending rates will go down, 
which could lower the cost of lending. Secondly, the changes in BI 7DRR can cause 
an impact on asset prices. If the reference rate decreases, this may alter asset prices. 
Third, the adjustment of this rate will affect the movement of the exchange rate. Any 
increase in the reference rate may increase the interest differential, which then can 
attract foreign investors to invest in the domestic financial market.  
Table 11.1 The Central Bank’s balance sheet: selected items 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IFS–IMF, CEIC and Indonesian Banking Statistics, 
2015 
 
(IDR bio)
Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-10 Jan-14 Jan-16
Assets 685,967 673,549 1,060,692 1,641,082 1,692,736 
Foreign assets 291,610 309,776 653,989     1,232,540  1,442,907  
Claims on government 288,076 267,856 279,402     354,073     241,495     
Claims on banks and other FI 54,475    52,177    20,864       48,132       7,869         
Other assets 51,806    43,740    106,437     6,337         409             
Liabilities 685,967 673,549 1,060,692 1,641,082 1,692,736 
Monetary base 132,296 185,385 469,691     849,783     884,788     
Foreign liabilities 120,289 107,626 84,093       44,141       105,132     
OMO (CB certificate) 104,385 166,764 315,420     246,403     234,626     
Government deposits 95,261    63,938    83,227       136,664     83,377       
Other items 233,736 149,836 108,261     364,091     384,813     
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Table 11.1 presents a simplified version of the Central Bank’s balance sheets and 
compares the structure of each period. The main contribution of the Central Bank’s 
assets comes from foreign assets and the claims on the government. The claims on 
the government can be seen, for example, in the form of government securities 
ownership (Bank Indonesia, 2015). By law, the Central Bank cannot purchase 
government securities from the primary market, but rather the secondary market31. 
The liabilities side consists of reserves money, foreign liabilities, government 
deposits, the CB certificates and other items. Currently, the amount of base money 
and CB certificate issuance represent the largest proportion of liabilities. The Central 
Bank uses the CB certificate issuance to perform open market operations. This 
element also provides information as to the sterilisation process, as conducted by the 
Central Bank. From the liabilities side, the historical data shows the CB certificate 
issuance can be used as an example of the compensation process, especially 
between 2009 and 2011. From Table 11.1, the size of the CB certificate issuance is 
quite high, representing almost 50% from foreign reserves.  
The structure of this simplified balance sheet is apt for application of the 
compensation thesis, as the table consists of components representing economic 
agents in the real world. In the case of the Central Bank’s balance sheets, the 
elements occupying the biggest proportion of the assets side are the foreign assets 
and claims on the government. According to Lavoie and Wang (2012), the way to 
differentiate between an asset-based economy and an overdraft economy, besides 
the explanation in Section 11.02, lies in two factors. The first factor is the claims on 
domestic institutions; when substantially bigger than the other elements, the country 
can be considered an asset-based economy; the second factor is the possibility of 
commercial banks and other financial institutions getting advances from the Central 
Bank. If the commercial banks have access to the Central Bank, the country can then 
be considered an overdraft economy. Based on this argument, Indonesia can be 
classified as an asset-based economy since the total number of advances to the 
commercial banks and other financial institutions is relatively small.  
                                                
31 According to Law No. 3/2004 pertaining to Bank Indonesia, the Central Bank cannot buy the 
government securities in primary market to finance budget deficit (Nasution, 2015, p.29). However, 
to be excluded from this regulation is the purchase of short-term government securities for 
monetary control operations and the purchase of government securities as part of the stipulation 
of the emergency financing facility for banking sector (Bank Indonesia, 2004). In addition, having 
the role as the lender of last resort, Indonesian Central Bank may provide short-term financing for 
a commercial bank, which faces a liquidity problem.  
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11.05 Empirical analysis 
Following Lavoie and Wang (2012) and Bozhinovska (2015), this study employs five 
indicators in the Central Bank’s balance sheets. These are the foreign assets (FA), 
the moentary base (MB), the total claims on the domestic institutions (CL), the Central 
Bank’s certificate (CB), and the liabilities of the Central Bank to the Government or 
the Government Deposits (GOV). The monthly data series is taken mostly from the 
International Financial Statistics. Before the 2000s, the monthly data availability was 
inconsistent, and the first data that can be obtained consistently begins from 
December 2001. Accordingly, this chapter employs the period of the data ranging 
from December 2001 to December 2015.  
Figure 11.2 presents the historical data of five variables interest that will be included 
in the model. According to the compensation principle, the positive movement of 
foreign assets will be compensated for by the movement of other components; these 
changes will not bring about changes in the reserves money. The changes of a 
component on the asset side may affect the other components of the asset or the 
other components on the liabilities side. For example, the increasing size of foreign 
assets may be followed by the decline in claims to the domestic sector or the increase 
in the size of government deposits or CB certificates issuance. 
Figure 11.2 Selected elements of Central Bank’s balance sheet (IDRbio) 
 
Source: IFS–IMF and CEIC  
In investigating the research objective, this study will use the ARDL model that was 
developed by Pesaran et al. (1999, 2001). The detailed explanation of this 
econometric technique is provided in Chapter 5. By using the ARDL model, it is 
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possible to investigate the relationship among the variable interests, since the result 
of the estimation allows the researcher to establish the long-run relationships 
between these variables. In addition to this, one advantage of the ARDL is that it may 
use a different order of integration (Ononugbo, 2012, p. 202). In general, the ARDL 
model can be formulated based on the following basic equation 
𝛥𝑦௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑𝛽௜𝛥𝑦௧ିଵ + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑥ଵ௧ି௝ + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑥ଶ௧ି௞ + 𝛿଴𝑦௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଵ𝑥ଵ௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଶ𝑥ଶ௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ 
This model can provide a result when the values of the maximum lags are selected 
appropriately. The selection of the lags values can be done using the ordinary 
selection criteria, for example, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or Schwartz 
Information Criteria. 
The first step in using this method is to perform an examination of the order of 
integration of each variable involved in the model, either in a stationary that is I(0), or 
non-stationary, I(1). This step is considered critical since it determines whether or not 
the estimation can use ARDL. If the orders of integration of all variables involved are 
similar I(0), the method used will be the error correction model (ECM). If there is a 
mixture of the order of integration amongst the variables, one can employ ARDL.  
This study checks the presence of unit root using the ADF test that will be validated 
by the Phillip-Peron (PP) test. In this step, one may define the variable’s integration 
order, which is expected to be in the same order of integration. Based on the test that 
has been done and shown in Table 11.2, the results of the unit root tests show that 
the t-statistics for these variables have a different order of integration. Since the 
results are inconclusive, this study proceeds with ARDL. 
Table 11.2 Unit root tests 
 
Source: Own calculations 
The critical step in the ARDL and bounds testing is the method of constructing the 
model that will clarify the objective of this chapter in examining the implementation of 
the compensation principle in Indonesia. The relationship between the variables 
Decision Decision
FA 1.276 -10.596 *** I(1) 1.428 -11.652 *** I(1)
MB 1.102 -12.681 *** I(1) 2.666 -21.476 *** I(1)
CL -2.351 -14.157 *** I(1) -2.18 -15.123 *** I(1)
CB -2.435 -14.625 *** I(1) -2.348 -14.606 *** I(1)
GOV -4.087 *** -10.578 *** I(0) -4.001 *** -18.936 *** I(0)
Variables
ADF Phillips-Perron
Level 1st difference Level 1st difference
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involved needs to be taken into account and considered with care. It is worthwhile 
recalling the interrelations of each balance sheet element used in the models. Based 
on the compensation principle, the change in foreign assets will be compensated for 
by the change of other elements in the Central Bank’s balance sheets, whether it is 
on the assets side or the liabilities side. With this description, the foreign asset is the 
element that is expected to influence the change in other elements, as they represent 
a bivariate relationship. With one explanatory variable (FA) and four dependent 
variables (MB, CB, CL, GOV), there are four models involved in the analysis. This 
step is in line with the study of Bozhinovska (2015). Hence, the models developed 
can be formulated as follows: 
Model 1: 𝛥𝑚𝑏௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑𝛽௜𝛥𝑚𝑏 + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ି௝ + 𝛿଴𝑚𝑏௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଵ𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ 
Model 2: 𝛥𝑐𝑏௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑𝛽௜𝛥𝑐𝑏௧ିଵ + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ି௝ + 𝛿଴𝑐𝑏௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଵ𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ 
Model 3: 𝛥𝑐𝑙௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑𝛽௜𝛥𝑐𝑙௧ିଵ + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ି௝ + 𝛿଴𝑐𝑙௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଵ𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ 
Model 4: 𝛥𝑔𝑜𝑣௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑𝛽௜𝛥𝑔𝑜𝑣 + ∑𝛾௝𝛥𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ି௝ + 𝛿଴𝑔𝑜𝑣௧ିଵ + 𝛿ଵ𝑓𝑎ଵ௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ 
Referring to the explanation in Chapter 5, this study uses AIC to determine the lags 
value of the model. The number of lags that may provide the best model is the one 
that has minimum scores. In this case, AIC is selceted since it does not depend on 
the number of observations32. Even though AIC may present the problem of over-
fitting, the AIC model can capture the data underlying trend. Besides, AIC better fits 
the data than the other selection criteria. 
Based on this result, the next step is to undertake the bounds test in order to examine 
the long-run relationship between variables in the model. To get this information, we 
need to compare the computed F-test with the upper and lower bounds conducted 
as the critical value. When the value of the F-statistics is smaller than the lower 
bound, the conclusion would be no long-run relationship; when the value of the F-
statistics is bigger than the upper bound, on the other hand, there would be a long-
run relationship. From Table 3, it can be seen that there is one model that finds a 
cointegrating vector, which is the fourth model. In contrast, the other three models, 
namely Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3, fail to show the existence of the long-run 
relationships at the 5% level.  
                                                
32 The basic formula for Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is AIC = -2*ln(likelihood) + 2*k, where k is the 
degrees of freedom. 
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Table 11.3 Bounds test results 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: - The choice of trend regressors (unrestricted intercept and no trend) is set based on 
the critical value of Pesaran et al. (2001).  
- *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% levels. 
Table 11.4 presents the error corrections mechanism, which indicates the adjustment 
level of the variables involved; this means the bigger the negative value of the error 
correction term, the faster the adjustment process. Based on the results, Model 4 
provides a negative error correction coefficient with the value of –0.217, which has 
negative signs and the value is statistically significant. The error correction term of 
Model 4 implies that there will be a correction of any disequilibrium that takes the 
value around 0.22 over a period of a month.  
Table 11.4 Error corrections and long run coefficient 
 
Source: Own calculations 
The following equation describes the long-run relationship between the variables in 
Model 4:  
𝐺𝑂𝑉௧ = 17.06 + 0.043𝐹𝐴௧ 
                  [2.98]        [1.72]  
R-squared = 0.160   Adj.R-squared = 0.150  No. obs=168 
Note: the numbers in brackets are the t-statistics 
The long-run coefficients give us information as to the existence and direction of the 
relationship between each balance sheet’s components. As suggested by the 
compensation thesis, the change in foreign assets should affect the change of the 
other assets’ components in the opposite direction or the liabilities’ components in 
the same direction. Based on the empirical results, the long-run relationships of 
Model 4 describe the change in the Central Bank’s foreign assets will positively affect 
the change of government deposits on the liabilities side. The above equation 
lower bound upper bound
1 MB_FA ARDL(3,0) 4.86 4.94 5.73 No long-run relationship
2 CB_FA ARDL(2,3) 4.73 4.94 5.73 No long-run relationship
3 CL_FA ARDL(4,1) 3.83 4.94 5.73 No long-run relationship
4 GOV_FA ARDL(1,1) 10.26 4.94 5.73 *** Long-run relationship exist
Model Selected model F_stat
Critical values
Remarks
Coeff. Std. Error t-stat. Prob
Model 4 Error correction -0.217 0.0478 -4.543 0.000
Long-run coeff. 0.0433 0.0251 1.72 0.087
Model
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suggests that the coefficient of estimates of FA in model 4 (GOV_FA) is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
11.06 Discussion 
After completing an investigation based on the empirical data, the results show that 
the compensation thesis implementation does exist in the Indonesian Central Bank 
operations. There are at least two arguments that can be supported by these findings. 
The first one is the application of the Endogenous Money Theory, which emphasises 
the demand-led principle. Model 1 (RM_FA), which is expected to explain the long-
run relationship between reserves money and foreign assets fails to capture this 
association. The results of Model 1 show that there is no cointegration, which 
therefore implies that foreign assets do not determine the reserves money. This result 
differs from common understanding concerning (i) the positive relationship between 
foreign assets and reserves money, and (ii) supply-led money creation.  
Secondly, this finding supports the claim that the compensation thesis is also 
applicable to a floating rate regime. Indonesia is one country that applies the floating 
exchange rate33 arrangement from 1997/1998, with the analysis showing that the 
compensation thesis works under this regime.  
Referring to Figure 11.1, the first channel of the capital inflows to the domestic 
financial market goes via foreign investors that want to invest their funds in the 
domestic financial system. There are several alternative mechanisms of foreign 
investors for purchasing the Indonesian financial assets. One of the alternatives is 
described by the intention of foreign investors to buy commercial banks’ securities, 
which subsequently affects the total number of foreign assets and the claims on 
commercial banks. However, based on the empirical analysis, Model 3 (CL_FA) 
shows that there is no long-run relationship between foreign assets and claims on 
domestic institutions. One possible explanation is associated with the classification 
of Indonesia as the asset-based economy. This system suggests that the increasing 
                                                
33 Recalling the definition of floating exchange rate as provided in Chapter 2, in this case the floating 
exchange rate should be distinct from free-floating exchange rate. According to the IMF (2015), 
the floating exchange rate regime is defined as the exchange rate mechanism by which the Central 
Bank can intervene to lessen the steep changes and avoid extreme fluctuation of its exchange 
rate (IMF, 2015) 
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foreign assets that comes from the domestic institutions transactions has small 
impact on the movement of the claims to the domestic institutions.  
The second channel is the capital inflows via the government decision to issue the 
government bonds in the global financial market. When the government sells global 
bonds to foreign investors, the funds go to the government account in the Central 
Bank, which increases the government deposits and foreign assets. Based on the 
results of the empirical analysis in section 11.04, Model 4 (GOV_FA), which explains 
the relationship between foreign assets and government deposits shows its 
coefficient estimate that is statistically significance. In general, the result shows that 
the foreign investors and government take the active role in this mechanism. 
11.07 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a contribution to the literature by observing the implementation 
of the compensation thesis under the Endogenous Money Theory, which takes the 
Indonesian case as a focus of the study. Two theoretical frameworks that have 
different perspectives on the Central Bank’s role in the money supply are presented. 
The mainstream analysis argues that in order to deal with the excess of money 
supply, the Central Bank may sell or purchase securities in a process that is 
commonly referred to as sterilisation. This mechanism states that the Central Bank 
should play an active role in taking control of the money supply. In contrast, the 
Endogenous Money Theory maintains that the demand for credit will lead to money 
creation; thus, the Central Bank should not influence the supply of money. There is 
a framework referred to as the compensation thesis; this can help us clarify this 
debate. The compensation thesis is defined as the changes in one component of the 
Central Bank’s balance sheets will be compensated by an opposite movement of 
assets’ components or the liabilities’ components in the same direction. 
The objective of this study is to examine the implementation of the compensation 
principle in the Indonesian case. The analysis uses the Indonesian Central Bank 
balance sheets monthly data over the period 2001–2015. Using an econometric 
technique known as ARDL, this study finds that the compensation thesis applies in 
Indonesian case. This finding supports the endogenous money, and demand-led 
principles for there is no long-run relationship between foreign assets and reserves 
money.  The results also confirm the mechanism within the compensation thesis, 
which shows that a fluctuation in a component on the assets side will affect the 
change of the liabilities component in the same direction.   
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Chapter 12  
Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Further Research 
This chapter will offer some conclusions and summarise the findings, as well as the 
policy implications that can be drawn from the empirical analysis. In addition to this, 
this chapter also highlights several contributions that have been made by this study. 
12.01 Conclusion 
Before the financial crisis of 1997/1998, Indonesia was included by the World Bank 
amongst the countries that represented “East Asian Miracles”. Prior to the 1997/1998 
crisis, Indonesia enjoyed a real GDP growth rate in the range of 5% to 7% for about 
ten years. Some economists (Goeltom, 1995; Hill, 1996; James and Stephenson, 
2002) believed that this achievement was due to the economic and financial reforms 
in Indonesia. It was in the middle of the 1980’s when the reforms were implemented 
and focused on reorienting the economy to reduce its dependence on the oil sector 
and to expand the role of the private sector. To meet these purposes, key elements 
of the reform were implemented in the 1980s that stressed the development of the 
money market, enhanced bank supervision, and improved the functioning of the 
banking system. The financial sector reform was accelerated by allowing greater 
foreign participation in the financial sector. Foreign banks were permitted to open 
branches, and foreign investors were able to participate in other types of financial 
institution and the insurance business. Subsequently, the authorities liberalised 
capital inflows by removing the limits on bank borrowing from non-residents, and 
foreigners were permitted to invest in the stock market. During this period, restrictions 
on foreign direct investments were also loosened, and foreign investors were allowed 
to sell foreign exchange directly to commercial banks (Sharma, 2003, p.128). 
However, an unexpected event occurred following these reforms that changed the 
economic condition drastically. Since then, just like the other developing countries, it 
appears that Indonesia has been prone to financial crisis. 
Considering the current development of the financial system, the occurrence of a 
crisis is believed to have been contributed to by financial instability in the financial 
system. An alternative theoretical framework that can explain this phenomenon was 
developed by Hyman Minsky and is called the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH). 
He constructed his argument using a closed-economy approach and emphasised the 
disadvantages of a robust economic condition, as this can then become the source 
of instability. Arestis and Glickman (2002) expanded on Minsky’s FIH with an open-
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economy approach that explored the existence of capital mobility between countries. 
If the FIH provided the alternative explanation of the series of financial crisis episodes 
during these 30 years, how should we define the mainstream argument? Under 
mainstream views, there are three main models that try to formalise how a financial 
system becomes vulnerable. All of the models explain the mechanisms of crises by 
investigating its causes and by connecting the numerous variables that are 
suspected to trigger financial crisis. To answer this question, this study has tried to 
make a comparison of the basics features of these two frameworks.  
To this end, this research had the main objective of investigating financial instability 
in the case of the Indonesian financial system. This objective was subsequently 
divided into three objectives as provided in the first chapter of this thesis. By 
addressing the main objective, this study can highlight the key implications for 
Indonesian policies, such as identifying the methods that can be used to measure 
the level of instability and to predict another coming crisis. In the following section, 
this chapter will present the policy implications based on the findings of the research. 
The last section will be the conclusion and offer suggestions for further research. 
12.02 The findings and policy implications 
There are several findings and policy implications that can be derived from the 
investigation. The following sections will present the findings based on the three 
objectives as provided in Chapter 1. 
12.02.1 In search of the source of financial instability 
One key element of the financial reforms that is famously known as financial 
liberalisation is argued to be able to help a country accelerate and improve its 
economic performance. Chapter 5 discussed this aspect and summarised the 
mainstream views that financial liberalisation can support economic performance by 
lowering the cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000), increasing economic growth 
(Quinn and Toyoda, 2008), and lessening crisis occurrences (Beck et al., 2006). 
However, the financial sector indicators offered some evidence that financial 
liberalisation tends to make a country more fragile. The private sector’s tendency to 
use short-term debt, the increasing volatility of capital inflows and the stock index in 
the post-liberalization period could have been the key factors that triggered financial 
instability in Indonesia. Moreover, this study found that some variables that represent 
financial liberalisation have a positive association with the volatility of the exchange 
rate. In order to offer a detailed analysis, this study constructed a monthly Financial 
 237 
 
Liberalization Index (FLI), which was one of the main contributions of this thesis to 
the literature. Furthermore, this study maintained that it is difficult to conclude that 
financial liberalisation had a positive effect on the Indonesian economy.  
As a response to the data on capital outflows unavailability before 1997/1998, this 
study intended to find an alternative method of measuring capital outflows. In so 
doing, this study has tried to extend the research by calculating capital flight from 
Indonesia. To the best of my knowledge, this has been the first effort to formalise the 
method for identifying capital flight in the Indonesian case using higher frequency 
data and involving 150 trading partners’ countries. Based on the result of analysis, 
the movements of capital flight were volatile, especially during the GFC. This 
development suggests that the authorities need to pass regulation concerning capital 
ownership and capital movement. When the authority does not have sufficient tools 
to handle the movement of capital, the country’s economy is in a dangerous situation. 
Considering the importance of the impact of capital flows on the domestic financial 
system, it is necessary that the authorities continue to improve the policies for 
managing the flows of capital. The policies involving capital flows management are 
necessary to avoid or lessen the impact of sudden changes of flows that can 
potentially have a negative impact on the economy.   
12.02.2 The financial instability measurement 
To prevent a financial system experiencing a crisis period, one of the solutions is that 
a country needs to maintain the stability of its financial system. There are several 
aspects to supporting financial stability, such as, (i) the process and method of 
developing a system that enables the authorities to effectively monitor, evaluate and 
assess the financial system conditions; (ii) a method to equip the authorities in 
constructing policy, and other economic agents in anticipating financial market 
situations; and (iii) ways to increase country’s resiliency so that it can cope with an 
adverse situation. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) proposed EWI’s that gauge the 
vulnerability of economic conditions by examining the movement of selected 
variables during the normal period. Using empirical data on the Indonesian economy 
and applying the EWI, Chapter 6 identified the weakness of the framework, which is 
the low performance of the method in predicting the crisis occurrence. However, this 
method was useful for evaluating the patterns and behaviour of some of the economic 
variables.  
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This study has incorporated several important elements of a financial system in 
building the instrument to predict financial crisis and to measure financial instability. 
The reason for focusing on the elements of the financial system lies on its dynamic 
characteristics and the fact that it is a complex system. Chapter 7 described the 
methods for generating the financial instability index and presented the two kinds of 
methods that were used: CDF and PCA. Referring to the results, the composite index 
using the PCA method outperformed the CDF since it gave better information on how 
high the index was when the financial system faced distress. There are several 
advantages to using the PCA composite index, especially that this index can capture 
the important events that occurred during 1997–2010 that had a direct impact on the 
Indonesian economy. These events are the Asian financial crisis, the domestic mini-
crisis, and the GFC. On the other hand, the CDF composite index captured most of 
the domestic events but was less sensitive to foreign financial occurrences.  
Chapter 8 explored the financial instability from the FIH point of view. By examining 
a number of indicators in Indonesian banking and non-bank private sectors - for 
example, the debt to equity ratio, loan to deposit ratio, private sector short-term debt, 
and a simple portfolio analysis - this study found that during the normal period, there 
was a tendency for increasing the external financing or direct borrowing. The 
increasing amount of debt outstanding, especially ones that had a shorter maturity, 
may have had a negative impact on the financial system. This chapter also assessed 
the structural changes of the Indonesian financial system by constructing the financial 
instability index based on the FIH. This index showed the evolution of the state of the 
fragility of the Indonesian financial system in 1997. Even though this analysis was 
not done using a formal model, the results can accurately depict the country’s 
condition, especially prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
The attempt to generate the composite index is important for the Indonesian 
authorities. By using the index, the policy makers can get an insight into the domestic 
and external financial conditions. This measurement can be a source of help for the 
authorities, either the government or the Central Bank, in considering what the 
appropriate policy response might be if there is a signal of instability. In addition to 
this, the analysis of the banking sector and the non-bank private sector balance 
sheets, as well as the dynamic financial fragility method, can improve their 
understanding of the state of the domestic financial system. 
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12.02.3 The policies assessment in dealing with capital flows 
The mobility of capital is possible, especially when there are no restrictions or 
regulations that hinder it. Developing countries also make efforts to attract capital into 
their countries. However, there is a potential problem that emerges, especially when 
the amount of capital massively flows out from a country.  
Chapter 9 explored the effectiveness of monetary policies in coping with the capital 
flows. Based on the findings, these policies can show their associations with the 
dependent variables, such as the movement of the exchange rate and the movement 
of asset prices. However, the effect of the minimum holding period is considered 
weak. This study investigated the cause of this weak association and found that, 
based on the examination of the foreign ownership of government securities, the 
implementation of a minimum holding period for CB certificates had an impact on the 
decision of investors, who shifted their funds from CB certificates to government 
bonds. This decision explains the way by which an investor always tries to avoid 
regulations that potentially reduce their profits or increases their risks. The investors’ 
decision to shift their investment in to government bonds will increase the risk of the 
government’s debt management, particularly when these investors are non-
residents. For this reason, macro-coordination among the authorities is necessary to 
avoid increasing costs and risks.  
Concerning the compensation thesis, Chapter 11 discussed what the Central Bank 
should do to deal with capital flows. The findings from the empirical analysis 
concluded that the compensation thesis, to a certain extent, does hold in the case of 
Indonesia. This finding explains the existence of long-run relationships between 
foreign assets and the government deposits. The mechanics of these variables can 
be summarised by showing the changes in the Central Bank’s foreign assets will 
affect the change of government deposits. When the country accepts capital inflows, 
the movement of foreign assets will be compensated by the positive movement of 
the government deposit on the Central Bank balance sheet. Additionally, this chapter 
found that there is no long-run relationship between foreign assets and the monetary 
base. Based on the demand-led principle, the increase of foreign assets will not have 
an impact on the reserves money. 
12.03 Contributions of this study 
This research has made several contributions to the literature on financial instability 
and financial crisis, which can be itemised as follows: 
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a. Chapter 3 and 4 demonstrated the difference between two competing 
frameworks, namely the mainstreams views and the FIH. These chapters 
explored at least five features, which consist of the definitions of financial 
instability, the factors that possibly cause the instability, the common policies 
recommendation to be undertaken by the authority, the response to the 
monetary policy, and the way that financial instability has been measured. 
b. Chapter 5 constructed a monthly FLI for Indonesia. So far, most economists 
have generated an annual index. By collecting detailed information on the 
Indonesian financial reform policies or events that have had an impact on the 
index construction, a monthly assessment can be made to construct the 
monthly FLI. The availability of a higher frequency index is useful when 
figuring out the detailed development of a country’s financial system.  
c. Chapters 7 and 8 explored ways to measure the level of instability using two 
different methods. The first method is the financial instability composite index 
that is derived from four sub-indices that represents the four markets in the 
domestic financial system. Chapter 7 presented the financial instability 
composite indices for Indonesia that were constructed using daily data. It is 
argued that the daily index shows a more detailed level of movement and 
therefore can provide better information. Meanwhile, Chapter 8 examined the 
financial instability measurement by focusing on the balance sheets and its 
ratios. In addition, this chapter examined the dynamic of financial fragility by 
developing the financial fragility measurement. The empirical analysis shows 
that the measurements can evidence the Indonesian state of fragility. 
d. Chapter 9 provided a key contribution by calculating capital flight based on 
two formal methods. From the results that have been generated, the 
movement of historical capital flight from 1985 to the present can be therefore 
be observed. 
e. Chapter 11 contributed to the literature as the first empirical test of Indonesian 
monetary policy using the compensation thesis. Most of the studies under the 
compensation thesis have focussed on developed countries and the 
European region. Hence, the examination of the implementation of the 
compensation thesis in the Indonesian case fills this gap in the literature. 
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12.04 Limitations and further research suggestions 
a. One of the requirements for constructing instruments to measure financial 
instability is having a relatively long period that sufficiently captures the 
movement in the variables of interests. In applying the method to the case of 
Indonesia, there is a limitation on fulfilling these requirements, especially in 
relation to the data availability for a longer period, since the high-frequency 
data for several financial markets indicators was only available after the early 
2000s. As a result, the intention to capture these variables’ and their 
behaviour in the pre-crisis period was not possible. For countries that have 
access to financial market data, the problem of limitations in the involved 
variables can be minimised. There are some alternative indicators available 
in the financial market that can be explored further and used in the 
measurement, for example, the stock-bond correlation, and non-deliverable 
forward (NDF). In this study, these variables have not been incorporated in 
the model since they are available in a shorter period compared to the 
variables of interest that have been observed.  
b. In developing the financial instability composite index, this study treated all of 
the financial market segments as having a similar weight, assuming that each 
market segment had an effect on the movement or development of the whole 
financial market. Hence, there was an opportunity to expand the method by 
incorporating a weighting for each segment, based on the importance of each 
market segment in the financial system. 
c. The financial instability analysis opened up the opportunity to construct the 
financial instability index by referring to the evolutionary or dynamic approach. 
A certain effort has been made by Tymoigne (2014) to measure the index for 
each economic agent. However, the challenge in measuring the degree of 
instability using the FIH lies in data availability as some necessary information 
was difficult to obtain (Tymoigne, 2011). 
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Appendix A 
 
Source: Abiad et al. (2008) 
Dimension/ Policy areas Sub-dimension Sub-dimension scoring guide (Raw score) Score total
Credit programme
[0] if the allocation of credit is determined by the Central 
Bank.
[1] if the credit allocation is eliminated or does not exist.
Ceiling on Reserve 
Requirement
[0] if the reserve requirement >20%.
[1] if the reserve requirement between 10% - 20%.
[2] if the reserve requirement <10%.
Subsidized sector
[0] if the commercial banks have to provide credits to a 
certain sector at subsidized rates.
[1] if the mandatory requirement of credit at subsidized 
rates is eliminated or does not exist.
Credit ceiling
[0] : Fully repressed if ceiling on credit expansion is 
imposed by the Central Bank
[1] : Fully liberalized if no restriction exists
Deposit
[0] if the government sets a ceiling.
[1] if the rate is fluctuating within a band.
[2] if the rate is freely floating.
Lending
[0] if the government sets a ceiling.
[1] if the rate is fluctuating within a band.
[2] if the rate is freely floating.
Foreign bank branch
[0] if there is tight restrictions on the entry of foreign 
banks.
[1] if foreign banks are allowed to do business in domestic 
financial system, but nonresidents equity shares should be 
>50%.
[2] if no restriction on the equity ownership of domestic 
banks by nonresidents; or there is an equal treatment for 
foreign banks and domestic banks; or unlimited number of 
branching for foreign banks.
Banned of new 
domestic banks
[0] if there is any restriction on new entry of domestic 
banks.
[1] if there is no restriction on new entry of domestic 
banks.
Branching restriction
[0] if there is any branching restriction.
[1] if no branching restriction.
Banking sector 
activities
[0] if the banking sector activity only in the banking 
activities.
[1] if banking sector is allowed to become universal banks.
Exc. Rate
[0] if a special exchange rate regime exists.
[1] if the exchange rate system is unified.
Restric. KI
[0] if there is significant restriction on capital inflows.
[1] if banks have access to foreign borrowing without any 
restriction.
Restric. KO
[0] if there is significant restriction on capital outflows.
[1] if there is no significant restriction on capital outflows.
Privatization
[3] : Fully liberalized, if no state banks exist.
[2] : Largely liberalized, if most banks are privately 
owned.
[1] : Partially repressed, if many banks are privately 
owned but major banks are state-owned.
[0] : Fully repressed, if major banks are all-state 
owned banks. 
Development measures
[0] if there is no securities market.
[1] if securities market is starting.
[2] if there are policies to develop securities market 
(primary dealer system, yield curve nechmarking, etc.)
[3] if there is any policy to develop derivative markets or 
to broaden the investors or completing the deregulation in 
stock exchange.
Foreign ownership
[0] if there is a restriction on foreign equity ownership 
[1] if foreign ownership is allowed, but it cannot exceed 
50%
[2] if there is no restriction on the majority share of foreign 
ownership
[3] if there is any policy to develop derivative markets or 
to broaden institutional investors
Capital Adequacy Ratio [0] if the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is not implemented.[1] if the Basle risk-weighted CAR is implemented.
CB independent
[0] if there is lack of legal framework for the 
independence of the Central Bank in supervising the 
banking sector
[1] if if the objective of the Central Bank in supervising the 
banking sector is clearly defined
Supervisory
[0] if the Central Bank does not have adequate legal 
framework in conducting an deffecctive supervision to the 
banking sector.
[1] if the legal framework of on/off-site examinations is 
available, but is insufficient.
[2] if the Central Bank performs an effective and 
sophisticated examinations.
supervisory coverage
[0] if some financial institutions are excluded from 
banking supervisory agency oversights.
[1] if all banks are supervised by the Central Bank without 
exception.
Banking sector supervision
[4] : Fully liberalized
[3] : Largely liberalized
[2] or [1] : Partially repressed
[0] : Fully repressed
[5] or [4] : Fully liberalized.
[3] : Largely liberalized.
[2] or [1] : Partially repressed.
[0] : Fully repressed.
[3] : Fully liberalized.
[2] : Largely liberalized.
[1] : Partially repressed.
[0] : Fully repressed.
[5] or [4] : Fully liberalized.
[3] : Largely liberalized.
[2] or [1] : Partially repressed.
[0] : Fully repressed.
[6] : Highly regulated.
[5] or [4] : Largely regulated.
[3] or [2] : Less regulated.
[1] or [0] : Not regulated.
Credit control
Interest rate Liberalization
[4] : if lending and deposit rates are determined at 
market rates.
[3] : if one of this rate is freely floating, but the other 
one is subject to band.
[2] or [1] : if one of these rates is determined by 
market rates, but the other one is under the 
government ceiling.
[0] : if both of these interest rates are set by the 
government.
Banking sector entry
Capital account transaction
Securities market
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 Appendix B 
I. The data description 
a. The currency volatility and financial liberalisation  
  
b. Economic growth and financial liberalisation 
  
II. Coefficient correlation of the variables of interests  
a. Currency volatility and financial liberalisation  
 
b. Economic growth and financial liberalisation 
 
Variable Observation Mean Stdev Max Min
excrate 100 0.074 0.082 0.294 0.004
gdp 100 1.213 1.710 5.647 -7.830
privcre 100 0.183 0.191 0.905 -0.784
idxreturn 100 0.037 0.165 0.681 -0.454
inflation 100 -0.103 0.122 0.006 -0.784
realintrate 100 12.76 9.508 69.52 5.789
fli 100 2.297 0.242 2.500 1.875
Variable Observation Mean Stdev Max Min
gdp 100 1.213 1.709 5.648 -7.839
credgdp 100 1.287 0.528 3.001 0.674
m2gdp 100 1.680 0.276 2.539 1.274
idxvol 100 6.097 4.160 16.0 2.425
fli 100 2.298 0.243 2.500 1.875
excrate gdp inflation privcre realintrate idxreturn fli
excrate 1
gdp -0.2742 1
inflation -0.4079 0.3860 1
credgdp -0.4432 -0.3222 -0.1621 1
realintrate 0.4282 -0.4339 -0.8688 0.2120 1
idxreturn 0.0000 -0.0638 -0.0290 -0.1915 -0.1820 1
fli 0.4120 -0.0207 0.1345 -0.2146 -0.2955 0.1020 1
gdp m2gdp credgdp idxvol fli
gdp 1.000
m2gdp -0.378 1.000
credgdp -0.245 0.291 1.000
idxvol -0.082 -0.249 0.614 1.000
fli -0.021 -0.891 -0.110 0.176 1.000
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III. Error correction of the ARDL model 
a. Currency volatility and financial liberalisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARDL Error Correction Regression
Dependent Variable: D(EXCRATE)
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 0, 3, 4, 0, 0)
Case 3: Unrestricted Constant and No Trend
Sample: 1991Q1 2015Q4
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 0, 3, 4, 0, 0)
Variable Coeff. t-Stat
C -0.003 -2.928
D(EXCRATE(-1)) 0.192 2.391
D(EXCRATE(-2)) 0.403 5.709
D(GDP) -0.001 -1.720
D(GDP(-1)) 0.007 7.219
D(GDP(-2)) 0.004 3.845
D(GDP(-3)) 0.002 2.886
D(PRIVCRE) -0.008 -0.657
D(PRIVCRE(-1)) 0.013 1.104
D(PRIVCRE(-2)) 0.022 1.869
D(REALINTRATE) 0.000 1.243
D(REALINTRATE(-1)) 0.000 -1.228
D(REALINTRATE(-2)) 0.000 -2.106
D(REALINTRATE(-3)) -0.001 -5.505
BREAK 0.027 6.610
CointEq(-1) -0.242 -7.723
R-squared 0.816
Adjusted R-squared 0.782
S.E. of regression 0.007
F-statistic 23.65
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Case 3: Unrestricted Constant and No Trend
ECM Regression
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b. Economic growth and financial liberalisation 
 
ARDL Error Correction Regression
Dependent Variable: D(GDP)
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 3, 0, 0)
Case 3: Unrestricted Constant and No Trend
Sample: 3/01/1991 12/01/2015
Included observations: 97
Variable Coeff. t-Stat Prob.   
C 23.516 8.542 0.000
D(CREDGDP) -4.963 -5.068 0.000
D(CREDGDP(-1)) 1.905 1.974 0.052
D(CREDGDP(-2)) -1.881 -1.930 0.057
CointEq(-1) -0.884 -8.555 0.000
R-squared 0.579 -0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.560 2.002
S.E. of regression 1.328 3.455
F-statistic 31.579 1.948
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00
ECM Regression
Case 3: Unrestricted Constant and No Trend
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Appendix C 
List of variables for the construction of early warning indicators 
Variables Data range Median Source 
 Normal 
period 
Crisis 
period 
M2 to reserves Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.009 -0.194 IFS and the Indonesian 
Central Bank 
Lending to deposits 
rate ratio 
Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
1.65 1.278 The Indonesian Central 
Bank 
Bank deposits Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.14 0.3 The Indonesian Central 
Bank 
Credit to GDP Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
-0.063 -0.058 IFS and the Indonesian 
Central Bank 
Real interest rate Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
7.58 18.2 IFS 
 
Interest rate 
differential 
Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
6.45 12.4 IFS 
 
Reserves Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.105 0.2 IFS 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.72 5.3 BIS 
Exports Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.103 0.03 IFS 
Imports Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.11 -0.05 IFS 
Stock index Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.004 
 
-0.023 CEIC  
Output Jan 1994–
Dec 2015 
0.037 -0.003 Index of Industrial 
Production from OECD 
statistics 
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Appendix D 
I. The list of variables for the construction of the composite index 
 
Market segments Variables Source 
1. Money market - The historical volatility of the interbank money market 
rate as a proxy for short-term interest volatility. The 
historical volatility is obtained from the annualized 
standard deviation of natural log interest rate. Daily 
data starts on 23 January 1993. 
- The spread between the policy rate and Federal 
Reserve’s rate. The data starts on 29 January 1993. 
- CMAX transformation of the interbank money market 
rate is used to capture the sharp movement of this 
variable. Daily data starts on 23 January 1993 
- CEIC  
- Bloomberg 
 
2. Bonds market - The historical volatility of the 10-year-government 
bond. Daily data starts from 22 July 2003. 
- The interest rate spread between Indonesian 10-year-
government bonds yields with the U.S. 10-year 
government bond. Daily data starts from 22 July 2003 
- The change of foreign ownership of the government 
bonds that is expected to capture the flight to quality. 
Data starts from fourth week of December 2002 
- CEIC  
- Bloomberg 
- Ministry of Finance 
3. Equity market - The volatility of stock market indices and historical 
volatility is used. The historical volatility is calculated 
from the standard deviation of the natural log of the 
stock index (annualized). Daily data starts from 1 
January 1996. 
- The idiosyncratic risk of the stock prices is calculated 
from the OLS residual of daily return (financial and 
non-financial sector) on the log market return. The 
daily data starts from January 1996. 
- CMAX transformation of the stock prices is used to 
capture the sharp movement of the daily stock index. 
Daily data starts on 1 January 1996 
- CEIC  
 
4. Foreign 
exchange 
market 
- The movement of the daily USD/IDR, JPY/IDR, 
RMB/IDR and EUR/IDR. The sharp depreciation is 
expected to put pressure on the economy. Daily data 
starts from 8 January 1988. 
- CEIC  
- Bank of Japan 
Statistics 
- Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
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II. The sub-indices summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables # observations Mean St.dev Min Max Stationary
Foreign exchange
USD/IDR 5216 0.125 0.181 0.003 1.730 Stationary
JPY/IDR 5216 0.172 0.171 0.442 1.682 Stationary
RMB/IDR 5216 0.126 0.181 0.005 1.731 Stationary
EUR/IDR 5216 0.155 0.175 0.003 1.730 Stationary
Money market
Interest rate volatility 5216 0.917 1.5 0 10.4 Stationary
CMAX 5216 0.672 0.23 0.02 1 Stationary
Interest differential 5216 6.40E-06 0.029 -0.53 0.71 Stationary
Stock market
Risk_non finance 5216 -3.77E-06 0.0139 -0.123 0.097 Stationary
Risk_finance 5216 0.21 0.1148 0.055 0.773 Stationary
Volatility 5216 -5.10E-06 0.012 -0.20 0.094 Stationary
CMAX 5216 0.875 0.1358 0.392 1 Stationary
Bond market
volatility 3239 0.151 0.133 0 1.39 Stationary
spread 3239 -3.00E-05 0.021 -0.128 0.264 Stationary
ownership 3239 0.0014 0.005 -0.0536 0.0572 Stationary
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III. The domestic and global chronological events 
 
No. Event Remarks/impact 
1. Q4 1997/ Q1 1998: Asian financial crisis Domestic currency depreciated, 
huge negative growth 
2. Q2 1998: Rusian crisis Recovery period from the crisis 
3. Q4 2001: Argentina Economic Crisis - 
4.  Q3 2002: Bali bombing Short-term volatility in the stock 
market 
5. Q1 2003: Iraq war - 
6. Q3 2004: The first presidential direct election Short-term volatility in financial 
market 
7. Q4 2004: Aceh tsunami Sudden drop in the stock index 
8. Q3 2005: Domestic mini crisis The decline of the stock market 
index and the government bond 
price 
9. Q2 2006: uncertainty towards Federal Reserve 
increasing interest rate policy  
Increase of the domestic interest 
rate 
10. Q4 2008: Collapse of Lehman Brothers In short-term, the stock market 
index was declined sharply. 
11. Q4 2009: European sovereign debt crisis the stock market index and the 
price of government bond were 
volatile 
12. Q3 2011: Global uncertainty  - 
13 Q1 2014: Uncertainty on the U.S. interest policy The IDR was depreciating against 
USD, the stock market index was 
volatile, and yield bond was 
increase 
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Appendix E 
I. The evidence of asset prices 
a. The summary statistics of variables of interests 
 
b. The unit root test 
 
 
c. The Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Observation Mean Stdev Max Min
idx 192 0.082 0.0206 0.153 0.021
regindex 192 0.005 0.060 0.17 -0.29
inflation 192 0.074 0.036 0.18 -0.01
growth 192 0.037 0.055 0.34 -0.13
dummy_holding 192 0.343 0.476 1 0
announce_holding 192 0.010 0.101 1 0
dummy_restrict 192 0.526 0.501 1 0
announce_restrict 192 0.010 0.101 1 0
Variables ADF test statistic
Critical 
value P>|t| Decision Stationarity
idx -2.869 -3.464 ** 0.011 Reject H0 Stationary
regional index -12.818 -3.464 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
growth -5.308 -3.464 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
inflation -3.354 -3.464 ** 0.014 Reject H0 Stationary
Coefficient Uncentered Centered
Variance VIF VIF
regindex 5.8E-04 1.03                 1.02           
inflation 2.1E-03 6.96                 1.35           
growth 7.7E-04 1.64                 1.12           
dummy_holding 2.1E-04 1.05                 1.04           
announce_holding 1.7E-05 2.75                 1.81           
dummy_restrict 2.0E-04 1.02                 1.01           
announce_restrict 1.3E-05 3.39                 1.61           
Variable
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II. The evidence of exchange rate volatility 
a. The summary statistics of variables of interests 
 
b. The unit roots test 
 
c. The Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
 
III. The foreign ownership of government bonds and minimum holding periods 
a. The summary statistics of variables of interests 
 
Variable Observation Mean Stdev Max Min
excrate 192 0.047 0.0336 0.151 0.008
intrate 192 -0.006 0.4965 2.060 -2.910
rating 192 0.001 0.02 0.106 -0.046
wti 192 0.059 6.270 15.96 -32.60
dummy_holding 192 0.349 0.476 1 0
dummy_restrict 192 0.526 0.501 1 0
announce_holding 192 0.005 0.072 1 0
announce_restrict 192 0.010 0.101 1 0
Variables ADF test statistic Critical value P>|t| Decision Stationarity
excrate -3.436 -3.464 ** 0.011 Reject H0 Stationary
intrate -6.942 -3.464 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
rating -16.917 -3.464 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
wti -10.752 -3.464 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
Coefficient Uncentered Centered
Variable Variance VIF VIF
intrate 1.95E-05 1.158 1.158
rating 5.93E-06 1.113 1.107
wti 1.11E-07 1.050 1.050
dummy_holding 2.68E-05 2.268 1.476
announce_holding 8.27E-04 1.043 1.038
dummy_restrict 2.47E-05 3.146 1.491
announce_restrict 4.06E-04 1.024 1.013
Variable Observation Mean Stdev Max Min
for_ownership 150 3.681 8.226 39.54 -29.29
yieldspread 150 -0.003 0.747 3.94 -3.01
rating 150 0.018 0.577 2.50 -2
embi 150 -0.463 39.4 241 -114
dummy_holding 150 0.447 0.499 1 0
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b. The unit root test 
 
 
c. The Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
 
 
 
Variables ADF test statistic P>|t| Decision Stationarity
for_ownership -10.719 -3.474 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
yieldspread -11.703 -3.474 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
rating -11.691 -3.474 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
embi -9.604 -3.474 *** 0.000 Reject H0 Stationary
Critical value
Coefficient Uncentered Centered
Variance VIF VIF
yieldspread 0.99 1.49 1.49
rating (t-1) 1.13 1.01 1.01
embi 0.00 1.50 1.50
dummy_holding 1.52 1.84 1.01
Variable
